Mahdi v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 6/8/2016. (c/m 6/8/2016 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAWUD W. MAHDI,
Plaintiff,
v
STATE OF MARYLAND,
CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC.,
TRUSTEE JEFFREY NADEL, Substitute
Trustee et al.,
SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEES,
CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. PJM-16-1790

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 2, 2016, Dawud W. Mahdi, who describes himself in the caption of his filing as
a “third party intervenor,” filed a self-represented Notice of Removal of case number CAEF-1415384 from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s Court, Maryland to the District of Maryland
and a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.1 ECF 1, 2. Mahdi cites a litany of
constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and regulations pursuant to which he brings this
action, including the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), 5 U.S.C. §551, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1505, 2331, and 22 CFR § 92.12-92.30. There are no grounds to suggest the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, criminal statutes at 18 U.S.C. §1001 (false
statements in federal proceedings); 18 U.S.C. §1505 (obstruction of federal proceedings) or 18

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Mahdi removed this matter under the caption as indicated above. Mahdi has followed incorrect procedure by
calling himself “Plaintiff” in the captioning of this matter. If this is in fact a removal of an underlying action in
state court, see supra note 2, Mahdi has reversed the parties’ roles.

U.S.C. §2331 (international terrorism) or federal regulations at 22 CFR § 92.12-92.30
(certification by notary) are relevant to Mahdi’s state foreclosure proceeding.
As relief, Mahdi seeks to vacate a Circuit Court for Prince George’s County decision in a
foreclosure proceeding for “lack of in rem, in personam, territorial, and subject matter
jurisdiction, as well as for improper venue, as well as pursuant to the 11th Amendment Foreign
State Immunity.” ECF 1, Complaint, p. 8. For reasons to follow, this case will be remanded to
the Circuit Court for Prince Georges County.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Mahdi’s financial information submitted in support of the
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is incomplete. Mahdi has not answered questions about
expenses or other questions posed in the required financial affidavit. ECF 2. Further, Mahdi
filed no documents from the state court proceeding with the Notice of Removal. Of note, Court
personnel have been unable to locate the case Mahdi seeks to remove on the Maryland Judiciary
case search website http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis.2 Requiring
Mahdi to correct these deficiencies would unnecessarily delay resolution of this matter.
“[Q]uestions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point during the
proceedings and may ... be raised sua sponte by the court.” Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v.
Datanet Eng'g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized
by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender
v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). As such, subject-matter jurisdiction

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CAEF-14-15384 is not listed as an active or pending case. The Maryland Case Search website show
Mahdi is a party in three pending civil action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Nadel v.
Hairston, case CAEF1604271; U.S.A v. Mahdi, case FL122023, and Capitol One Bank USA N.A. v.
Mahdi, case NL150786. http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquirySearch.jis.

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cannot be conferred by the parties, nor can a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction be waived by
the parties. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
The removal statute provides that any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
to the federal district where the action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). To effectuate
removal, the defendant must file a notice of removal in the district court within thirty (30) days
of receipt of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief in the action. Id.
§1446(a) & (b). Mahdi provides no evidence he has satisfied this requirement. Because removal
raises “significant federalism concerns,” the removal statutes must be strictly construed, and all
doubts must be resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court. Md. Stadium Auth. v.
Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic
Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating removal jurisdiction is strictly
construed). The removing party has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Id.;
Johnson v. Nutrex Research, Inc., 429 F.Supp.2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2006).
Even if Mahdi timely removed the action, jurisdiction is lacking. First, Mahdi’s summary
recitation of statutory citations without supporting facts fails to provide grounds to establish
federal question subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1331; see, e.g., Thomas v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Removal based on the existence of a
federal question, nevertheless, must allege all facts essential to the existence of that federal
question. Consequently, a notice of removal based upon a ‘bare-bones contention’ …is subject to
remand.”) (citations omitted). Second, Mahdi alleges no grounds to establish diversity of the
parties’ jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332. Rather, this action appears predicated on an in

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rem foreclosure proceeding filed pursuant to Maryland state law against property located in
Maryland.
Notably, even if Mahdi had demonstrated jurisdiction, he may not re-litigate orders
entered in the state foreclosure action in this court. Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit in appellate review of judicial determinations made
in state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). “[J]urisdiction to review such decisions lies
exclusively with superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court.” Plyler
v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997); see 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). “Courts have consistently
applied the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to dismiss claims requesting federal district court review
of a state court's eviction and foreclosure proceedings.” Sanders v. Cohn, Goldberg & Deutsch,
LLC, Civil Action No. DKC 15-1571, 2016 WL 223040, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 19, 2016) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see id. (listing cases). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). It bars “lower federal courts from considering not only issues raised and decided in the
state courts, but also issues that are 'inextricably intertwined' with the issues that were before the
state court.”' Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Feldman, 460
U.S. at 486); see Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731. In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes
Mahdi’s efforts to pursue vacatur of the state court’s decision in this court.

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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider this case and the matter will be
remanded to the Circuit Court for Prince Georges County for all matters as may be appropriate.
A separate Order follows.

______________/s/_________________
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

June 8, 2016

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