Mansfield v. Kerry
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 12/21/16 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/21/2016. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
CHARLES G. MANSFIELD
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 15-3693
:
JOHN KERRY, Secretary,
U.S. Department of State
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
employment discrimination case are the following motions:
this
(1) a
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment
filed by Defendant John Kerry (“Defendant”), Secretary of the
United States Department of State (the “Agency”) (ECF No. 8);
and (2) a cross-motion for partial summary judgment filed by
Plaintiff Charles G. Mansfield (“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 14).
The
issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.
reasons,
granted,
Defendant’s
and
motion
Plaintiff’s
will be denied.
Local Rule 105.6.
for
motion
summary
for
For the following
judgment
partial
summary
will
be
judgment
I.
Background1
Plaintiff, an African American man, is a retired Agency
employee who applied for an Agency Personal Services Contractor,
Program Analyst position (GS-0080-13/13) on the Field Support
Branch
(“FSB”),
Vacancy
Announcement
(ECF No. 8-2, at 43-46, 53-67).
DS-2011-0230,
in
2011.
The job announcement included
the four factors upon which the candidates would be evaluated:
A.
Experience
applying
Federal
rules,
regulations,
and
policies
related
to
procurement and acquisition activities.
B.
Experience researching and analyzing
data and information to produce forecast
plans and reports.
C.
Experience
providing
quotes,
justifications,
requisitions
and
funding
information
to
vendors
pertaining
to
procurement activities.
D.
Knowledge of the Federal budgetary
rules, regulations and process to provide
expert advice and guidance.
(ECF Nos. 12-4, at DOS-0046; 8-2, at 95, 114).
The Agency’s
human resources department created a Certificate of Eligibles
from the applications, which included Plaintiff and four other
candidates.
(ECF
No.
8-2,
at
130-31).
The
Certificate
of
Eligibles included the five candidates’ scores on “job-specific
self-assessment
questions,”
application process.
130-31,
101-02).
answered
online
as
part
of
the
(See ECF Nos. 12-4, at DOS-0047; 8-2, at
Plaintiff
had
1
the
second-highest
self-
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed or construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.
2
assessment score, and Charles Segrist, Jr., a Caucasian man, had
the lowest score.
The Certificate of Eligibles was sent to the
selecting official, FSB Branch Chief Tamika Abbott.
2, at 91-93).
(ECF No. 8-
FSB Section Chief Rickey Fergerson assisted Ms.
Abbott in reviewing the candidates’ applications, but did not
play a role in making the selection decision for the Program
Analyst position.
(Id. at 92, 104).
Fergerson are African American.
Both Ms. Abbott and Mr.
(Id. at 91, 104).
Ms. Abbott reviewed the application materials and ranked
the eligible candidates based on her determination of the extent
to which each candidate satisfied the four evaluation factors.
(Id.
at 93, 95).
candidates.
Ms. Abbott did not interview any of the
(See id. at 93; ECF No. 12-9, at 3).
Ms. Abbott
ranked Mr. Segrist first and Plaintiff fourth, and Mr. Segrist
was selected for the Program Analyst position.
93, 95).
(ECF No. 8-2, at
Plaintiff was informed that he was not selected for
the position on May 3, 2011.
(Id. at 44).
On May 9, Plaintiff contacted an Agency Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor.
(Id. at 16).
A Notice of Right
to File a Discrimination Complaint was issued to Plaintiff on
August 10.
(Id. at 28-29).
On August 23, Plaintiff filed a
formal EEO complaint with the Agency Office of Civil Rights.
(Id. at 13-15).
Final
Agency
The Agency Office of Civil Rights issued a
Decision
determining
3
that
Plaintiff
did
not
establish his claims of discrimination on July 7, 2013.
ECF No. 12-8, at 1).
Opportunity
affirmed
Plaintiff appealed to the Equal Employment
Commission,
on
(See
March
and
the
11,
Office
of
2015.
Federal
Plaintiff
Operations
requested
reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 2015.
On December 2, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint asserting racial discrimination for failing to hire
him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
(ECF No. 1).
On April 1, 2016,
Defendant moved to dismiss or for summary judgment.
8).
(ECF No.
Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice (ECF No. 9),
which advised him of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and
his entitlement to respond within seventeen days from the date
of the letter.
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.
1975) (holding
pro se
right
responsive
to
judgment).
separate
file
plaintiffs should be advised of their
material
to
a
motion
for
summary
Plaintiff opposed the motion (ECF No. 12), filed a
“proposed
findings
of
fact”
and
a
“response
to
Defendant’s proposed finding of fact” (ECF Nos. 13; 15), and
moved for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 14).
Defendant
replied and opposed Plaintiff’s motion in his reply brief.
No. 16).
4
(ECF
II.
Standard of Review
Defendant’s motion is styled as a motion to dismiss, or in
the alternative, for summary judgment.
A court considers only
the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Where the
parties present matters outside of the pleadings and the court
considers those matters as it does here, the court will treat
the motion as one for summary judgment.
See Gadsby v. Grasmick,
109 F.3d 940, 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party
is
entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
250
(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is inappropriate if any material factual issue
“may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash. Sports
Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
However, no genuine
dispute of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her
case as to which he or she would have the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
Therefore, on those issues on
5
which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or
her responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with
an “affidavit or other evidentiary showing” demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
See Ross v. Early, 899
F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md. 2012), aff’d, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir.
2014).
“A mere scintilla of proof . . . will not suffice to
prevent summary judgment.”
(4th Cir. 2003).
significantly
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
probative,
summary
judgment
may
be
granted.”
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
A “party
cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere
speculation or compilation of inferences.”
Shin v. Shalala, 166
F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
Indeed,
this court has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually
unsupported
claims
and
defenses
from
going
to
trial.
See
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.
1987)).
Although
latitude,
the
pro
above
se
litigants
standards
apply
are
to
to
be
everyone.
given
some
Thus,
as
courts have recognized repeatedly, even a pro se party may not
avoid
summary
judgment
speculative arguments.
by
relying
on
bald
assertions
and
See Smith v. Vilsack, 832 F.Supp.2d 573,
580 (D.Md. 2011) (citing cases).
6
III. Analysis
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s
personal characteristics such as “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Univ. of Texas Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).
To survive a
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff asserting a Title VII
claim
must
provide
evidence
of
through one of two avenues of proof:
discrimination
motivated
the
intentional
discrimination
(1) direct evidence that
employer’s
adverse
employment
decision, or (2) the McDonnell Douglas “pretext framework” that
requires
a
plaintiff
to
show
that
the
“employer’s
proffered
permissible reason for taking an adverse employment action is
actually a pretext for discrimination.”
See Hill v. Lockheed
Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir.
2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)).
Because Plaintiff does not put forth direct evidence of
discrimination, his discrimination claim must be examined using
the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas.
The familiar McDonnell Douglas framework “‘compensat[es] for the
fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard
to come by’” and “give[s] plaintiffs who lack direct evidence a
method for raising an inference of discrimination.”
Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.
7
2005) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271
(1989)
(O’Connor,
J.,
concurring
in
the
judgment)).
Under
McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff meets his initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case for a Title VII violation,
“the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
the
adverse
Lockheed Martin, 354 F.3d at 285.
employment
action.”
If the employer meets this
burden of production, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s
stated reasons ‘were not its true reasons, but were a pretext’”
for discrimination.
Prods.,
Inc.,
530
Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
U.S.
133,
143
(2000)).
According
to
the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “[t]he
final
pretext
inquiry
‘merges
with
the
ultimate
burden
of
persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of
intentional discrimination, which at all times remains with the
plaintiff.’”
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601
F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
Tex.
Dep’t
of
Cmty.
Affairs
v.
Burdine,
450
U.S.
248,
256
(1981)).
A.
Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure
to hire based on race, a plaintiff must show that:
member
of
a
protected
class;
(2)
8
the
employer
(1) he is a
had
an
open
position for which he applied; (3) he was qualified for the
position; and (4) he was not selected for the position under
circumstances
giving
discrimination.
80
F.3d
954,
rise
to
an
inference
of
unlawful
See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,
(4th
959-60
Cir.
1996);
see
also
Anderson
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 268 (4th Cir.
2005);
Brown
Plaintiff
v.
has
McLean,
failed
159
to
F.3d
898,
establish
902
a
prima
(4th
Cir.
facie
1998).
case
of
discrimination because he has not put forth evidence sufficient
to
show
that
his
non-selection
occurred
under
circumstances
giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant challenges
Plaintiff’s
selecting
showing
official
on
Ms.
only
the
Abbott
fourth
did
not,
prong,
and
arguing
could
not,
that
have
discriminated against Plaintiff because she was unaware of his
race at the time of the selection decision.
8).
(ECF No. 8-1, at
“It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot be found to have
discriminated against a plaintiff on the basis of race where the
defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s race.”
Washington
v. Chao, 577 F.Supp.2d 27, 40 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing cases).
There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Abbott knew that
Plaintiff was African American.
To the contrary, Ms. Abbott
attested under oath that she was unaware of Plaintiff’s race
when she made the hiring decision, and until she was informed of
9
Plaintiff’s
EEO
complaint.
(ECF
No.
8-2,
at
91).
It
is
undisputed that Plaintiff’s application did not mention his race
(see id. at 53-67), and that Ms. Abbott did not interview him
(see id. at 44).
Plaintiff
asserts
that
he
“believes
he
first
saw”
Ms.
Abbott at an Agency forum or meeting, and that he “recognized”
her at an alternative dispute resolution meeting held after he
filed
his
complaint.
(ECF
No.
12,
at
4).
In
his
EEO
Investigative Affidavit, Plaintiff stated that Ms. Abbott was
aware of his race because, “as a former Government employee and
Manager at State, [he] frequently attended conferences/meetings
with Diplomatic Security contract staff and management officials
employed by Diplomatic Security where [his] race would have been
obvious.”
(ECF No. 8-2, at 43).
affidavit
that
the
included his race.
have
seen
Ms.
Agency’s
(Id.).
Abbott
at
Plaintiff also stated in his
personnel
records
would
have
Plaintiff’s contention that he may
an
Agency
conference
while
he
was
employed at the Agency, prior to 2007, is not in evidence, but
even if it were, it would be evidence only that Plaintiff was
aware of Ms. Abbott’s race, not that she was aware of his.
Ms.
Abbott also averred that she considered only the application
materials provided to her in making the selection decision, and
without any evidence that Ms. Abbott had access to or consulted
the Agency’s personnel records, or that Plaintiff’s race was
10
recorded therein, the Agency’s awareness of Plaintiff’s race due
to his prior employment cannot reasonably be imputed to Ms.
Abbott.2
Plaintiff’s
genuine
dispute
on
speculative
this
issue
statements
given
Ms.
cannot
Abbott’s
create
a
specific
affidavit statement that she was unaware of Plaintiff’s race at
the time of the selection decision.
Plaintiff also argues that he “believes” that Mary Kelley,
a
Caucasian
supervisory
human
resources
specialist,
was
“involved with the qualifications and selection [and] knew [his]
race” and “played a role in his non-selection.”
5, 7).
(ECF No. 12, at
The record evidence shows that only Ms. Abbott made the
selection
decision.
(ECF
No.
8-2,
at
92,
74,
85,
104).
Moreover, Ms. Kelley has also affirmed that she was unaware of
Plaintiff’s race until she was informed of his EEO complaint
(id. at 85), and Mr. Fergerson similarly affirmed that he “was
unaware of the age and race of the candidates” when he assisted
Ms.
Abbott
in
reviewing
resumes
(id.
at
104).
Plaintiff’s
assertions that Ms. Abbott or other officials at the Agency were
aware of his race are unsupported by evidence, and accordingly
do not create a genuine issue of material fact.
2
In addition, Ms. Abbott, like Plaintiff, is African
American.
(ECF No. 8-2, at 91).
Her membership “in the same
protected racial class as plaintiff. . . . weighs against an
inference of discrimination.”
Hammond v. Chao, 383 F.Supp.2d
47, 58 n.2 (D.D.C. 2005).
11
B.
Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason and Pretext
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of
discrimination,
he
has
failed
to
show
that
Defendant’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring him is a
pretext for discrimination.
Defendant has put forth evidence
supporting its stated reason for not selecting Plaintiff, which
is that he was not the most qualified of the applicants.
Abbott
explained
in
her
EEO
Investigative
Affidavit
Ms.
that
Plaintiff “was not selected because there were three eligible
candidates that were ranked higher than he was based on [her]
review.”
(ECF No. 8-2, at 92).
She further explained that Mr.
Segrist was selected because he was “the most qualified of the
applicants reviewed,” based on his experience and the fact that
he “possessed current skill sets in all four factors that each
candidate was evaluated against.”
Mr.
Segrist
first
among
the
(Id. at 93, 95).
eligible
candidates,
In ranking
Ms.
Abbott
noted that he had more than ten years of experience at the
Agency, including five within the FSB, and was “well versed with
the
software
demonstrated
and
systems
superior
used
performance
by
[the
with
duties outlined in the job analysis.”
Agency],
regard
to
and
the
(Id. at 93, 146-47).
has
major
Ms.
Abbott determined that Mr. Segrist was “the most qualified of
the applicants reviewed.”
(Id. at 92-93).
The record further
reflects that Ms. Abbott ranked Plaintiff fourth among the five
12
candidates, finding that he was “qualified,” but noting that his
“resume presents management skill sets more than analytical.”
(Id. at 95; see also id. at 92, 97, 102, 112).
that
Plaintiff’s
application
demonstrated
Ms. Abbott noted
previous,
but
not
current, experience in three of the four skill sets, and that it
was not apparent based on a review of his resume “if he was
experienced
and
funding
in
providing
information
quotes,
to
justifications,
vendors
activities,” the fourth requirement.
pertaining
requisitions
to
procurement
(Id. at 95, 97).
Ms.
Abbott further affirmed that Plaintiff “was ranked number 4 on
the hiring managers list because his resume indicated he had
experience
related
to
applying
Federal
procurement
and
rules,
regulations
acquisition
and
activities
policies
from
a
position in 2007 but no current experience,” while Mr. Segrist’s
“resume indicated current use of this skill set.”
(Id. at 102).
Plaintiff has produced no evidence of pretext.
In order to
show pretext, Plaintiff must “prove ‘both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’”
Adams v.
Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d
369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff argues that he was the most
qualified candidate based on his own assessment of his resume
and critique of Mr. Segrist’s resume.
He also argues that Mr.
Segrist’s experience and resume were falsified.
13
Even construing
Plaintiff’s arguments liberally, they are wholly unfounded and
clearly contradicted by Defendant’s evidence.
Plaintiff does not offer evidence to dispute the legitimacy
of Ms. Abbott’s statement that she valued current use of the
required skills over prior experience in her evaluation of the
applications, or that management skills were less important for
the Program Analyst position than analytical skills.
Plaintiff
argues that his resume demonstrated “specialized experience and
qualifications” that Mr. Segrist lacked (ECF No. 12, at 8), and
submits an affidavit attesting that, based on his own experience
and review of the applications, Mr. Segrist’s resume did not
properly
identify
examples
of
accomplishments (ECF No. 12-12).
his
work
product
or
Plaintiff’s evaluations of his
and his competitor’s applications are not sufficient evidence
that Ms. Abbott’s nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s nonselection are false.
See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960; Taylor v.
Brown, 928 F. Supp. 568, 574-75 (D.Md. 1995), aff’d, 86 F.3d
1152 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Plaintiff expresses his own views as to
his qualifications and the necessity for certain experience for
the position.
Title
VII
irrelevant;
‘The self-perception of a plaintiff in an ADEA or
suit
what
as
to
matters
his
is
or
the
her
other
perception
qualifications
of
the
is
decision-
maker.’” (quoting Douglas v. PHH FleetAmerica Corp., 832 F.Supp.
1002, 1010 (D.Md. 1993))); see also Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc.,
14
203
F.3d
274,
(4th
280
Cir.
2000)
(noting
that
plaintiff
improperly disputed the merits of poor performance evaluations
in a discriminatory discharge case rather than showing that the
evaluations
were
“dishonest
or
not
the
real
reason
for
her
termination”); Bostron v. Apfel, 104 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (D.Md.
2000), aff’d, 2 F.App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Standing alone,
self-serving claims of superiority in a Title VII case do not
suffice.”).
Plaintiff also contends, as evidence of pretext, that he
was more qualified for the position than Mr. Segrist because he
was ranked second on the Certificate of Eligibles, while Mr.
Segrist was ranked fifth.
(ECF No. 12, at 8).
These scores
reflected only the candidates’ self-assessments, however.
Ms.
Abbott affirmed that she did not consider the self-assessment
scores in making the selection, but based the decision only on
her review of the five applications using the criteria discussed
above.
(ECF
No.
8-2,
at
101-02).
Once
the
list
of
most
qualified candidates was provided to Ms. Abbott, she was free to
choose
from
account
the
among
them,
and
self-assessment
was
not
scores.
required
(See
id.
to
take
into
at
195
(“The
selecting official has the right to select or not select any
candidate
referred
on
the
promotion
competitive list.”)).
15
certificate
or
non-
Plaintiff
“fabricated
Selectee
asserts,
Selectee’s
qualified
without
[Mr.
based
evidence,
Segrist’s]
on
that
Ms.
Kelley
to
ensure
Ms.
Abbott
background
vacancy,”
and
that
“fabricated Selectee’s background, interjected her abstract view
into
his
resume,
then
re-ranked
candidates
abstract view of Selectee’s background.”
utilizing
her
(ECF No. 12, at 8; see
also id. at 12 (arguing that Plaintiff “believes Agency, HR, and
SO [Ms. Abbott] fabricated Selectee’s demonstrated specialized
experience
to
get
Selectee
to
qualify”)).
Plaintiff’s
mere
speculation cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact.
Moreover,
Plaintiff
has
offered
no
evidence
discrimination was the real reason he was not selected.
that
There
is no evidence that Ms. Abbott was “motivated by any desire
other
than
to
select
the
candidate
[she]
felt
was
the
best
suited for the position.”
Riley v. Honeywell Tech. Sols., Inc.,
323
&
F.App’x
276,
plaintiff’s
differences
277-78
“self-serving
in
n.2
(4th
Cir.
contentions
evaluation . . . and
that
2009)
(noting
that
that
there
were
[the
selectee]
was
preselected, were properly discounted by the district court as
having no viable evidentiary support and as being insufficient
as a matter of law to establish pretext”); see also Hawkins, 203
F.3d
at
281.
Plaintiff
has
not
shown
that
the
Agency’s
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its selection decision
16
are pretextual, and accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
IV.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment solely on
the issue of whether Ms. Abbott conducted an interview for the
position.
(ECF No. 14).
The undisputed evidence in the record
shows that Ms. Abbott did not interview any of the candidates in
making
the
selection.
(ECF
Nos.
8-2,
at
93;
12-9,
at
3).
Defendant mistakenly stated in the factual background section of
his briefing that Ms. Abbott interviewed only Selectee.
No. 8-1, at 3 & n.2).
(ECF
In reply, Defendant acknowledges this
error and argues that this issue is not relevant to the issue
before the court.
(ECF No. 16, at 5 n.3).
Pursuant to the
Agency Foreign Affairs Manual, “Selecting officials will have
the option of interviewing all, any or none of the candidates
referred.”
undisputed
referred
(ECF Nos. 8-1, at 3 n.2; 8-2, at 194-95).
that
Ms.
Abbott
candidates,
chose
consistent
to
with
interview
Agency
It is
none
of
policy.
the
Her
decision not to interview candidates is not a material issue,
and
Plaintiff’s
motion
for
partial
summary
judgment
will
be
denied.
V.
Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine dispute as to a
material fact with respect to both his prima facie case and the
17
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason articulated by Defendant for
his non-selection for the Program Analyst position.
foregoing
reasons,
Defendant
John
the
Kerry
motion
will
for
be
summary
granted,
and
judgment
judgment
For the
filed
by
will
be
entered against Plaintiff with respect to his claim of race
discrimination under Title VII.
Plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment will be denied.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
18
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