Bynum v. Board of Commissioners of Calvert County et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 12/27/2016. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
C'
II
IN TilE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TilE ("STRICT OF MARYLANI)
Southern
Division
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I
r
("
ALEXANDRA BYNUM,
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Case No.: G.III-I(,-2067
Plaintiff,
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v.
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LAURA L. MAIHIN,
STATE'S ATTOI{NEY
FOR CALVERT COUNTY, MARYLAND
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a disparate
l(lrIner employer.
County.
I(Jr
treatment
case brought by Plaintiff Alexandra
Laura L. Martin. in her otlicial
purported
violations
Bynum against her
capacity as State's Atlorney
I(Jr Calvert
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Tille VJr"). 42
LJ.S.c. ~ 2000e el seq and the Maryland
Fair Employmenl
Practices Act ("FEPA").
Ann .. State Gov't ~ 20-601 el seq. Now pending bel(lre the Court are Defendant's
Dismiss.
ECF No. 16. and Plaintiff's
or alternatively.
Motion to Defer Ruling on Defendant's
lo convert the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion I(lr Summary
permit the parties to engage in discovery.
Motion to
Motion to Dismiss.
Judgmenl
lOCI' No. 21. A hearing was held on December
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.). For the I(lilowing reasons. Defendant's
and Plaintifrs
Md. Code
Motion to Defer Ruling on Defendant's
and
5. 2016.
Motion to Dismiss is granted
Motion to Dismiss is denied.
I.
HACKGROUND'
Alexandra
employment
13
Bynum, a white female married to an AIi'iean American man, began her
with the Office of the State's Attorney for Calvert County in June 2007. Eel' No.
'i'i 3, 10. Ms. Bynum
was employed as an Assistant Statc's Attorney ("ASA") and describes
her role as that of a line prosecutor
Martin's pcrsonal staff. Id.
County since 2006. /d
'i
','i 9.10.
who did not engage in policymaking
or IlJrln part of Ms.
Ms. Martin has served as the State's Attorncy Il)r Calvert
4. In that role. Ms. Martin maintained,
directed and opcrated the Office
of the Statc's Attorncy. /d
On August 8. 2014, I'laintilTwas
advised that her husband, Terris L. Bynum, had sexual
assault charges filed against him hy a white woman./d.
~ 10. On August 13, 2014,l'laintiffwas
told hy State's Attorney Laura Martin and Deputy State's Attorney Fran Longwell to resign or be
discharged.
/d.
'i II.
At all times prior to that conversation,
successful perllmner:'
PlaintilTalleges
/d
'1 9. Mr.
I'lainti ff was "at Icast a fully
Bynum was never eonvictcd of any scxual assault charges.
thaI. under similar eireumstanccs,
other employees
whose I~lmily
memhcrs are not AIi'ican Amcrican have not heen asked to resign or be discharged.
Specifically,
PlaintilTpoints
to two other Assistant State's Attorncys,
system during Defcndant's
tenure./d
/d
'i
12.
Lisa Ridge and Tammy
Laffcrty, who wcre not asked to resign, despite their hushand or close relativc's
the criminal.iustice
2
interactions
~ 12. .1 According to PlaintilI
with
Lisa
, For the purposes of<.it:ciding this l\.1otioll to Dismiss. all facts arc taken from the Amended Complaint and assumed
~o be truc.::.ul1l~ssspecifically noted otherwise.
- The COlllpl:Jinl notes Ihut alter an investigation by a special prosecutor. Mr. Bynum was exonerated orthe sexual
assault charges. It!. ~ 10. It is unclear when the investigation concluded.
~ While noting that their husbands arc not African-Americans. the Amended Complaint docs not specify the race of
Ms. Ridge or 1\'15.Lafferty or \vhethcr their marriages are interracial. Although Plaintifrs Opposition 10 Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss further specificd that ncither Ms. Ridge or Ms. Lafferty were in an interracial relationship,
plaintitY"cannot. through the use of motion brief", amend the complaint."1.adwir Ltd r. Driggs, 965 f'. Supp. 741.
Ridge's
husband.
"not guilty:'
Michael Charles Ridge. had multiple traflic citations dismissed
and allegations
\\'ere made in court. but never investigated.
known illegal drug supplier.
the l~lCI that criminal
!d I'laintiffalso
drug-related
substances.
other than marijuana"
!d ~ 14. Similarly.
victim witness advocate.
II.
during Defendant's
tenure as State's Attorney.
in 2008: was convicted
lei.
of Ji'audulently
in 2009. Tammy Lafferty's
of driving under the inlluence.!d
violence.
had knowledge
brother. Jefli'ey Alan Mills. had several charges
county in 20 10: and in 20 II. was convicted
was convicted
domestic
13. Ms. Bynum also alleges that Delendant
alleges that Lisa Ridge's
pled guilty 10 "possession
dangerous
'1
that Mr. Ridge was a
of
baltery charges against Mr. Ridge were placed on the stet docket in 1992.
ICiony olknses
neighboring
!d
or entered as
'116.
I'laintilTalso
for
lei. ~ 144 Mr. Mills
of criminal offenses
obtaining
husband.
in a
controlled
Gerald Lafferty.
notes that Nora Bowen. a
was not asked to resign even though her son-in-law
was prosecuted
for
'1 18.
STANDARD OF REVI EW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) provides
.. tails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:'
purpose "is to test the suflicieney
of a complaint
lacts. the merits of a claim. or the applicability
for the dismissal
of a complaint
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule's
and not to resolve contests surrounding
of defenses:'
R. Civ. 1'. 8. /Jell Allalllic Corp. \'. T\j'{)lIIh~l'. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). and Ashcrofi
complaint
the
Presley \'. Cil)' o{Chor/Ol/es\'il/e.
464 F.3d 480. 483 (4th Cir. 20(6). To that end. the Court bears in mind the requirements
U.S. 662 (2009). when considering
if it
of Fed.
\'. 1'lhal.556
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically.
must contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is
74811.4 (D.Md.1997); soe also ,/"/III.WIIII'. Se"rek. I""., No, eIV,A, EI.f!- 13-03798.2014 WI. 1464378. at '2 (D,
Md, Apr, 14.2014),
I At the hearing. counsel for Plaintiff prolTercd that rv1s. Ridge was a senior drug prosecutor at the time and staled
that PlaintilTwould amend her complaint to allege that fact ifgivcl1 the opportunity.
,
.>
a
entitled to rei ice
..[tjhreadhare
statements.
plaintiff
Fed. R. Civ. p, &(a)(2). and must state "a plausihle claim fi.lf reliee
recitals of the elemellls of a cause of action. supported
do not suflice:'
1,,11(//.556 U.S, at 678-79. "A claim has facial plausihility
is liahle tlH' the misconduct
In an employment
t[lets estahlishing
,t/cDollllel/
e '17/y.. No,
discrimination
a primaj'lcie
09-2453.
ease such as this. "pleadings
case of discrimination
DOllg/as Corp, \'. Green
standard'
to plead a primajilcie
20 I 0 WL 3369 I 69. at
need not 'eontain
under the framework
* 3 (D,
speeilic
set jlll"th' in
',I'
Md, Aug,23. 20 I0 (quoting ')Il'ierkiell"ic= \',
"would essentially
under which a plainti ff without direct evidence
create a 'heightened
of discrimination
case even though she might uncover direct evidence
discrimination
that the
411 U,S. 792 (1973 ):' iVes/more/a11l/I', I'rillce George
Id (quoting ')\I"ierkie\ric::, 534 U,S, at 511-12),
employment
inference
when the
Id. at 663.
alleged:'
Sorell/({, NA,. 534 U,S. 506 (2002)), Such a requirement
pleading
hy mere conclusory
pleads t[lctual content that allows the court to draw the reasonahle
defendant
as
would need
during discovery:'
If this were the case. a plaintiff claiming
would have .,.to plead more I[lets than [slhe may ultimately
prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence
of discrimination
need to
Id. (quoting
is discol'ered:"
')Il'ierkie\l"ic::. 534 U.S, at 512),
The Fourth Circuit "has not. however.
ofa plaintitTto
de Nemollrs
F,3d 193.213
allege taets suflieient
interpreted
to state all the clements
(4th Cir. 2(02) ("/TJhe Supreme Court's
holding in .)\rierkie\ric::
that a plaintiff sct tl)rth l[lets suflicient
clement of his claim," (internal citation omitted)),
claim does not need to establish
Corll .. 309
\', Sorema did
to allegc each
Thus, whilc a plaintitTpleading
a primaj'lcie
the burden
of her e1aim:' Bass \'. EI. DII/'Oll/
& Co .. 324 1'.3d 761. 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dicksoll \', Microso!;
not alter the hasic pleading requirement
discrimination
')\I"iakiell'ic= as removing
ease under McDolllleli
a
DOllg/as to
survive a motion to dismiss. Sll'ierkiell'ic=.
534 U.S. at 51 D. she must still plead lilcts suflicient
state each elcmcnt of the asscrtcd elaim. See Hass. 324 F.3d at 765 ("Whilc a plaintiffis
charged with plcading
complaint.
facts sufficicnt
a plaintiffis
to prove hcr casco as an cvidcntiary
to
not
maller. in her
rcquircd to allege filcts that support a elaim lilr relicf.") (emphasis
in
original).
III.
()ISCUSSION
Title VII makes it illcgallilr
rcspect to his compensation.
individual's
race
an employer
terms. conditions.
42 U.S.c.
of: (i) the individual's
or privileges
~ 2DDOe-2(a). Similarly.
Title VII. makes it illegal to "discharge.
respect to the individual's
..to discriminate
or othcrwise
compcnsation.
against any individual
of cmploymcnt.
tcrms. conditions.
state analogue to
against any individual
or privilegcs
of employmcnt
racc ..... Md. Code Ann .. State Gov't ~ 20-606(a)(1
)(i). Defendant
two rcasons why I'laintilTs
elaims under thesc statutes should bc dismisscd:
I'laintilTwas
and. thus. not an cmployec
Plaintiffis
because of such
FEPA. the Maryland
discriminate
a policymaker
covcrcd by Title VII. I'laintitThas
with
with
bccausc
raiscs
(I) that as an ASA.
covcred by Title VII: and (2) cvcn if
failed to sunicicntly
allcgc the elemcnts
ofhcr
claim.
A. The I'olieymaker
In its definition
protcctions
Exception under Title VII/FEI'A
orthc
lilr individuals
of any State by thc qualificd
officer's pcrsonal stalf
who arc "electcd
Title VII creatcs an cxception
thlll1
its
to public onicc in any Statc or political subdivision
votcrs thcrcof. or any pcrson choscn by such officer to bc on such
or an appointee
respect to thc exercisc ofthc
Similarly.
tcrm "cmploycc."
on thc policy making Icvel or an immediate
constitutional
or legal powers of the officc'" 42 U.S.c.
FEPA docs not apply to ..... (ii) an individual
5
adviser with
~ lOOOe(\).
choscn by an elcctcd oflicer to be on the
oflicer's
personal staff: (iii) an appointee
on the policy making level: or (iv) an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional
Md. Code Ann .. State Gov't ~ 20-601(e)(2).
Defendant
or legal powers of an elected office'"
contends
that Ms. Bynum cannot bring a
claim under Title VII or FE!' A because. as an ASA. she was an "appointee
level." and thus falls outside the protection
of those statutes. ECF No. 16-1 at 5-6. By contrast.
Ms. Bynum argues that as a line prosecutor.
she did not serve in a policymaking
No. 20 at 1 I. Much of the case law relevant to this determination
analyzing
a similar policymakcr
on the policy making
cxception
position.
ECF
has grown out of cases
to the First Amendment's
prohibition
against
patronage dismissals.
"The First Amendment
cmployers.
including
government
protection
elected oflicials.
cmployees
Civ. No. JFM-15-3760.
2016 WL 3057990
against patronage
policymaking
dismissals.
explicitly.
whether an employee
of a patronage
courts consider
perlllnllance'"
political beliefs .... Bor=illeri
Similar to the exception
privy to conlidential
in!llnllation.
in Title VII. this
occupies
a policymaking
position.
whether "there is a rational connection
(Sept.
in the context
between shared
SlolI \'. 11(/\l'IJrl17. 16 F.2d 134. 142 (4th Cir. 1990). Adopting
9
decisionmaking
on goals or their implementation
Urod\'.
does not apply to persons "occupying
test issued by the First Circuit. the Fourth Circuit in SlolI considered
involve[ d] government
\'. i\Ioshy.
Roherls. 730 F.3d 368. 374 (4th Cir. 2013). as amended
23. 2013). To determine
idcology andjob
government
non-con!idential
at *3 (D. Md. May 31. 2016) (quoting
J concurring)).
positions."IJ/al1l/\'.
dismissal.
dismissals ... prohibits
from firing 'non-policymaking.
... upon the sole ground ol'[theirJ
Bul'11s. 427 U.S. 347. 375 (Stewart.
prohibition
against patronage
...
a
whether ..the position
on issues where there is room Il)r political disagreement
land] whether Ithe position
a communicator.
6
I resembles
a policymaker.
a
or some other ortice holder whose function is
such that party affiliation
is an cqually appropriatc
requirement."
Sto/l.
916 F.2d at 142 (quoting
Fuei1les ", Torres (Ja=tamhide, 807 F.2d 236. 241-42 (I st Cir. 1986)), Following
.Iimenc
body oflaw.
the court in Hor=illeri held that the position of an ASA was a policymaking
because it was "a position for which political affiliation was an appropriate
this
position
requirement."
Hor=illeri. 2016 WL 3057990 at *5. Thus. the newly elected State's Attorney was determined
to
be within her rights to terminate an ASA who had supported her opponent ..to ensure decisivc
and laithliil implemcntation
of her policies:'
in Hor=illeri in thc context ofPlaintifrs
Id. Defcndant urges this Court to follow the ruling
Title VII and FEI'A claims.
The Fourth Circuit has yet to opine on whether the policy-maker
should be interpreted
prohibition
against patronage dismissals.
results. ('ompare
exempting
in the same manner as the policy-maker
exception in Titlc VII
exception to the First Amendment
Other Circuits have addressed the issue with dil'fering
\', Carler. 74 F,3d 138. 144 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the reasons lor
Americanos
the office li'om the patronage ban apply with equal force to the requirements
of the
ADEA land Title VIlI")) (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original) with !Jlltler \', New
fork State Department
dismissals
of'LlI\1'. 211 F.3d 739. 746-47 (2d, Cir. 2000) ("We consider patronage
to be an appropriate
restraint on First Amendment
between shared ideology and job perlimnance
the language of the statute and congressional
While Delendant
Herring.
rights when there is a connection
.. , Our Title VII analysis. by contrast. draws on
intent.").
relies on Hor::illeri. Plaintiff dirccts the Court's attention to Reardon \',
No, 3:16-CV-34.
2016 WL 3181138 (E.D. Va. June 3. 2(16), There. the court
addressed whether a Virginia Assistant Attorney General ("AAG") could allege a violation of the
Equal Pay Act ("lOPA"). The defendant argued that the plainti ITwas excmpt from thc lOP
A
because she was "appointed
by [an elected] officeholder
7
to serve on a polieymaking
level." !d at
*4. The court looked to the legislative history and case law interpreting
language regarding the polieymaking
exemption
was identiealto
Title VI L whose
the determinative
language
under the EI' 1\. <
Looking first at the legislative history, the court concluded that .., it] could not be e1earer:
Congress intended that the exeeption be very narrowly construed, and that the exception should
apply only to offieials 'at the highest levels' of their respective departments'"
that there was a eircuit spilt. the court examined the dil"ICrent approaches
It/. at *6," Noting
taken by the Seventh.
Second, and Eighth Circuits to determine whether or not an individual serves "on the
leveL" Ill. at *7-*8. ultimately adopting the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit
policymaking
in GreglJlY
t'.
A.lhcrofi.
"the 'policymaking
898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.1990). The Eighth Circuit's approach found that
level" inquiry turns on the extent to which the plaintiff's position is 'entrusted
with extensive decision making authority and discretionary
l".
A.lhcrofi,
powerl']""
It/. at *7 (quoting c;reglJl)'
898 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir.1990). a/I'd, 50 I U.S. 452, (1991
ยป(
holding that judges
are exempt from coverage of the ADE1\ because they are appointees on the policymaking
That determination
is made by looking at "(1) whether the [appointee]
than solely administrative
appointing
powers, (2) whether the [appointee]
authority, and (3) whether thc lappointeel
3181138, at *8 (quoting non-exhaustive
5 "To bring a claill1l1l1dcr the EPA. a plaintifflllllst
has discretionary,
level).
rather
serves at the pleasure of the
formulates policy'" Reardoll, 2016 WI.
list of t~lctorS referenced in Grego/y, 898 F,2d at 6(4).
be all "employee" as that term is defined by the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FI.SA ")." Rear""" \'. "erring. NO.3: t6-CV-34, 2016 WI. 31 Kt13K. at '4 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2016),
Specifically. the House-Senate Conference COlllmittee. which developed the tinallanguagc found ill Title VII.
stated that the amendment exempted only "appointees of(electedl otlicials on the highest policymaking levels such
as cabinet members Of other imlllediate advisors of such elected ollicials ... This exemption is intended to be
construed very narrowlv and is in no way intended to establish all overall narrowing of the expamkd coverage of
Statl' and local governmental employees as sct forth in section 701(a) and (b) above:' /?eart/ol1. 2016 WL 3181138.
at *6 (cmphasis and alterations in original).
h
8
Applying thc Eighth Circuit tcst to thc dutics of an AAG. thc court in Reardol/ limnd that
thc ..tasks of invcstigating
crimcs. prosecuting
issues. answering questions
legislation.
from citizens and law enliJrcement
making recommendations
original). The court lilrther concluded
though somewhat expansivcly
description.
decisionmaking
that "it is reasonahle
dcscrihcd in thc Complaint.
powers involving the formulation
Notahly. here. the PlaintilThas
there is no hasis to conclude that Plaintiffs
tn infer that Reardon's
position.
is that of a line attorney with little. if
of policy:'
Id. 7
Without further
position involved more than that
understood.
an individual line
role would likely he less expansive than that which was deserihed in the complaint
Although the language of the policymaker
and the language of the exception
goal of assuring thc implcmentation
hy the clectorate:'
this Court agrees with its reasoning.
exception to the prohihition
of patronage
in Title VII are similar. the context and purposes
are no\. In the context of patronage dismissals.
sanctioncd
Id at *13 (emphasis in
authority'"
alleged that she is a "Iine prosecutor:'
in Reardol/.s Thus Reardol/ is instructive and. additionally.
dismissals
agencies. reviewing pending
or implementation
descrihed hy the court in Reardol/. Indeed. as commonly
prosecutor's
agencies on legal
to the Attorney General. and drafting opinions do not ~
lorce plead that an AAG ... has 'extensive
any. discretionary
cases. advising administrative
the exception serves ..the important government
of policies of r a ] new administration.
policies presumahly
Wal/d. 730 F.3d at 374- 75 (internal citation omitted).
Indeed.
--e1ectcd orticials. in working to achieve their policy goals. are likcly to prefer individuals
similar political and ideological
outlooks:'
with
Reardol/. 2016 WL 3181138 at*1 0 (internal citation
"7 The court ill Reardon ultimately
determined thai because the allegations in the complaint lead to an inference that a
"complex hierarchy exists within the GAG." that even if the plnintifTherselfdid
nol formulatc policy. it was
possible that powers inherent in her position might satisfy the Eighth Circuit standard and. thus. allowed discovery
011 the issue. lei. at *13. No such indication
of a complex hierarchy has been made here.
1I If this case were to proceed into discovery. this issue could renninly be revisited at the ~lImmisparate Treatment
onethcless.
the Court will grant Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss because I'laintitT fails
to plead I[lets sufficient to state the second and fi1Urlh elements of her asserted disparate
treatment claim. Absent direct evidence. in order to state a prima/ileic claim of discrimination
under Tille VII. a plaintilTmust
plausibly allege: ..( I) membership
10
in a protected class: (2)
satisl~lctory job pcrformancc: (3) an advcrsc cmploymcnt action: and (4) di f1ercnt trcatment Irom
similarly situatcd employccs outsidc thc protcctcd class:' Colell/an \'. Aid CO/lrl o(Appeals. 626
F.3d 187. 190 (4th Cir. 20 I0). Discriminatory dischargc based on panicipation in an intcrracial
relationship is a cognizablc claim of discrimination. Collin v. Reclors & Visilors ol Unit'. o(
Virginia. No. 96-1078: 1998 U.S. App. Lcxis 21267. at *4 (4th Cir. 1998) ("it is gcncrally
acccptcd that thc spouscs of mcmbcrs of protccted partics may bc able to make out a prima 1~lcic
casc of discriminatory dischargc") (pcr curiam): see also A /I/rey \'. ,1/lI1:l'!allll. iv. No. G LR-14C
3064. 2016 WL 362502. at *3 (I). Md. Jan. 29. 2(16).
In rcgards to thc second c1cmcnt. satisfactory job perl(lfInancc. Plaintiffmcrcly
allcgcs
that"at all times prior to August 13.2014. I'laintilTwas atlcast a lully succcssful pcrformcr:'
ECF No. 13 ~ 9. Evcn undcr thc more libcral plcading standards of 7\roll/h~l'.550 U.S. 544
(2007) and I"hal. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). a conclusory statcmcnt of this kind is not sullicicnt to
statc a claim 1(lrdisparate trcatment. See Kilmehali \'. Slrayer Univ. Corl'" NO.2: 14CV203.
2014 WL 7(,92396. at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21. 2(14) (1'laintiIrs refercnccs to his 'record of
succcss' and 'superior perl(JrInance' would havc bccn insufficient without detailed factual
inl(JrInation rcgarding perl(JrInancc): see also Mason
I'.
Mon/goll/el)' Oy.. No. I'WG-13-1 077.
2015 WL 3891808. at *5 (D. Md. Junc 23. 2(15) (holding that Plaintiff failed to allegc sullicicnt
I~lctsto show that "hc was pcrlorming
I his 1job
duties at a levcl that met I his I cmploycr's
legitimate expcctations at thc time ofthc advcrse cmployment action.").
Turning to thc l(llll'1hclemcnt. I'laintilThas 11lilcdto show that she was subjcct to
differcnt trcatmcnt Ii'om similarly situated employccs outside thc protectcd class. Although
courts do not always requirc comparator cvidcnce. a plaintilf like Ms. Bynum. who bases her
allcgations entircly upon a comparison to othcr cmployccs "must dcmonstratc that the
II
comparator
was 'similarly
Sallyers \'. United Parcel Sen' .. 946
in all relevant respects:'
432. 442 (D. Md. 2(13) a{rtf. J 3-1777. 20 J 4 WL 2809027
F.Supp.2d
"Such a showing
Iwere
situated'
I subject
to thc same standards
differentiating
employer's
would ineludc cvidcncc
or mitigating
and ...
circumstances
engaged
'dealt with thc same supervisor.
in the same conduct without such
that would distinguish
thcir conduct or thc
of them far it. ... lIaYlI'Iwd \'. Locke. 387 F. App'X 355.359
treatmcnt
2(10) (quoting
that thc cmployees
(4th Cir. June 23. 2(14).
(4th Cir.
MitchellI'. Toledo IIlJ.\pital. 964 F.2d 577. 583 (6th Cir. 1992)): see
alsa Humphries \'. C80CS W. IlIc.. 474 F.3d 387. 405 (7th Cir. 20(7) ("ITJhe purposc of the
similarly
situatcd requiremcnt
performancc
histories.
is to eliminate
or decision
making pcrsonnel
I Jcrc. Ms. Bynum identifies
mitigating
circumstances
confounding
distinguishing
Ms. Ridge. I'laintiffalleges
were "laJllcgations
such as diffCi"ing roles.
") a{rtf. 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
....
a number of potential comparators
their situations
Lisa Ridge and Tammy Lafrcrty who. likc I'laintifI
Regarding
variablcs.
but each has different or
li'OI11Ms. Bynum's.
servcd as Assistant
(I) that her husband had "multiple
I'lainti ff identilics
State's Attorneys.
traftic citations".
made in court that Mr. Ridge was a known drug supplier"
and criminal
battery charges were placed on the "stet" docket in 1992 and (2) Ms. Ridgc's
thcre
brother was
changcd with drug-related
similarity
ICiony olfenses.
to the arrest of Ms. Bynum's
are, by any reasonable
"allegations"
ECF No. 13 ~'j 3- J 4. Nonc of these bare any
1
husband for scxual assault. First. multiplc tramc citations
mcasure. a much Icss scrious olknse
arc not the equi"'licnt
than sexual assault: second.
of an arrest: and. third. the alleged placcment
on thc stct
dockct of battery chargcs took place prior to Ms. Martin's
tenure as Statc's Attorney.
allegations
bctwcen husband and wife and a
brother-sister
in\"Olving Ms. Ridge's
relationship.
brothcr. the relationship
particularly
in a casc whcre thc core allcgation
12
Regarding
is based on allcged
discrimination
allegations
for being in an interracial marriage. are clearly too distinguishable
to make
involving Ms. Ridge's brother rclevant. Similarly. the lact that Ms. Lafferty's
husband was convicted of driving under the inlluence. id ,; 16. is not similar enough to a sexual
assault arrest to make Ms. Lafferty a uscful comparator.
Finally. I'laintilTpoints
to Nora Bowen but this comparator
is also not similarly situated.
As an initial matter. Ms. Bowen was a Victim Witness Advocate and not an Assistant State's
Attorney like Plaintiff. Second. as with Ms. Ridge's brother. the prosecution
son-in-law
for domestic violence is not a useful comparison
in a case alleging discrimination
Accordingly.
prejudice."
of Ms. Bo\ven's
to an arrest of Ms. Bynum's husband
based on interracial marriage.
Id';
J
6.
the Court will dismiss Ms. Bynum's disparate treatment claim with
Plainti 1'1'
also raises an identical state law claim under FEP A. which other judges in
this district have held to be interpreted consistently
with Title VII. See Finkle \'. !lOIl'lIrd
el)' ..
Ald. 12 F. Supp. 3d 7XO. 784 (D. Md. 2014) ("FEPA is the state law analogue of Title VII and its
interpretation
is guided by federal cases interpreting
Title VII"). Thus. Illr the same reasons that
Ms. Bynum's
Title VII claim Illils. her state law claim regarding the same conduct also Jails.
At the Illotion"s hearing. the Court asked Plaintiffs counsel to proffer 11lCtsthat would be added to a Second
Amended Complaint. In posing the question. the Court also noted that Plaintirrhad previously amended her
'J
Compl3int in response to Defendant's original Motion to Dismiss. Counsel responded by noting tiltH Plaintiff would
add that Ms. Ridge '\'as a senior drug prosecutor when her brother was alleged to have committed drug offenses and
that all of the listed comparators were supervised by the sallle Deputy State's Attorney. Neither fact would change
th~ outcome as the alleged comparators \\'oliid still be too distinguishable to serve as comparators for the reasons
discussed. "IDjismissa! with prejudice is proper if there is no set oftacts the plaintiff could present to support his
claim," ,11"dden \'. Ed".",.dS. C"hll. LLC. NO.I'WG-14-395. 2014 WI. 7188823. at *2 (I). Md. Dec. 16.2(14)
(citation omitted). Plaintiff additionally makes a request for discovery prior to the Court's decision on this motion.
But a Plaintiff cannot make conclusory or otherwise insufficient allegations and still he given the keys to the doors
of discovery in hopes of uncovering new or stronger allegations. Ashen!!/l'. Iqhal, 556 U.S. 662. 678-79 (2009)
r-I Notice pleading} marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical. code-pleading regime of a
prior era. but it docs not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintifTanned with nothing morc than conclusions.")
Thus. Plaintitrs Motion to Defer Ruling is denied and the dismissal is with prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 16, and deny Plaintiffs Motion to Defer Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or
alternatively. to convert the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment and pernlit
the parties to engage in discovery. ECF No. 21. A separate order follows.
H#-
Dated: DecemberJ.12016
6EORCiE:C HAZEL
United States District Judge
14
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