Mansfield v. Kerry

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 12/21/16 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/21/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
CHARLES G. MANSFIELD
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-3693

:
JOHN KERRY, Secretary,
U.S. Department of State

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

employment discrimination case are the following motions:

this
(1) a

motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment
filed by Defendant John Kerry (“Defendant”), Secretary of the
United States Department of State (the “Agency”) (ECF No. 8);
and (2) a cross-motion for partial summary judgment filed by
Plaintiff Charles G. Mansfield (“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 14).

The

issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.
reasons,
granted,

Defendant’s
and

motion

Plaintiff’s

will be denied.

Local Rule 105.6.
for

motion

summary

for

For the following
judgment

partial

summary

will

be

judgment

I.

Background1
Plaintiff, an African American man, is a retired Agency

employee who applied for an Agency Personal Services Contractor,
Program Analyst position (GS-0080-13/13) on the Field Support
Branch

(“FSB”),

Vacancy

Announcement

(ECF No. 8-2, at 43-46, 53-67).

DS-2011-0230,

in

2011.

The job announcement included

the four factors upon which the candidates would be evaluated:
A.
Experience
applying
Federal
rules,
regulations,
and
policies
related
to
procurement and acquisition activities.
B.
Experience researching and analyzing
data and information to produce forecast
plans and reports.
C.
Experience
providing
quotes,
justifications,
requisitions
and
funding
information
to
vendors
pertaining
to
procurement activities.
D.
Knowledge of the Federal budgetary
rules, regulations and process to provide
expert advice and guidance.
(ECF Nos. 12-4, at DOS-0046; 8-2, at 95, 114).

The Agency’s

human resources department created a Certificate of Eligibles
from the applications, which included Plaintiff and four other
candidates.

(ECF

No.

8-2,

at

130-31).

The

Certificate

of

Eligibles included the five candidates’ scores on “job-specific
self-assessment

questions,”

application process.
130-31,

101-02).

answered

online

as

part

of

the

(See ECF Nos. 12-4, at DOS-0047; 8-2, at
Plaintiff

had

1

the

second-highest

self-

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed or construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.
2

assessment score, and Charles Segrist, Jr., a Caucasian man, had
the lowest score.

The Certificate of Eligibles was sent to the

selecting official, FSB Branch Chief Tamika Abbott.
2, at 91-93).

(ECF No. 8-

FSB Section Chief Rickey Fergerson assisted Ms.

Abbott in reviewing the candidates’ applications, but did not
play a role in making the selection decision for the Program
Analyst position.

(Id. at 92, 104).

Fergerson are African American.

Both Ms. Abbott and Mr.

(Id. at 91, 104).

Ms. Abbott reviewed the application materials and ranked
the eligible candidates based on her determination of the extent
to which each candidate satisfied the four evaluation factors.
(Id.

at 93, 95).

candidates.

Ms. Abbott did not interview any of the

(See id. at 93; ECF No. 12-9, at 3).

Ms. Abbott

ranked Mr. Segrist first and Plaintiff fourth, and Mr. Segrist
was selected for the Program Analyst position.
93, 95).

(ECF No. 8-2, at

Plaintiff was informed that he was not selected for

the position on May 3, 2011.

(Id. at 44).

On May 9, Plaintiff contacted an Agency Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor.

(Id. at 16).

A Notice of Right

to File a Discrimination Complaint was issued to Plaintiff on
August 10.

(Id. at 28-29).

On August 23, Plaintiff filed a

formal EEO complaint with the Agency Office of Civil Rights.
(Id. at 13-15).
Final

Agency

The Agency Office of Civil Rights issued a

Decision

determining
3

that

Plaintiff

did

not

establish his claims of discrimination on July 7, 2013.
ECF No. 12-8, at 1).
Opportunity
affirmed

Plaintiff appealed to the Equal Employment

Commission,
on

(See

March

and

the

11,

Office

of

2015.

Federal

Plaintiff

Operations
requested

reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 2015.
On December 2, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint asserting racial discrimination for failing to hire
him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

(ECF No. 1).

On April 1, 2016,

Defendant moved to dismiss or for summary judgment.
8).

(ECF No.

Plaintiff was provided with a Roseboro notice (ECF No. 9),

which advised him of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and
his entitlement to respond within seventeen days from the date
of the letter.

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.

1975) (holding

pro se

right

responsive

to

judgment).
separate

file

plaintiffs should be advised of their
material

to

a

motion

for

summary

Plaintiff opposed the motion (ECF No. 12), filed a
“proposed

findings

of

fact”

and

a

“response

to

Defendant’s proposed finding of fact” (ECF Nos. 13; 15), and
moved for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 14).

Defendant

replied and opposed Plaintiff’s motion in his reply brief.
No. 16).

4

(ECF

II.

Standard of Review
Defendant’s motion is styled as a motion to dismiss, or in

the alternative, for summary judgment.

A court considers only

the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Where the

parties present matters outside of the pleadings and the court
considers those matters as it does here, the court will treat
the motion as one for summary judgment.

See Gadsby v. Grasmick,

109 F.3d 940, 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

250

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is inappropriate if any material factual issue
“may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash. Sports
Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

However, no genuine

dispute of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her
case as to which he or she would have the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Therefore, on those issues on
5

which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or
her responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with
an “affidavit or other evidentiary showing” demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue for trial.

See Ross v. Early, 899

F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md. 2012), aff’d, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir.
2014).

“A mere scintilla of proof . . . will not suffice to

prevent summary judgment.”
(4th Cir. 2003).
significantly

Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314

“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not

probative,

summary

judgment

may

be

granted.”

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

A “party

cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere
speculation or compilation of inferences.”

Shin v. Shalala, 166

F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).

Indeed,

this court has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually
unsupported

claims

and

defenses

from

going

to

trial.

See

Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.
1987)).

Although

latitude,

the

pro

above

se

litigants

standards

apply

are
to

to

be

everyone.

given

some

Thus,

as

courts have recognized repeatedly, even a pro se party may not
avoid

summary

judgment

speculative arguments.

by

relying

on

bald

assertions

and

See Smith v. Vilsack, 832 F.Supp.2d 573,

580 (D.Md. 2011) (citing cases).

6

III. Analysis
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s
personal characteristics such as “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Univ. of Texas Sw.

Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).

To survive a

motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff asserting a Title VII
claim

must

provide

evidence

of

through one of two avenues of proof:
discrimination

motivated

the

intentional

discrimination

(1) direct evidence that

employer’s

adverse

employment

decision, or (2) the McDonnell Douglas “pretext framework” that
requires

a

plaintiff

to

show

that

the

“employer’s

proffered

permissible reason for taking an adverse employment action is
actually a pretext for discrimination.”

See Hill v. Lockheed

Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir.
2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)).
Because Plaintiff does not put forth direct evidence of
discrimination, his discrimination claim must be examined using
the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas.
The familiar McDonnell Douglas framework “‘compensat[es] for the
fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard
to come by’” and “give[s] plaintiffs who lack direct evidence a
method for raising an inference of discrimination.”

Diamond v.

Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.
7

2005) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271
(1989)

(O’Connor,

J.,

concurring

in

the

judgment)).

Under

McDonnell Douglas, once the plaintiff meets his initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case for a Title VII violation,
“the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory

reason

for

the

adverse

Lockheed Martin, 354 F.3d at 285.

employment

action.”

If the employer meets this

burden of production, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s
stated reasons ‘were not its true reasons, but were a pretext’”
for discrimination.
Prods.,

Inc.,

530

Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
U.S.

133,

143

(2000)).

According

to

the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “[t]he
final

pretext

inquiry

‘merges

with

the

ultimate

burden

of

persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of
intentional discrimination, which at all times remains with the
plaintiff.’”

Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601

F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
Tex.

Dep’t

of

Cmty.

Affairs

v.

Burdine,

450

U.S.

248,

256

(1981)).
A.

Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure
to hire based on race, a plaintiff must show that:
member

of

a

protected

class;

(2)
8

the

employer

(1) he is a
had

an

open

position for which he applied; (3) he was qualified for the
position; and (4) he was not selected for the position under
circumstances

giving

discrimination.
80

F.3d

954,

rise

to

an

inference

of

unlawful

See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,
(4th

959-60

Cir.

1996);

see

also

Anderson

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 268 (4th Cir.
2005);

Brown

Plaintiff

v.

has

McLean,

failed

159

to

F.3d

898,

establish

902

a

prima

(4th

Cir.

facie

1998).

case

of

discrimination because he has not put forth evidence sufficient
to

show

that

his

non-selection

occurred

under

circumstances

giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant challenges
Plaintiff’s
selecting

showing

official

on
Ms.

only

the

Abbott

fourth

did

not,

prong,
and

arguing

could

not,

that
have

discriminated against Plaintiff because she was unaware of his
race at the time of the selection decision.
8).

(ECF No. 8-1, at

“It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot be found to have

discriminated against a plaintiff on the basis of race where the
defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s race.”

Washington

v. Chao, 577 F.Supp.2d 27, 40 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing cases).
There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Abbott knew that
Plaintiff was African American.

To the contrary, Ms. Abbott

attested under oath that she was unaware of Plaintiff’s race
when she made the hiring decision, and until she was informed of
9

Plaintiff’s

EEO

complaint.

(ECF

No.

8-2,

at

91).

It

is

undisputed that Plaintiff’s application did not mention his race
(see id. at 53-67), and that Ms. Abbott did not interview him
(see id. at 44).
Plaintiff

asserts

that

he

“believes

he

first

saw”

Ms.

Abbott at an Agency forum or meeting, and that he “recognized”
her at an alternative dispute resolution meeting held after he
filed

his

complaint.

(ECF

No.

12,

at

4).

In

his

EEO

Investigative Affidavit, Plaintiff stated that Ms. Abbott was
aware of his race because, “as a former Government employee and
Manager at State, [he] frequently attended conferences/meetings
with Diplomatic Security contract staff and management officials
employed by Diplomatic Security where [his] race would have been
obvious.”

(ECF No. 8-2, at 43).

affidavit

that

the

included his race.
have

seen

Ms.

Agency’s
(Id.).

Abbott

at

Plaintiff also stated in his

personnel

records

would

have

Plaintiff’s contention that he may
an

Agency

conference

while

he

was

employed at the Agency, prior to 2007, is not in evidence, but
even if it were, it would be evidence only that Plaintiff was
aware of Ms. Abbott’s race, not that she was aware of his.

Ms.

Abbott also averred that she considered only the application
materials provided to her in making the selection decision, and
without any evidence that Ms. Abbott had access to or consulted
the Agency’s personnel records, or that Plaintiff’s race was
10

recorded therein, the Agency’s awareness of Plaintiff’s race due
to his prior employment cannot reasonably be imputed to Ms.
Abbott.2

Plaintiff’s

genuine

dispute

on

speculative

this

issue

statements
given

Ms.

cannot
Abbott’s

create

a

specific

affidavit statement that she was unaware of Plaintiff’s race at
the time of the selection decision.
Plaintiff also argues that he “believes” that Mary Kelley,
a

Caucasian

supervisory

human

resources

specialist,

was

“involved with the qualifications and selection [and] knew [his]
race” and “played a role in his non-selection.”
5, 7).

(ECF No. 12, at

The record evidence shows that only Ms. Abbott made the

selection

decision.

(ECF

No.

8-2,

at

92,

74,

85,

104).

Moreover, Ms. Kelley has also affirmed that she was unaware of
Plaintiff’s race until she was informed of his EEO complaint
(id. at 85), and Mr. Fergerson similarly affirmed that he “was
unaware of the age and race of the candidates” when he assisted
Ms.

Abbott

in

reviewing

resumes

(id.

at

104).

Plaintiff’s

assertions that Ms. Abbott or other officials at the Agency were
aware of his race are unsupported by evidence, and accordingly
do not create a genuine issue of material fact.

2

In addition, Ms. Abbott, like Plaintiff, is African
American.
(ECF No. 8-2, at 91).
Her membership “in the same
protected racial class as plaintiff. . . . weighs against an
inference of discrimination.”
Hammond v. Chao, 383 F.Supp.2d
47, 58 n.2 (D.D.C. 2005).
11

B.

Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason and Pretext

Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of
discrimination,

he

has

failed

to

show

that

Defendant’s

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring him is a
pretext for discrimination.

Defendant has put forth evidence

supporting its stated reason for not selecting Plaintiff, which
is that he was not the most qualified of the applicants.
Abbott

explained

in

her

EEO

Investigative

Affidavit

Ms.
that

Plaintiff “was not selected because there were three eligible
candidates that were ranked higher than he was based on [her]
review.”

(ECF No. 8-2, at 92).

She further explained that Mr.

Segrist was selected because he was “the most qualified of the
applicants reviewed,” based on his experience and the fact that
he “possessed current skill sets in all four factors that each
candidate was evaluated against.”
Mr.

Segrist

first

among

the

(Id. at 93, 95).

eligible

candidates,

In ranking
Ms.

Abbott

noted that he had more than ten years of experience at the
Agency, including five within the FSB, and was “well versed with
the

software

demonstrated

and

systems

superior

used

performance

by

[the

with

duties outlined in the job analysis.”

Agency],

regard

to

and
the

(Id. at 93, 146-47).

has
major
Ms.

Abbott determined that Mr. Segrist was “the most qualified of
the applicants reviewed.”

(Id. at 92-93).

The record further

reflects that Ms. Abbott ranked Plaintiff fourth among the five
12

candidates, finding that he was “qualified,” but noting that his
“resume presents management skill sets more than analytical.”
(Id. at 95; see also id. at 92, 97, 102, 112).
that

Plaintiff’s

application

demonstrated

Ms. Abbott noted

previous,

but

not

current, experience in three of the four skill sets, and that it
was not apparent based on a review of his resume “if he was
experienced
and

funding

in

providing

information

quotes,
to

justifications,

vendors

activities,” the fourth requirement.

pertaining

requisitions

to

procurement

(Id. at 95, 97).

Ms.

Abbott further affirmed that Plaintiff “was ranked number 4 on
the hiring managers list because his resume indicated he had
experience
related

to

applying

Federal

procurement

and

rules,

regulations

acquisition

and

activities

policies
from

a

position in 2007 but no current experience,” while Mr. Segrist’s
“resume indicated current use of this skill set.”

(Id. at 102).

Plaintiff has produced no evidence of pretext.

In order to

show pretext, Plaintiff must “prove ‘both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’”

Adams v.

Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d
369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995)).

Plaintiff argues that he was the most

qualified candidate based on his own assessment of his resume
and critique of Mr. Segrist’s resume.

He also argues that Mr.

Segrist’s experience and resume were falsified.
13

Even construing

Plaintiff’s arguments liberally, they are wholly unfounded and
clearly contradicted by Defendant’s evidence.
Plaintiff does not offer evidence to dispute the legitimacy
of Ms. Abbott’s statement that she valued current use of the
required skills over prior experience in her evaluation of the
applications, or that management skills were less important for
the Program Analyst position than analytical skills.

Plaintiff

argues that his resume demonstrated “specialized experience and
qualifications” that Mr. Segrist lacked (ECF No. 12, at 8), and
submits an affidavit attesting that, based on his own experience
and review of the applications, Mr. Segrist’s resume did not
properly

identify

examples

of

accomplishments (ECF No. 12-12).

his

work

product

or

Plaintiff’s evaluations of his

and his competitor’s applications are not sufficient evidence
that Ms. Abbott’s nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s nonselection are false.

See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960; Taylor v.

Brown, 928 F. Supp. 568, 574-75 (D.Md. 1995), aff’d, 86 F.3d
1152 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Plaintiff expresses his own views as to
his qualifications and the necessity for certain experience for
the position.
Title

VII

irrelevant;

‘The self-perception of a plaintiff in an ADEA or

suit
what

as

to

matters

his
is

or
the

her

other

perception

qualifications
of

the

is

decision-

maker.’” (quoting Douglas v. PHH FleetAmerica Corp., 832 F.Supp.
1002, 1010 (D.Md. 1993))); see also Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc.,
14

203

F.3d

274,

(4th

280

Cir.

2000)

(noting

that

plaintiff

improperly disputed the merits of poor performance evaluations
in a discriminatory discharge case rather than showing that the
evaluations

were

“dishonest

or

not

the

real

reason

for

her

termination”); Bostron v. Apfel, 104 F.Supp.2d 548, 556 (D.Md.
2000), aff’d, 2 F.App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Standing alone,
self-serving claims of superiority in a Title VII case do not
suffice.”).
Plaintiff also contends, as evidence of pretext, that he
was more qualified for the position than Mr. Segrist because he
was ranked second on the Certificate of Eligibles, while Mr.
Segrist was ranked fifth.

(ECF No. 12, at 8).

These scores

reflected only the candidates’ self-assessments, however.

Ms.

Abbott affirmed that she did not consider the self-assessment
scores in making the selection, but based the decision only on
her review of the five applications using the criteria discussed
above.

(ECF

No.

8-2,

at

101-02).

Once

the

list

of

most

qualified candidates was provided to Ms. Abbott, she was free to
choose

from

account

the

among

them,

and

self-assessment

was

not

scores.

required
(See

id.

to

take

into

at

195

(“The

selecting official has the right to select or not select any
candidate

referred

on

the

promotion

competitive list.”)).

15

certificate

or

non-

Plaintiff
“fabricated
Selectee

asserts,

Selectee’s

qualified

without
[Mr.

based

evidence,

Segrist’s]

on

that

Ms.

Kelley

to

ensure

Ms.

Abbott

background

vacancy,”

and

that

“fabricated Selectee’s background, interjected her abstract view
into

his

resume,

then

re-ranked

candidates

abstract view of Selectee’s background.”

utilizing

her

(ECF No. 12, at 8; see

also id. at 12 (arguing that Plaintiff “believes Agency, HR, and
SO [Ms. Abbott] fabricated Selectee’s demonstrated specialized
experience

to

get

Selectee

to

qualify”)).

Plaintiff’s

mere

speculation cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact.
Moreover,

Plaintiff

has

offered

no

evidence

discrimination was the real reason he was not selected.

that
There

is no evidence that Ms. Abbott was “motivated by any desire
other

than

to

select

the

candidate

[she]

felt

was

the

best

suited for the position.”

Riley v. Honeywell Tech. Sols., Inc.,

323

&

F.App’x

276,

plaintiff’s
differences

277-78

“self-serving
in

n.2

(4th

Cir.

contentions

evaluation . . . and

that

2009)

(noting

that

that

there

were

[the

selectee]

was

preselected, were properly discounted by the district court as
having no viable evidentiary support and as being insufficient
as a matter of law to establish pretext”); see also Hawkins, 203
F.3d

at

281.

Plaintiff

has

not

shown

that

the

Agency’s

legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its selection decision

16

are pretextual, and accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment solely on

the issue of whether Ms. Abbott conducted an interview for the
position.

(ECF No. 14).

The undisputed evidence in the record

shows that Ms. Abbott did not interview any of the candidates in
making

the

selection.

(ECF

Nos.

8-2,

at

93;

12-9,

at

3).

Defendant mistakenly stated in the factual background section of
his briefing that Ms. Abbott interviewed only Selectee.
No. 8-1, at 3 & n.2).

(ECF

In reply, Defendant acknowledges this

error and argues that this issue is not relevant to the issue
before the court.

(ECF No. 16, at 5 n.3).

Pursuant to the

Agency Foreign Affairs Manual, “Selecting officials will have
the option of interviewing all, any or none of the candidates
referred.”
undisputed
referred

(ECF Nos. 8-1, at 3 n.2; 8-2, at 194-95).
that

Ms.

Abbott

candidates,

chose

consistent

to
with

interview
Agency

It is

none

of

policy.

the
Her

decision not to interview candidates is not a material issue,
and

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

partial

summary

judgment

will

be

denied.
V.

Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine dispute as to a

material fact with respect to both his prima facie case and the
17

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason articulated by Defendant for
his non-selection for the Program Analyst position.
foregoing

reasons,

Defendant

John

the

Kerry

motion

will

for

be

summary

granted,

and

judgment
judgment

For the
filed

by

will

be

entered against Plaintiff with respect to his claim of race
discrimination under Title VII.

Plaintiff’s motion for partial

summary judgment will be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

18