Ward et al v. Massey et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Defendants 6/9/16 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/9/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
CARRIE M. WARD, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-1530

:
CLIFFORD L. MASSEY, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is
a

motion

to

remand

filed

by

Plaintiffs.

(ECF

No.

33).

Defendants have filed a response in opposition titled “Object to
Order and Recommendation.”

(ECF No. 34).

The relevant issues

have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons,

the motion to remand will be granted.
Also pending is Defendants’ motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.

(ECF No. 29).

Upon review of the affidavit

submitted with their motion, it does not appear that Defendants
are

indigent

Specifically,

and

unable

Defendants

to
note

pay
a

the

full

combined

civil
monthly

filing
salary

fee.
of

$6,800 and indicate they have $3,000 in their joint checking
account.

(Id.)

Their motion shall, accordingly, be denied.

I.

Background
On or about August 3, 2015, Carrie Ward, Howard Bierman,

Jacob

Geesing,

Pratima

Lele,

Joshua

Coleman,

Richard

R.

Goldsmith, Jr., Ludeen McCartnery-Green, Jason Kutcher, Nicholas
Derdock,

and

Elizabeth

Jones

(collectively,

the

“Substitute

Trustees”) commenced a foreclosure action against Mr. Clifford
Lee Massey and Mrs. Marilyn L. Panda-Massey in the Circuit Court
for Prince George’s County.

Defendants Clifford Lee Massey and

Marilyn L. Panda-Massey filed an answer on August 26, 2015.
On May 17, 2016, Defendants filed a notice of removal from
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

(ECF No. 1).

Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C § 1441(a), “a civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants.”

The burden of demonstrating jurisdiction, and

the propriety of removal, rests with the removing party.

Dixon

v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 2004).

On a

motion to remand, the court must “strictly construe the removal
statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to
state court,” indicative of the reluctance of federal courts “to
interfere with matters properly before a state court.” Barbour
v. Int’l. Union, 640 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc),

2

abrogated

by

statute

on

other

grounds

by

28

U.S.C.

§

1446(b)(2)(B).
The removal statute provides, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts
of
the
United
States
have
original
jurisdiction,
may
be
removed
by
the
defendant or the defendants, to the district
court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
jurisdiction

of

Constitution,

laws,

U.S.C. § 1331.

Federal district courts have “original

all
or

civil

actions

treaties

of

arising

the

the

States.”

United

under

28

Such jurisdiction arises from “those cases in

which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to
relief

necessarily

depends

question of federal law.”
Vacation

Trust,

463

U.S.

on

resolution

of

a

substantial

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers
1,

27-28

(1983);

see

also

In

re

Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir.
2006) (“actions in which defendants merely claim a substantive
federal defense to a state-law claim do not raise a federal
question”).
While the arguments presented by Defendants in their notice
of removal are difficult to discern, they appear to assert that
this

court

has

jurisdiction

over
3

the

claims

in

this

action

because

they

are

“property

and

Franchise

of

the

Federal

Government known as a U.S. Citizen” and “Therefore, the U.S.
citizens

residing

in

one

of

the

states

of

the

union,

are

classified as property and franchises of the federal government
as an ‘individual entity.’”
In determining the propriety of removal, however, courts
generally look to the face of the underlying pleading.

See

Griffin

616

v.

Ford

Consumer

Finance

Co.,

812

F.Supp.

614,

(M.D.N.C. 1993) (quoting American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951)).

Here, there is no federal question

presented by the Order to Docket or the accompanying papers
filed

by

pleading

Plaintiffs
cites

in

state

various

court.

provisions

To

the

under

the

contrary,
Real

the

Property

Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland and the Maryland Rules
as

grounds

Defendants
promissory

for

the

foreclosure

challenge
note

and

action.

Plaintiffs’
deed

of

ability

trust,

governed exclusively by Maryland law.
Law §§ 3-101, et seq.
may

wish

to

jurisdiction.

To

such

the
to

extent

that

enforce

the

determinations

are

See Md. Code Ann., Comm.

Moreover, any defensive claims Defendants

present

cannot

provide

a

basis

for

removal

See In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460

F.3d at 584 (“a defendant may not defend his way into federal
court

because

a

federal

question under § 1331”).

defense

does

not

create

a

federal

Thus, the case cannot be sustained in
4

this

court

Because

on

all

the

basis

parties

are

of

federal

Maryland

question

residents,

jurisdiction.
there

is

not

complete diversity of citizenship such that jurisdiction could
be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Accordingly, the case was

improperly removed by Defendants.
Moreover, as Plaintiffs point out, removal is allowed only
if a notice of removal is filed within 30 days after the receipt
by the defendant of the initial pleading.
place

well

after

Defendants.
purported

that

thirty

day

period,

Removal here took
as

admitted

by

They state that they only recently learned of the
basis

for

the

removal.

That,

however,

is

an

insufficient basis to excuse the tardiness, and this procedural
defect is an additional reason to remand this case.
IV.

Conclusion
For

the

foregoing

will be granted.

reasons,

Plaintiffs’

motion

to

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

5

remand