Grant v. Prince George's County Dept. et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 7/17/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/17/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DECONTEE S. GRANT
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-2433

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPT.,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights
Jonathan

case

is

Hill

the

motion

(“Detective

to

Hill”)

dismiss
and

filed

Prince

(“the County”) collectively, (“Defendants”).

by

Defendants

George’s

County

(ECF No. 47).

The

issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following

reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that while unconscious during a

medical procedure on or about February 18 or 19, 2012, she was
sexually

assaulted

by

(“Doctor’s Hospital”).

the

staff

at

Doctor’s

(ECF No. 16, at 10).

Hospital

Inc.

In September 2012,

Plaintiff reported the alleged sexual assault to Detective Hill
in the Prince George’s Police Department, who contacted Doctor’s

Hospital.

The hospital informed Detective Hill that Plaintiff

was “knocked out” for a pelvic exam and had awoken before the
doctors could start the second part of the exam.

(Id. 3).

Detective Hill declined to conduct an investigation.
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Detective Hill.
id.

at

5).

In

November

2012,

Sergeant

Plaintiff in response to her grievance.

T.

Nalley

(See

contacted

Plaintiff alleges that

Sergeant Nalley asked “where are you from?” when asking for her
personal information and said that he would look at her medical
record and make a decision.

(Id.).

He subsequently closed her

grievance.
In

December

2012,

Plaintiff

met

with

Lieutenant

Webster

regarding her complaint against Doctor’s Hospital.

Plaintiff

informed

pages

Lieutenant

Webster

that

“several

crucial

of

information for the time interval of the sexual assault” were
missing

from

Lieutenant

the

copy

Plaintiff’s

possession.

patient

(Id.).

record

in

Plaintiff

gave

Lieutenant Webster an updated copy of her medical record.

(Id.

at 6).

Webster’s

of

Upon Lieutenant Webster’s inquiry, Plaintiff disclosed

that she had spoken with a lawyer but was unable to pay for
legal services.

Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant Webster and

another

“exchanged

officer

glances”

and

refused to investigate the sexual assault.

2

Lieutenant
(Id.).

Webster

In July 2014, Sergeant B. Selway informed Plaintiff that he
was

investigating

her

grievance

against

Detective

Hill.

Plaintiff gave Sergeant Selway a copy of her medical files.
Plaintiff alleges that at a later meeting, Sergeant Selway’s
“face became angry when Plaintiff [spoke] about her meeting with
[Lieutenant] Webster.”

(ECF No. 16, at 7).

Plaintiff alleges

that the County’s personnel interfered with her grievances and
investigation

since

then.

Plaintiff

received

a

letter

from

Captain Rodriguez stating that her grievance against Detective
Hill

was

closed.

In

November

2014,

Sergeant

Dillingham

contacted Plaintiff regarding a letter Plaintiff had sent to a
United States Senator’s office.

He informed Plaintiff that her

complaint for sexual assault would not be investigated because
it had already been closed by Lieutenant Webster.
Plaintiff,

the

intimidating

County

Plaintiff

.

was
.

.

“tracking,
in

order

to

According to

monitoring,
keep

the

sex[ual]

assault case and subsequent cover-up from being exposed.”
at 9).
“an

and

(Id.

Plaintiff asserts that she was re-victimized, treated as

inferior

class

person,”

and

“suffers

from

[a]nxiety,

sleeplessness, violation of her privacy, and violation of trust
in the public institution whose mission [it] is to enforce the
laws equally.”

(Id.).

3

B.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff,
Detective

proceeding

Hill,

(“PGPD”),

Prince

Doctor’s

pro

se,

filed

George’s

Hospital,

Tyrone on August 17, 2015.

a

County

Tisha

S.

complaint
Police

Hillman,

against

Department

and

Erik

R.

(ECF No. 1).

The operative amended complaint was filed on September 30,
2015,

and

asserted

violations

of:

18

U.S.C.

§ 242

against

Detective Hill and PGPD (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Ms.
Hillman
against

and

Tyrone

Detective

§ 1985(2)–(3)
§ 1986

Mr.

Hill

against

against

(Count

PGPD

and

all

II);
PGPD

the

(Count

Defendants

(Count

V);

Fourteenth
III);

(Count

42

U.S.C.

Amendment
42
42

IV);

U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 1983

against

Detective Hill and PGPD (Count VI); and 18 U.S.C. § 241 against
Doctor’s

Hospital,

(ECF No. 16).

Ms.

Hillman,

and

Mr.

Tyrone

(Count

VII).

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

Detective Hill moved to dismiss for insufficient service of
process (ECF No. 13), and PGPD moved to dismiss on the ground
that it is not a legal entity that can be sued (ECF No. 25).
The other Defendants also filed motions to dismiss.
19; 30; 32).

(ECF Nos.

Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice

after each motion was filed.

See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d

309, 310 (4th Cir. 1971); (ECF Nos. 20; 27; 31; 34).

On June 29,

2016, the motions to dismiss filed by Doctor’s Hospital, Ms.
Hillman,

and

Mr.

Tyrone

were

granted.
4

(ECF

Nos.

41;

42).

PGPD’s motion to dismiss was denied, and the court construed
Plaintiff’s claims as being against the County.
15-16).

(ECF No. 41, at

Detective Hill’s motion to dismiss was construed as a

motion to quash service and was granted.

(ECF Nos. 41; 42).

On October 12, 2016, Detective Hill and the County filed
the instant motion to dismiss (ECF No. 47), and the Clerk sent a
Roseboro notice to Plaintiff (ECF No. 48).1
response in opposition to the motion.

Plaintiff filed a

(ECF No. 49).

Defendants

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that Plaintiff
lacks standing or, in the alternative, has failed to state a
claim.
II.

Standing
The issue of standing may be challenged on a motion to

dismiss

for

Fed.R.Civ.P.

lack

of

12(b)(1).

subject
The

matter

plaintiff

jurisdiction
bears

the

under

burden

of

proving that subject matter jurisdiction properly exists.

Evans

v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).

In a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court “may consider evidence outside
the pleadings” to help determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the case before it.

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac

1

After filing her response, Plaintiff filed a statement
notifying the court that she did not receive a copy of the
Roseboro notice but was later able to access a copy of the
notice online, and requested that her response be considered
timely. (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff filed a timely response to the
motion to dismiss and it appears that she received sufficient
notice of the motion.
5

R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see
also Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.

The court should grant the Rule

12(b)(1) motion “only if the material jurisdictional facts are
not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.”
Any

Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768.

plaintiff

seeking

to

invoke

the

federal court must establish standing.
Wright,

468

U.S.

737,

750—51

jurisdiction

of

a

See, e.g., Allen v.

(1984);

S.

Walk

at

Broadlands

Homeowner’s Ass’n Inc. v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d
175, 85 (4th Cir. 2013).

The doctrine of standing consists of

two

constitutional

distinct

“strands”:

Article III and prudential standing.

standing

pursuant

to

See Elk Grove Unified Sch.

Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).

The requirements for

constitutional standing reflect that Article III “confines the
federal

courts

to

‘controversies.’”

adjudicating

actual

‘cases’

and

Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; see also Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1993) (“[S]tanding is
an

essential

and

unchanging

part

requirement of Article III[.]”).

of

the

case-or-controversy

“[Plaintiff] must, in other

words, show that the facts alleged present the court with a
‘case or controvesy’ in the constitutional sense and that she is
a proper plaintiff to raise the issues sought to be litigated.”
Linda

R.S.

v.

Richard

D.,

410

6

U.S.

614,

616

(1973).

To

establish

Article

III

standing,

a

plaintiff

must

demonstrate

that:
(1) [she] has suffered an “injury in fact”
that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.
Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).
Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims against Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.2

She claims that

Defendants “are sworn to protect all citizens, enforce state
laws and county ordinances” (ECF No. 49, at 7), and that their
failure to investigate her sexual assault, enforce the Maryland
law criminalizing sexual offenses in the third degree, Md. Code,
Crim. Law § 3-307, and aid in the criminal or civil prosecution

2

Plaintiff also alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242,
which are criminal statutes, in her amended complaint, and
references these claims in her opposition. (See ECF No. 49, at
2, 4). As previously held, it is beyond the court’s purview in
this civil matter to provide relief under criminal statutes.
(ECF No. 41, at 12-13); cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally
rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
Plaintiff has also
raised in her opposition additional complaints of sexual assault
and harassment (see ECF No. 49, at 11-14), but she cannot amend
her complaint by asserting new facts in an opposition to a
motion to dismiss.
7

of

her

assailants

violated

generally id. at 2-12).
not

have

standing

to

her

constitutional

rights

(see

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does

bring

claims

for

the

police

officers’

refusal to investigate her sexual assault complaint.

(ECF No.

45, at 5).
There is no “constitutional, statutory, or common law right
that

a

private

investigate

or

citizen
prosecute

has
a

to

require

crime.

a

These

public
are

official

to

discretionary

public duties that are enforced by public opinion, policy, and
the ballot.”

Doe v. Mayor of Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. 1137,

1139 (D.Md. 1990); accord Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227
(4th Cir. 1988) (noting plaintiff’s argument that he “had an
enforceable right as a member of the public at large and as a
victim to have the defendants criminally prosecuted” which was
“protected by the equal protection clause of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment,”

but

that

“[t]here

is,

of

course,

no

such

constitutional right”); see also Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619
(citing cases holding that “a citizen lacks standing to contest
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is
neither

prosecuted

nor

threatened

with

prosecution”

and

concluding that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”).

The

duty to investigate or prosecute a crime with which a public
official is charged is not owed to any individual member of the
8

public.

Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. at 1139-40.

Detective Hill

and the County did not owe Plaintiff a duty to investigate her
complaint

to

her

satisfaction,

enforce

the

Maryland

criminal

code by conducting a prosecution in her case, or assist her in
her civil suit against Doctor’s Hospital, and Plaintiff does not
have a right to compel them to act.
Plaintiff has not shown that she has standing to bring this
action because she has “failed to allege a sufficient nexus
between her injury and the government action which she attacks
to justify judicial intervention.”
18.

Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617-

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, she sustained a

legally cognizable injury as a result of her sexual assault, but
that injury is not fairly traceable to the police department’s
refusal to investigate.
seeking

enforcement

of

See id. at 618 (finding, in action
child

support

criminal

statute,

that

plaintiff “no doubt suffered an injury stemming from the failure
of

her

father

standing

lacked

child’s

to

because

contribute

support

injury

not

her

did

payments,”
result

from

but
the

nonenforcement of the statute); Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. at
1139-40 (holding in § 1983 case that sexual assault victims “all
sustained legally cognizable injuries as a result of the sexual
attacks
those

directed

injuries

inadequate

against

were

“not

investigations

them,”

but

‘fairly
by

the
9

lacked

traceable’

standing
to

defendants”).

the

because
alleged

Moreover,

standing

requires

that

the

relief

requested

be

capable

of

redressing the specific injury for which it is sought.
Allen,

468

redressed
conducted.

U.S.
even

at
if

751.
a

more

Plaintiff’s
thorough

injury

would

investigation

See

not

had

be

been

Pocomoke City, 745 F.Supp. at 1140; see also Linda

R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.

Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to

bring her claims against Defendants and the motion to dismiss
will be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

10