Sewell v. Fidelity National Financial

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Denying 11 Motion for Reconsideration and for Default Judgment; Denying 13 Motion for a Ruling and Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/24/2016. (c/m 2/24/2016 nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
STARSHA SEWELL,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL in care
of Chicago Title Insurance Company,
Milestone Title, LLC
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

*

MILESTONE TITLE, LLC,
Defendants.

Civil Action Nos. PWG-15-3077
PWG-15-3392

*

*

*
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Starsha Sewell lost her property in a foreclosure action and subsequently filed
Civil Action No. PWG-15-3077, along with a related action against the same defendants, Civil
Action No. PWG-15-3392, apparently believing that the loss resulted from racially
discriminatory intent not to enforce her title insurance policy. In PWG-15-3077, she purports to
remove a case she initiated before the Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”), which was
heard before the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings. In PWG-15-3392, Sewell brought
a breach of contract claim and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim relating to Defendant Fidelity National
Financial’s (“Fidelity”) denial of her claim under a title insurance policy that Sewell alleges was
due to her race (African American) and gender (female). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma
pauperis, such that I was obligated to review the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims before the
Court served Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). I dismissed PWG-15-3077 as improperly
removed, and I dismissed PWG-15-3392 on various grounds, including that Plaintiff could not
state a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim based on her property loss.

Sewell filed motions for

reconsideration of both dismissals, and I denied both motions. Now she again has filed motions

for reconsideration in both cases. Because she has not shown grounds for reconsideration, I will
deny these motions. Having once again denied Sewell’s motions for reconsideration, she is
advised of her right to file an appeal with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals if dissatisfied with
this memorandum and order.
I.

PWG-15-3077
Procedural History
On October 9, 2015, Sewell filed a “Notice of Removal & Complaint of Breach of

Contract 42 USC 1981 on the Basis of Race and Gender,” in which she stated that she
“remove[d] this action from the State’s Office of Administrative hearings” (“OAH”) pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1443. Pl.’s Notice of Removal & Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. She provided an OAH case
number, as well as a MIA case number. Id. at 1. She asserts that she filed a “complaint of
Identity theft . . . with Jeff Kelberg, Identity Theft Attorney General of Maryland.” Id. at 5. She
attached various documents, but most significant is what she did not attach: the complaint she
filed with the MIA, or a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders relating to the state action.
See ECF No. 1-2.
On October 23, 2015, I dismissed Sewell’s “Notice of Removal” on two bases. ECF No.
4. First, Sewell claimed that she initiated the state proceedings, but the statutes providing for
removal of state actions to federal court only allow “the defendant,” not the plaintiff, to remove
the action. See Oct. 23, 2015 Order, ECF No. 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (providing that “[a]
defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the
district court of the United States . . . a notice of removal . . . , together with a copy of all
process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action”
(emphasis added)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (providing that “the defendant” may remove
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certain “civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court” that implicate the
defendant’s civil rights (emphasis added)). Second, § 1446(a) outlines a required procedure for
removal, which Sewell did not follow, as she failed to file the documents from the state court
proceedings in this Court. See Oct. 23, 2015 Order (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (providing that
removing defendant shall file in federal court “. a notice of removal . . . , together with a copy of
all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action”
(emphasis added))).
Sewell then filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment, insisting that “this action is a Civil
Rights action that was removed under statute 28 U.S.C. 1443, and the exception under this action
permits removals whenever civil rights are denied and cannot be enforced in state courts due to
racial discrimination disparities and in matters involving fraud.” Mot. for Relief 1, ECF No. 5.
She contended that she “remove[d] this action from the State Administrative Law Agency,” but
it was “impossible for the Plaintiff to file the administrative record; as she does not have
government files in her possession.” Id. at 1–2. I denied her motion on January 5, 2016, noting
the grounds for dismissal and the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration, and
reasoning that Sewell did “not provide any additional information that resuscitates the claim
asserted” or “evidence that this Court’s analysis was improper or legally deficient.” Jan. 5, 2016
Order 2, ECF No. 11.
Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 12)
Sewell once again requests reconsideration of the dismissal of her case, this time in a
Motion for Reconsideration that asks the Court to reconsider its denial of her Motion for Relief
from Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) and to reconsider “all Judgments in this action” pursuant
to Rule 60(b) (1), (2), and (6). ECF No. 12. Defendants oppose the pending motion “for the

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reasons given in Fidelity’s Brief Opposing Plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion,” ECF No. 13. Although
Sewell’s motion comes less than twenty-eight days after the order denying her Motion for Relief
from Judgment, it is more than twenty-eight days after the dismissal order, and therefore I will
address it pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be
made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the
entry of the judgment or order . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”); MLC Auto., LLC
v. Town of So. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that whether to address
motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) depends on timing of motion). Rule 60(b)
provides:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); [or]
...
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Plaintiff persists in her argument that it was error to dismiss this case on the basis that
“Plaintiff filed a []Notice of Removal, that was unaccompanied by a complaint,” because
“Plaintiff’s Notice of Removal was accompanied with her complaint.” Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. 1.
She voices her concern that “the Court did not read the Plaintiff’s complaint prior to dismissing
it,” because “[t]he Judge . . . assert[ed] that the Plaintiff did not file it.” Id. at 1, 2.
It is true that Sewell filed a “Notice of Removal & Complaint of Breach of Contract 42
USC 1981 on the Basis of Race and Gender.” Notice of Removal & Compl. 1 (emphasis added).
What Sewell did not file, even though she labeled her pleading as a “Notice of Removal” and

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referred to the administrative proceedings, were the administrative complaint and any other
administrative filing that she served on the defendants in the administrative proceeding from
which she removed the case to this Court.

As explained twice before, in both the order

dismissing this case and the order denying her Motion for Relief from Judgment, the removed
case cannot proceed in this Court without those administrative filings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
And, as also explained repeatedly, even if Sewell filed the administrative pleadings, she, as the
plaintiff in the administrative proceeding, could not remove the case to this Court because only
defendants can remove state court proceedings to federal court.1 Thus, to the extent that Sewell

1

Indeed, it is not clear that an administrative proceeding before the MIA or OAH qualifies
as a “state court” action for removal purposes under § 1443, which provides for removal of
actions “commenced in a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
held, albeit in the context of removal by criminal defendant:
It is not enough to support removal under § 1443(1) to allege or show that the
defendant’s federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by
state administrative officials in advance of trial . . . . Under § 1443(1), the
vindication of the defendant’s federal rights is left to the state courts except in the
rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a
pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be
denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.
City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1966) (emphasis added). And,
considering removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which similar to § 1443 provides for removal of
“any civil action brought in a State court,” this Court held that neither the MIA nor the OAH was
“a ‘court’ under § 1441(a)” for purposes of removal. Gottlieb v. Lincoln National Life Insurance
Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579–82 (D. Md. 2005). Similarly, in Rockville Harley–Davidson v.
Harley–Davison Motor Co., this Court held that the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration
was not a state court from which proceedings could be removed under § 1441(a). 217 F. Supp.
2d 673, 676–80 (D. Md. 2002). In Maryland Commissioner of Financial Regulation v. Western
Sky Financial, LLC, this Court concluded that an administrative proceeding brought before the
Maryland Office of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation, an executive agency, could not
be removed to this Court under § 1441(a), because the state agency “does not function as a
court,” such that “this case was not ‘brought in a state court’ and must be remanded.” No. WDQ11-0735, 2011 WL 4894075, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2011) (quoting § 1441(a)). But cf. Wilson v.
Gottlieb, 821 F. Supp. 2d 778, 791 (D. Md. 2011) (“[A]lthough the [Maryland Health Claims
Alternative Dispute Resolution Office] is obviously not a court, it has the minimum of court-like
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sought to remove to this Court an action she initiated before the MIA without filing the
administrative complaint, it was not error to dismiss this action, and Sewell has not demonstrated
otherwise. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
To the extent Sewell appears to argue that she has filed suit against Defendant in this
Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, for racial discrimination in the enforcement of a contract, I note
that she did so in PWG-15-3392. Indeed, she appears to conflate the two cases. See Pl.’s Mot.
for Recons. 2 (quoting discussion of title insurance policies from dismissal order in PWG-153392); id. at 3 (stating that case was dismissed as “Frivolous,” which was the case in PWG-153392); id. at 4 (discussing the Court’s “failure to serve process of the complaint on the
Defendant,” which was the case in PWG-15-3392, in which I dismissed the case prior to service;
referring to “a similar action see[] PWG-15-3077,” as if this filing were in PWG-15-3392; and
stating that “Judge Grimm erred in this action, perhaps he will grant the proper relief for the
same under PWG-15-3077”); id. at 5 (referring to the statute of limitations, which was a basis for
dismissal in PWG-15-3392 but not this case). Were Sewell to argue that PWG-15-3077 is not a
removal action, despite the title of her pleading and explanations in her filings, and instead
presents the same claims as PWG-15-3392, it would be subject to dismissal for the same reasons
stated with regard to PWG-15-3392.
Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 12)
Plaintiff’s motion also incorporates a “Motion for Default Judgment for Opposing
Counsel’s failure to Respond timely, on the Plaintiff’s Good faith belief that it failed to do so
because of the Defendant’s First Hand Knowledge That It Breached Contract.” Pl.’s Mot. for

functions that suffice to render an agency a ‘State court’ for purposes of the federal officer
removal statute [28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)]. . . .”).
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Recons. 1. The Court has discretion to enter a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)
when the “adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” SEC
v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005). Here, the adversary process already
concluded, when I dismissed this case on October 23, 2015. And, in any event, Defendants have
not been unresponsive, even if their filings have been late. See ECF Nos. 7 (Opposition to
Motion for Relief from Judgment) & 13 (Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration). Therefore,
Sewell’s default judgment motion is denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Lawbaugh, 359 F.
Supp. 2d at 421.2
Motion for a ruling and motion to strike (ECF No. 14)
On February 8, 2016, Sewell filed another motion seeking a ruling on her January 8,
2016, motion for reconsideration and asking me to strike Defendants’ opposition, ECF No. 13.
See Pl.’s Mot. for Ruling, ECF No. 14. Sewell repeats many of her arguments made in her prior
motions. Id. at 1. She also alleges for the first time that Defendants are running a Ponzi scheme.
See id. at 4. Because I have now ruled on Sewell’s January 8, 2016, motion, I will deny her

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Plaintiff also includes various allegations of judicial misconduct, see Pl.’s Mot. for
Recons. 2–4, 7. She does not request any action with regard to these allegations. I note that this
is not the first time Sewell has complained to this Court of the purported misconduct and bias of
members of the judiciary and the government. See, e.g., Sewell’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant[’s] Motion to Extend Discovery and Dispositive Motions Deadlines along with
Plaintiff[’s] Motion to Compel Discovery 2, ECF No. 9 in Sewell v. WMATA, TDC-13-2961
(referring to “ongoing acts of fraud and racial discrimination in the Judiciary”; alleging
violations of federal statutes by “[t]he State and Bad actors in the Federal Court”; Plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed case); ECF No. 15 in Sewell v. WMATA, TDC-13-2961 (motion for recusal
of Judge J.F. Motz; denied in ECF No. 19); Compl. 1–2, ECF No. 1 in Sewell v. WMATA, TDC15-1334 (claiming that Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was “obstructing Justice”
and discriminating in violation of federal law; lodging specific allegations against a district
director, an assistant director, and others; case dismissed and appeal dismissed); ECF No. 23 in
Sewell v. Strayer University, DKC-12-2927 (motion for recusal of Judge Chasanow; denied in
ECF No. 26); Mot. for Relief of Jmt. 1–2, ECF No. 40 in Sewell v. Strayer University, DKC-122927 (allegations of “conspiracy among members of the federal government”).

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motion for a ruling as moot. Defendants filed their opposition on January 26, 2016, eighteen
days after Sewell filed her January 8, 2016, motion for reconsideration. Defendants’ opposition
was due seventeen days after Sewell filed her motion. See Loc. R. 105.2(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d)
& 5(b)(2)(C). Because Defendants’ opposition was filed only a day late, I will deny Sewell’s
motion to strike.
II.

PWG-15-3392
Procedural History
On November 5, 2015, Sewell filed her complaint in this Court raising a breach of

contract claim and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim alleging that Fidelity failed to reimburse her under a
title insurance policy because she is an African American woman. See Compl. 4, ECF No. 1.
Among the documents that Sewell attached were her insurance policy issued by Chicago Title
Insurance Company (“Chicago Title”), Insurance Policy, Compl., Ex. A., ECF No. 1-2, and a
letter from Chicago Title to the MIA setting forth the basis for Chicago Title’s denial of her
insurance claims, Chicago Title Letter 1–2, Compl., Ex. C., ECF No. 1-4.
Because Sewell was proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, I was obligated to review
the sufficiency of her claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On November 19, 2015, I dismissed her
claim for breach of contract because her claim was barred under Maryland’s three-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract claims. See Mem. Op. 2, ECF No. 4. I dismissed her 42
U.S.C. § 1981 claims because they were based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
insurance that Sewell purchased as detailed in Chicago Title’s letter to the MIA. See id. 2–3;
Chicago Title Letter.

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On November 23, 2015, Sewell filed a motion (i) for relief of judgment pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); (ii) to rescind my November 19, 2015, Memorandum and Order for lack of
jurisdiction, and (iii) declaratory relief on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

See Pl.’s

November 23, 2015, Mot., ECF No. 6. In addition to restating her initial claim, Sewell stated
that I violated Judicial Canons 1, 2, and 3 because I “assumed the role of the Defendant” in
dismissing her case. See id. 2. Fidelity filed an opposition to Sewell’s motion. ECF No. 7. On
January 4, 2016, I issued an order denying Sewell’s motion, analyzing Sewell’s claims under
both Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. January 4, 2016, Order, ECF No. 10. I explained to Sewell
again that the nature of her insurance policy did not support her insurance claim, id. at 1, and
found that she had failed to provide “evidence that this Court’s analysis was improper or legally
deficient,” id. at 3. For these reasons, I denied her motion for reconsideration. Id.
Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 11)
On January 8, 2016, Sewell filed another motion for reconsideration and additionally
sought default judgment against Fidelity for failure to respond timely. See Pl.’s January 8, 2016,
Mot., ECF No. 11. Sewell’s 60(b) motion is opposed by counsel for Fidelity, ECF No. 12, which
incorporates the arguments it made in its previous opposition filed on December 17, 2015, see
ECF No. 7.
Sewell seeks reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. R. 59 and 60. See Pl.’s January 8, 2016,
Mot. 1. As discussed previously with respect to PWG-15-3077, Sewell’s motion comes less than
twenty-eight days after my January 5, 2016, order denying her motion for relief of judgment and
more than twenty-eight days after my November 19, 2015, dismissal order. Therefore I will
address it pursuant to Rule 60(b).

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The underlying complaint in this case was dismissed as frivolous. This Court observed
that:
The claimed breach of contract occurred on or about March 16, 2011, the date
the Substitute Trustee’s Deed was issued transferring the property to substitute
trustee, Shannon Menapeace. ECF 1-4 at p. 2. The statute of limitations for a
cause of action based on breach of contract is three years. See Md. Cts & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. ' 5-101. The date a cause of action for breach of contract
accrues is the date of the alleged breach. See Boyd v. Bowen, 806 A.2d 314,
145 Md.App. 635 (2002). The instant complaint has been filed more than
three years after the alleged breach of contract and is therefore untimely.
To the extent Sewell asserts claims based on federal statutes prohibiting
discriminatory practices, she has failed to allege facts sufficient to support that
claim. As explained to Sewell in correspondence from Defendant, a title
insurance policy does not operate in the fashion she believes it does. Rather,
title insurance simply insures the purchaser of real property that there are no
senior claims to the title at the time of purchase. It is not an insurance policy
guaranteeing that the title to the property will forever remain with the
purchaser regardless of after-occurring legal claims asserted to collect debts
secured by the property. The mere fact that Sewell is female and AfricanAmerican does not transform the denial of her baseless claim into a
discriminatory practice.
Mem. Op. 2–3. Sewell again asserts that I have breached the Canon of Conduct for United
States Judges, which requires “patience and competence of the law.” Pl.’s January 8, 2016, Mot.
1. She claims the complaint is timely and relies upon the date of a letter from counsel as the
operative date for the breach of contract action. Id. at 2. She further claims this Court is denying
her a right to have her contract enforced and that I have committed a fraud by concealing the
fraud of Defendant. Id. 2, 5.
Sewell has not asserted a basis for relief under Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 60(b). The
pending motion simply reiterates her legal theories and does not disclose a mistake,
inadvertence, or fraud requiring relief from judgment. “To the extent that the post-judgment
motion sought to have the district court reconsider its ruling with respect to the [issues addressed
in the district court’s original order], it [is] clearly improper, because Rule 60(b) does not

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authorize a motion merely for reconsideration of a legal issue.” United States v. Williams, 674
F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 1982). This Court’s application of the law to the facts as asserted in the
complaint does not suffice as a “fraud on the court.”
I will endeavor to explain to Sewell again why her insurance claim was rejected by
Fidelity and why I originally dismissed her case before me. Sewell is bringing this claim against
Fidelity based upon certain events that occurred subsequent to the policy date of her title
insurance. See Compl. 1–2; Chicago Title Letter 1–2. Sewell has highlighted Covered Risks 1
to 7 in her insurance policy issued by Chicago Title, including item “7. Any of Covered Risks 1
through 6, occurring after the Policy Date.” Insurance Policy 1. Although her insurance policy
states that it covers “actual loss from any risk described under Covered Risks if the event
creating the risk exists on the Policy Date or, to the extent expressly stated, after the Policy
Date,” the insurance policy also contains certain exceptions and exclusions. See Insurance
Policy 1–2; Chicago Title Letter 2–3. Schedule B, which Sewell has not included in her
complaint, includes “loss, costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses” related to the deed securing
Sewell’s mortgage. See Chicago Title Letter 2–3. In addition, Sewell’s policy also contains the
following exclusion:
In addition to the Exceptions in Schedule B, You are not insured against loss,
costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses resulting from:
...
4.

Risks:

...
d.

That first occur after the policy date--this does not limit the
coverage described in covered risks 7, 8.d, 22, 23, 24 or 25.

See Insurance Policy 2; Chicago Title Letter 2–3. As a result, although Sewell may interpret
Covered Risk 7 of her insurance policy, see Insurance Policy 1, as providing insurance that

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supports her claim, the exception in Schedule B and exclusion 4.d in her insurance policy
indicate that Sewell’s insurance does not provide the coverage that she thinks it does as was fully
explained in Chicago Title’s letter to the MIA. See id. at 2; Chicago Title Letter 2–3.
Simply put, the title insurance policy at issue does not cover Sewell for the acts that she
claims form the basis for her lawsuit. Her lawsuit therefore lacks merit. Accordingly, Sewell’s
motion for reconsideration is denied.
Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 11)
Like in PWG-15-3077, Plaintiff’s motion also incorporates a motion for default
judgment. See Pl.’s January 8, 2016, Mot. Sewell provides no justification for her motion for
default judgment except to say she is entitled to it under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Pl.’s January 8, 2016,
Mot. 5.

Sewell has failed to demonstrate why she should be granted default judgment,

notwithstanding the fact that her case has already been dismissed. As I explained earlier, the
Court has discretion to enter a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) when the
“adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Lawbaugh,
359 F. Supp. 2d at 421. Here, I already dismissed Sewell’s case on November 19, 2015, and in
any event, Defendant Fidelity has been responsive, even if its filings have been late. See ECF
Nos. 7 (Opposition to Motion for Relief from Judgment) & 12 (Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration). Accordingly, Sewell’s motion for default judgment is denied.
Motion for a ruling and motion to strike (ECF No. 13)
On February 8, 2016, Sewell filed another motion seeking a ruling on her January 8,
2016, motion for reconsideration and asking me to strike Fidelity’s opposition, ECF No. 12. See
Pl.’s Mot. for Ruling, ECF No. 13. Sewell repeats many of her arguments made in her prior
motions. Id. at 1. She also alleges for the first time that Fidelity is running a Ponzi scheme. See
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id. at 4. Because I have now ruled on Sewell’s January 8, 2016, motion, I will deny her motion
for a ruling as moot. Fidelity filed its opposition on January 26, 2016, eighteen days after Sewell
filed her January 8, 2016, motion for reconsideration. Fidelity’s opposition was due seventeen
days after Sewell filed her motion. See Loc. R. 105.2(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) & 5(b)(2)(C).
Because Fidelity’s opposition was filed only a day late, I will deny her motion to strike.
III.

CONCLUSION
Having now addressed Sewell’s arguments multiple times (originally and as part of her

two motions for reconsideration), she is advised that should she be dissatisfied with the ruling of
this Court, she should exercise her right to file an appeal with the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
ORDER
Accordingly, it is, this 24th day of February, 2016, hereby ORDERED that
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and for Default Judgment incorporated therein
in PWG-15-3077, ECF No. 12, IS DENIED;
2. Plaintiff’s motion for a ruling and motion to strike in PWG-15-3077, ECF No. 14, IS
DENIED;
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and for Default Judgment incorporated therein
in PWG-15-3392, ECF No. 11, IS DENIED; and
4. Plaintiff’s motion for a ruling and motion to strike in PWG-15-3392, ECF No. 13, IS
DENIED.
/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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