ENow v. Judge Steven G. Salant

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/6/2015. (c/m 10/07/2015 bus, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
NDOKEY ENOW, # 435845

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Plaintiff,
v
JUDGE STEVEN G. SALANT
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
On September

2, 2015, self-represented

Civil Action No. PWG-15-2602

OPINION
plaintiff Ndokey Enow ("Enow")

filed a

Complaint and a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2) Enow will be granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose of preliminary review of the Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Enow is suing the Honorable Judge Steven G. Salant, pursuant to 42 U.S.c. ~ 1983 for
allegedly violating his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and the Maryland Tort Claims Act. Judge Salant is an Associate Judge on the
Circuit Court of Maryland for Montgomery County.
Enow states that on January 9, 2015, he entered a guilty plea before Judge Salant to
solicitation to commit first-degree murder.
voluntary.

Enow claims his plea was neither knowing nor

Further, Enow faults Judge Salant inter alia for "maliciously" sentencing him on

February 27, 2015, to a term of forty years of incarceration, sentencing him above the guideline
range, denying him due process, and failing to recognize attendant mitigating circumstances.
CompI. As relief, Enow requests $250,000 million damages for "negligence." ld.

DISCUSSION

This Complaint seeks to hold a state court judge liable for decisions arising out of the
performance of his judicial duties. It is well-settled law that judges are entitled to immunity to
suit in the performance of their judicial functions. See Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991).
"The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his
or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for
damages." !d. (citations omitted).

Therefore, "[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for

his [or her] judicial acts even if his [or her] exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of
grave procedural errors." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Further, judicial
immunity is a shield from suit, not just from assessment of damages. Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11.
Judicial immunity can be overcome in two circumstances. First, a judge is not immune
from liability for his or her non-judicial acts. Stump, 435 U.S. at 360. Second, a judge is not
immune for actions that, though judicial in nature, were taken in complete absence of all
jurisdiction. Id. at 356-57.
the act in contention

In determining whether an act is judicial, a court examines whether

is a function normally performed

by a judge. Id. at 362. Neither

circumstance applies here.
Enow does not dispute Judge Salant's decisions were rendered in the performance of his
judicial duties nor does he question the exercise of jurisdiction. Instead, his claims are premised
on his disappointment with the sentence imposed.
doctrine

of absolute judicial

immunity

Dismissal of this case is compelled by the

as well as under federal statute at 28 U.S.C.

~ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (directing courts to dismiss cases of litigants proceeding in forma pauperis
against a defendant who is immune from relief).
Although captioned as a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983, this action essentially is an
attempt to appeal a state conviction in federal court.

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As such, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine

warrants abstention in this case. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). The RookerFeldman doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that prohibits a federal district court from hearing "cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
In other words, the doctrine precludes claims that seek redress for an injury caused by a statecourt decision, because such a claim essentially asks "'the federal district court to conduct an
appellate review of the state-court decision. '" Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir.
2006) (quoting Davani v. Va. Dep't ofTransp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006)).1
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, this case will be dis

with prejudice.

A separate

Order follows.

Jili>lt
ate

Pau W. Grimm
United States District Judge

I
Enow may challenge his state conviction by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.c. S 2254. He first must exhaust his claims before the state courts before filing a S 2254 petition for
federal habeas relief. Enow will be sent a forms and instructions packet for filing a S 2254 petition.

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