Robinson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/19/2017. (c/m 06/20/2017 jf3s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMES W. ROBINSON, JR.,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
Civil Action No. DKC-16-1222
Pending is a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment filed by
defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., (“Wexford”), Peggy Mahler, NP, Beverly
McLaughlin, PA/NP, and Colin Ottey, M.D. (“Medical Defendants”). ECF No. 13.1 Also
pending is a motion to dismiss, or alternatively for summary judgment filed by defendant Alicia
Cartwright (“Correctional Defendant”). 2 ECF No. 14. Plaintiff has filed opposition responses
(ECF Nos. 17 & 18) to which the medical defendants have replied. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff has
also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. ECF No. 20. Upon review of the papers filed,
the court finds a hearing in this matter unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For
the reasons stated below, Defendants’ dispositive motions will be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Citations are to the court’s electronic docket except as to ECF No. 12, Ex 1, which is filed separately in
The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the correct names of all defendants.
I. Complaint Allegations
Plaintiff James W. Robinson, Jr., an inmate currently confined at Maryland Correctional
Institution (MCI-J) in Jessup, Maryland, filed a complaint, a supplement, and an amended
complaint alleging that the named medical defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. ECF Nos. 1, 4 & 7. Additionally, he names Alicia Cartwright as a
defendant but fails to specify how she violated his constitutional rights.
Specifically, Plaintiff states he has a growth on his left testicle for which he requested
medical defendants provide him a sonogram. ECF No. 1, p. 3. He also alleged that he was
denied pain medication and that his health care providers refused to address the situation. Id.
Plaintiff alleged that he was being denied “any form of treatment for the growth on [his] left
Plaintiff indicated in the supplement to his complaint that he was seen throughout 2014 to
2016 by Wexford employees, Buck, Martin and McLaughlin. ECF No. 4, p. 1. After review, the
court further directed him to supplement the complaint. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff then filed an
amended complaint naming Beverly McLaughlin, Peggy Mahler, Colin Ottey, and A. Cartwright
as Defendants. ECF No. 7, p. 2. Plaintiff reiterated his claim that he was denied a sonogram for
the growth on his left testicle and again noted that all pain medication after April 19, 2016 was
denied to him. Id., p. 4. He claimed that he was denied any treatment for the growth on his
testicle and that he had been given different diagnoses by different medical providers. Id. He
provided no factual allegations as to Cartwright, the administrative remedy coordinator at
Western Correctional Institution. Id.
II. Defendants’ Response
The medical defendants indicate that Plaintiff has a medical history positive for a
testicular growth. ECF No. 13-3. They argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead properly a civil
rights claim, they are entitled to immunity, and they demonstrate through medical records that
Plaintiff has received constitutionally adequate medical care. Id.
Correctional Defendant Cartwright indicates, through declarations and documentary
evidence, that Plaintiff’s claim is unexhausted and that she was not deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. ECF No. 14.
On July 11, 2014, while housed at WCI, Plaintiff was evaluated by Robustiano Barrera,
M.D., due to complaints that he noticed a “tender lump at the base of his left testicle.” ECF No.
13-3, p. 2. Plaintiff has a history of throat cancer and expressed concerns to Dr. Barrera that the
cancer returned. Barrera ordered blood work and advised that he may request a CT of the
abdomen depending on the results of the lab work. Id., pp. 2-3. He was prescribed Naprosyn for
pain relief and directed to return to Dr. Barrera in 2 weeks. Id., p. 3.
Plaintiff was seen by Beverly McLaughlin, R.N.P. on a sick call on August 27, 2014.3
Plaintiff complained of left testicular pain and a lump which began one year ago, but which had
shrunk in size. Id., p. 4. Examination revealed “a mass, left, the location is hard, with mobile
texture.” Id. He was prescribed Tylenol with Codeine. Id., p. 6. Blood work was again ordered
and Plaintiff was directed to follow up with the provider regarding the results of the ordered lab
The computer was not working on the day of the examination and the note was entered on August 29, 2014.
McLaughlin consulted with Plaintiff again on September 24, 2014, for follow-up and for
unrelated issues regarding his compliance with his medically prescribed diet. Id., p. 6. At that
time it was noted that Plaintiff’s penile shaft was normal; no abnormal groin lymph nodes were
palpable but the vas deferens was lumpy and tender. Id. McLaughlin recommended a testicular
Plaintiff was next seen by McLaughlin on October 2, 2014, for a scheduled provider visit.
Id., 8. Plaintiff complained of scrotum pain. He was advised that McLaughlin had placed a
request for an ultrasound and was awaiting the decision from collegial. His pain medication was
renewed for one month. Id., p. 9.
On October 10, 2014, Peggy Mahler, RNP updated Plaintiff’s chart with the results of his
lab work. As a result of the blood work, fish oil capsules were prescribed, and he was directed to
follow up in the chronic care clinic in one month for treatment of hyperlipidemia e.g. high
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Barrera on November 7, 2014, for a scheduled provider visit.
Id., p. 11. Plaintiff complained of a scrotal lump on the left side. He indicated that it slowly
increased in size and was tender and uncomfortable when he sat. Dr. Barrera indicated he would
request a sonogram of the testicles. Id.
On November 25, 2014, Plaintiff was evaluated by Colin Ottey, M.D. during a scheduled
visit. Id. p. 13. Plaintiff again reported testicular pain for over a year with no blood in the urine
or discharge. Swelling in the scrotum occurred for about two months which then went down but
a lump on the left testicle became larger with time. Id. Plaintiff reported pain while sitting,
problems sleeping at night, and pain when pressure is applied. He reported no pain when
urinating. Id. Plaintiff was prescribed an antibiotic and his other medications, which did not
include an analgesic, were continued . Id. He was directed to follow-up in two weeks. Id., p. 14.
Plaintiff was seen on November 29, 2014, by Terri Davis, P.A. due to his noncompliance with his medical diet. At that time, Plaintiff requested Tylenol for the testicular pain.
Davis noted that Plaintiff had just been seen by a physician and no analgesic prescribed, as such,
Davis prescribed Tylenol for 10 days, pending Plaintiff’s follow up with the physician. Id., p.
On December 2, 2014, Plaintiff was seen for follow-up with Dr. Barrera who noted that
Plaintiff had been prescribed antibiotics for 15 days due to his complaints of testicular pain.
Plaintiff reported that he still had some tenderness in the area but examination revealed no mass.
Id., p. 17. Plaintiff was prescribed Tylenol with Codeine and provided scrotal support. Id., pp.
Plaintiff was seen on December 26, 2014, February 6, 2015, April 10 and 15, 2015,
May 1, 2015, July 10, 2015, and August 14, 2015, for health concerns unrelated to the testicular
pain/lump. He did not express any concerns regarding testicular pain at those times. Id., pp. 2021, 23-28. On August 25, 2015, Plaintiff’s chart was updated to reflect that a targeted cell search
was conducted and 4 pills of medication were found in Plaintiff’s locker resulting in his being
charged with hoarding medication. As a result, Plaintiff’s prescriptions for Ultram and Baclofen
were discontinued. Id., p. 31.
On September 3, 2015, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Barrera due to complaints of
bilateral testicular pain and “on and off” swelling. Id., p. 32. Plaintiff reported that the scrotal
support was not helping. Examination revealed a cystic mass on Plaintiff’s left testicle. Dr.
Barrera indicated that he would renew Plaintiff’s prescription for Ultram and schedule a scrotal
sonogram. Id. Dr. Barrera again examined Plaintiff on October 22, 2015. Id., p. 34. Plaintiff
again complained of testicular pain. Examination revealed no testicular tenderness and the
epididymis was not enlarged while the vas deferens was slightly swollen and tender. Dr. Barrera
noted that he would continue to observe Plaintiff and he was directed to continue to take his
medication as directed. Id. Plaintiff’s pain medication was renewed on January 6, 2016. Id., pp.
On February 27, 2016, Plaintiff was evaluated for unrelated medical concerns issues. Id.,
Plaintiff’s chart was updated on April 21, 2016, by Peggy Mahler, NP who noted that
Plaintiff’s prescription for Ultram 50 mg. was not approved to treat his left testicular pain. Id., p.
41. It was recommended that instead he receive Mobic 7.5 mg. Mahler also indicated that
scrotal support would be ordered. Id.
On May 26, 2016, plaintiff was seen by McLaughlin during a scheduled visit. He
expressed that his intermittent testicular pain continued and that he was frustrated with the
medical process and questioned how collegial review could “deny anything [when they] are not
on site.” Id., p. 42. Plaintiff was advised of the process and McLaughlin noted she would
resubmit the request for an ultrasound. Id. He was advised to continue taking his medication,
including Baclofen and Extra Strength Tylenol as prescribed. Id., p. 43.
On August 10, 2016, an ultrasound of Plaintiff’s scrotum/testicles was performed. ECF
No. 13-4. On August 29, 2016, after being transferred to MCI-J, Plaintiff was evaluated by
Yonas Sisay, M.D. Id., p. 44. Plaintiff reported that he had suffered from “testicular area lumps
for a few years” and had previously been prescribed Ultram. Plaintiff was examined and the
results of the ultrasound reviewed. The ultrasound showed bilateral hydrocele and right sided
cysts. No evidence of a solid mass was shown.4 Examination showed Plaintiffs’ right scrotum
was minimally enlarged. No tenderness or signs of erythema were noted. Dr. Sisay advised
Plaintiff that narcotics were not an appropriate treatment for his condition. It was recommended
that Plaintiff take Acetaminophen as Plaintiff reported that he did not like NSAIDs. Id. Dr.
Sisay ordered a stool sample, acetaminophen for pain relief, and scrotal support, and directed
Plaintiff follow up in the chronic care clinic in three months. Id., pp. 44-46.
On September 15, 2016, Plaintiff was seen during sick call due in part to his concerns
that the Tylenol prescribed was insufficient to treat his testicular pain. He agreed to Naprosyn
and same was prescribed. Id., pp. 47-48.
Dr. Sisay again examined Plaintiff on September 22, 2016. Id., p. 49. Examination
revealed minimal non-tender lumps on both scrotums. It was noted that Plaintiff wanted Ultram
and Neurontin for his reported scrotal pain. Sisay again advised Plaintiff that Neurontin and
Ultram were not indicated or appropriate to treat him. Sisay recommended an increase in
Tylenol and discontinuing the Naprosyn. Id., p. 49.
Alicia Cartwright avers that she is a correctional officer at WCI. ECF No. 14-2, ¶ 1. She
declares that she has no personal involvement in the provision of medical care to any inmate. Id.
¶ 3. She specifies that she is without authority to make decisions regarding an inmate’s care or
to direct medical personnel to take any specific action. Id. She avers that she did not interfere
with, hinder, or delay Plaintiff’s medical care. Id., ¶ 4.
Plaintiff contends that the medical defendants cannot know that the cysts are benign as no follow-up
appointment or culture of the cysts was taken. ECF No. 17, ¶ 3.
On April 1, 2015, Cartwright reviewed ARP WCI-0651-15, submitted by Plaintiff,
indicating that there was a misdiagnosis of a growth on his left testicle and he had attempted to
obtain proper medical treatment. Id. Cartwright dismissed the ARP, pending resubmission, with
directions that Plaintiff specify the dates and providers he had seen and the issue he had with the
treatment. Plaintiff did not resubmit the ARP. Id. There is no record at the headquarters’
ARP/IGO Unit that Plaintiff ever filed an appeal of the ARP dismissal to headquarters. ECF No.
14-3, ¶ 2. Additionally, Plaintiff did not file any grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office
regarding complaints of inadequate medical care. ECF No. 14-4, ¶ 3.
III. Standard of Review
Motion to Dismiss
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test the
sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243
(4th Cir. 1999). The dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted does
not require defendant to establish “beyond doubt” that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 561 (2007). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 563. The court need not,
however, accept unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles County Comm’rs, 882 F.2d
870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, see Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual
events, see United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw
all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness’ credibility.”
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) the Supreme Court
explained that in considering a motion for summary judgment, the “judge’s function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.” A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. Thus,
“the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or
the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the
evidence presented.” Id. at 252.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. No genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her case as to which he or she would have
the burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Therefore, on
those issues on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility
to confront the summary judgment motion with an affidavit or other similar evidence showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.
It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983
claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior
liability under § 1983); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (no
respondeat superior liability in a Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on
ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative
factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.
1984)). Plaintiff has failed to point to any personal conduct by Wexford, in regard to the matters
alleged in his complaint. Plaintiff’s effort to hold this Defendant liable based on its supervisory
role is unavailing. Wexford is entitled to dismissal.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue
of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976). “Scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not limited to those punishments authorized
by statute and imposed by a criminal judgment.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th
Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). In order to state an Eighth
Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions of the
defendants or their failure to act amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “Deliberate indifference is a very high standard
– a showing of mere negligence will not meet it . . . [T]he Constitution is designed to deal with
deprivations of rights, not errors in judgments, even though such errors may have unfortunate
consequences . . . To lower this threshold would thrust federal courts into the daily practices of
local police departments.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695- 96 (4th Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the
prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the prison
staff were aware of the need for medical attention but failed to either provide it or ensure the
needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Objectively, the
medical condition at issue must be serious. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)
(there is no expectation that prisoners will be provided with unqualified access to health care).
Proof of an objectively serious medical condition, however, does not end the inquiry.
The subjective component requires “subjective recklessness” in the face of the serious
medical condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40. “True subjective recklessness requires
knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that
risk.” Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997). “Actual knowledge or awareness on
the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference ‘because
prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment.’”
Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Center, 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844). If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an official may avoid liability “if [he]
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted.” See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged in light of the risk the
defendant actually knew at the time. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 2000)
(citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998)) (focus must be on precautions
actually taken in light of suicide risk, not those that could have been taken).
The Fourth Circuit has identified two slightly different aspects of a correctional official’s
state of mind that must be shown in order to satisfy the subjective component in the context of
medical care. First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required. Young v. Mt.
Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d
294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is not enough that the officer should have recognized it.”). Beyond
such knowledge, however, the officer must also have “recognized that his actions were
insufficient” to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs. Parrish,
372 F.3d at 303 (emphasis added); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here there is no evidence that Cartwright was aware that Plaintiff suffered from a serious
medical need and/or that his needs were not being met by medical staff. Cartwright’s sole
involvement with Plaintiff in regard to his medical care was directing that he resubmit his ARP
detailing his claims. He failed to comply with her request. Plaintiff indicates in his opposition to
the dispositive motion that he had “several conversations” with Cartwright where Cartwright
“request[ed] more time to address the situation.” ECF No. 18, p. 1. Plaintiff indicates that by
Cartwright’s requesting more time to resolve his situation, “all chances for an appeal would
become valid.” Id. He indicates that Cartwright had “broad powers throughout the institution”
and she could resolve many issues without any paper work. Id., p. 2. Even if Cartwright agreed
to make informal inquiries on his behalf regarding his medical care, there is absolutely nothing in
the record to suggest that she interfered with the provision of medical care to Plaintiff, or had an
actual knowledge of a risk of harm to Plaintiff and failed to act. She is entitled to summary
The undisputed record establishes that Plaintiff did not suffer a serious medical need for
which he did not receive constitutionally adequate medical care. Indeed, the records filed
establish that the medical defendants have treated Plaintiff’s complaints and filed the appropriate
requests for further diagnostic testing, provided him regular follow-up care, ordered laboratory
tests, provided him medication for pain management, and medical devices.
defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment.
In essence, for Plaintiff to prevail, the treatment rendered must be so grossly incompetent
or inadequate as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness. Miltier 896
F.2d at 851 (citation omitted) (overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;
aff’d in pertinent part by Sharpe v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 621 Fed.Appx. 732 (Mem), (4th Cir.
“Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless
disregard.” Id. Reckless disregard occurs when a defendant “knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw
the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a health care provider
must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of the symptoms.
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998). Mere negligence or malpractice does
not rise to a constitutional level. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975); Donlan v.
Smith, 662 F. Supp. 352, 361 (D. Md. 1986) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at 106).
The right to treatment is “limited to that which may be provided upon a reasonable cost
and time basis and the essential test is one of medical necessity and not simply that which may be
considered merely desirable.” Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir.1977). The
record evidence indicates that Plaintiff’s requests for treatment were considered and his needs
addressed. The delays that have occurred do not appear to be deliberate, nor have they resulted
in harm to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s numerous grievances are reflective of his frustration, but
“[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate’s proper medical care do
not state a § 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged.” Wright v. Collins, 766
F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3rd Cir.1970)).
There are no exceptional circumstances alleged in this case.
It is unclear from the record before the court why Plaintiff’s providers’ requests for
sonogram were not approved earlier. It is clear, however, that the delay in providing the
sonogram did not result in any harm to Plaintiff as his course of treatment did not alter once the
sonogram was obtained. Plaintiff has been treated conservatively and there does not appear to be
any need for more aggressive treatment. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the delay in obtaining a
sonogram and his disagreement with the analgesic medication prescribed to treat his discomfort
amount to nothing more than a disagreement with the course of treatment prescribed. The
medical defendants are entitled to summary judgment.5
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss, or in the alternative
motions for summary judgment, construed as motions for summary judgment, will be granted.6
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment will be denied. A separate Order follows.
June 19, 2017
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Plaintiff indicates in his motion for partial summary judgment that on April 12, 2017, he was called to
medical to consult with Dr. Sisay. At that time Dr. Sisay made a telephone call which lasted 4 minutes and which
Dr. Sisay conducted in a foreign language. At the end of the call, Sisay advised Plaintiff that no further treatment
for his unidentified “accelerating medical condition” would be administered. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff’s motion will
be denied. It is unclear whether the facts alleged in the motion pertain to the subject of this action or concern some
other medical issue. Plaintiff does not identify how his medical condition has accelerated.
In light of the foregoing the court need not address Defendants’ claims of qualified immunity.
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