Lattisaw, Jr. v. C.O. Ross et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 9/21/2017. (c/m 9/21/2017 tds, Deputy Clerk)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

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CHARLES WILLIAM
#444-499,

LATTISA W,.IR.

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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CO. ERIC ROSS,'
CHARLES COUNTY SHERIFF TROY
BERRY,
CHARLES COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER DIRECTOR CAPTAIN RICE,
CHARLES COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
CHARLES COUNTY DETETION
CENTER,

Case No.: G."'-16-1258
(Consolidated with G.IH-16-2469)

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
I'laintilTCharles William Lattisaw. Jr" a prisoner eonlined at Jessup Correctional
Institution. has liled a sell~represented civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.c. ~ 19832 As
amended hy eonsolidation.-' the Complaint seeks $5 million in damages against Charles County
Detention Center ("Detention Center") Officer Eric Ross. Director Captain Rice. Charles County
Sheriff Troy Berry. and Charles County. Maryland.

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The Clerk shall amend the docket to relleet the full and proper spelling of Defendants'

:! In addition

to claims brought under the Civil Rights statutc. the complaint
battery. and negligence .

names.

also contains state tort claims for assault.

.~ Lattisaw's first complaint. Civil Action No. GJII-16-1258. named Officer Ross and the Detention Center as
defendants. and alleged that on February 28. 2014. Ross turned ofTthe lights and \vater in the shower arca while
Lattisavy' was showering. leading to injury. ECF No. I. On June 29, 2016, Lattisaw filed a second civil action arising
from the same event. adding Berry. Ricc. and Charles County as defendants. That actioll. Lall;SOlI' 1'. Be,.,:\'. C!{ (// .•
Civil Action No. GJH.16-2.J69. was consolidated with Civil Action No. GJH-16-1258. ECF NO.8.

Pcnding is a Motion to Dismiss or. Alternatively. for Summary Judgment tiled on behalf
of Ross. Rice. Berry and Charlcs County.4 ECF No. 17. and Lattisaw's Responsc. Eel' No. 22.
No hearing is needed to resolve the issues raised. See Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2(16). For the
following reasons. Defendants' Motion will be granted.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Lattisaw's

Allegations'

Lattisaw e1aims that on February 28. 2014. he was "assaulted in various ways (physically.
sexually. verbally) by CO Ross:'

ECF NO.1 at 5." Lattisaw states that Ross turned the lights and

water on and offin the shower area. When Lattisaw stepped out of the shower to ask Ross to stop
playing with the controls. Ross "stuck up his middle linger" and laughed at him. !d Lattisaw
resumed his shower and Ross continued to turn the water and lights on and off. Lattisaw was
struck with "exceedingly hoC watcr that burncd his "back. neck and butt:' and as hc hurricd out
of the shower. he tripped and fell in Ii'ont 01'''15-20 other inmates" who frightcncd him by
making "scxual remarks" toward him. Id. Lattisaw contends Ross's conduct constitutes "abusc
and negligcnce:' and that Ross ignored his rcquests for medical treatment and left Lattisaw on
the floor in pain. !d at 6. Lattisaw states another officer heard his crics for help and escort cd him
to the medical area. !d Lattisawasked

Sgt. Irby to review the security camera to verify the

incident. which was witnessed by other inmates. !d Lattisaw e1aims he continues to sulkr
"[dlepression. anxiety. nightmares. fear and emotional [inlstability" because of the incident. !d

~ The Detention Center \\'as dismissed on preliminary rcvic\\'. as it was not a "person"' amenable to suit under 42
U.S.c. ~ 1983. ECF NO.3.
~ Unless othenvise stated. the facts <Ire taken from Plaintiffs Complaint and assumed to be true.
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Pin cites to documents tiled on the Court's electronic filing system (CM/ECF)

by that system.

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refer to the page numbers generated

B.

Defendants' Responses

Ross contends that the incident that resulted in Lattisaw's fall was an accident. l.attisaw
was not denied medical care and in any event was not sexually assaulted or otherwise injurcd.
and that the video of the incident was overwritten alter review because it did not reveal any
wrongdoing.
Ross has submitted an affidavit detailing the layout of the Men's Classification Unit
("MCU") where the incident occurred and explaining his actions on the day of the incident. ECF
No. 17-4. The MCU is a two-tiered unit with 24 cells with a common area and a shower on each
tier. ld. ~ 3. Two ofticers are typically assigned to the MCU. one to the first floor control room
and the other to the desk just outside the control room. ld. ~ 4. From the main screen of the
computer in the control room. an ofticer can control various operations in the MCU. including
the opening and closing of cell doors. lights. and water to the showers.!d.

~i There
5.

is a speeilic

button that controls the lights to the shower on both the first and second floors. Id. ~ 6. A
separate mouse-activated button controls the water to the showers. This button does not control
the water flow from the shower head. but simply acts to turn the water lines running to the
showers on and otT. !d. ~ 7. An ollicer cannot control the temperature of the water in the showers
from the control room; the temperature is controlled at the water heaters. !d. ~ 8. Because the
mouse must be clicked to turn the lights on and off and also to turn the water to the showers on
and oil: the lights and water cannot be turned on and off simultaneously. It!. ~ 9.
The shower area on the first floor includes an area that has a toilet. sink. and bench as
well as a shower stall. ECF No. 17-4 ~ 10. The shower stall is separated Irom the toilet area by a
shower curtain. !d. There is a lip that inmates must step over to enter the shower that prevents

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water from flowing into the toilet area. Similarly. there is a lip in the entrance to the toilet area
that prevents water from flowing out into the common area. /d.

'110.

Water will not !low Ii'om the shower head until the corrections oflicer in the control room
has turned the water to the showers on. The showers are not automatically activated when the
shower button is pressed on the computer in the control room. Instead. the shower heads are
activated only when an inmate presses a button located below the shower head itself. When an
inmate presses the button. the water turns on for approximately twenty seconds. Consequently.
inmates have to continuously press the button during their showers. /d.

'112.

If the water to the

showers is turned off in the control room while water is flowing trom the shower head. the water
will stop !lowing. /d. ,; 13. Water will not automatically flow trom the shower head when the
water is turned back on in the control room. Once the water has been turned back on in the
control room. an inmate must press the button below the shower head to turn the water back on
for an additional twenty seconds. /d. Neither inmates. nor the corrections oflicer in the control
room. have control over the temperature of the water that comes trom the shower head. /d. ~ 14.
Inmates assigned to the MCU are in their cells for approximately twenty-two hours a day
and are allowed into the common area twice a day. for one hour at a time. once during the
morning shin (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) and once during the evening shin (3:00 p.m. to I 1:00
p.m.). /d. ~ 15. Inmates are allowed to use either of the two showers while out of their cells. The
only restriction is that inmates cannot take a shower during the morning shin until the showers
have been cleaned and inspected by a corrections oflicer. /d.
On February 28. 2014. Ross was assigned to the Control Room in the MCU when
Lattisaw and fellow inmate Mark Clower decided to take showers. /d. ~ 16. Lattisaw was in the
shower on the first floor and Clower was in the shower on the second !loor. /d. Aner several

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minutes. Ross told Clower to finish his shower because he was scheduled to be taken to the
medical unit. Id. ~ 17: ECF No. 17-3 at 118. When Clower ignored Ross's order. Ross turned ofT
the lights to the shower areas tirst. followed by the water to the showers. then turned each back
on. in roughly three second intervals. repeating the process three additional times over a two
minute period. ECF No. 17-4 ~~ 17-18. Laltisaw was still in the first floor shower while this was
occurring. Id.
Ross avers that his decision to turn the lights and water off and on was bascd solely upon
the need to get Clower to the medical unit. and Laltisaw's presence in the shower did not filctor
into this decision. Id. ~ 19. Alier Ross stopped turning the lights and water on and oft: he lcarncd
that Laltisaw was complaining of injury. hi. ~ 20. Ross did not say anything to Laltisaw during
or alier the incident. !d.
Laltisaw was transported by Corporal Fagnani to the mcdicalunit. hI. ~ 21. wherc he
"stated he fell in the shower and also stated the water in the shower was hot." ECF No. 17-3 at
251. Nothing in the record suggests that he complained to medical staff about being sexually
assaultcd. !d. Staff check cd Laltisaw's vitals. !d. The medical records do not include any
reference to Laltisaw sustaining burns on his body or to other obvious injury eaused by his
alleged fall. Id. Lattisaw remained in the mediealunit overnight but was released the next day
alier indicating he had no pain. Id.
Defendants do not dispute that a Samsung SCB-2000 High Resolution video camera is
positioned to record activity in and around the shower located on the first floor of the MCU. ECF
No. 17-5 ~ 2. Brandon Foster. Acting Director of the Detention Center. explains that each of the
three cameras in the MCU is connected to a digital video recorder located on A-Block. where
MCU is located. in the Mini-Control room. Id. ~ 3. During the time period in question. the

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images captured by the video cameras in the MCU were stored on a Model D 16LS6TB DVR
("the DVR") that recorded 24 hours a day. seven days a week. Id. The DVR has an internal
memory capable of storing approximately three months' worth of video ICed by overwriting the
earliest videos in one minute increments on a constant and revolving basis: thus. any visual
evidence captured by the DVR. if not converted to a video lile before that particular day in
question. is overwritten. and is lost lorever. Id.
At the time of the incident in question. the Detention Center did not have a written policy
in place to preserve all videos related to complaints madc by inmates. Id.

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4. During the time in

question. if an inmate made a complaint about a corrections ofticer. a supervisor or member of
the command stalTwould watch a playback of the incident directly fromlhe DVR on which it
was stored: if the review revealed no wrongdoing. there was no requirement that the video be
preserved. If the review revealed any type of wrongdoing. the digital recording from the DVR
was converted to a video file and saved. !d.
Aller Lattisaw complained about Ross's behavior on the date in question. Sergeant
Matthew Irby reviewed the f()otage of the incident and did not lind any cvidencc to corroborate
Lattisaw's claim against Ross. Id. ~ 5. Bascd upon the policy in place during the time period in
question. Irby was not required to preserve the video. Id. ~ 67
II.

STANDARD

OF RF:VIEW

Defendants' motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Proccdure 12(b)(6) or. in the alternative. lor summary judgment under Rule 56. If the Court
considers mattcr outsidc the pleadings. as the Court does here. the Court must treat a motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgmcnt. Fcd. R. Civ. 1'. 12(d). When the Court trcats a motion to

On May 9. 2016 the Court issued an Order requiring that the video surveillance referenced in the Complaint be
preserved. ECF No.3. By that date, the video had already been recorded over and was not availahle to be preserved.

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dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, "[a]1I parties must be given a reasonable opportunity
to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion:' Id It is obvious that when the moving
party styles its motion as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or. alternativcly. Illotion
for summary judgmcnt. as is the case here. and the nonmoving party attaches cxhibits to its
opposition. the nonmoving party is aware that materials outside the pleadings arc bC!l)fe the
Court. and the Court can treat the motion as one lor summary judgment. See Laughlin

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Metropolitan Wash. Airports, Auth.. 149 F.3d 253. 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998). Furthcr. the Court is
not prohibitcd fi'om granting a motion for summary judgment befi.)rcthe commcncement of
discovery. See Fed. R, Civ. 1'. 56(a) (stating that the court "shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine disputc as to any material fact" without distinguishing
pre- or post-discovery),
However. summary judgmcnt should not be granted ifthc nonmoving party has not had
the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition to thc motion,
Anderson \', Liberty Lohhy. Inc.. 477 U.S, 242. 250 n. 5 (1987). If the nonmoving party feels that
the motion is premature. that party can invoke Rule 56(d). See Celotex Corl',

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Cl1rell. 477 U.S.

317. 326 (1986). Under Rule 56(d). the Court may deny a motion for summary judgmcnt if the
non-movant shows through an affidavit that. for specificd rcasons. he cannot properly prcsent
facts essential to justify an opposition because they are unavailable to him. Fed. R. Civ. 1'. 56(d).
"'[TJhe f:1ilureto tile an affidavit ... is itselfsufficicnt grounds to rejcct a e1aim that thc
opportunity or discovery was inadequatc ...• Harrod" Ltd

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Sixty Internet DOlllain Nallles. 302

F.3d 214. 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). However. a failurc to tilc an affidavit may be
cxcused "if thc nonmoving party has adequately infi.JrInedthe district court that thc motion is
premature and that more discovcry is necessary" and the "nonmoving party's objcctions befi.)re

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the district court scrvcd as the functional cquivalcnt of an affidavit." Id at 244--45 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Lattisaw is aware that materials outside the pleadings are heli)re the Court. and that the
Court may treat the motion as one lor summary judgment. Lattisaw has received copies of the
exhibits that accompany the Defendants' dispositive motion. ECI' No. 17. and has attached
exhibits to his opposition. ECF No. 22-1. I'urthermore. Lattisaw has not filed an affidavit.
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). to show what essential facts. currently unavailable to him. he
could present if given an opportunity to conduct discovery. Lattisaw has requested a copy of
video footagc showing the incident involving the showcr area. but the footage is not available.'
Further. lor reasons addressed herein. the video is not sufficiently material to the outcome of this
case. Thus. the Court is satislied that it is appropriate to address Defendants' motion as onc for
summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if'"materials in the record. including depositions.
documents. electronically stored information. affidavits or declarations. stipulations ...
admissions. interrogatory answers. or other materials:' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). show that there is
'"no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law:' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see a/so Ce/Olex. 477 U.S. at 322. The party moving for summary
judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuinc dispute exists as to material lacts.
Pulliam/m' .. Co. \".Cameo Props .. 810 F.2d 1282. 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). If the moving party
demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party's case. the burden shifts
to the non-moving party to identify specific lacts showing that there is a genuine issue li)r trial.
See Ce/o/ex. 477 U.S. at 322-23. i\ material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit

RThe COUll accepts the veracity of Lattis3\'/S statements regarding Ross's turning the water and lights on and otT
and Lattisaw's f..,I! in the shower area for the purpose ofsullllllary judgment review.

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under the governing law:' Spri~~s v. Diall/ond Aulo Glass, 242 F.3d 179. 183 (4th Cir. 2011 )
(quoting Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute of material fact is only genuine ifsurticient
evidenee favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of lact to return a verdict Illr that
party. Id at 248. However. the nonmoving party "cannot crcatc a gcnuine issue of material faet
through mere speeulation or the building of one inference upon another:' !Jeale \'. Ilan~I', 769
F.2d 213. 214 (4th Cir. 1985). The Court may only rely onlacts supported in the rccord.not
simply assertions in the pleadings. in order to fullill its "artirmative obligation ... to prevent
'faetually unsupported claims or defenscs' from proeecding to tria!'" Felly v.. Gral'i!-lIulI/phreys
Co.. 818 F.2d 1126. 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Celolex, 477 U.S. at 324-25), Whcn ruling on
a motion for summary judgmcnt. "ftJhe evidencc ofthc non-movant is to be believed. and all
justifiable inferenees are to be drawn in his favor:' Anderson, 477 U,S, at 255. Beeausc Lattisaw
is sell~reprcsented. his submissions arc liberally eonstrued. See Erickson \'. Panlus, 551 U.S. 89.
94 (2007),
III.

DISCUSSION

Lattisaw brings this aetion under the auspiees of the Eighth Amendmcnt. allcging Ross's
aetions subjectcd him to scxual assault and amounted to an impropcr usc of f(lree. Lattisaw raises
three Eighth Amcndmcnt claims: intliction of cruel and unusual punishment caused by Ross's
aetions in turning on and olTthe lights and water: lailurc to protcct Lattisaw from violence whcn
he fell outside the shower: and denial of medical or mental health treatment lollowing a scxual
assault. Lattisaw's eomplaint. liberally construed. also raises state tort claims for assault. battery.
and negligencc.
"The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments imposes eertain
basic duties on prison otlicials:'

Raynor v, Pu~h. 817 F.3d 123. 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (eiting

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Farmer \', Brennan. 511 U,S, 825. 832 (1994). Those duties "include maintaining humane
conditions ofconlinement.

including lhe provision of adequate medical care and ...

'reasonablc

measures to guarantee the safety ofthc inmates .... Id, "[NJot every injury sulkred by a prisoner
at the hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison ortieials responsible I()r
the victims safety."' A1akdessi \'. Fields. 789 1',3d 126. 133 (4th Cir. 2015).
"A plaintiff bringing an Eighth Amendment claim must salisl)' a two-part test. consisting
of both an objective and a subjective inquiry. for liability to attach."' See Raynor, 817 1'.3d at
127, Objectively. the prisoner "must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the

1()fIn

of a

serious or signiticant physical or emotional injury" or substantial risk to either il~jury. DallS(,/,

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Siansberry. 772 1'.3d 340. 346--47 (4th Cir. 2014). The objective inquiry requires the Court to
"assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk."'
Helling

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1j,IcKil111ey. U.S. 25. 36 (1993) (emphasis in original). A genuine dispute of tact
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regarding the extent of the injury sutlered precludes summary judgment. Raynor. 817 F.3d 12829,

Subjectively. a plaintiff must establish that the prison ot1icial involved had"a surticiently
culpable state of mind" amounting to "deliberate indifference to inmate health or salety."
Farmer. 511 U.S. at 834, Evidence establishing a culpablc stalc of mind requires actual
knowledge of an cxcessive risk to the prisoner's safety or proof thaI prison orticials were aware
of lacts from which an inlerence could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and
that the inlerence was drawn. 1<1. at 837. A plainti ff may "prove an orticial's actual knowledge of
a substantial risk in the usual ways including inferencc from circumstantial evidence" so that "a

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factfinder may conclude that a prison orticial knew of a substantial risk from the very faet that
the risk was obvious:' Raynor. 817 F.3d at 128 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
A. Claims Against Russ
Nothing in the reeord suggests that Ross's actions in turning ofTthe lights and water were
sutlieiently egregious to establish Eighth Amendment liability. and nothing suggests that
Lattisaw sutTered any injury due to a fall sustained while escaping a blast of hot water.
Latlisaw's claim that Ross "gave him the finger:' if true. does not without more constitute a
violation of constitutional law. See Carler \'. Morris. 164 F.3d 215. 219 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting use of racial epithets as a basis for constitutional claim). The gesture alleged in this
case is not condoned by the Court. but even assuming it occurred. it falls short of acts forbidden
by the Fourth. the Fourteenth. or the Eighth Amendments. See Pink \'. Lesler. 52 F.3d 73. 75
(1995) ("not all undesirable behavior by state actors is unconstitutionan.
Lattisaw also claims that he was injurcd due to "sexual assault" by other inmates present
in the shower area. In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect from
violence. Lattisaw must establish that Ross exhibited deliberate or callous indifTerence to a
spccific known risk of harm. See Pressly v. HlIIlo. 816 F. 2d 977. 979 (4th Cir. 1987). Failure to
take any action in an ongoing assault can amount to deliberate indifference. See Winl/elt! \'. Bass.
106 F.3d 525. 532 (4th Cir. 1997). However. courts have recognized. that not every allegation of
sexual abuse is "objectively. surticiently serious" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. See
Wilkins

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Gadc~l'.559 U.S. 34. 37 (2010) ("not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives

rise to a federal cause of action") (internal citation omitted): Boddie. 105 F.3d at 861 ("isolated
episodes of harassment and touehing ... are despicable ....

But they do not involve a harm of

federal constitutional proportions as defined by the Supreme Court") (ell in}.:Farmer. 511 U.S. at

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833-34). Instead. courts must conduct a Itlct-intensive. case-by-case inquiry to detcrminc iftbe
alleged sexual abuse was suniciently serious. Chapman

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Willis. NO.7: 12-CV-00389. 2013 WI.

2322947. at *5 (W.D. Va. May 28, 2(13).
Here. Lallisaw's claim of "sexual assault .. involves lewd comments made by fellow
inmates while he lay sprawled outside the shower. Nothing in the record remotely suggests that
he was fondled. assaulted. or otherwise a victim of sexual assault." Accordingly, there is no
dispute as to any material Itlct that would suggcst that Ross. either objectively or subjectively.
violated Lallisaw's Eighth Amendment rights.
B.

Claims Against the County, Sheriff, and Director

Lallisaw has failed to establish an Eighth Amendment claim against Ross. thus barring
his claims against Charles County. Charles County Sheriff Troy Berry, and Detcntion Center
Director Captain Rice. which stem li'OI11 is claim against Ross. Even if the underlying claim
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against Ross wcre to proeeed. there is no doctrine of re.\jlOndeal superior in ~ 1983 actions, and
Lallisaw has failed to establish that the incident resulted from inadequate or improper training
required by tbe County or that Berry or Rice failed to properly supervise Detention Center stan~
See Chin

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CiJy o{Ba/JiJllore. 241 F. Supp. 2d 546. 549 (D. Md, 2(03) (citing Monell \'. Nell'

York DeparlmenJ o{Socia/ SelTices. 436 U.S. 658. 694 (1978»: see a/so Miller \'. lIamm. Civ.
No. CCB-I 0-243.2011

WL 9185. at * 14 (D, Md. Jan, 3. 2(11) (dismissing a plaintiffs ~ 1983

claim against defendants in their onicial capacity where the plaintifTtailed to establish that
defendants' policies. customs. or practices causally contributed to a constitutional violation).
" Lattisaw also argues that Defendants did not provide him mental health counseling following the event. ECF No.
22 at 3. Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion that Lanisaw was not a victim afsexual assault. the record shows
that Lattisaw's mental health concerns were monitored and addressed throughout his placement at the Detention
Center. Lattisaw requested a mental health/HIV consultation on March 10.2014. and was seen two days later. on
March 12.2014. The nature of the consultation is not apparent in the record. ECF 17-3 at 159. Medical records
indicate Lattisaw had a history of depression and was prescribed an antidepressant while at the Detention Center.
beginning in July of2013./d
at 236-256. 260.

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C. State Tort Claims
The facts underpinning Lattisaw's civil rights claim. specifically that Ross acted with
malice to expose him to scalding water in the shower and that the incident could have been
avoided had Rice and/or Berry provided better management and training of Detention Center
staff. could also be construed as a state tort claim. However. a federal court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where it has dismissed the federal claim.
28 U.S.c. ~ 1367(c)(3). When. as here. the federal claim is dismissed. the federal courts arc
inclined to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice rather than retain supplemental
jurisdiction.lo See Carnegie Melloll Unil'. \'. Cohill. 484 U.S. 343. 350 (1988). Accordingly.
Latlisaw's claims of assault. batlery and negligence are dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

II

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or. Alternatively. for Summary
Judgment is granted and this action is dismissed. A separate Order f{)lIows.

Dated: SeptemberU.

2017
GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge

lO Because the state la\\' claims will not be adjudicated here. this COllrt need not consider Defendants' arguments
concerning the limitations period for assault actions and compliance \\lith Maryland's Local Government Tort
Claims Act. Md. Code. Ann .. Cts & Jud. Proc ..
5.301 to 5.304 (2013 RcpL VoL).

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II

To the extent these state claims remain viahle. Louisa\\-' may wish to pursue any appropriate action in state court.

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