Eccleston v. Prince George's County

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/1/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
BALDY ECCLESTON
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-3871

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Prince George’s County.

(ECF No. 18).

The issues

have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons,

the motion to dismiss will be granted.
I.

Background1
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint is fairly sparse.

No. 1).2

(See ECF

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, his

1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.
2

Generally, pro se pleadings are liberally construed and
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Plaintiff
filed his complaint pro se in December 2015.
(ECF No. 1).
Counsel for Plaintiff entered his appearance on August 18, 2016,
but Plaintiff has not amended his complaint. Even where a court
applies
the
more
lenient
pleadings
standard,
“[l]iberal
construction means that the court will read the pleadings to
state a valid claim to the extent that it is possible to do so
from the facts available; it does not mean that the court should

employer, discriminated against him on the basis of his national
origin.

(Id. ¶ 5).

He contends that Defendant “fail[ed] to

appoint [him] with [his] required hour[s] of personal and sick
leave.”

(Id. ¶ 3).

better

treatment

miscalculated.

He states, “[O]ther employees were given
even

though

their

leaves

were

also

For example, one employee got paid for his leave

that was unknown and I didn’t get paid for my leave.”

(Id. ¶

6).

After filing this complaint, Plaintiff retained counsel

(ECF

No.

17),

but

Plaintiff

has

not

amended

his

original

complaint.
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 25,
2016.

(ECF No. 18).

When Plaintiff failed to file a timely

opposition to the motion, the court issued a paperless notice to
counsel on September 29 requesting that Plaintiff promptly file
a response or advise the court if he did not intend to file an
opposition.
II.

(ECF No. 19).

Plaintiff has not responded.

Standard of Review
Defendant moves to dismiss because Plaintiff has failed to

exhaust

his

administrative

remedies.

A

failure

to

exhaust

administrative remedies under Title VII deprives the courts of
subject
Indus,

matter
Inc.,

jurisdiction,
711

F.3d

401,

see
406

Balas
(4th

v.
Cir.

Huntington
2013),

Ingalls

requiring

rewrite the complaint to include claims never presented.”
Olekanma v. Wolfe, No. DKC-15-0984, 2016 WL 430178, at *2 (D.Md.
Feb. 4, 2016) (citing Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132
(10th Cir. 1999)).
2

analysis under Rule 12(b)(1) at the motion to dismiss stage, see
Onuoha v. Grafton School, 182 F.Supp.2d 473, 481 (D.Md. 2002).
In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court “is to regard the pleadings
as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside
the

pleadings

without

summary judgment.”

converting

the

proceeding

to

one

for

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co.

v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see also
Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).
should

grant

the

motion

to

dismiss

only

“if

The court

the

material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is
entitled

to

prevail

as

a

matter

of

law.”

Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 945 F.2d at 768.
plaintiff

has

the

jurisdiction exists.

burden

of

proving

that

Richmond,

Moreover, the
subject

matter

Id.

III. Analysis
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative

remedies

because

his

claim

in

this

distinct from the claim he filed in his EEOC charge.
18, at 5).

court

is

(ECF No.

“Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff

must exhaust h[is] administrative remedies by bringing a charge
with the EEOC.”

Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234,

247 (4th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 210
(2010).

Title VII civil suits may not present entirely new

factual bases or entirely new theories of liability not found in

3

the initial EEOC complaint.

Rather, the scope of the initial

administrative charge limits the scope of the civil action to
“those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those
reasonably

related

developed

by

complaint.”

to

the

reasonable

original

complaint,

investigation

of

and

the

those

original

Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80
F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Thus, a plaintiff fails to exhaust his claims when “his
administrative charges reference different time frames, actors,
and discriminatory conduct than the central factual allegations
in his formal suit.”

Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505,

506 (4th Cir. 2005).

This limitation on the civil action is

routinely

applied

where

a

plaintiff’s

charge

“alleges

discrimination on one basis - such as race – and he introduces
another basis in formal litigation – such as sex.”
It

also

alleges

applies,
one

type

however,
of

when

“the

discrimination

–

Id. at 509.

administrative
such

as

charge

discriminatory

failure to promote – and the claim encompasses another type –
such

as

discrimination

in

pay

and

benefits.”

Id.

(citing

cases).
Here, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged only that Defendant
was giving him a heavier workload than his Caucasian co-worker.
(ECF No. 18-1, at 3).

His EEOC charge made no reference to
4

employee leave or any other benefits.

(Id.).

Nor was the issue

of leave “developed by reasonable investigation.”

After his

charge was cross-filed, the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights
investigated the EEOC charge and issued a written finding on
August 6, 2015.

(ECF No. 18-2).

That finding makes no mention

of leave, benefits, or any other issue outside of Plaintiff’s
workload.

(Id.).

The comparators Plaintiff alleges highlight

the distinction between the allegations in the EEOC charge and
his

claim

in

court.

Plaintiff’s

EEOC

charge

compared

workload to that of a female employee, Margaret Hayes.

his

(ECF No.

18-1, at 3).

His complaint here compares the leave he received

with

employee

another

who

“got

paid

for

indicates that the other employee was male.

his

leave,”

which

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 6).

Because Plaintiff’s complaint is based on factual allegations
and discriminatory conduct different from those alleged in his
EEOC charge, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies
for his claim in this court as Title VII requires.

Therefore,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Prince George’s County will be granted.

A separate

order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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