Wood et al v. Charles County Public Schools Schools et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 3/26/2018. (tds, Deputy Clerk)

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IN TIlE UNITF:D STATF:S DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Soutltem Dil';s;oll

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1nla I.\;\R 21

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CALEIGB

WOOD, et lII.,

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Plaintiffs,

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Case No.: G.III-((,-2J9

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EVF:L YI\' ARNOLD, et lII.,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM
The Establishment
prohibits

('omm;ss;oll.

religious

Lemoll

*

Iinancial support. and active involvement

of the sovereign

\'. Kurl=m<l1!. 403 U.S. 602. 612 (1971) (eiting

arc too precious to be either proscribed

lI'e;Sm(/II, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992). Additionally.

from prohibiting

Slales ". UII;le"

Food,.

individuals

IIIC" 533 U.S. 405. 410 (2001).

the right to build impenetrable

silos, completely

separating

in

11'(/1=". '1ilx

beliefs and

by thc Statc," Lee

I'.

prevents the

to express certain vicws, UII;led

But the First Amendment

learning of beliefs contrary to their own, Nor. in this Court's
teacher IrOlll Icading a purely acadcmic

or prescribed

the First Amcndment

speech or compelling

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to the United States Constitution

397 U.S. 664. 668 ( I970)). This principle exists bccause "religious

expression

government

*

OPINION

Clause of the First Amendment

the "sponsorship.

religious aetivity."

*

adherents

docs not anord

of onc religion from e\"CJ'

view. docs it prohibit a high school

study of a rcligion that may differ from thc religious

belicfs of some of his students.

I Follov.:ing Plaintiffs' Amcnded Complain!. ECF No. 39. the docket will be updated to rcllcct thc current Plaintill's
as John Wood and Calcigh Wood.

q: 31

In this action. Plaintiffs

Caleigh Wood and John Kcvin Wood allcgc that Dcfcndants

Evelyn Arnold ("'Principal

Arnold")

Wood's

rights by requiring

First Amendment

and Shannon

Morris ("Vice Principal Morris") violated Ms.

her to study Islam as part of a World History

course. and retaliated against Mr. Wood by banning him from school grounds ancr hc excrciscd
his First Amendment
presently

rights by complaining

anout the course. The 1()lIowing motions are

pending nef()I'e the Court: Plaintiffs'

ECF No. 47. Defendants'
Motion for Summary

Motion I()r Summary

Judgment.

Second Motion to Alter or Amend the Complaint.
Judgment.

ECF No. 54. and Plaintiffs'

ECF No. 55. A hearing was held on November

6.2017.

105.6 (D. I'vld. 2016). For the reasons stated below. the Court will grant Defendants'
Summary

I.

Judgment

and deny Plaintiffs'

Cross
Loc. R.

Motion f(lr

motions.

HACKGROUND
A. Factual HackgroulJ(f
Caleigh Wood attended

("Relevant

Period").

La Plata High School during the 2014-2015

school year

during which she was an 11 til grade student. ECF No. 54-13 at 23 Principal

Arnold was the school principal at La Plata during the Relevant Period. ECF Nos. 54-13 at 2-3:
54-2 at 2-3.10:

54-4 at 2. One of Principal Arnold's

safe and orderly operation

of the school environment.

Period. Sgt. Mark Kaylor was employed
assigned

primary responsibilities

was to maintain the

ECF No. 54-4 at 2. During the Relevant

by the Charles County Shcri fr s Departmcnt

and was

to La Plata as a School Resource Officcr. ECF Nos. 54-8 at 2-3: 54-2 at 2-3.
World History is a rcquired coursc mandated

Education.

is part ofthc

social studies curriculum.

ECF No. 54-2 at 3. During thc Relevant

by the Maryland

Statc Departmcnt

and is taught in the II

til

of

grade at La Plata.

Period. Ms. Wood was enrolled in a World History e1ass

Unless otherwise noted. the facts relied on arc undisputed by the parties.
Pin cites to documents filed on the Court's electronic filing system (CMIECF) refer to the page
by that system.
2

.1

2

Ilumbers

generated

taught by social studies teacher Trevor Bryden and received a passing grade. ECF No. 54-2 at
I J: ECF No. 54-13 at 6. 7. The topie "Muslim

World (including

Islam

r' was

World Ilistory class as part of the course unit on Middle Eastern empires.

introduced

in the

ECF Nos. 54-5 at 6:

54-2 at 14.
During the class. Ms. Wood was taught. imc,. alia. that "Most Muslim's
strongcr than the average Christian
peaceful rcligion'"
was to complete
comprise

[sic]""4 (emphasis

is

in original) and that "Islam. at hcart. is a

ECI' Nos. 55-2 at 3: 55-4 at 3. Additionally.
a worksheet

[sicllilith

one of Ms. wooers

assignments

where she had to provide missing words within thc statements

that

the "Five Pillars of Islam'" ECF No. 56-3. This included a sentence stating that 'There

is no god but Allah and Muhammad

is the messenger

S/Ill/wda. Id When Ms. Wood refused to complete
assignments:

of Allah'"

assignments.

which is also known as the
she received no crcdit for those

but the paJ1ies dispute the impact. if any. that any uncompleted

assignments

had on

her final grade. lOCI' No. 55-2 at 3: 56-I. Principal Arnold had the authority to grant Ms. Wood
an opt-out or alternate
for the DetCndants.
that "Most Muslim's

assignments.

ECI' No. 55-7 at 2-3. Jack Tutlle. the curriculum

agreed that it is not appropriate

specialist

for a public school teacher to tell his class

[sicl f[lith is strongcr than the average Christian

[sic]:'

lOCI' No. 55-<) at

1-2.
Neither Principal Arnold nor Vice Principal Morris ever spoke with r"ls. Wood about
their religious

beliefs during the Relevant

Period or at any other time. nor did they suggest Ms.

Wood practice the Islamic f[lith. lOCI' No. 54-13 at 8-<). Additionally.

neither Principal Arnold

~This statement appears 011 a PowerPoinl slide attached 10 the original complaint. ECF No. I-I. and Ms. Wood

dcclnres that this statement was included in an assignment she received. ECF No. 55-1 ~ 8. Hmvcvcr. Mr. Bryden
states that \\'hile he provided all the material he had related to his \\'orld History course. including the slide. he docs
not recall if the statement was actually presented to the class. ECF No. 56.5: EeF No. 56 at 7 nA. As this is a
disputed fact, the Court will construe this in favor of Pia inti fl'. fix the purpose of resolving Defcndants' motioll. and
assume the statemcnt was in fact taught to Ms. Wood.

,
.,

nor Vice Principal

Morris ever directed Ms. Wood to recite the live pillars of the Islamie laith.

pledge allegiance

to Allah. prot\:ss the Shahada or direct Ms. Wood to profess or write out lilith

statements

concerning

Islam. ECF Nos. 54-2 at 5-6: 54-3 at 2.

On Wednesday.
which he expressed
in Mr. Bryden's

October 22. 2014. Mr. Wood telephoned

his conccrn about the homework

assignment

resolve Mr. Wood's

concerns.

assistant.

returned Mr. Wood's

October 23. 2014.

phone call in an attempt to

ECF Nos. 54-10 at 5-6: 54-2 at 4. 17. On the same day. Vice

Morris also telephoned

Mr. Wood. At some point during that conversation.

stated that he was "going to create a shit storm like you have never seen:';
Additionally.

in

that Ms. Wood had been given

World Ilistory elass. ECF No. 54-12 at 2. 3. On Thursday.

Ms. Shanif Pearl. the administrative

Principal

La Plata and len a voicemail

Mr. Wood

ECF No. 54-9 at 3--4.

Mr. Wood stated that "you can take that fucking Islam and shove it up your white

fucking ass!" ECF Nos. 54-9 at 4: 54-2 at 16. According
MOtTis was visibly shaken when later describing

to Principal Arnold. Vice Principal

the conversation

with Mr. Wood. ECF No. 54-2

at 3--4.
Around the time she became aware of the conversation

with Vice Principal

Principal Arnold became aware of online posts by Mr. Wood on I'acebook@
be increasingly

concerned

about the safe and orderly operation

that caused her to

of La Plata. ECF Nos. 54-2 at 19:

54-4 at 3. In one post. Mr. Wood. while talking about his daughter
about fucking lost it ...

Morris.

studying

Islam. states: "I just

My white ass is going into school on Monday and letting my fcelings be

known. Caleigh said her teacher was a Navy Seal. Can you guess what I said to that! ('m fucking
livid!!!!!!

!:. ECF

get arrested.

No. 54-2 at 19. In response

Mr. Wood responded

to a comment

from a friend cautioning

that he would ..try:' !d. In response to a suggestion

him not to
that he

Mr. Wood states this was a reference to contacting lawyers and the media regarding the incident. Indeed. in her
real-time memo regarding the call. Morris records that he said "1 just want you to know that lawyers have been
contacted and rill going to crcalc a shit storm like you have never seen:" ECF No. 54-2 <:It 16.
5

4

study Islam because hc could not dcfcat what hc could not understand.
"556 doesn't

Mr. Wood statcd that a

study Islam and it kills thcm tuckcrs every day."" It/. In a subscqucnt

Wood statcs that he would use his daughter's

2 at 22. Thcsc interactions

study shect as "confetti

took placc during thc school's

Principal Arnold sought thc assistance
Wood's

demcanor.

concern

for the safe and ordcrly opcration

Oflicc, Principal

his intcractions

Ilomccoming

post. Mr.

on Monday!"

lOCI' No. 54-

wcck. lOCI' No. 54-2 at 4.

of Ccntral Oflice administrators

regarding

with Vice Principal Morris, and Principal Arnold's

Mr.

growing

of La Plata. lOCI' No. 54-2 at 4. In her cmail to Ccntral

Arnold statcs "At this point I am happy to call Mr. Wood mysclfbut

appear to want to listen and instead wants to cursc and scrcam. His dcmcanor

hc docsn't

on thc phonc was

so cxtrcme that I do havc concerns about him coming up to the schoo!. Since hc works at Ft.
Belvoir and states that he is a Marine. I am assuming

that he has acccss to wcapons:'

ECF No.

54-2 at 18. Principal Arnold also discusscd hcr conccrns with Sgt. Kaylor, who prepared a No
Trcspass

Order lor Principal Arnold's

signature

54-8 at 4-5, 8-9. Sgt. Kaylor inlormed

alicr revicwing

the Facebook@ posts. ECF No.

Mr. Wood that a No Trespass Order was being issued

against him. ECF Nos. 54-8 at 5: 54-4 at 8. Mr. Wood nevcr contacted
about rescinding

the No Trcspass

Principal Arnold to meet

Ordcr. lOCI' No. 54-2 at 5.

B. Procedural Background
Plainti ffs filcd thc instant Complaint
injunctivc

rclief. damagcs,

First and Fourteenth

and attorncys'

Amcndmcnts,

on January 27, 2016, seeking dcclaratory

fees undcr 42 U.S.c.

Titlc IX of the Education

thc Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Articlc 36 of the Declaration

(, A "556" is a reference

lO

and

~ 1983 based on claims under thc

Amendmcnts

of 1972. Title VI of

of Rights ofthc

Maryland

5.56 millimeter caliber ammunition used in the U.S. Armed Forces' standard-issuerille.

See https:/len.wikipedia.org/wiki/MI6_rille

(last visited March 26. 2018).

5

Constitution.

ECI' NO.1. On September

Preliminary

Injunction

Court dismissed

and grantcd. in part. Dctendants'

all claims against thc Board of Education

Principal Arnold and Vice Principal
dismissed

Plaintiffs'

retaliation

Motion tl)r a

Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 36. Thc
of Charlcs County. as well as

Morris in their oflieiai capacities.

In addition.

claim asscrtcd on behalf of Ms. Wood. Plaintit1s'

process claim asserted on behalfofMr.
Following

30. 2016. the Court denied Plaintiffs'

this Order. Plaintifts'

County as a named defendant.

Wood. and Plaintiffs'

filed an Amended
and substituting

the Court
procedural

due

Title IX and Title VI claims.

Complaint.

ECF No. 39. removing Charles

Ms. Wood as a named plaintiff. in plaec of her

mother Mclissa Wood. as Ms. Wood is no longer a minor child. Plaintiffs also rcmoved their
claims under Title IX and Title VI. As a result of the Cour!"s Order and Amendcd
following

claims remain: First Amcndment

Wood (Claim I): I'irst Amended
I'irst Amcndment
the Maryland

II.

Retaliation

Declaration

STANDARD

Establishmcnt

Clause violation on behal f of Ms.
Wood (Claim II):

on behalf of Mr. Wood (Claim III): and Violation

of Articlc 36 of

of Rights on behalf of Ms. Wood (Claim V).

OF RF.VIEW

grant summary judgment

responsibility

the

Freedom of Speech violation on behalfofMs.

A party may move for summary judgment

entitled to judgment

Complaint.

ifthcre

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "The court shall

is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is

as a maller of law:' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the "initial

of informing

portions of the pleadings

the district court of the basis tl)r its motion. and identifying
...

togcthcr with thc aflidavits.

the absence of a genuinc issue of material

ifany.

those

which it bclieves demonstratc

lact:' Celo/ex Corp. \'. CalrelI. 466 U.S. 317. 323

(1986) (intcrnal citation omittcd).

In considcring

wcigh the cvidcnce and dctcrmine

thc truth of the maller. but to determine

thc motion ... the judgc's

6

function is not ...
whether there is a

to

genuine issue for trial:' Anderson

1'.

Liha/v. Lohhv. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). To withstand a
.

motion for summary judgmcnt. thc nonmoving party must do more than prescnt a mcre scintilla
ofcvidcncc. Phil/ips \'. CSXTral1.ljJol'/. Inc.. 190 F.3d 285. 287 (4th Cir. 1999). Rather ... thc
adversc party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a gcnuinc issuc for trial:'
Anderson. 477 U.S. at 250. Although the Court should draw alljustiliable

infcrcnecs in thc

nonmoving party's favor. the nonmoving party cannot crcatc a gcnuinc issue of matcrial lact
..through mere speculation or thc building of onc infcrcncc upon another:' Beale

1'.

I/al'dy. 769

F.2d 213. 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
Cross-motions for summary judgment require that thc Court considcr "cach motion
scparately on its own merits to dctcrmine whether cithcr of thc partics descrves judgment as a
maller of law:' Rossigllolv.

Vool'haal'. 316 F.3d 516. 523 (4th Cir. 2003). "Thc Court must den)'

both motions ifit linds thcre is a genuinc issuc ofmateriallilCt.

but ifthcrc is no gcnuinc issue

and one or thc other party is entitlcd to prcvail as a maller of law. the court will render
judgment:'

IVaI/ace \'. POlilos. No. DKC 2008-0251. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89700. at *13 (D.

Md. Sept. 29. 2009) (internal citation omillcd).
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs' assert constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.c. ~ 1983. Section 1983
providcs that:
Every person who. under color of any statute. ordinance. regulation.
custom. or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.
subjects. or causes to be subjected. any citizen of the United States or
other person within thcjurisdiction thcreofto the deprivation of any rights.
privileges. or immunitics securcd by the Constitution and laws. shall be
liable to thc party injurcd in an action at law. suit in equity. or other proper
proceeding ...

7

42 U.S.C. ~ 1983. Herc. Plaintiffs'
were violatcd.7

Amendment
Establishment
Wood's

remaining

Spccilically.

claims assert that their rights undcr the First

Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Wood's

rights under thc

Clause were violated through the teaching of Islam in her public school. Ms.
the 5;/w/w<!a and

right to Free Spcech was violated when she was required to "confess"

that Mr. Wood was subjected
grounds aner hc exprcssed

to First Amendmcnt

his opposition

Retaliation

to the school's

when he was banned from school

teaching.

Each claim will be addressed

in turn.
A. Ms. Wond's
Plaintiffs'
a statemcnt

First Amcndmcnt

claim that Defcndants

Establishmcnt

violated the Establishmcnt

made by a teacher during Ms. Wood's

faith is stronger than the average Christian

[sicl" (the "comparative

Establishment
religion:'

Lell/Ilil.

Clause provides that "Congress

U.S. Cons1. amend. I. Gcnerally.

Establishmcnt
to

that presents the most significant

Clausc is determined

purposc. (2) the primary cffect ofthc

7 "[T]he

First Amendment's
prohibiting the free exercise

mandate

ECF No.

during the motion hearings in this matter. it

difficulty

for the Defendants'

the constitutionality

case. The

an establishment

of govcrnment

of

action under the

the three prong tcst outlincd in

(I) the government

government

that 'Congress

f~lith statement").

shall make no law respecting

by applying

for the action to be constitutional.

Clause f(]cuscS primarily on

World Ilistory class that "Most Muslims [sic]

55-1 at IO.s And. indeed. as the Court has mentioned
is this statement

Cia usc Claim

Lell/oll.

Pursuant

activity must have a secular

activity must neithcr advance nor inhibit

shall make no 13\1.' respecting

an establishment

thereof has been made \\"holly applicable 10 the Stales by the Fourteenth
Schoo! Dis/riel (!fAhillgl0f1 TOlI'nship. Penmyh'al1;a \', Schempp. 374 U.S. 203. 115 (1963).

of religion. or
Amendment:'

the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs list a litany of objections to the study of Islam in the World Ilisiory COUfse.
including the length of the unit. it! ~ 9. focus on Islam over Christianity or .Judaism. hI. ,; 55. omission of Islamicrelated topics from the syllabus and tcxtbook sent home with students as compared to that actually used in class. id
5. reference 10 cultural practices placing women as subservient to men. id ~ 56. and discussions pertaining to
"jihad:' it!. ~ 53. But Ihe motions for summary judgment focus almost entirely on thc allcgations that Ms. \\'ood was
instructed that "Most Muslim's faith is stronger than the average Christian:'
hI. ~ 51 (citing EeF No. 1-1), and thai
Ms. Wood "had to profess the Shahada. by claiming. 'There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of
Allah .... ECl' No. 39 ~ 52 (citing ECl' No. 1-2).
1I In

'1

religion: and (3) the activity must not cause the government to be exccssivcly cntangled in
religion. 402 U.S. at 612-13." The thrcc factors are addrcssed in turn.
First. Plaintiffs arguc that thc comparativc faith statcmcnt has no sccular purposc bccausc
it does not teach any verifiable and objcctive facts about Islam. lOCI'No. 55-1 at 12. "In applying
the purpose test. it is appropriate to ask 'whcther the government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove ofrcligion,"
Wallace

" . .f(ltli-ee.

Mellell

\'. Blllllillg.

327 FJd 355. 372 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting

105 S.C!. 2479 (1985 )). "The secular purposc requircmcnt prcsents a fairly

low hurdlc for thc state" and "a statc-sponsorcd practicc violates this prong of Lemoll only 'i f it
is ell/irely

motivated by a purposc to advancc rcligion,''' /d. (emphasis in Mel/ell).

In considcring the secular purpose ofthc comparativc faith statcmcnt. as wcll as in the
analysis of the sccond and third Lemoll factors. it is important to consider whcther the Court
should vicw the statemcnt in isolation or in the contcxt ofthc curriculum as a whole. Plaintiffs
contcnd that thc Court should analyze this statcmcnt in isolation. divorced Irom the context of
the class as a wholc. During the hearing on thc pending motions. Plaintiffs dircctcd thc Court to

c.F. ".

Capis//'{mo.

Capis/rallo.

615 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (C.D. Ca. 2009) to support thcir position. In

an out-ot~circuit case that was vacatcd on appcal. a tcacher stated that crcationism is

"supcrstitious nonscnsc," and thc district court hcld that it could not "disccrn a legitimate secular
purposc in this statcment. el'CIIII'/tell

cullsidered

ill

cOlllexl,"

Id at 1146 (cmphasis addcd). Thus.

this casc docs not suggcst that thc Court must revicw the comparative t~lithstatcmcnt in complctc
isolation and ignore thc contcxt in which it was presented. Herc. the Court finds it ncccssary to
place the statement in thc contcxt of the class in which it was made to disccrn both purposc and
cffcct.
As the Court recognized in its prior Memorandulll Opinioll. Lemon's three-part test provides a useful framework
for evaluating Establishment Clause claims but need nol be rigidly applied. EeF No. 35 at 14 n.7 (referencing other

<)

Establishment

Clause tests. such as the coercion

test and endorsement

9

lest).

Generally.

the study of religious texts and concepts can be secular in purpose. School

Di.\/ricl o(Ahillgloll TOll'I/ship. Pellmylmllia

\', Schempp. 374 U.S. 203. 225 (1963). According

to Defendants.

was "designed

the Muslim World curriculum

to explore. among other things.

formation of Middle Eastern empires ineluding the basic concepts orthe
'along with politics. culture. economics.
empires:'

Ecr

contributed

No. 54-1 at 24. The rccord providcs no suggcstion

board down through the individual
Defendants'

and geography

explanation

orthe

Islamic raith and how it

to the developmcnt

that anyone Ii'om thc school

teacher held any bias for or against any rcligion. or that

curriculum

served as cover tor a religiously-motivated

C/ Edwards \'. Aguillard. 482 U.S. 578. 587 (1987) (finding that legislation
teaching

of creationism

legislativc

along with evolution

history suggested

of those

rcquiring

purpose.
the

did not havc a secular purposc bccausc the

that the purpose "was to narrow the scicnce curriculum").

The Supremc Court's

in Ahillgloll is instructivc

decision

hcrc. There. in two companion

cases. statc laws requircd thc Holy Bible to bc read at the opening of each public school day.

AhillglOIl. 374 U.S. at 205. The readings wcre broadcast to each e1assroom and were tollowed by
the Lord's Praycr. during which students
unison. Id. at 207. Participation
character

of the cxercises.

subjects:'

in these exercises

the Supremc

thc Biblc was for "nonreligious
Id. at 224. Concluding

wcrc asked to stand and join in repeating the praycr in
was voluntary.

hi. Givcn thc religious

Court rejected thc notion that thc purpose of the usc of

moral inspiration

or as refcrencc

1(Ir thc teaching of secular

that the laws in both cascs rcquired "religious

Suprcme Court round that thcy violatcd thc Establishmcnt

Clause. Id But. ofsignificanec

thc C01ll1 also stated that "[n]othing

wc have said hcre indicatcs

religion. when presentcd

as part of a secular program or education.

effected consistently

objcctively

Id at 225.

with the rirst Amcndment:'

fO

cxercises:'

thc
herc.

that such study of the Biblc or of
may not be

Relying on Abington. the crux of Plaintiffs'
faith statement

is not "objective,"

notwithstanding
presented
assignment

is that because the comparative

it cannot have a secular purpose.

the single comparative

as part of an academic

argument

faith statement

ECF No. 55-1 at

in the PowerPoint

recite it at all. Nor wcre they required to memorize

it. Rather. they were rcquircd to fill in statemcnts

Christians

biographical

of the single comparative

any and all seeular purpose of the curriculum.

Certainly
objective.

the comparative

As Defendants

and the curriculum

faith statement.

acknowledge.

even in isolation.

the statement

but not limitcd to.
and the lact that

ECF No. 1-2. Thus. it is clear

statement

does not strip away

as a whole did not violate the

10

tact," ECF No. 25. However.
offensive.

about the Prophet Muhammad.

the

cxercise Abingtoll said would not run ailllll of the

Clause. The subjectivity

1-Irst I.ell/oll prong.

of I;lith. which

to complete

related to Islam. including.

and Jews all trace their ancestry to Abraham.

that this was the sort of academic
Establishment

infollnation

to Abington. or to

only that specific statement

Shahada along with a varicty of factual statements

Muslims.

slide. the material was

for the Shahada. The students were not

being required to recite the Shahada daily. which would make it analogous

the relevant continents.

2. But

exercise and not a religious one. This is also true of the

that required the students to fill-in-the-blanks

could serve to highlight

J

iI'taken literally in isolation.

the statement

evcn if the comparative
it is not elllirely motivated

is not purely

"may have been wanling in accuracy
faith statement

or

was inartful or. to some.

by a purpose to advance religion. First.

does not serve as a direct attack on any particular

religion or bclief. The statement

III Plaintiffs
provide deposition testimony from Am)' Hollstein. former assistant superintendent of instruction. and
.lack Tuttle. curriculum specialist. to suggest that the comparative faith statement was not factual and should not
Imvc been used in the classrooIll. See EeF No. 55-7 at 28:21-29:2 (Hollstein Answer: ." think faith is spiritual. and I
think I have m)' 0\1,111 relationship with God. and I don"t think you can calculate 111y O\V!l spirituality"): ECF No. 55-9
at 3 (Question: "Ifthe teacher came up to you and said. I want to te<lch [the comparative faith statementJ. what
would you advise the leacher?" Tuttlc Answer: "Not to do Ihat"). But whether or not school ollicials. in their {)\\"n
judgment. cOllsider the subject material appropriate is immaterial to the Court's constitutional inquiry.

I1

merely opines on the degree to which Muslims adhere to their own 11lithas compared
Christians.

Second. the comparative

!t1itll statement

Christian.

II

Christian

would seem to negate the possibility

advancing

the Islamic faith. Again. however.

statement

As Plaintiffs acknowledged

demonstrates

PowerPoint

relevant

contrasting

PowerPoint

in the hearing. the It1ct that the statement
that the statement

lillldamentalists

slide. the comparative

represent

within a discussion
with other Muslims.

faith statement

was made by a

was made !()r the purpose of

cven using just the immediate

was provided

Islam v. Radical Fundamentallslam
!illldamentalists

by Mr. Bryden. who is a

context of the

it was not entirely devoid of secular purpose. According

slide. the statement

fundamentalists.

was delivercd

to

to the

on the rise of radical Islamic
ECI' No. 1.1 at

2-3. In the

is listed under the heading "Peace!il!

.. 12 and the locus appears to be on tcaching that

a "small percentagc

of the population

of Islam:'

and not on advocating

that students should adhere to the faith. 1£1.
Second. the Court must consider whether the primary effect of the comparative

in the context of the class. was to advance or endorse religion. See Melle//, 327 F3d at

statement.

347 (..the effect prong asks whether. irrespective

of government's

under review in tact conveys a message of endorsement

actual purpose. the practice

or disapproval

of religion")

omitted):

C;reaterl'illshurgh

Chapter. 492 U.S. 573. 597 (1989) ("[wJhcn evaluating

govcrnmcnt

conduct under the Establishment

governmental

action is sufliciently

denominations

as an endorsement.

choiccs.")

(citation and

see also County of Allegheny 1'. American Ch'i! Uherties Union

internal quotations

religious

faith

Clause. we must ascertain

likely to be perceived
and by the nonadherents

(citation and internal quotations

by adherents

whether the challenged
of the controlling

as a disapproval.

omitted).

the efIcct of

According

of their individual

to Plaintiffs.

During the hearing. Defendants stated. and Plaintiffs did not dispute. that Mr. Bryden identities as Christian.
not explicitly stated. it would appear the slide seems designed to address Islamophobia. which the COllrt
would vicw as a secular purpose.
II

11 While

12

subjectively opining that Muslims arc strongcr in thcir faith than Christians has thc cffect of
promoting Islam because "it is sufficicntly likcly to bc perceivcd by adhcrcnts of the controlling
denomination

1.1 IIslam.J

as an cndorscmcnt. and by nonadherents [Christians I as a disapproval.

of their individual religious choices'" ECF No. 55-1 at 13 (citing AlleghellY. 492 U.S. at 597).
Here. it is not "sufficicntly likcly" that a singular rctercnce to a Muslim's strcngth of
faith. or the class as a whole. suggcsts that DelCndants have cndorsed Islam. As statcd above. the
statement is made in thc contcxt of an academic study and placed in a PowerPoint slide
addressing the issue of "Radical Fundamcntal Islam'" making thc point that fundamcntalists
represent a small portion of Islam. ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. The record does not show that
Dcfendants. or anyonc clse. drew any conclusions from this statcmcnt or inlerred that because
Muslims' purportcdly have a stronger faith. Islam was secn by thc school as a supcrior religion.
Plaintiffs argue that because thcy are dcvout Christians. and the statement offended thcir beliefs
as Christians. Dctendants havc endorsed Islam. But cvcn if such a statcmcnt is decply offensive
to Plaintiffs. its ol"ICnsivcnature alone docs not cause it to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
See Lee. 505 U.S. at 597 ("We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid

if onc or a lew citizens lind it oITensive."); see also Mellell. 327 F.3d at 374 (citing Barg/IOII/\'.
Bureall o('Kosher

Mea/alld

Food COIl/rol. 66 F.3d 1337. 1345) (4th Cir. 1995) ("'This 'primary

effect" prong must be assessed objectively. in ordcr to measure whcther the principal elTect of
governmcnt action 'is to suggest governmcnt prclercnce for a particular religious view or till"
religion in general. "').
Third. the Court must consider whether the comparative faith statement. or the
curriculum itselC created an excessive cntanglcmcnt betwecn government and rcligion. See
Lemoll.403

U.S. at 615 (cntanglcmcnt is detcrmincd by ,.the character and purposcs of thc

13

institutions

that are benelited.

relationship

the nature of the aid that the State provides. and the resulting

betwccn the govcrnmcnt

and the religious authority").

While Defendants

did not rely

on any Muslim clergy to delivcr the subjcet material. scc Conlra ['cop/c o(Slalc 0(1/1. cx rei.

McCollulIl \'. Btl. '!fEti. '!f'Sch. Disl. No. 7/. Challlpaign Cly.. 11/. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding
.
that religious studies classes taught on school grounds by religious c1crgy violated thc
Establishment
entanglement

Clause). I'laintifls

in religion becausc thc Defendants

ECF No. 55-1 at 13 (quoting
867 (1995)).
Soutcr's

arguc that the comparativc

However.

faith statcment

utilized "evangelist's

li)stcrs an cxeessive

mission statcmcnts:'

Scc

Roscnbcrger \'. Rcclor & I'isilors o{'thc Uni\'. o( Va.. 5 I 5 U.S. 819.

in support of their position.

I'laintifls

quote a passage from .Justice

dissent in Roscnbergcr. which merely suggcsts that topics cross the line li'om scholarly

study to entanglemcnt

whcn "facially

to fulfill the tencts of Christianity

secular topics become platfimns

in their livcs:'

!d at 866-68 (Souter . .J.. dissenting).

cncouraging

students to fulfill the tenants of Islam. Delendants

to Muslims.

did not aide Muslims.

school and any Islamic organization.
entanglement

betwcen government

Ii'om which to call readcrs

did not provide any direct benefit

and did not inler or suggest any relationship
Thereli)rc.

Far Irom

between thc

thc Court has no basis to lind an excessive

and religion. Thus. the curriculum

survives all three prongs

of the Lemon test.1J
Defendants'

motion for summary judgment

is granted as to Plaintiffs'

Establishment

Clause claim.

I.'

In MeIlCIII'. IJlllllillg. 327 F.3d 355. 370 14th Cif. 2003). the Fourth Circuitlloted

addition

to the Lemoll test. has also applied

the "endorsement

tesC and the "coercion

that the Supreme C(lurt. in
test" in various

Establishment

Clause challenges. "Under the endorsement test. the government may flot engage in a practice that suggests to the
reasonable, informed observer that it is endorsing religion:' lei. (citing Lynch \', f)(JfIl1e1~\'.465 U.S. 668. 690
(1984 ». Pursuant to the coercion test. "government Illay not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise:' It!. (citing I.e/! ". Weisman. 505 U.S. 577. 587 (1992)). For the same rcason the curricululll survives the
Lemon test. it would survive these as well. The material was taught as part of an academic endeavor and neither the
school administrators or the teacher endorsed a religion or coerced Ms. Wood to participate in religious exercises.

14

B. Ms. Wood's First Amendment
The rcquirement

that Ms. Wood complete

Five Pillars of Islam. including
compelled

Free Speech Claim
the lill-in-the

the Shahat/a. implicates

blank assignment

First Amendment

speech. The Supreme Court has long held that the government

eontaining

protections

the

against

may not compclthe

speech of private actors. See Vni/et/ S/ales \'. Vni/et/ Foods. Inc.. 533 U.S. 405. 413-15

(200 I):

Wooley \'. '\/o)'nol'd. 430 U.S. 705. 714-15 ( 1977): IV Va. Sla/e Btl. ojEt/uc. \'. Hamel/e. 3 I 9
U.S. 624. 642 (1943). Moreover.
constitutional

it is well-settled

that public school students do not "shed their

rights to freedom of speech or expression

at the schoolhouse

gate:'

Tinkel' \'. Des

Moines Indep. 011ly. Sch. Dis/ .. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). But "the First Amendment
students

in the public sehools are not automatically

settings. and must be applied in light ofthc

coextensive

special characteristics

rights of

with the rights of adults in other
ofthc school environment."

Ha::ehl'(}odSch. Dis/. \'. Kuhlllleiel'. 484 U.S. 260. 266 (1988) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).

As the Third Circuit has recognized.

particular

topie but may not be forced to "profess

not agree:'

a student may be f(lrced to speak or write on a
beliefs or views with which the student does

C.N. \'. Rh~t:e\l'()()dHti. ojEt/uc .. 430 F.3d 159. 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005).

As alleged in the Complaint.

require that students write out and cO/lFessthe

"Defendants

the Islamic Profession

original).

Thus, at the Motion to Dismiss stage. the Court found that "while discovery

mayor

may not prove otherwise:'

Islam to compelling

Ms. Wood's

of Faith:'

ECF No. 35 at 15 (citing ECI' No. I

'i 7)

Shahada.

in

and trial

as alleged. the activity crossed the linc from learning about
belief in Islam. ECF No. 35 at 15-16 (comparing

U.S. at 642 (.. [i J f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
high or PCttY. can prcscribe

(emphasis

what shall bc orthodox

constellation.

in politics. nationalism.

Homel/e, 319

it is that no orticial.
rcligion. or other

matter of opinion or force citizens to conless by word or act thcir faith therein) wi/h Hl'inst/o/l \'.

15

McAl/cll. No. 15-40160.2016

WL 4204797. at *6-7 (5th Cir. Aug. 9. 2011i) (requiring student to

recite Mexican pledge of allegiance in Spanish class did not violate First Amendment because
there was no evidence that the required speech involved an attempt to compel the speaker's
affirmative belie!) and .l/ozcr'

I'.

lI{fIrkins Cty. Bd of Ei/llc .. 827 F.2d 1058. I01i9 (6th Cir. 1987)

(no constitutional violation for required reading of texts offensive to some parents hecause the
school did not require students to believe or say they believe the contcnts)).
Following discovery. the record is clear that Ms. Wood was not compelled to confcss the
Sl1al1ai/a: rather. she was simply asked to understand the significance of the statement to
Muslims. Eel' No. 1-2 (under "Beliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars." Ms. Wood was asked to
fill in the following blanks: "There is no god but __

and Muhammad is the __

of Allah"). In

the hearing. Plaintiffs conceded that there is no evidence that Ms. Wood was required to recite
the Slwl1ada aloud or listen to other students recite the Sl1al1ada in the classroom-the

only

exercise was the fill-in-the-blank assignment. which did not present the Sl1al1ada in a way that
suggested the students should believe in the words of the Sl1al1ai/a itself:

C.l

I.ec. 505 U,S, at 593

(asking adolescent students to stand in silence as an alternative to reciting prayers during
graduation ceremonies creates "subtle and indirect" peer pressure that "can be as real as any
overt compulsion"). The fill-in-the-blank question was provided alongsidc other questions that
served to test students' knowledge of the geographic and cultural origins of Islam. As a rcsult.
the "confession" alleged in the Amcnded Complaint was in actuality nothing beyond an
academic exercise, .'Icc l1azeill'Ood. 484 U.S, at 273 ("educators do not offend thc First
Amendment ... so long as their actions arc reasonably rclated to legitimate pedagogical
conccrns"). Thcret4Jre. Delcndanis' did not violate Ms. Wood's First Amendment protections
when teaching about the Sl1alwi/a within the contexts of its World Ilistory course.

Iii

C.

Mr. Wood's First Amendment
I.

Claim

Retaliation

Plaintiffs allege that Defcndants banned Mr. Wood ti'OJllschool grounds bccause ..they
disagreed with his viewpoint that his daughter should receive alternative assignmcnts to
Dctendants' unconstitutional promotion of Islam ..... and their disagrccment was ..thc sole
rcason for the no-trcspass ordcr'" ECF No. 55-1 at 18. A plaintiff claiming First Amcndmcnt
rctaliation must dcmonstrate that "( I) [hc] engagcd in protected First Amcndmcnt activity. (2)
the defendants took some action that adversely a!kctcd [his] First Amcndment rights. and (3)
therc was a causal rclationship bctwccn Ihis] protccted activity and thc dcfcndants' conduct'" SC'C'
COlIslamillC'

\'. RC'elol's ami Visit 01'.1' f'Geol'ge
o

2005): see also Corales

1'.

Bellllell.

Masoll

Ullil'el'sily.

411 F,3d 474. 499 (4th Cir.

567 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2009) (clarifying that thc third prong

requircs that ..the protectcd activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's
conduct."),
Dctendants arguc that they arc entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Wood's retaliation
claim bccausc Mr. Wood did not engage in protected speech under the First Amendmcnt. ECF
No, 54-1 at 36. Not all spccch is protectcd spcech. and thc narrowly limitcd classcs of spcech
that remain unprotected include true threats. Ulliled Slales \'. Cassi«I'. 814 F. Supp. 2d 574. 583
(citing JValls \', United Stales. 394 U.S. 705 (1969»: see also Ulliled Stale.I'

1'.

IVhite.

670 F,3d

498.507 (4th Cir. 2012) (true thrcats are words that by their very utterance inflict injury. and thc
prevention of such speech has never becn thought to raise any Constitutional problcm) (intcrnal
citations omittcd), In support of their motion. Dc!endants citc

LOI'C'1'I1

\'.

Echl'lll'dl'.

190 F,3d 648.

655-56 (4th Cir. 1999) for the proposition that school officials havc thc authority and
responsibility to control parents in order to prevcnt disruptions to thc school environmcnt. ECF

17

No. 54-1 at 36. But Lo\'a11 is factually and proccdurally distinguishahle from this case. In
Lovern. the Fourth Circuit recognized that the plaintilTwas banned Irom school grounds
following a "continuing pattern of verbal abuse and threatening behavior towards school
officials" that took place afier he was permitted to air his concerns numerous times while on
school property. 190 F.3d at 656 n.13. Ultimately. the Fourth Circuit determined that the
plaintilTs desire to have "boundless access to school property" was clearly Irivolous. !d at 656.
Here. Mr. Wood never made it to school grounds. Further. the record shows that Mr.
Wood was attempting to speak out against his daughter's participation in the subject curriculum.
and parents criticizing school officials are clearly protected by the First Amendment. .Ie11killS ".
Rock Hill Loml School Disl .• 513 F.3d 580. 588 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Chiu \'. Pla110
l11depe11delll Schoo/ Disl .. 260 F.3d 330. 343--44 (5th Cir. 2001) (speaking against a change in
public school curriculum is an issue of public concern lor parents of students enrolled in the
school district and is protceted under the First Amendment). Defendants tail to point to any cases
suggesting that Mr. Wood's legitimate objection. even if presented in a threating and hostile
manner. lalls within the limited category of threatening speech not protected by the First
Amendment. CJ R.iI. V. \'. Cilyof"SI.

Paul. Mi11l1..505 U.S. 377. 384-85 (1992) ("It is not true

that lighting words have a de minimis expressive content or that their content is in all respects
worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection; sometimes they are quite expressive
indeed.") (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Ilowever. even if Mr. Wood engaged in protected speech. and the No Trespass Order
inhibited his continued ability to do so. Plaintiffs cannot show a causal relationship between his
protected speech and Defendants' decision to issue the No Trespass Order. The record indicates
that Delendants issued the No Trespass Order based on its perception of the threats of disruption

18

following notification of Mr. Wood's Facebook@ posts, not in objection to Mr. Wood's
protected speech.

I.

While Mr. Wood voiced his opposition to Defendants' curriculum in these

posts, he also suggested that he would comc to school and cause a disruption. The following
passages from Mr. Wood himsclfare particularly telling:
•

"My white ass is going into school on Monday and letting my feelings be
known:'

•

"[a] 556 [type of ammunition] doesn't study Islam and it kills them fuckers cvery
day:'

•

"I plan on using the paper [Ms. Wood's shredded homework assignment] as
confctti on Monday!"

ECF No. 54-2 at 19,20, 22.
Plaintiffs attempt to mitigate the confrontational naturc of somc of thesc posts. See ECF
No. 55-1 at 16 ("Although oddly and amusingly, Dcfendants attcmpt to manul[lcturc a threat out
of confetti:'). However. beyond voicing his opposition to the curriculum through, as Plaintiffs
acknowledge, use of "coarse language:' Mr. Wood suggested that he was going to cause a
disturbance at La Plata High School.
Further, Principal Arnold's deposition testimony indicates that she perceived Mr. Wood's
Facebook@ posts as threatening and issued the No Trespass Order within an hour of discussing
her specific concerns with her Central Office superiors. ECF No. 54-4 at 6-8: see aiso Eel' No.
54-2 ~ 15 ("I [Principal Arnold] regarded Mr. Wood's Facebook@ posts as threatening, and I
grew increasingly concerned about his potential disturbance at La Plata, particularly in light of

1.1 While PlaintitTs allege that Defendants issued the No Trespass Order based 011 Mr. Wood"s belief that the school
was engaging in the unconstitutional promotion oflsl<ll11. ECF No. 55-\ (citing ECF No. 55-4 (declaration of J.
Wood)), Mr. Wood"s unsupported speculation to this point cannot create a genuine issue of material HIe! necessary
to survive a Illotion for summary judgment. See Beale \'. lIan{l'. 769 F.1d 113. 214 (4th Cir. 1985).

19

the [flurry] of Homecoming activitics and increased number of visitors during that timc"'). Her
email to Central Oftlce further demonstrates her safety concern as she expressed concerns about
Mr. Wood's demeanor and the possibility he might have access to weapons. ECF No. 54-2 at
18.1; In addition. Sgt. Kaylor's deposition testimony indicates that he wrote the No Trespass
Order as a result of Mr. Wood making what he perceived to be verbal threats against the school
through his Faeebook@ posts. ECF No. 54-8 at 9. Accordingly. even if Plaintiffs might believe it
was an overreaction. the record is clear that Defendants issued the

0

Trcspass Ordcr in response

to perceived threats of a disruption on school grounds. not in retaliation against Mr. Wood's
protected speech.

I" See.

e.g. Frallcis

1".

Boo:. AI/ell & !loll/ii/oil.

11lc.. 452 F.3d 299. 309 (4th

Cir. 2006) (noting that temporal proximity between protected activity and adversc action is not
dispositive of a rctaliation claim when the adverse action is otherwise justi lied).
2.

Free Speeeh

In their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintifts introduce arguments that
Defendants' issuance of the No Trespass Order was also an unconstitutional restriction on Mr.
Wood's freedom of speech. See ECF No. 55-1 at 20 ("'not only did Defendants ban Mr. Woodfill'
exercising his First Amendment right to tree speech. but the no-trespass order was also a prior
restraint on his ability to exercise his First Amendmcnt rights on school grounds in the future"")
(emphasis in original). This additional First Amendment claim goes beyond the scope of the
claims currently before the Court. Spccitically. Claim III only allegcs that the No Trespass Order
15

While Plaintiffs contend there is a dispute regarding the tOile and demeanor of Mr. \\'ood"s communications. there
of the communication caused Principall\rnold
serious concern as it is reflected in the

is no dispute that the nature
email she sent at that time.

1(,In the hearing. Plaintiffs suggested that Defendants' tlsscrtion ora perceived threat was a pretext for retaliation
because if Defendants truly perceived that Mr. \Vood was a threat. they would have taken more drastic action such
as requesting additional police presence or social services intervention. However. the more reasonable inference to
draw is that Defendants feared a disruption if Mr. Wood came to school grounds. not that Mr. \Vood was cOllling to
cause a disturbance or act of violence irrespective of the No Trespass Order. As such. lhe No Trespass Order was
tailored 10 the perceived threat. as contemporaneously doculllented by Defendants. and was not a pretext for
retaliatioll.

20

was issued in retaliation for Mr. Wood"s protected activity: it does not suggest that the No
Trespass Order subsequently abridged Mr. Wood"s free speech rights. While Mr. Wood"s
Procedural Due Process Claim" Claim IV. could be construed to include a claim under his First
Amendment right to tree speech. see ECF No. 39

'i

121. the Court previously dismissed this

claim. Specifically. the Court found that Mr. Wood was provided with sufticient process and
simply chose not to avail himself of procedures available to him. lOCI'No. 35 at 19-22. Thus.
whether the arguments in Plaintiffs' Cross Motion rellect an attempt to state a claim never
included in a Complaint or one that has already been dismissed. they are not relevant to any
claim currently pending before the Court.
However. even if Mr. Wood's First Amendment tree speech claim is properly bel()re the
Court at this time" Plaintiffs are still not entitled to relief. In assessing a First Amendment tl'ee
speech claim. a court must determine whether the plaintilTwas engaged in protected speech.
identify the nature of the !()rum in which the protected speech was raised. and assess whether the
justifications for exclusion trom the relevant l()HUllsatisfy the requisite standard. Gou/arl
Mead01l"s. 345 F.3d 239. 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Comelius

I'.

\'. NAACP Lega/ Del" & Educ.

FUIlt!. IlIc.. 473 U.S. 788. 797 (1985)). The three recognized fora are the traditional public forum.
the nonpublic forum. and the designated or limited public forum. It!. at 248 (citing Ark. Educ.
Tele\'isioll COI11I11'1I Forhes. 523 U.S. 666. 677 (1998)).17
\'.
For the designated and limited public fora. a court must apply either an "internal
standard" to situations where ""thegovernment excludes a speaker who t1ll1swithin the class to
whieh a designated [limited] public !imull is made generally available:" or an "external standard"
for all others. Gou/arl. 345 F3d at 250 (citing Warrell

I'.

Fair/it\' COUllly. 196 F.3d 186 (4th

Cir.1999) (en bane)). Under the internal standard. a limited public torum is treated as a
17

For the purpose of the analysis herein. the Court presumes that Mr. Wood"s conduct was protected speech.

21

traditional

public f<Jrlnll. such that govcrnment

exclusion

of spccch is subject to strict scrutiny.

lei. Under thc cxtcrnal standard. a limited public forum is trcatcd as a nonpublic
government

control of speech must bc viewpoint

neutral and rcasonablc

forum. such that

in light ofthc

objcctive

servcd by the forum. Ie/. "Once a limited forum has been created. cntities of a 'similar

purposes
character'

to thosc allowed access may not be excludcd."
hours. !d. Although

public fora during alier-school
nonpublic

Ie/. Public school facilitics are limited

Dcfcndants

I'(Jrlnll during school hours. the No Trespass

argue corrcctly

that La Plata is a

Ordcr went beyond limiting Mr. Wood

Irom coming to school during school hours and instcad limitcd all access to school grounds.
Thereforc.

Mr. Wood was banned Irom La Plata at timcs when it was a limitcd public I(Jrlnll.

PlaintilTs argue that as a parcnt of a student at La Plata. Mr. Wood is "undoubtcdly
the elass to whom parcnt/teacher
events. and celebratory
and Defendants'

cvcnts honoring

dccisionto

"similar character"
objections

to the curriculum.

'0

Ilowever.

at the school are made generally

available:'

Order is thcreforc subjcct to strict scrutiny.
1'.

.'le/we/er. 760 F.3d 352. 377 (4th

actions may bc justi Iicd only if narrowly tailorcd to

Plaintiffs'

characterization

Mr. Wood. unlike all other parents

to be concerned

Trespass

internal standard.

Dcfendants'

meetings and

of Mr. Wood as a parent of

to other parents ignores the simple fact that in addition to voicing his

caused school onicials
to issue the

his daughtcr

in original); see a/so Boslie

Cir. 2014) (undcr strict scrutiny.
state intcrest).

Parcnt Tcachcr School Organization

issue the No Trcspass

ECF No. 55-1 at 22 (cmphasis

a compelling

conferenccs.

within

parents to participate

which the forum is open.

about safety at the school. As such. Defendants'

decision

Order is not subject to strict scrutiny under the limited public forum

Rather. under the external standard.

neutral and reasonable

1(1I'

in light of the objective
in school-relatcd

the No Trespass

Order must be viewpoint

purpose of the limited public forulll (i.e .. allowing

functions).

22

As prcviously

discussed.

the No Trcspass

Order was not based on Mr. Wood's
was reasonable

objections

to the curriculum.

was limited in duration.lx

in order to ensure that Mr. Wood did not disrupt school-related

and

iunctions

lor other parents. ,<,ee
AI//erican Ciril Liherlies Union\'. ,Hole. 423 FJd 438. 445 (4th

reserved

Cir. 2005) (citing Comelills. 473 U.S. at 808) (a school's

decision to restrict speech in a limited

public forum under the external standard "need only be reasonable:
reasonable

or the only reasonable

limitation")

(emphasis

it need not be the most

in original).

As such. cven if Mr. Wood

had a Ii'ce speceh claim pcnding before the Court. it would fail.
I).

Ms. Wood's

Plaintiffs

Articlc 36 Claim

do not allege that Article 36 providcs

Ms. Wood with morc cxpansive

protections

than she is entitlcd to under its fcdcral corollary.

Dcfendants

did not violate Ms. Wood's

Defendants'

Motion lor Summary

First Amcndmcnt

Judgmcnt

Because the Court linds that

protections.

on Ms. Wood's

the Court must also grant

Article 36 Claim and oeed not

address whether Article 36 gives risc to a private cause of action lor damagcs.

See Boolh

Mw:\'land Depl. o(l'lIhlic Solely <I':Correclional Sen'ices.

2008 WL

2484937.

at *8 (D. Md. Junc 18.2008)

611 (1979) ("'Maryland
exercise provision
IV.

o. RDI3 05-1972.

(citing SlIperl//arkelS Geneml Corp.

courts havc rcpcatedly

I'.

I'.

SIll/e. 286 Md.

deeidcd cases on the assumption

that thc li'ce

of Articlc 36 is in pari I//aleria with thc First Amcnchnent.")).

Motion to Amcnd
Separately.

Plaintiffs movc to lile a Second Amcndcd

attempt to add Bryden. Tuttlc. Supcrintendcnt
Hollstein

as namcd defendants.

involvemcnt

Kimbcrly

Complain!.

Ilill. and Assistant

ECF No. 47. in an
Superintcndcnt

Plaintiffs allege that thcy only learncd ofthcse

Ii.,llowing depositions

taken on March 23 and 24. 2017. constituting

individuals'
good causc to

lR While Plaintifl~ argue that Mr. Wood was categorically banned from all school-related activities for over a year.
the record indicates that the "No Trespass Order could he rescinded if Mr. WO(lJ calmly met \\dth me I Principal
Arnold] to discuss it,'" ECF No. 54-2 ~ 17: see also ECF No. 54-8 at 7.

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amend their complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). ECF No. 47-1 at 2.
However. the Court need not consider Plaintiffs' arguments. as the Court evaluated the alleged
constitutional violations in their entirety. without regard to which actions were taken by the
named defendants as compared to the proposed defendants. As such. Plaintiffs' motion is denied
as moot.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment. ECF No. 54. deny Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 55. and
deny Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Amend/Correct the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 47. A
separate Order follows.

/t£---

Dated: March 26. 2018

GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge

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