Farrish v. Navy Federal Credit Union

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 3/2/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/2/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
KUKIA R. FARRISH
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-1429

:
NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is the motion to
dismiss

filed

by

(“Defendant”).

Defendant

(ECF No. 13).

Navy

Federal

Credit

The issues have been briefed, and

the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule 105.6.

Union

Local

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss

will be granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiff

Kukia

Farrish

(“Plaintiff”)

filed

a

complaint

against Defendant in the District Court of Maryland for Prince
George’s County on April 8, 2016.
details

provided

in

Plaintiff’s

(ECF No. 2).

complaint

are

the

“particulars of this case”:
Credit card (Cash Rewards Card)
payments weren’t applied properly excessive
interest
Broken FDCPA laws on collection
Calls (TCPA) harassing me
false credit report reported
Financial theft
ATM deposit wasn’t properly inputed

The only
following

los[s] of $300 for Clinton branch
threatened to close my account and they did.
They caused me pain and suffering and
embarrassment.
(Id.).

Defendant removed the case to federal court because the

complaint

appears

to

allege

violations

of

federal

statutes,

specifically the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.

(ECF No. 1, at 2).

its motion to dismiss on May 19.

Defendant filed

(ECF No. 13).

Plaintiff

responded (ECF No. 15), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 16).
II.

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

Presley v. City of

Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A complaint

need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

“Rule 8(a)(2)

still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.”
544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

That showing must consist of more than “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or
“naked

assertion[s]

devoid

of

further

factual

enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).

2

At

this

stage,

all

well-pleaded

allegations

in

the

complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S.

266,

268

(1994),

and

all

factual

allegations

must

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

be
See

Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783
(4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d
503,

505-06

(4th

Cir.

2011).

In

evaluating

the

complaint,

unsupported legal allegations need not be accepted.

Revene v.

Charles Cty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
conclusions

couched

as

factual

allegations

are

Legal

insufficient,

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations
devoid

of

any

reference

to

actual

events.

United

Black

Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see
also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged, but it has not ‘show[n] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”
8(a)(2)).

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

at

679

(quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P.

Thus, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that

requires

the

reviewing

experience and common sense.”

court
Id.

3

to

draw

on

its

judicial

Generally,

pro

se

pleadings

are

liberally

construed

and

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
lawyers.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Liberal construction means that the

court will read the pleadings to state a valid claim to the
extent that it is possible to do so from the facts available; it
does not mean that the court should rewrite the complaint to
include claims never presented.
1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).

Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d

That is, even when pro se litigants

are involved, the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege
facts that support a viable claim.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No.
RDB–12–969,

2012

WL

6087491,

at

*3

(D.Md.

Dec.

4,

2012)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[E]ven a pro
se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible
claim for relief.”).
III. Analysis
The court has examined the Complaint and finds that it does
not comply with federal pleading requirements.

It is well-

settled law that the allegations in a complaint must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”
U.S.

506,

512

(2002)

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

(internal
4

quotation

marks

omitted).

Instead of a concise statement of facts underlying her cause of
action,

the

Complaint

conclusions.

Even

contains

after

a

affording

list
the

of

matter

unsupported
a

generous

construction, the court cannot determine the precise nature of
Plaintiff’s
dismiss,

claims.

Plaintiff

more detailed.
that

the

Responding
has

provided

to

information

(ECF No. 15, at 1-3).

complaint

may

not

Defendant’s

be

is

to

somewhat

However, “it is axiomatic

amended

opposition to a motion to dismiss.”

that

motion

by

the

briefs

in

Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo,

N.V., 770 F.Supp. 1053, 1068 (D.Md. 1991) (quoting Car Carriers,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984)); see
Zachair Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D.Md. 1997)
(stating

that

the

plaintiff

“is

bound

by

the

allegations

contained in its complaint and cannot, through the use of motion
briefs, amend the complaint”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir.
1998).
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted,
and the court will allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint, she must identify
each of the laws and federal statutes on which this civil action
is predicated and what specific acts or omissions by Defendant
allegedly violated those laws.

She is reminded to put the same

case number on any amended complaint.

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IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Navy Federal Credit Union will be granted.

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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