Rembold v. Helsel et al

Filing 6

SUPERSEDING MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 7/14/2016. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)(C/M 7/14/16)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DONALD GARY REMBOLD
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID HELSEL, M.D., et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. PWG-16-1569

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*****

SUPERSEDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 19, 2015, in a separate action, Donald Gary Rembold (“Rembold”) filed a 28
U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of
counsel throughout the pretrial process of his criminal case and had been committed to a mental
hospital without due process. He sought release from confinement. See ECF No. 1 in Rembold
v. Helsel (“Rembold I”), No. PWG-15-1825 (D. Md.).
The briefing in Rembold I showed that on April 7, 2014, Rembold was arraigned in the
Circuit Court for Harford County on multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor and third degree
sex offense. On January 28, 2015, the circuit court issued an order for the Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”) to conduct an evaluation of Rembold’s competency to stand
trial. Dr. Kim Witczak, a forensic evaluator for the DHMH, examined Rembold at the Harford
County Detention Center on January 30, 2015, and opined that he did not have a factual and
rational understanding of the nature and object of the proceeding against him, nor did he possess
sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
She further concluded that Rembold would present a danger to himself or to others if released
from confinement. See ECF No. 7 in Rembold I.

On February 6, 2015, the Circuit Court issued an order finding Rembold incompetent to
stand trial and, by reason of mental disorder, a danger to himself or the person or property of
another.

The order committed Rembold to the custody of the DHMH until he becomes

competent. The order requiring Rembold’s commitment was based on the evaluation performed
by Dr. Witczak and required Rembold’s immediate transportation to Spring Grove Hospital
Center (“SGHC”) or another facility designated by DHMH. Rembold was admitted to SGHC on
February 13, 2015. Id.
Pursuant to state law, the DHMH evaluates persons committed as not competent to stand
trial at least every six months. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 3-108(a). Rembold was reevaluated in July of 2015 by Dr. Lindsay D. Holbein. Dr. Holbein concluded that Rembold was
competent to stand trial and did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. Additionally, Dr.
Holbein noted that Rembold’s treatment team did not believe he had a psychiatric illness and that
no medications had been prescribed for Rembold during his stay at the SGHC. Counsel for the
DHMH subsequently requested the Circuit Court hold a hearing by August 28, 2015, pursuant to
Crim. Proc. § 3-106(c)(1)(iii). On September 3, 2015, Rembold was found competent to stand
trial by the Circuit Court for Harford County, released from SGHC, and remanded to the custody
of the Harford County Detention Center where he remains at this time.1 Id.
On September 14, 2015, this Court dismissed Rembold I without prejudice, based on
Rembold’s release from SGHC. See ECF No. 7 in Rembold I.
On May 20, 2016, Rembold filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action challenging his
previous confinement at SGHC, allegedly without properly being diagnosed as having a mental

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Rembold’s trial on sex offense charges concluded on April 12, 2016. See State of Maryland v. Rembold,
Case
Nos.
12K14000396
&
12K14000397
(Harford
Co.
Cir.
Ct.);
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.uslinquiry. The electronic docket shows that sentencing is currently
scheduled for July 20, 2016. Id.

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health disorder, and seeking declaratory relief that he was “unlawfully admitted” and damages
for “202 days of ignominy.”

Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.

Because Rembold challenged the

constitutionality of his involuntary commitment and sought declaratory relief, the action was
construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief, labeled as such in the
electronic case filing system, and reviewed as a habeas petition. See Docket.
On June 24, 2016, I issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing the petition without
prejudice. ECF Nos. 3, 4. I noted that pretrial federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 if
the petitioner is in custody, has exhausted state court remedies, and special circumstances exist
that justify intervention by the federal court. See Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F. 2d 220, 224-26
(5th Cir. 1987).

I found that there were no special circumstances justifying this Court’s

intervention because Rembold is no longer confined at the SGHC. June 24, 2016 Mem. 3.
I did not state explicitly that I was construing Rembold’s pleading as a habeas petition,
and I did not address the pleading as a § 1983 complaint so as to place Rembold on notice of its
deficiencies.2 This Superseding Memorandum Opinion now addresses the pleading as a hybrid
§ 1983 complaint for damages, incorporating by reference the previous analysis of the pleading
as a habeas petition and dismissing the civil rights portion of the action.3
Rembold has named “David Helsel, Superintendent, et al., Spring Grove Hospital
Center” as defendants, asserting that they are liable under § 1983 because they received him on
an involuntary commitment order and housed him for over 200 days without ever diagnosing

2

Because Rembold sought unspecified “damages,” I suggested that if Rembold wished to seek
damages from alleged due process violations related to his detention at SGHC in 2015, he could
file a civil rights action in this Court requesting specific damages. A civil rights form packet was
sent to him. June 24, 2016 Mem. 3 n.2; June 24, 2016 Order.
3

Rembold’s pleading was accompanied by an indigency motion. ECF No. 2. I granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, June 24, 2016 Order, and that aspect of my ruling is not superseded.
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him as having a mental disorder as required under Maryland law. He does not, however, provide
factual details explaining how any defendant personally violated his constitutional rights.
As for Superintendent Helsel, “supervisory officials may be held liable in certain
circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” See Shaw v. Stroud,
13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)). This
“liability is not premised upon respondeat superior but upon ‘a recognition that supervisory
indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the
constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Id. (quoting Slakan, 737
F.2d at 372–73). “[L]iability ultimately is determined ‘by pinpointing the persons in the
decisionmaking chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to
continue unchecked.’” Id. (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 376).
To state a claim for supervisory liability against Helsel under § 1983, Rembold must
allege
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response
to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices,”; and (3) that there was an
“affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (citations omitted). Rembold simply alleges that Helsel violated Maryland
law “by receiving the plaintiff as an involuntary admission” when neither “[t]he defendant, nor
any other physician, ever diagnosed the plaintiff as having a mental disorder . . . .” Compl. 3.

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Because he has not alleged that Helsel knew or should have known that Plaintiff had not been
diagnosed properly,4 Rembold fails to state a claim against Helsel. See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799.
To the extent that Rembold intended to include any other individual as a defendant, his
use of the words “et al.” is insufficient to state a claim because it fails to identify any individual
or conduct by an individual that would support a § 1983 claim. To the extent that Rembold
believes that he can cure these deficiencies by filing an amended complaint as to Helsel and/or
any individual defendants, he may do so on or before September 12, 2016.
It also is unclear from reading Rembold’s complaint whether he intended to file a claim
against SGHC as an entity or whether he referenced it merely to reflect the address of Helsel and
the other defendants as required by the pleading form. See Compl. 1. However, to the extent
that he intended to name SGHC as a defendant, it is an inanimate object that cannot act under
color of state law and therefore is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority
and San Quentin Prison not “person[s]” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Preval v. Reno,
57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,’ and
therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.
Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons’ and the jail is
not a person amenable to suit.”). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against SGHC under
§ 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Allison, 419 F.2d at 823. Because Plaintiff’s claim against SGHC
is “truly incurable,” it is dismissed with prejudice. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391,
4

Indeed, it appears that Helsel received Plaintiff based on a state court order committing him to
the custody of the DHMH, which in turn was based on an evaluation performed by Dr. Kim
Witczak, a forensic evaluator for the DHMH, who opined that Plaintiff did not have a factual and
rational understanding of the nature and object of the proceeding against him, nor did he possess
sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
See Rembold I.
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400–01 (4th Cir. 2009) (“While a potentially meritorious claim, particularly by a pro se litigant,
should not be unqualifiedly dismissed for failure to state a claim unless its deficiencies are truly
incurable, such an unqualified dismissal is entirely proper when the court has reviewed the claim
and found it to be substantively meritless. Once a court has determined that the complaint is truly
unamendable, a dismissal without prejudice is of little benefit to the litigant, as the claim cannot
be made viable through reformulation.” (internal citation omitted)); Weigel v. Maryland, 950 F.
Supp. 2d 811, 825–26 (D. Md. 2013) (“[D]ismissal with prejudice is proper if there is no set of
facts the plaintiff could present to support his claim.”).
Therefore, while this hybrid § 2241 petition and § 1983 civil rights action is subject to
dismissal as a habeas petition, fails to state a claim under § 1983, and shall be dismissed with
prejudice as to SGHC as a § 1983 action, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to amend to state a
claim under § 1983 against Helsel and/or the unnamed defendants. A separate Order will issue.

Date: July 14, 2016

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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