Eccleston v. Prince George's County
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/1/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Civil Action No. DKC 15-3871
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
Presently pending and ready for resolution is a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Prince George’s County.
(ECF No. 18).
have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons,
the motion to dismiss will be granted.
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint is fairly sparse.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, his
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
Generally, pro se pleadings are liberally construed and
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Plaintiff
filed his complaint pro se in December 2015.
(ECF No. 1).
Counsel for Plaintiff entered his appearance on August 18, 2016,
but Plaintiff has not amended his complaint. Even where a court
construction means that the court will read the pleadings to
state a valid claim to the extent that it is possible to do so
from the facts available; it does not mean that the court should
employer, discriminated against him on the basis of his national
(Id. ¶ 5).
He contends that Defendant “fail[ed] to
appoint [him] with [his] required hour[s] of personal and sick
(Id. ¶ 3).
He states, “[O]ther employees were given
For example, one employee got paid for his leave
that was unknown and I didn’t get paid for my leave.”
After filing this complaint, Plaintiff retained counsel
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 25,
(ECF No. 18).
When Plaintiff failed to file a timely
opposition to the motion, the court issued a paperless notice to
counsel on September 29 requesting that Plaintiff promptly file
a response or advise the court if he did not intend to file an
(ECF No. 19).
Plaintiff has not responded.
Standard of Review
Defendant moves to dismiss because Plaintiff has failed to
administrative remedies under Title VII deprives the courts of
rewrite the complaint to include claims never presented.”
Olekanma v. Wolfe, No. DKC-15-0984, 2016 WL 430178, at *2 (D.Md.
Feb. 4, 2016) (citing Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132
(10th Cir. 1999)).
analysis under Rule 12(b)(1) at the motion to dismiss stage, see
Onuoha v. Grafton School, 182 F.Supp.2d 473, 481 (D.Md. 2002).
In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court “is to regard the pleadings
as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co.
v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see also
Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).
jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 945 F.2d at 768.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
distinct from the claim he filed in his EEOC charge.
18, at 5).
“Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff
must exhaust h[is] administrative remedies by bringing a charge
with the EEOC.”
Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234,
247 (4th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 210
Title VII civil suits may not present entirely new
factual bases or entirely new theories of liability not found in
the initial EEOC complaint.
Rather, the scope of the initial
administrative charge limits the scope of the civil action to
“those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those
Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80
F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Thus, a plaintiff fails to exhaust his claims when “his
administrative charges reference different time frames, actors,
and discriminatory conduct than the central factual allegations
in his formal suit.”
Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505,
506 (4th Cir. 2005).
This limitation on the civil action is
discrimination on one basis - such as race – and he introduces
another basis in formal litigation – such as sex.”
Id. at 509.
failure to promote – and the claim encompasses another type –
Here, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged only that Defendant
was giving him a heavier workload than his Caucasian co-worker.
(ECF No. 18-1, at 3).
His EEOC charge made no reference to
employee leave or any other benefits.
Nor was the issue
of leave “developed by reasonable investigation.”
charge was cross-filed, the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights
investigated the EEOC charge and issued a written finding on
August 6, 2015.
(ECF No. 18-2).
That finding makes no mention
of leave, benefits, or any other issue outside of Plaintiff’s
The comparators Plaintiff alleges highlight
the distinction between the allegations in the EEOC charge and
workload to that of a female employee, Margaret Hayes.
18-1, at 3).
His complaint here compares the leave he received
indicates that the other employee was male.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 6).
Because Plaintiff’s complaint is based on factual allegations
and discriminatory conduct different from those alleged in his
EEOC charge, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies
for his claim in this court as Title VII requires.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Prince George’s County will be granted.
order will follow.
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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