Hinson v. Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) Rail et al

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/6/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
BELINDA HINSON
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-0792

:
MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
(MTA) RAIL, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

negligence case are (1) the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants Maryland Transit Administration (“MTA”) and National
Railroad

Passenger

Corporation

(“Amtrak”)

(collectively,

“Defendants”) (ECF No. 63); (2) the motion to strike Plaintiff’s
response filed by Defendants (ECF No. 65); and (3) the motion to
allow

for

late

filing

filed

(“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 66).

by

Plaintiff

Belinda

Hinson

The issues have been fully briefed,

and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the motion to

strike will be denied, the motion to allow for late filing will
be granted, and the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I.

Background1
On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff took a train operated by

Defendants from Baltimore, Maryland, to New Carrolton, Maryland.
1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.

For the ride, she sat on the second deck of the train.
train

approached

belongings.

New

Carrolton,

Plaintiff

As the

gathered

her

At New Carrolton, she waited for the train to stop

and went to the stairs.

Five seconds after the train initially

stopped, the train suddenly moved and Plaintiff fell down the
stairs. (ECF Nos. 2 ¶¶ 7-8; 64-2, at 3).
Plaintiff

filed

suit

in

the

Circuit

Court

George’s County, Maryland, on January 15, 2016.

for

Prince

(ECF No. 2).

Defendant Amtrak removed the case to federal court.

(ECF No.

1).

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No.

63).

Plaintiff responded 21 days later even though Local Rule

105.2.a requires a response be filed within fourteen days.
No. 64).

Defendants replied and moved to strike the response.

(ECF No. 65).
moved

to

replied.
II.

(ECF

allow

Plaintiff responded to the motion to strike and
the

late

filing.

(ECF

No.

66).

Defendant

(ECF No. 67).

Choice of Law & Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “The district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the

Constitution,

Congress

laws,

established

“[f]ederal

question

or

treaties

Defendant

Amtrak

jurisdiction

of
as

exists

the
a
for

United

States.”

corporation,

congressionally

incorporated corporations under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”

Aliotta v.

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 758 n.1 (7th

2

and

Cir.

2003);

In re Rail Collision Near Chase, Md. on Jan. 4, 1987

Litig.,

680

F.Supp.

728,

730

(D.Md.

1987)

(finding

federal

jurisdiction for Amtrak because of its Congressional charter).2
Federal

question

jurisdiction

exists

because

“[e]ven

though

state law creates [the] cause[] of action . . . [the] right to
relief under state law requires resolution of a . . . question
of

federal

law[.]”

Franchise

Tax

Bd.

of

Cal.

v.

Constr.

Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
In

this

situation,

the

district

court

applies

substantive law that creates the cause of action.
Amtrak

Ne.

Corridor,

937

F.Supp.

1110,

1114

the

Hollus v.

(D.N.J.

1996)

(concluding that New Jersey substantive law applied to a tort
action against Amtrak).
suit

brought

applies.

under

Maryland

Therefore, as this was a negligence

Maryland
law

does

law,
not,

Maryland
however,

substantive
govern

law

procedural

rules in this court.
III. Motion for leave for late filing and Motion to Strike
Plaintiff filed her response to Defendants’ motion late.
(ECF

No.

filing.

64).

(ECF No. 65).

late filing.

2

Defendants

moved

to

strike

Plaintiff’s

late

Plaintiff then moved to allow for the

(ECF No. 66).

Defendant Amtrak misstates the basis for the court’s
jurisdiction as 28 U.S.C. § 1349. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 3). 28 U.S.C. §
1349 acts as a limit on jurisdiction and does not provide any
affirmative grant of jurisdiction.
3

Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(b)(2)

governs

motions

for

enlargement

time sought after expiration of the specified time period.
rule

provides

a

district

court

with

discretion

to

order

of
The
an

extension even after the expiration of a specified time period,
but only for “cause shown” and if the failure to act in a timely
fashion

is

6(b)(2).

the

result

of

“excusable

neglect.”

Fed.R.Civ.P.

The Supreme Court of the United States defined the

meaning of excusable neglect in Pioneer Investment Services Co.
v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), a
case dealing with late filings in bankruptcy proceedings.

In

defining neglect, the Supreme Court reasoned that courts could
accept

late

carelessness,
control.

filings
and

due

intervening

to

inadvertence,

circumstances

mistake

beyond

a

or

party’s

To ascertain whether a delay in filing is excusable,

courts must consider “all relevant circumstances surrounding the
party's omission.”

Id. at 395.

Here, Plaintiff avers that her delay in filing was due to a
mistake about the timeline within which to file a response.
(ECF No. 66).
Defendants

This mistake resulted in only a week delay, and

have

not

alleged

any

prejudice.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s motion to allow for late filing will be granted, and
Defendants’ motion to strike will be denied.

4

IV.

Motion for Summary Judgment
A.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
prevail

on

a

motion

for

summary

judgment,

the

moving

250
To

party

generally bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.
248-50.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.”
inquiry,

a

court

must

Id. at 248.

view

the

facts

In undertaking this
and

the

reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable to the
party

opposing

the

motion,”

Matsushita

Elec.

Indus.

Co.

v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also
EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir.
2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material
fact

through

mere

speculation

or

compilation

of

inferences.”

Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation
omitted).

5

B.

Analysis

“To establish a cause of action in negligence a plaintiff
must prove the existence of four elements: a duty owed to him
(or to a class of which he is a part), a breach of that duty, a
legally

cognizable

causal

relationship

duty and the harm suffered, and damages.”
Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 531 (1986).
carriers.

between

the

breach

of

Jacques v. First Nat.
Defendants are common

See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Seymour,

387 Md. 217, 224 (2005).

Maryland law provides:

A common carrier is not an insurer of the
safety of its passengers, but is bound to
employ the highest degree of care for their
safety, consistent with the nature of the
undertaking. It owes its passengers a duty
to deliver them to their destination as
expeditiously as possible, consistent with
safety.
Mass

Transit

Admin.

v.

Miller,

271

Md.

256,

259

(1974).

Although routinely expressed in these terms, see, e.g. Todd v.
Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 156-57 (2003), as with any
other duty, the requirements of the duty and whether a breach
occurred

depend

presented.

on

the

specific

facts

and

circumstances

See Seymour, 387 Md. at 224 (“Thus, when a passenger

suffers injury while onboard a common carrier . . . and the
passenger thereafter sues the common carrier under a negligence
theory, the pivotal question to determine is whether the act of
the

common

carrier

.

.

.

under

negligent act[.]”).
6

the

circumstances,

was

a

To

establish

the

element

of

duty,

a

plaintiff

must

introduce evidence to show how a reasonable common carrier would
act in the situation that faced the defendant.

See Brooks v.

Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 85 n.5 (2003) (“This is the
essence of a negligence action, as ‘negligence is a failure to
do what the reasonable [person] would do “under the same or
similar circumstances.”’”) (quoting William L. Prosser, The Law
of Torts § 32 (4th ed. 1971) (alteration in the original)); Jones
v. Balt. Transit Co., 211 Md. 423 (1956) (affirming a directed
verdict

for

plaintiff

the

failed

unreasonably).

defendant,
to

offer

a

common

evidence

carrier,

that

the

because

defendant

the
acted

When presented with a situation that an average

person would face in everyday life, then, from the facts of the
case,

the

trier

of

fact

can

be

expected

to

determine

the

appropriate degree of care and whether the defendant failed to
use “that caution, attention, or skill a reasonable person would
use under similar circumstances.” Chamberlain v. Denny’s Inc.,
166

F.Supp.2d

1064,

1068

(D.Md.

2001).

When,

however,

the

situation involves the conduct of a professional and requires
knowledge

“beyond

the

“expert’s

testimony

ken

is

of

the

necessary

standard for the trier of fact.”
413

Md.

15,

28

(2010)

average
to

laymen,”

elucidate

the

then

an

relevant

Schultz v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted)

(concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the
7

standard of care for a bank when allowing an individual to be
added to an existing bank account); see Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Miles

&

Stockbridge,

(concluding

that

whether

lawyer

a

P.C.,

expert
had

138

F.Supp.2d

testimony

was

breached

695

necessary

the

duty

to

(D.Md.
to
a

2001)

determine
client

in

recommending a settlement), modified by Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Miles

&

Stockbridge,

P.C.,

142

F.Supp.2d

676

(D.Md.

2001);

Puppolo v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 215 Md.App. 517 (2013)
(concluding
whether

a

that

expert

doctor

testimony

specializing

in

was

necessary

the

care

to

of

determine

hospitalized

patients breached the duty to a patient in determining a plan of
treatment).
plaintiff

If
fails

an

issue

requires

to

introduce

expert

expert

testimony

testimony,

and

then

a
the

plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish
negligence and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400 Md. 39, 71 (2007) (“If proof

of [the required degree of care] is lacking, ‘the court may
rule, in its general power to pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence,

that

there

is

not

sufficient

evidence

to

go

the

jury.’”) (quoting Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 361 (1934)).
“[T]he

proper

operation

of

a

railroad

involves

a

combination of factors not within the knowledge of the average
juryman.”

Bridger v. Union Ry. Co., 355 F.2d 382, 389 (6th Cir.

1966); accord Collins ex rel. Kay v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
8

Co., 675 F.2d 1185, 1195 (11th Cir. 1982).

The average juror

does not know how to start a train, how to drive a train, or how
to stop a train.

Likewise, the average juror would not know

what causes a train to jerk and what could be done to prevent a
sudden movement of the train. Thus, the standard of care – how a
reasonably prudent train operator would run a train — requires
expertise outside the knowledge of the average juror.
Plaintiff
establish

has
an

failed

to

essential

introduce

element

of

sufficient

her

claim,

Because

evidence

to

Defendants

are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A

similar

conclusion

was

reached

by

the

United

States

District Court for the District of Columbia in Frick v. Amtrak,
54 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014).

There, a plaintiff sued Amtrak

after he was knocked off his feet by a sudden movement of the
train.

Id. at 2.

Plaintiff testified that the train had left

the station late and appeared to be going faster than usual.
The

train

operator

applicable laws.

testified

that

he

complied

with

all

In that case, because “the standards governing

the operation of train operators are distinctly related to an
occupation that is ‘beyond the ken of the average layperson,’”
the case “present[ed] a clear situation where an expert [was]
required to establish the national standard of care.”
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

9

Id. at 4

In

an

attempt

to

avoid

the

requirements

of

an

expert,

Plaintiff points out that Defendants’ witnesses, including an
engineer,

testified

that

the

movement

of

the

train

(ECF No. 64-1, at 13).3

stopping is a safety issue.

after

Plaintiff

also states, in conclusory fashion, “The negligent movement of
the train in this case is based on a common-sense safety issue .
. . not beyond the ken of the average juror.”

(Id. at 12-13).

Plaintiff fails to comprehend the elements she must prove to
prevail.
Plaintiff’s

argument

requires

inferring

from

the

mere

occurrence of an event – the movement of the train – that the
Defendants acted negligently.

Although likely correct that the

average juror would know that the movement of a train is a
safety risk, Plaintiff needs to show not only that what happened
was potentially dangerous but also that the occurrence was the
result of some form of negligent conduct of the Defendants.
Without an explanation as to how or why the train moved, the
type of explanation an expert would provide, Plaintiff cannot

3

In their reply, Defendants interpret this as an argument
that Plaintiffs could use the Defendants’ witnesses as experts
to satisfy the requirement of an expert. (ECF No. 65, at 6-9).
This does not appear to be Plaintiff’s argument.
If it were,
and even assuming the witnesses could be qualified as experts by
Plaintiff,
the
witnesses
would
not
satisfy
the
expert
requirement
because
the
witnesses
did
not
testify
that
Defendants’ conduct fell below a reasonable standard of care.
Rather, they asserted that the train is allowed to move after
stopping under the applicable safety standards. (ECF Nos. 63-5,
at 10; 63-6, at 14).
10

show that Defendants’ conduct fell below a reasonable level and,
therefore, cannot prevail.4
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will
be granted.

(ECF No. 63).

Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff

was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk do not need to
be addressed.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for late filing filed

by

Plaintiff

Belinda

Hinson

will

be

granted,

the

motion

to

strike filed by Defendants MTA and Amtrak will be denied, and
the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants MTA and
Amtrak will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

4

Plaintiff never mentions the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
The doctrine allows for a jury to infer negligence
from the occurrence of an event, but to invoke res ipsa loquitur
a plaintiff must show the event is the type that does not
ordinarily occur absent negligence.
Gillespie v. Ruby Tuesday,
Inc., 861 F.Supp.2d 637, 642 (D.Md. 2012).
Here, Plaintiff
could not invoke res ipsa loquitur because she has failed to
offer evidence that a train does not readjust in the absence of
negligence.
11