Ali v. The Prince George's County Department of Corrections et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 72 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/13/2019. (heps, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SEIFULLAH A. ALI,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY; MARY
LOU MCDONOUGH; CORENNE LABBE;
W. STEPHAN SIMMONS; AMANDA
WELCH

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Civil Action No. 8:16-cv-186

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Seifullah A. Ali alleges that while he was incarcerated at Prince George’s County
Detention Center (“PGCDC”), he was denied the ability to exercise his religion. ECF No. 60
(“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 1. Plaintiff names Prince George’s County (“the County”), along with PGCDC
employees Mary Lou McDonough, Corenne Labbe, W. Stephan Simmons and Amanda Welch
(the “Individual Defendants”), in their official and individual capacities, as defendants. Pending
is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 72.1 For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The claims against the Individual
Defendants in their individual capacities are dismissed. The case will proceed against the
Individual Defendants in their official capacities and the County. Defendants’ request to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages is denied.

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The parties fully briefed the motion. See ECF Nos. 72, 73, 74. A hearing is not necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6.

Background
Plaintiff was incarcerated at PGCDC between December 2014 and April 2016 while
awaiting trial and sentencing for criminal charges in the Prince George’s County Circuit Court.
Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Mary Lou McDonough is the Warden and Director of PGCDC; Corenne Labbe
is the Deputy Director and head of the Bureau of Administration of PGCDC; W. Stephan Simmons
is the Chief of the Program Services Division of PGCDC; and Amanda Welch is the Chief of the
Inmate Services Section of PGCDC. Id. at ¶¶ 7–10. Plaintiff claims the County and the Individual
Defendants prohibited him and other Muslim inmates from exercising their religion at PGCDC. 2
Specifically, Plaintiff allegedly sought permission to congregate for group prayers and to
engage in study groups. Id. at ¶¶ 25–31. Plaintiff claims that he was told it was the policy of
PGCDC to prohibit Muslim inmates from congregating for prayers or study group unless a
volunteer imam from outside PGCDC was present to lead the services but that “no one from the
volunteer community had volunteered to perform these services at the Detention Center.” Id. at ¶
28. Plaintiff says that he volunteered to help PGCDC seek out imams from the local community
that would be willing to visit PGCDC, but his requests were denied. Id. at ¶ 30. In addition to
prayer services, Plaintiff alleges he and other Muslim inmates were denied special meals for
holidays. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff claims he was told that it was not the policy of the PGCDC to

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On August 7, 2017, I granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss or in the alternative
a motion for summary judgement filed by Defendants and dismissed all of Mr. Ali’s claims except
his religious exercise claim. ECF Nos. 32, 33. I also ordered service to be completed on PGCDC
chaplains Romero and Penn regarding his religious exercise claim. Id. Once served, Chaplain
Romero and Chaplain Penn filed separate Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 37, 44. The Clerk of the
Court informed Mr. Ali that he had seventeen days to respond to each, or the claims could be
dismissed without further notice. ECF Nos. 41, 45. Mr. Ali filed a response only to Mr. Romero’s
motion. ECF No. 43. Because Mr. Ali’s allegations failed to state a claim for which relief may
be granted as to Chaplains Romero and Penn, his complaint was dismissed as to both Chaplains.
ECF Nos. 48, 49. I appointed pro bono counsel for Mr. Ali and granted him leave to file a second
amended complaint. Id. The present amended complaint and pending motion to dismiss followed.
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provide special meals to Muslim inmates.

Id.

Plaintiff maintains that other correctional

institutions in Maryland allow congregation for prayer services and provide special meals for
religious holidays. Id. at ¶ 35.
Plaintiff further alleges Defendants provided programs, services and opportunities to
Christian inmates, but “failed to undertake reasonable efforts to bring Muslim religious volunteers
to the Detention Center.” Id. at ¶ 34. PGCDC contracted with a ministry to bring religious officials
to perform Christian services and programs. Id. at ¶ 40. Christian inmates were permitted to
congregate for religious services and engage in Bible study groups even when a religious official
was not present. Id. at ¶ 41–42. They are also given special meals during Christmas and Easter.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Plaintiff asserts that “[a]ll of these policies, practices, and customs were formulated,
designed, and implemented by and under the supervision of” the Individual Defendants, and that
the Individual Defendants were “acting on behalf of Prince George’s County.” Id. at ¶¶ 44, 50.
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act against Defendant Prince George’s County and the Individual
Defendants in their official capacities. Id. at ¶¶ 51–59. Count II alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment against Defendant Prince George’s
County and the Individual Defendants in their official and individual capacities. Id. at ¶¶ 60–68.
Count III alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against Defendant Prince George’s County and the Individual Defendants in their
official and individual capacities. Id. at ¶¶ 69–77. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, nominal,
punitive, and other money damages. Id. at ¶ 78.

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Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the official capacity claims should
be dismissed in each count, the individual capacity claims should be dismissed in Counts II and
III, and that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts II and III.
ECF No. 72 at 2. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims must be
dismissed. ECF No. 74 at 6.
Standard of Review
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal if they “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state
“a plausible claim for relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule
12(b)(6)’s purpose “is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). The well pleaded facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint are
accepted as true. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations are
construed “in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff.” Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d
369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060, 1062 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
Discussion
Individual Capacity Claims
Defendants move to dismiss the § 1983 individual capacity claims in Counts II and III
against the Individual Defendants. ECF No. 72. Section 1983 provides liability for “[e]very

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person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “‘Although § 1983 must be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions, liability will
only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation
of the plaintiffs’ rights.’” Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vinnedge
v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted in original). “The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this
section.” Id. Rather, § 1983 “require[s] proof of an affirmative causal connection between the
official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation”). Id. (citing and quoting
Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995)).
For example, § 1983 liability based on personal involvement was found for a prison
director and sheriff where the defendants “played key roles” in ensuring that the plaintiff remained
in solitary confinement by “seeking and recommending approval by the Governor.” Williamson
v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 172–73 (4th Cir. 2018). In contrast, civil rights claims against a sheriff
stemming from a foreclosure action were dismissed where the plaintiff failed to allege any specific
facts regarding the sheriff’s personal involvement. Proctor v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 289 F.
Supp. 3d 676, 690–91 (D. Md. 2018).
Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead personal involvement of the Individual Defendants.
Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that his requests for accommodation were communicated to and denied
by Defendants’ agents, “including Chaplain James Penn, Chaplain Filiberto Romero, Lieutenant
Dixon, and various correctional officers in his housing units, including Corporals Montgomery,
Dudley, Wallace, Hawkins, and Mothershead.” Am. Compl. ¶ 27; see also id. at ¶¶ 28–33. In

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fact, Plaintiff does not allege any specific action or omission taken by the Individual Defendants.
Therefore Plaintiff has not adequately plead facts to allow a reasonable inference of liability
against the Individual Defendants based on their personal involvement.
Plaintiff cites Cranford v. Frick to support his claim that a supervisor is liable for his own
“affirmative misconduct” as a basis for personal liability. No. 05-00062, 2007 WL 676687, at *6
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2007). While that proposition is true, this case does not advance Plaintiff’s
argument. In Cranford, the plaintiff alleged that the supervisor, a sheriff, was directly involved
with the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights by authorizing an unlawful search and seizure
performed by his subordinate officers. Id. at *4. Here Plaintiff does not plead any affirmative
conduct by the Individual Defendants, except the conclusory allegation that the Individual
Defendants were responsible for “formulating, designing, implementing, and enforcing the
policies” in question and for the actions of their agents that resulted in his injuries. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 44–50. Unlike in Cranford, these allegations are not sufficient for the Court to reasonably infer
affirmative misconduct of the Individual Defendants as a basis for personal involvement.
However, there is a limited exception for supervisory liability based on the actions of
subordinates. “Such liability is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather
is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’
misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed
to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v.
Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.1984). “[L]iability ultimately is determined ‘by pinpointing
the persons in the decision-making chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional
abuses to continue unchecked.’” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798

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(4th Cir.1994)

(quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 376). To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate
three factors articulated in Shaw v. Stroud:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response
to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices’; and (3) that there was an
‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisors inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Randall v. Prince George’s Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lewis v. Bishop, No. PWG-183616, 2019 WL 4038558, at *7 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2019) (listing factors).
With respect to the first prong, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the supervisor’s knowledge of
(2) conduct engaged in by a subordinate (3) where the conduct poses a pervasive and unreasonable
risk of constitutional injury to the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. “Establishing a ‘pervasive’
and ‘unreasonable’ risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least has
been used on several different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the subordinate poses
an unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury.” Id. “Because supervisors ‘cannot be
expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence,’ and because
they may be powerless to prevent deliberate unlawful acts by subordinates, the courts have
appropriately required proof of multiple instances of misconduct before permitting supervisory
liability to attach.” Randall v. Prince George’s Cty., Md., 302 F.3d at 207 (quoting Slakan, 737
F.2d at 373).
For the second prong, “[d]eliberate indifference . . . may be satisfied by showing ‘[a]
supervisor’s continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.’” Randall v. Prince
George’s Cty., Md., 302 F.3d at 206 (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). “Deliberate indifference is a

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very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”

Mikkelsen v. DeWitt, 141

F. App’x 88, 91–92 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir.1999)).
“‘[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence’ but ‘is
satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d at 236 (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)).
As to the third prong, “proof of causation may be direct . . . where the policy commands
the injury of which the plaintiff complains . . . [or] may be supplied by [the] tort principle that
holds a person liable for the natural consequences of his actions.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 791 (quoting
Slakan, 737 F.2d at 376) (alterations in original).
For example, in Shaw, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a denial of summary judgment where a
supervisor was aware of at least three reports of violent tendencies by a subordinate officer but
failed to take any action to prevent constitutional abuse. 13 F.3d at 800. And in Slakan, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding supervisory liability where high-pressure water hoses were
used against an inmate housed in a one-man cell. 737 F.2d at 376. In that case, the Court noted
that two of the supervisors had direct knowledge that high-pressure water hoses were used in
similar situations on at least seven occasions and the third indisputably knew that it was used as a
routine control measure. Id. at 374–76.
Likewise, in Baynard v. Malone, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, holding that a reasonable jury could find supervisory liability of a
school principal based on findings that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of
conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury where the principal
was informed on multiple occasions that a teacher abused a student and had inappropriate contact

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with students; and (2) ignoring these mounting warnings amounted to deliberate indifference. 268
F.3d at 235–36.
In contrast, in Randall v. Prince George’s County, Maryland, the Fourth Circuit vacated a
jury verdict and held that there was no supervisory liability where the plaintiffs had not established
a pattern of prior abuses that would demonstrate the supervisors had actual or constructive
knowledge that their subordinates were engaged in conduct that posed a “pervasive and
unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury.” 302 F.3d 188, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2002). While there
was evidence of a standard practice not to release a witness until a lead investigator or supervisor
reviewed a witness’s statement, the plaintiffs failed to establish that it was customary to
unconstitutionally detain a witness without probable cause after they expressed a desire to leave.
Id. The Court also rejected a theory that the abuses were so “widespread and pervasive” that the
supervisors must have known because that “contradicts the premise of supervisory liability, i.e.,
that the failure to supervise contributed to the constitutional deprivation in question.” Id. at 207.
See also Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 111 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming
summary judgment dismissal of supervisory liability allegations where plaintiff “only makes
conclusory allegations without any specific facts that these defendants had knowledge that
retaliation was taking place and that they acquiesced in the retaliatory acts.”).
Similar claims have also been found to be insufficient at the pleadings stage. In Moore v.
Greenwood Sch. Dist. No. 52, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of supervisory liability
claims on a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged a single incident of a supervisor upholding
and ratifying a subordinate’s allegedly retaliatory action not to renew an employment contract.
195 F. App’x 140, 144 (4th Cir. 2006). Likewise, in Jones v. Shanahan this Court dismissed with
prejudice individual capacity claims against a Chief of Police where the complaint was “totally

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bereft of any facts by which the court could infer [the Police Chief’s] involvement” and a proposed
amendment to the complaint that the arrest was completed with the Police Chief’s “knowledge,
direction, delegation and authorization” would be futile as a conclusory allegation. No. PX-1801678, 2019 WL 2341375, at *2, *3 n.3 (D. Md. June 3, 2019). And in Smith v. Wright, this Court
granted a motion to dismiss individual capacity claims, finding that the defendant’s receipt of an
administrative grievance form regarding an alleged incident was insufficient to establish personal
knowledge and liability. No. PWG-13-2258, 2014 WL 4094898 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2014).
Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead supervisory liability for the Individual Defendants.
At the first prong of the Shaw analysis, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts that indicate that
Individual Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that their subordinates were “engaged
in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury.” Plaintiff alleges
that Individual Defendants’ agents were “speaking on behalf of Defendants” when they
communicated that it was the policy of PGCDC to prohibit Muslim inmates from congregating for
group prayers and religious services unless an outside volunteer imam was present. Am. Compl.
¶ 28. And after detailing the ways in which the Individual Defendants’ agents denied his requests,
the complaint summarizes that “Defendants denied Plaintiff’s request to congregate with other
Muslims for religious purposes.” Id. at ¶ 34. These are conclusory allegations with respect to the
Individual Defendants, and are insufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). At best, Plaintiff alleges that he sent “at least one written request to
Defendants seeking permission to hold congregational Jumm’a prayer services” and that the
Individual Defendants’ agent denied the request. This is not enough for the Court to draw a
reasonable inference that the Individual Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that their

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subordinates were “engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of
constitutional injury.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799; cf. Moore v. Greenwood Sch. Dist. No. 52, 195 F.
App’x at 144 (affirming dismissal of supervisory liability claim on motion to dismiss where
plaintiff alleged single incident of supervisor upholding and ratifying allegedly unconstitutional
action); Smith v. Wright, No. PWG-13-2258, 2014 WL 4094898 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2014) (granting
motion to dismiss finding that defendant’s receipt of single administrative grievance form
regarding alleged incident insufficient to establish personal knowledge and liability.)
Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against the Individual Defendants also fail at the
second prong of the Shaw analysis, as Plaintiff does not adequately plead facts for the Court to
reasonably infer that the Individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his claims.
Plaintiff did not plead any facts for the Court to reasonably infer the Individual Defendants had
states of mind sufficient to constitute mere negligence, let alone that of deliberate indifference to
his claims. See Mikkelsen v. DeWitt, 141 F. App’x 88, at 91–92. Again, there were no specific
facts as to the acts or omissions of the Individual Defendants at all.
Plaintiff cites two unpublished out-of-circuit district court cases to support his argument
for supervisory liability. But these cases support Defendants. In Bishop v. Jesson, the plaintiff, a
practicing Jew, alleged supervisory liability against three defendants regarding his claims of
inadequate Kosher food. No. SER-14-1898, 2016 WL 8674584, at *14 (D. Minn. Feb. 12,
2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. ADM-14-1898, 2016 WL 906422 (D. Minn.
Mar. 9, 2016). The court dismissed the claims against two of the supervisors because the plaintiff
only asserted generally that they “implemented, retained and carried out a policy or de facto
standing practice of serving inedible, improper and inadequate kosher meals and non-kosher meals
as kosher meals, by the inclusion of non-kosher foods and provision[ ] or service in a non-kosher

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manner.” Id. Other than this and other general allegations, Plaintiff failed to allege “any facts
specific to [the individual defendants] that demonstrate their direct involvement, failure to train,
or failure to supervise that has caused the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.”) Id. In
contrast, the motion to dismiss the claims against the third supervisory defendant was denied,
because the plaintiff alleged that the inadequacy of the Kosher food was specifically brought to
the defendant’s attention and the defendant allowed it to continue. Id. at *15. Similarly, in
Williams v. Johnston, the court denied the dismissal of First Amendment freedom of association
claims against three supervisors at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program facility where plaintiff
was committed. No. DFW-14-369, 2015 WL 1333991, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted, No. FLN-14-369, 2015 WL 1334015 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2015). There
the court found that the plaintiff made specific allegations of wrongdoing against the supervisors,
including that they individually denied and upheld the denial of plaintiff’s visitation rights. Id.
Here, the allegations are like those against the two supervisors that were dismissed in Bishop and
unlike the allegations against the remaining supervisor in Bishop and the supervisors in Williams.
Like the claims against the dismissed supervisors in Bishop, Plaintiff only makes general
allegations that the Individual Defendants were responsible for and implemented the relevant
policies and fails to allege any facts specific to the Individual Defendants.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff has adequately pled allegations against the County and the Individual
Defendants in their official capacities. Indeed, this point is not contested. As described, Plaintiff
alleges generally that the Individual Defendants were responsible for “formulating, designing,
implementing, and enforcing the policies” that deprived him of his rights and for the actions of
their agents that resulted in his alleged injuries. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44–50. To the extent these
statements are more than conclusory allegations, they provide a basis for municipal liability, not

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supervisory liability of the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. See Mikkelsen v.
DeWitt, 141 F. App’x 88 at 90–91 (“[Plaintiff’s] contention that [individual defendant] is a ‘policy
maker’ does not quite capture the relevant issue here. Debating whether a public employer has
adopted an unconstitutional ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ is a question to be asked when examining the
basis for municipal liability under § 1983. . . . It is not the right question to ask when confronting
a supervisor’s potential liability in his individual capacity.”) (internal citation omitted, emphasis
in original).
Accordingly, the claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities are
dismissed.3 Because Plaintiff has twice amended his complaint and this is the third decision
regarding the sufficiency of the pleadings, this dismissal is with prejudice.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff also sues the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. Defendants move
to dismiss these claims, arguing that they can be consolidated with the claims against the County.
It is well established that government entities are the real parties of interest in official capacity
suits against local government officers. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As
long as the government entity receives notice and opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit
is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”); Huggins v. Prince
George’s Cty., Md., 683 F.3d 525, 532 (4th Cir. 2012) (A suit against a county official in his
official capacity “serve[s] as [a] suit[ ] against the County.”)
However, it is also well established that the Plaintiff is the “master of his complaint and
has the option of naming only those parties the plaintiff chooses to sue . . . .” Lincoln Prop. Co.

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Individual Defendants also claim qualified immunity. But because Plaintiff has not adequately
pled claims against the Individual Defendants, I do not reach this issue.
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v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 91 (2005) (quoting 16 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §
107.14[2][c] (3d ed. 2005)); see also Electro Source, LLC v. Nyko Techs., Inc., No. DT-01-10825,
2002 WL 34536682, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2002) (“Plaintiff is the master of the complaint and
is entitled to name any defendant against which there is a valid cause of action . . . .”). Suits under
RLUIPA and § 1983 can be properly brought against individuals in their official capacities. See,
e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (RLUIPA official capacity suit);
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006) (§ 1983 official capacity suit).
In Carter v. Myers, the Court considered a similar request to substitute the relevant county
as the defendant for individuals sued in their official capacities. No. HMH-15-2583, 2017 WL
3498878, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2017). The court denied the request, recognizing that suits against
the individuals in their official capacities was the same as a suit against the county, because “formal
substitution is not required.” Id. In contrast, in Snowden v. Prince George’s County Department
of Corrections, this Court dismissed official capacity claims against individual defendants in favor
of a suit against the county. No. PJM-18-160, 2018 WL 3862253, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2018).
There the Court found that doing so would “streamline discovery” and plaintiffs identified “no
prevailing need” to keep the individual official capacity defendants in the case. Id.
Here, Plaintiff opposes the request, and Defendants do not argue that dismissing the official
capacity defendants will streamline discovery or otherwise preserve the parties’ or judicial
resources. Indeed, Plaintiff represents that he will be seeking discovery from the Individual
Defendants. ECF No. 73 at 6–7. Given that (1) Plaintiff can choose to name the Individual
Defendants in their official capacities in his complaint, (2) substitution with the County is not
required, and (3) Defendant has not offered any countervailing reason to dismiss the official
capacity claims, Defendants’ request to do so is denied.

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Punitive Damages
Plaintiff is seeking “nominal, compensatory, punitive, and other money damages.” Am.
Comp. ¶ 78. Defendants concede that Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2017) allows
Plaintiff to seek monetary damages. ECF No. 74 at 6. However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
has failed to sufficiently allege punitive damages. Id.
A jury may consider punitive damages in § 1983 actions when there is “reckless or callous
disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law” or conduct
motivated by evil intent. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983); see also Cooper v. Dyke, 814
F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to punitive damages because
his requests for religious accommodation were repeatedly denied while Christian inmates were
afforded similar privileges and that Defendants acted with malice in their “purposeful
discrimination.” Am. Compl. ¶ 74. These allegations are enough to plead claims for punitive
damages as the Court can draw the reasonable inference that Plaintiff may be able to establish
“reckless or callous disregard” or evil intent after completing discovery. And should he fail to do
so, the Defendants will have an opportunity to raise this in a motion for summary judgment once
discovery has concluded. Therefore, Defendants’ request to dismiss the claims for punitive
damages is denied.
Conclusion
In sum, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically,
the claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities are dismissed. The
claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities and against Prince George’s
County may move forward, including claims for punitive damages.

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ORDER
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, it is, this 13th day of December, 2019,
hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 72, is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. Defendants’ request to dismiss the individual capacity claims against the Individual
Defendants is GRANTED. These claims are DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
2. Defendants’ request to dismiss the official capacity claims against the Individual
Defendants is DENIED.
3. Defendants’ request to dismiss all claims for punitive damages is DENIED.
4. Defendants shall file an ANSWER within 30 days of the date of this Order. A
conference call with the Parties then will be scheduled to discuss further proceedings
in this case.

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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