Daniels et al v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 6/21/2016. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 6/22/16)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JOHN S. BURSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

WILBUR L. DANIELS, et al.,
Defendants.

WILBUR L. DANIELS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.,
Defendants.

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* Case No. RWT 16-cv-2013
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* Case No. RWT 16-cv-2014
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Wilbur and Kathern Daniels removed an 8-year-old foreclosure proceeding to this Court
from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on June 10, 2016. Case No. RWT 16-cv2013. On the same day, they also filed a Complaint “against all persons claiming an interest in
and

to

property

known

as

9717

Dale

Drive,

Upper

Marlboro,

MD

20772.”

Case No. RWT 16-cv-2014. This is the same property that is the subject of the foreclosure
proceedings. See Case No. RWT 16-cv-2013, ECF No. 2. For the reasons that follow, the
removed foreclosure proceeding will be remanded and the new Complaint filed in this Court will
be dismissed.
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I.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2008, an Order to Docket foreclosure was filed in the Circuit Court for Prince

George’s County for the Dale Drive property. Id. From that point, the state court docket reveals
multiple suggestions of bankruptcy and stays. Ultimately, the property was auctioned off and the
court ratified the sale on April 13, 2015. CAE-08-29938, Dkt. 48. A writ of possession was
issued on March 14, 2016. CAE-08-29938, Dkt. 62. Wilbur and Kathern Daniels, who were the
mortgagors, allege that they own the property and that the foreclosure proceedings were
permeated by fraud and discrimination. Case No. RWT 16-cv-2014, ECF No. 1, at 4. Their
Complaint asserts numerous claims against all those involved in the foreclosure proceedings,
including the judge and the State of Maryland. Id. They request a stay or injunction forbidding
the continuation of the foreclosure proceeding, as well as other relief.
II.

ANALYSIS
A federal district court must liberally construe a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to

allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
Nonetheless, liberal construction does not mean that a court can ignore a clear failure in the
pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). The mandated liberal
construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the
pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a
district court may not rewrite a complaint. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1278 (4th Cir. 1985). To this end, the majority of the Complaint and Notice of Removal is
unintelligible. The Court has attempted to discern the alleged causes of action and supporting
facts.

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A. THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING
1. Case No. 16-cv-2013
a. Timeliness
As a preliminary matter, the removal of the foreclosure proceeding was untimely. A
proceeding must typically be removed within 30 days of the receipt of the initial pleading by the
defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) (2014). Proceedings removed based on diversity cannot be
removed more than a year after commencement. Id. § 1446 (c). Applying either requirement,
the removal in this case occurred eight years after the action commenced and was therefore
exceedingly untimely.
b. Rooker-Feldman
Even if the removal were timely, this Court nevertheless lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the foreclosure proceeding under the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. “The Rooker–Feldman
doctrine is a jurisdictional rule providing that lower federal courts generally cannot review state
court decisions.” Holliday Amusement Co. of Charleston v. State of S. Carolina, 401 F.3d 534,
537 (4th Cir. 2005). This is true whether the claims have been “actually decided” in state court
or are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision.
Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000).

See Brown & Root, Inc. v.

“A federal claim is considered to be

‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment when ‘the federal claim succeeds only to
the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” Holliday Amusement Co.,
401 F.3d at 437 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. W. Va. State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 819
(4th Cir. 2000)). In either case, “a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based

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So named after District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983) and Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923).

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on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994).
“Courts have consistently applied the Rooker–Feldman doctrine to dismiss claims
requesting federal district court review of a state court’s eviction and foreclosure proceedings.”
Sanders v. Cohn, Goldberg & Deutsch, LLC, No. CV DKC 15-1571, 2016 WL 223040, at *4
(D. Md. Jan. 19, 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see id. (listing cases). Here,
Wilbur and Kathern Daniels have already challenged the foreclosure sale in state court and are
once again attempting to challenge the state court’s judgments. Any adjudication of the current
claims would require review of the state court’s determinations throughout the foreclosure
proceeding. See Sanders, No. CV DKC 15-1571, 2016 WL 223040, at *5 (internal citations
omitted). Such a review is within the purview of the state appellate court, but not this Court. See
Brown, 211 F.3d at 198–99. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Wilbur and
Kathern Daniels’ foreclosure action and must remand it back to state court.
Even if, hypothetically, the Court determined that the removal was timely and that
subject matter jurisdiction did exist, Wilbur and Kathern Daniels are not entitled to a stay or
injunction of the foreclosure proceeding. In deciding whether to issue an injunction, a district
court must consider: (1) the balance of likely harm to both plaintiffs and defendants; (2) the
likelihood that the party requesting an injunction will succeed on the merits; and (3) public
interest. Steakhouse, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, N.C., 166 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 1999). The
decision to grant a stay also requires considering “competing interests and maintain[ing] an even
balance.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). The foreclosure proceeding in this
case was commenced in 2008 and Wilbur and Kathern Daniels have actively opposed it.
Nonetheless, a writ of possession has been issued for the property. See Case No. 16-cv-2103,

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ECF No. 51. Despite Wilbur and Kathern Daniels’ assertions, the foreclosure proceeding has
been all but finalized. The balance of equities does not favor this Court issuing a stay or an
injunction.
For the foregoing reasons, the request for an injunction or stay is denied and the case is
remanded to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.
2. Case No. 16-cv-2014
a. Rooker-Feldman
The Complaint in Case Number 16-cv-2014 suffers from the same infirmities. For the
reasons discussed in the previous section, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims, which all require that this Court find the foreclosure was fraudulently or negligently
obtained. This would require the Court to review, and in fact, overturn, the decisions of the state
court as to the merits of the foreclosure. These claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
b. Res judicata
Additionally, although “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal actions ‘complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments’ themselves, . . . it does not apply to federal actions
that are merely parallel to concurrent state court actions, and which originate from the same
alleged injuries that occurred outside of the judicial process.”

Roberts v. Thrasher,

No. CIV. A. ELH-15-1906, 2015 WL 4485477, at *2 (D. Md. July 20, 2015) (quoting Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). To the extent Wilbur and
Kathern Daniels’ claims are not already barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, “[i]t
is well established that the doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of matters previously
litigated between parties and their privies, as well as those claims that could have been asserted

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and litigated in the original suit.” Anyanwutaku v. Fleet Mortgage Grp., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d
566, 570 (D. Md.) aff’d, 229 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
“The preclusive effects of a state court judgment are determined by state law.” Jones v.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 444 F. App’x 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2011). “The elements of res judicata
under federal law are analogous to those under Maryland law: (1) identical parties, or parties in
privity, in the two actions; (2) the claim in the second matter is based upon the same cause of
action involved in the earlier proceeding; and, (3) a prior and final judgment on the merits,
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with due process requirements.”
Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 108, 887 A.2d 1029, 1037–38 (2005).
On the face of the Complaint, it is apparent that all three prongs are satisfied for any
claims against individuals or entities who were parties to the foreclosure proceedings. First, the
parties are identical. Second, all of Wilbur and Kathern Daniels’ claims are derived from the
foreclosure action and were either addressed during the foreclosure action or should have been
raised during the foreclosure action. They are thus part of the same claim. Third and finally,
there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation, despite Wilbur and Kathern
Daniels actively opposing the foreclosure for years.
c. Insufficient Pleading of Any Remaining Claims
Finally, to the extent any claims remain, specifically related to those Wilbur and Kathern
Daniels label “Credit Reporting Agencies” or Judge Toni E. Clarke or the State of Maryland, the
Complaint utterly fails to meet the requisite pleading standards. Indeed, the entirety of the
Complaint could be dismissed for this defect. Liberal construction does not allow a court to
ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a
federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). For

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example, the Complaint contains no specific facts supporting the conclusion that the Defendants
discriminated against Wilbur and Kathern Daniels on the basis of race. The Section 1983 cause
of action appears to seek redress for wrongs inflicted on the general public, rather than Wilbur
and Kathern Daniels. ECF No. 1, at 25 (alleging that the state has “fail[ed] to protect the interest
of landowners and borrowers”). This type of generalized grievance is not sufficient to invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The RICO claim, which is
asserted against no Defendants, is primarily a recitation of the statute and assertion that the Court
should invalidate the foreclosure because it was “a false debt.” ECF No. 1, at 22. As discussed
previously, the Court does not have jurisdiction to invalidate the foreclosure. Finally, the
Complaint also misrepresents public facts by claiming that “To date, the state related case has in
no way been finally adjudicated.” Id. at 2. This is simply false as indicated on the docket.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the foreclosure action shall be remanded and the related civil

matter shall be dismissed. Separate Orders follow.

Date: June 21, 2016

/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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