Grant v. Prince George's County Dept. et al
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 7/17/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/17/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DECONTEE S. GRANT
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 15-2433
:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPT.,
et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights
Jonathan
case
is
Hill
the
motion
(“Detective
to
Hill”)
dismiss
and
filed
Prince
(“the County”) collectively, (“Defendants”).
by
Defendants
George’s
County
(ECF No. 47).
The
issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following
reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that while unconscious during a
medical procedure on or about February 18 or 19, 2012, she was
sexually
assaulted
by
(“Doctor’s Hospital”).
the
staff
at
Doctor’s
(ECF No. 16, at 10).
Hospital
Inc.
In September 2012,
Plaintiff reported the alleged sexual assault to Detective Hill
in the Prince George’s Police Department, who contacted Doctor’s
Hospital.
The hospital informed Detective Hill that Plaintiff
was “knocked out” for a pelvic exam and had awoken before the
doctors could start the second part of the exam.
(Id. 3).
Detective Hill declined to conduct an investigation.
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Detective Hill.
id.
at
5).
In
November
2012,
Sergeant
Plaintiff in response to her grievance.
T.
Nalley
(See
contacted
Plaintiff alleges that
Sergeant Nalley asked “where are you from?” when asking for her
personal information and said that he would look at her medical
record and make a decision.
(Id.).
He subsequently closed her
grievance.
In
December
2012,
Plaintiff
met
with
Lieutenant
Webster
regarding her complaint against Doctor’s Hospital.
Plaintiff
informed
pages
Lieutenant
Webster
that
“several
crucial
of
information for the time interval of the sexual assault” were
missing
from
Lieutenant
the
copy
Plaintiff’s
possession.
patient
(Id.).
record
in
Plaintiff
gave
Lieutenant Webster an updated copy of her medical record.
(Id.
at 6).
Webster’s
of
Upon Lieutenant Webster’s inquiry, Plaintiff disclosed
that she had spoken with a lawyer but was unable to pay for
legal services.
Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant Webster and
another
“exchanged
officer
glances”
and
refused to investigate the sexual assault.
2
Lieutenant
(Id.).
Webster
In July 2014, Sergeant B. Selway informed Plaintiff that he
was
investigating
her
grievance
against
Detective
Hill.
Plaintiff gave Sergeant Selway a copy of her medical files.
Plaintiff alleges that at a later meeting, Sergeant Selway’s
“face became angry when Plaintiff [spoke] about her meeting with
[Lieutenant] Webster.”
(ECF No. 16, at 7).
Plaintiff alleges
that the County’s personnel interfered with her grievances and
investigation
since
then.
Plaintiff
received
a
letter
from
Captain Rodriguez stating that her grievance against Detective
Hill
was
closed.
In
November
2014,
Sergeant
Dillingham
contacted Plaintiff regarding a letter Plaintiff had sent to a
United States Senator’s office.
He informed Plaintiff that her
complaint for sexual assault would not be investigated because
it had already been closed by Lieutenant Webster.
Plaintiff,
the
intimidating
County
Plaintiff
.
was
.
.
“tracking,
in
order
to
According to
monitoring,
keep
the
sex[ual]
assault case and subsequent cover-up from being exposed.”
at 9).
“an
and
(Id.
Plaintiff asserts that she was re-victimized, treated as
inferior
class
person,”
and
“suffers
from
[a]nxiety,
sleeplessness, violation of her privacy, and violation of trust
in the public institution whose mission [it] is to enforce the
laws equally.”
(Id.).
3
B.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff,
Detective
proceeding
Hill,
(“PGPD”),
Prince
Doctor’s
pro
se,
filed
George’s
Hospital,
Tyrone on August 17, 2015.
a
County
Tisha
S.
complaint
Police
Hillman,
against
Department
and
Erik
R.
(ECF No. 1).
The operative amended complaint was filed on September 30,
2015,
and
asserted
violations
of:
18
U.S.C.
§ 242
against
Detective Hill and PGPD (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Ms.
Hillman
against
and
Tyrone
Detective
§ 1985(2)–(3)
§ 1986
Mr.
Hill
against
against
(Count
PGPD
and
all
II);
PGPD
the
(Count
Defendants
(Count
V);
Fourteenth
III);
(Count
42
U.S.C.
Amendment
42
42
IV);
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
§ 1983
against
Detective Hill and PGPD (Count VI); and 18 U.S.C. § 241 against
Doctor’s
Hospital,
(ECF No. 16).
Ms.
Hillman,
and
Mr.
Tyrone
(Count
VII).
Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
Detective Hill moved to dismiss for insufficient service of
process (ECF No. 13), and PGPD moved to dismiss on the ground
that it is not a legal entity that can be sued (ECF No. 25).
The other Defendants also filed motions to dismiss.
19; 30; 32).
(ECF Nos.
Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice
after each motion was filed.
See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d
309, 310 (4th Cir. 1971); (ECF Nos. 20; 27; 31; 34).
On June 29,
2016, the motions to dismiss filed by Doctor’s Hospital, Ms.
Hillman,
and
Mr.
Tyrone
were
granted.
4
(ECF
Nos.
41;
42).
PGPD’s motion to dismiss was denied, and the court construed
Plaintiff’s claims as being against the County.
15-16).
(ECF No. 41, at
Detective Hill’s motion to dismiss was construed as a
motion to quash service and was granted.
(ECF Nos. 41; 42).
On October 12, 2016, Detective Hill and the County filed
the instant motion to dismiss (ECF No. 47), and the Clerk sent a
Roseboro notice to Plaintiff (ECF No. 48).1
response in opposition to the motion.
Plaintiff filed a
(ECF No. 49).
Defendants
move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that Plaintiff
lacks standing or, in the alternative, has failed to state a
claim.
II.
Standing
The issue of standing may be challenged on a motion to
dismiss
for
Fed.R.Civ.P.
lack
of
12(b)(1).
subject
The
matter
plaintiff
jurisdiction
bears
the
under
burden
of
proving that subject matter jurisdiction properly exists.
Evans
v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
In a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court “may consider evidence outside
the pleadings” to help determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the case before it.
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
1
After filing her response, Plaintiff filed a statement
notifying the court that she did not receive a copy of the
Roseboro notice but was later able to access a copy of the
notice online, and requested that her response be considered
timely. (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff filed a timely response to the
motion to dismiss and it appears that she received sufficient
notice of the motion.
5
R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see
also Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
The court should grant the Rule
12(b)(1) motion “only if the material jurisdictional facts are
not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.”
Any
Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768.
plaintiff
seeking
to
invoke
the
federal court must establish standing.
Wright,
468
U.S.
737,
750—51
jurisdiction
of
a
See, e.g., Allen v.
(1984);
S.
Walk
at
Broadlands
Homeowner’s Ass’n Inc. v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d
175, 85 (4th Cir. 2013).
The doctrine of standing consists of
two
constitutional
distinct
“strands”:
Article III and prudential standing.
standing
pursuant
to
See Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
The requirements for
constitutional standing reflect that Article III “confines the
federal
courts
to
‘controversies.’”
adjudicating
actual
‘cases’
and
Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1993) (“[S]tanding is
an
essential
and
unchanging
part
requirement of Article III[.]”).
of
the
case-or-controversy
“[Plaintiff] must, in other
words, show that the facts alleged present the court with a
‘case or controvesy’ in the constitutional sense and that she is
a proper plaintiff to raise the issues sought to be litigated.”
Linda
R.S.
v.
Richard
D.,
410
6
U.S.
614,
616
(1973).
To
establish
Article
III
standing,
a
plaintiff
must
demonstrate
that:
(1) [she] has suffered an “injury in fact”
that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.
Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).
Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims against Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.2
She claims that
Defendants “are sworn to protect all citizens, enforce state
laws and county ordinances” (ECF No. 49, at 7), and that their
failure to investigate her sexual assault, enforce the Maryland
law criminalizing sexual offenses in the third degree, Md. Code,
Crim. Law § 3-307, and aid in the criminal or civil prosecution
2
Plaintiff also alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242,
which are criminal statutes, in her amended complaint, and
references these claims in her opposition. (See ECF No. 49, at
2, 4). As previously held, it is beyond the court’s purview in
this civil matter to provide relief under criminal statutes.
(ECF No. 41, at 12-13); cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally
rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
Plaintiff has also
raised in her opposition additional complaints of sexual assault
and harassment (see ECF No. 49, at 11-14), but she cannot amend
her complaint by asserting new facts in an opposition to a
motion to dismiss.
7
of
her
assailants
violated
generally id. at 2-12).
not
have
standing
to
her
constitutional
rights
(see
Defendants argue that Plaintiff does
bring
claims
for
the
police
officers’
refusal to investigate her sexual assault complaint.
(ECF No.
45, at 5).
There is no “constitutional, statutory, or common law right
that
a
private
investigate
or
citizen
prosecute
has
a
to
require
crime.
a
These
public
are
official
to
discretionary
public duties that are enforced by public opinion, policy, and
the ballot.”
Doe v. Mayor of Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. 1137,
1139 (D.Md. 1990); accord Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227
(4th Cir. 1988) (noting plaintiff’s argument that he “had an
enforceable right as a member of the public at large and as a
victim to have the defendants criminally prosecuted” which was
“protected by the equal protection clause of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment,”
but
that
“[t]here
is,
of
course,
no
such
constitutional right”); see also Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619
(citing cases holding that “a citizen lacks standing to contest
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is
neither
prosecuted
nor
threatened
with
prosecution”
and
concluding that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”).
The
duty to investigate or prosecute a crime with which a public
official is charged is not owed to any individual member of the
8
public.
Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. at 1139-40.
Detective Hill
and the County did not owe Plaintiff a duty to investigate her
complaint
to
her
satisfaction,
enforce
the
Maryland
criminal
code by conducting a prosecution in her case, or assist her in
her civil suit against Doctor’s Hospital, and Plaintiff does not
have a right to compel them to act.
Plaintiff has not shown that she has standing to bring this
action because she has “failed to allege a sufficient nexus
between her injury and the government action which she attacks
to justify judicial intervention.”
18.
Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617-
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, she sustained a
legally cognizable injury as a result of her sexual assault, but
that injury is not fairly traceable to the police department’s
refusal to investigate.
seeking
enforcement
of
See id. at 618 (finding, in action
child
support
criminal
statute,
that
plaintiff “no doubt suffered an injury stemming from the failure
of
her
father
standing
lacked
child’s
to
because
contribute
support
injury
not
her
did
payments,”
result
from
but
the
nonenforcement of the statute); Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. at
1139-40 (holding in § 1983 case that sexual assault victims “all
sustained legally cognizable injuries as a result of the sexual
attacks
those
directed
injuries
inadequate
against
were
“not
investigations
them,”
but
‘fairly
by
the
9
lacked
traceable’
standing
to
defendants”).
the
because
alleged
Moreover,
standing
requires
that
the
relief
requested
be
capable
of
redressing the specific injury for which it is sought.
Allen,
468
redressed
conducted.
U.S.
even
at
if
751.
a
more
Plaintiff’s
thorough
injury
would
investigation
See
not
had
be
been
Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. at 1140; see also Linda
R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to
bring her claims against Defendants and the motion to dismiss
will be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants will be granted.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?