Ali v. The Prince George's County Department of Corrections et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 9/4/2018. (c/m 9/4/2018 heps, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SEIFULLAH A. ALI, #446-853

:

Plaintiff

:

v.

: CIVIL ACTION NO. PWG-16-186

CHAPLAIN FILIBERTO ROMERO,1
CHAPLAIN JAMES PENN,

:
:

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Seifullah A. Ali was detained prior to trial and sentencing at the Prince George’s
County Detention Center (“Detention Center”) between December 23, 2014 and April 21, 2016.2
While there, Mr. Ali alleged that (1) he was unable to attend Friday and daily Islamic prayer
services; (2) he was denied inmate grievance forms and legal calls; (3) he was forced to pay for
haircuts and sick call visits; (4) he was unable to forward money from his institutional account to
his family; (5) he was placed in segregation prior to adjudication of a disciplinary matter; and (6)
he could not obtain certain legal information from the library.3 Compl. ¶¶ 3–6, 8–10. His

1

The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full names of Chaplains Romero and Penn.

2

Mr. Ali was arrested for possession of drugs and paraphernalia on December 22, 2014, and
pleaded guilty in Prince George’s County Circuit Court in Case No. CT-151188 to the drug
possession charge on June 18, 2015. While awaiting trial on the drug charges, Mr. Ali was also
charged in the Circuit Court with 149 counts of violation of a peace order, harassment, misuse of
the telephone, and related charges in Case No. CT-150316-X. Mr. Ali was represented by
counsel in each case. See http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquiry. Full case
information provided in the Maryland electronic docket is shielded; however, Division of
Correction personnel at Western Correctional Institution (“WCI”), where Mr. Ali is now
confined, indicate he is serving a 27-year sentence imposed on April 8, 2016, for electronic
harassment. His presumptive release date is September 14, 2033.

3

Ali also alleged constitutionally deficient health care by employees of Corizon, Inc, and
accused Corporal Lewis of assaulting him. Compl. ¶ 2, 7, Mot. To Amend Compl., ECF No. 9.

Complaint sought money damages for alleged violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 11–12; Mot. to Amend, ECF No.7.
On August 7, 2017, I granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendants McTerran, Dixon, McDonough, Bums, Stafford, and Labbe, and dismissed
all of Mr. Ali’s claims but his religious exercise claim. Aug. 7, 2017 Or. 1, ECF 33. I also
ordered service to be effected on Chaplains Romero and Penn regarding his religious exercise
claim. Id.
Once served, Chaplain Romero filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for
Summary Judgment, Romero Mot., ECF No. 37, and Chaplain Penn filed a Motion to Dismiss,
Penn Mot., ECF No. 44.4 On September 15, 2017 and October 6, 2017, respectively, the Clerk
of the Court informed Mr. Ali that Chaplains Romero and Penn each filed a dispositive motion;
that he had seventeen days in which to file a written opposition to the motion; and that if he
failed to respond, summary judgment could be entered against him without further notice. See
ECF Nos. 41, 45; Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). Mr. Ali filed a
response only to Mr. Romero’s motion. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 43. A hearing is unnecessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). Chaplain Penn’s Motion to Dismiss and Chaplain Romero’s
Motion for Summary Judgment5 will be granted. Because Mr. Ali’s allegations fail to state a

These claims were dismissed without prejudice and Ali was informed that these matters could be
brought as separate lawsuits. Apr. 13, 2016 Order at 2, ECF 12.
4

Both Chaplain Romero and Chaplain Penn filed their motions in the same document as their
memoranda in support of their respective motions. See Romero Mot.; Penn Mot.
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Because the Chaplain Romero filed a motion titled “Motion to Dismiss Pro Se Complaint, and
alternatively, for Summary Judgment,” along with documents in support, to which Plaintiff
responded, Plaintiff was on notice that the Court could treat the motion as one for summary
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claim for which relief may be granted as to Chaplains Romero and Penn, his complaint will be
dismissed as to both Chaplains. However, as Plaintiff plausibly has pleaded a cause of action
regarding his free exercise of religion claim, but has named the wrong defendants, I will
appoint counsel to represent Mr. Ali on this claim only, and will permit counsel (once he or she
has accepted his or her appointment) thirty days to amend Mr. Ali’s Complaint to identify the
correct defendants.
Standards of Review
Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under this Rule, Mr.
Ali’s Complaint is subject to dismissal if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state “a
plausible claim for relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule
12(b)(6)’s purpose “is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Velencia v.
Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012) (quoting Presley v.
City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006)).

judgment and rule on that basis. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253,
260–61 (4th Cir. 1998); Walker v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., No. CCB–12–3151, 2013 WL
2370442, at *3 (D. Md. May 30, 2013); Ridgell v. Astrue, No. DKC–10–3280, 2012 WL 707008,
at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012).
3

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and his Complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, liberal construction does not absolve Plaintiff
from pleading plausible claims. See Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981) (citing
Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562–63 (4th Cir. 1977)).
Motion for Summary Judgment
Chaplain Romero alternatively seeks summary judgment. It is proper when the moving
party demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . ,
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),
(c)(1)(A); see also Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 2013). If the
party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify evidence that
shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 & n.10 (1986). The existence of only a “scintilla of
evidence” is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). Instead, the evidentiary materials submitted must show facts
from which the finder of fact reasonably could find for the party opposing summary judgment.
Id. A “genuine” dispute of material fact is one where the conflicting evidence creates “fair
doubt”; wholly speculative assertions do not create “fair doubt.” Cox v. Cty. of Prince William,
249 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Miskin v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d
669, 671 (D. Md. 1999). The substantive law governing the case determines what is material.
See Hooven–Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001).

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A fact that is not of

consequence to the case, or is not relevant in light of the governing law, is not material. Id.; see
also Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining relevance). “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this
Court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Downing v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. RDB 12-1047, 2015 WL
1186430, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2015) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).
There is no genuine dispute of material fact if the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of his case as to which he would have the burden of
proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Therefore, on those issues for
which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his responsibility to confront the
summary judgment motion with an affidavit that “set[s] out facts that would be admissible in
evidence” or other similar facts that could be “presented in a form that would be admissible in
evidence” showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), (4); see also
Ridgell, 2012 WL 707008, at *7; Laughlin, 149 F.2d at 260–61.
Chaplain Romero attached to his motion an affidavit, Romero Aff., ECF No. 37-1; his
contract with the Detention Center, ECF No. 37-2; evidence that Mr. Ali participated in
Ramadan in 2015, ECF No. 37-3; and two inmate request forms regarding clarification on
available services, ECF Nos. 37-4, 37-5. In contrast, Mr. Ali filed an opposition without any
evidence, and filed an unverified complaint. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is not verified, its
factual assertions may not be considered in opposition to Chaplain Romero’s motion. See
Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also
Abdelnaby v. Durham D & M, LLC, No. GLR-14-3905, 2017 WL 3725500, at *4 (D. Md. Aug.
29, 2017) (awarding summary judgment for the defendants, because the plaintiff could not create
a genuine dispute of material fact ‘through mere speculation,’” and “[t]hus, the Court [wa]s left

5

with a record that [wa]s bereft of evidence supporting any of Abdelnaby’s arguments”) (quoting
Beale v. Hardy, 769, F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Discussion
Claims against Chaplains Romero and Penn
Mr. Ali claims that the Prince George’s County Detention Center’s (“Detention Center”)
Office of the Chaplain denied his request to attend Islamic prayer services because the facility
lacks a religious services center. Compl. ¶ 3. Mr. Ali named in his Amended Complaint,
Chaplains Romero and Penn, but did not specify any actions either took; he simply added their
names as Defendants. Am. Compl., ECF No. 5. In my August 7, 2017 Memorandum Opinion, I
addressed Mr. Ali’s allegations preliminarily: “It appears that Ali was provided some
accommodation of his religious practices. Defs.’ Mot. 3; Inmate Request Form, Defs.’ Mot. Ex.
2, ECF No. 24-2 (providing Ali with prayer calendar); Ramadan Participant List, Defs.’ Mot. Ex.
3, ECF No. 24-3.” Aug. 7, 2017 Mem. Op., ECF No. 32.
The Detention Center does not provide daily Islamic prayer service to inmates, but
“[i]nmates who wish to participate in daily prayers do so inside their respective cells.” Romero
Decl. ¶¶ 7–8. Chaplain Romero attests that he is not aware that Mr. Ali was denied his ability to
pray in his cell and that to his knowledge, Mr. Ali was informed of and provided access to yearly
Ramadan services and “weekly led prayer service depending upon the availability of a volunteer
Imam, . . . which are controlled by the Detention Center.” Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
In response, Mr. Ali argues, for the first time issues that were not pleaded in his
complaint, that when he was processed at the Detention Center, he was shown a video
concerning facility operations, which showed Christian, Jewish and Islamic services “in
congregation.” Pl.’s Opp’n 1–2. Mr. Ali also adds that interactions with Chaplains Romero and
Penn, which he argues contained language insinuating that no Islamic services existed at the
Detention Center, constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights, “the Freedom of
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Religion Act,” and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. However, I may not address his new claims because an opposition to a
dispositive motion is not a vehicle for amending a pleading.6 See Whitten v. Apria Healthcare
Grp., Inc., No. PWG-14-3193, 2015 WL 2227928, at *7 (D. Md. May 11, 2015).
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids the adoption of laws designed
to suppress religious beliefs or practices.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir.
2001). An additional consideration in this case is the standard provided by the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The act provides in part that:
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person—(A) is in furtherance of a compelling
government interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); see also Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198 & n. 8 (4th Cir. 2006).
To demonstrate his rights to the free exercise of his religion were violated, Mr. Ali “must
demonstrate that: (1) he holds a sincere religious belief; and (2) a prison practice or policy places
a substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion.” Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 168
(4th Cir. 2017) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
A person’s ability to freely exercise his or her religion is burdened when defendants place
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas,
450 U.S. at 718. When deciding whether an institution’s practice substantially burdens religious
exercise, “courts must not judge the significance of the particular belief or practice in question.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 n.2.

Mr. Ali clearly establishes he has sincerely held beliefs as a practicing Sunni Muslim. He

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Mr. Ali’s Opposition also moves for summary judgment on these issues, which are contained in
an unverified motion and opposition, Pl.’s Opp’n 3. However, as these claims are not before this
Court, his motion will be denied. See Whitten, 2015 WL 2227928, at *7.
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asserts that his faith requires daily congregant worship and a congregant worship service on
Fridays. Therefore, Mr. Ali has satisfied the first prong of Thomas. Mr. Ali also satisfies the
second prong because he has alleged that the Detention Center maintains a policy or practice that
does not permit him to attend Friday and daily Islamic Prayer Services. Compl. ¶ 3.
However, even though Mr. Ali satisfies the Thomas test, his claims against Chaplains
Romero and Penn fail. Chaplain Penn argues that Mr. Ali has failed to allege any specific facts
indicating how he personally violated Mr. Ali’s rights to freely practice Islam. Penn. Mot. 4–5.
Chaplain Penn is correct as Mr. Ali’s complaint does not have “facial plausibility . . . that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Mr. Ali’s claim only alleges that “the Office of the Chaplain”
was violating his rights, not Chaplain Penn. For that reason, Chaplain Penn’s Motion to Dismiss
will be granted. See id.
Chaplain Romero contracts annually with the Detention Center to serve as a Chaplain to
the Hispanic and Latino Inmate Ministry. Chaplain Romero attests that he lacks the “authority or
ability to designate any room inside the Detention Center as a religious services center, [and does
not have] knowledge that any such space is available.” Romero Aff. ¶ 12. Further, he attests
that the weekly led prayer services are depended on “the availability of a volunteer Imam” and
that those services and yearly Ramadan services “are controlled by the Detention Center.” Id.
¶ 5. Mr. Ali has not rebutted any of this evidence,7 and therefore, has failed to create a genuine
dispute of material fact, specifically that Chaplain Romero is responsible for a policy that does
not permit Mr. Ali to practice his religion or that he is able rectify any burden placed on Mr. Ali

7

Although Mr. Ali disputes Chaplain Romero’s version of events, he has not done so by
declaration, affidavit, or verified complaint. Accordingly his explanation fails to meet the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
8

by such a policy. See Vanderhurst v. Mohardt, PWG-13-2143, 2015 WL 3874551, at *2 (D. Md.
June 22, 2015) (awarding summary judgment to the defendant as the plaintiff named the wrong
defendant); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Abdelnaby, 2017 WL 3725500, at *4. As such,
Chaplain Romero’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
Ali’s Request for Counsel and Affording an Opportunity to Amend
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 47. A federal district court
judge’s power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is discretionary, and an indigent
claimant must present “exceptional circumstances” for the court to appoint counsel. Miller v.
Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). Exceptional circumstances exist where a “pro se
litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it.” See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739
F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S.
296, 298 (1989)(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of
counsel).
Plaintiff’s claim is not unduly complicated and he has demonstrated the ability to
articulate his claims. However, he has not named any defendant who is responsible for the
policy that restricts his religious exercise. To aid Mr. Ali, as it appears his only deficiency at this
time is identifying a proper defendant, I will appoint counsel in this case only for the purpose of
assisting him to prosecute his free exercise claim. Upon pro bono counsel’s acceptance of his or
her appointment, counsel will be permitted thirty days (unless otherwise ordered by the court or
agreed to by the parties) in which to amend Mr. Ali’s free exercise claim to name the defendant
or defendants responsible for overseeing the Detention Center’s policy that Mr. Ali alleges
restricted his rights to practice Islam.

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Conclusion
Mr. Ali’s claims against Chaplains Romero and Penn are dismissed as to these two
defendants as he has not alleged with specificity any actions taken by either that violated his
ability to freely exercise his religion. I will appoint counsel (in a separate order) to represent Mr.
Ali on his free exercise claim. Counsel will be permitted thirty days to amend Mr. Ali’s pleading
to name the appropriate defendants for this claim.
Separate orders shall issue.

Date: September 4, 2018

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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