Okere v. High et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 12/22/16 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/22/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
SYLVESTER O. OKERE
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-2152

:
MELVIN C. HIGH, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case are
the following motions: a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Melvin

C.

default

High

(“Defendant”)

judgment

filed

(ECF

by

(“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 17).

No.

7);

Plaintiff

and

a

motion

Sylvester

O.

for

Okere

The issues have been briefed, and

the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local

Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss

be

will

granted,

and

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

default

the

amended

judgment will be denied.
I.

Background
The

facts

outlined

here

are

set

and

construed

in

the

light

complaint
Plaintiff.
County,

forth

in

most

favorable

to

Defendant is the elected Sheriff of Prince George’s

Maryland.

On

June

14,

2016,

he

executed

or

“was

responsible for” the execution of a writ of possession issued by
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in the course of

foreclosure proceedings.

(ECF No. 3, at 2).

“Defendant was

given a Courtesy Package informing him of the corruption and the
distortion

that

[h]as

taken

place

in

foreclosure

proceedings

that resulted in an eviction,” but still executed the eviction.
(Id. at 2).
On June 16, 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint in this court.
complaint on June 17.

(ECF No. 1)

(ECF No. 3).

motion to dismiss on June 20.

He filed the amended

Defendant filed the instant

(ECF No. 7).

Plaintiff was

provided with a Roseboro notice (ECF No. 8), which advised him
of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and his entitlement to
respond

within

Roseboro

v.

seventeen

Garrison,

days

528

from

F.2d

the

309,

date
310

of

(4th

the
Cir.

letter.
1975).

Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 9), and Defendant replied (ECF No.
11).

Plaintiff also filed a response to Defendant’s reply.

(ECF No. 13).

On August 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of

Default” (ECF No. 14), and on August 29, he filed the pending
motion for default judgment (ECF No. 17).
II.

Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Defendant

argues

that

quasi-judicial

immunity

bars

this

action because he “was directed to execute a writ of possession
issued by the circuit court, and . . . such activity is integral
to the judicial process.”

(ECF No. 7, at 5-8).

amended

that

complaint

declares

2

he

is

“stating

Plaintiff’s
a

claim

of

trespassing” against Defendant based on “executing an eviction
due to foreclosure,” and alleges that Defendant “violated his
Oath of Office” by executing the eviction despite his “duty to
protect [Plaintiff] from the corruption and distortion and the
foreclosure
admits

industry[.]”

that

the

(ECF

eviction

No.

at

1,

ordered

was

3,

3).

by

the

Plaintiff

court

in

his

foreclosure proceeding.

(Id. at 2 (“The order in which the

Defendant

was

acted

upon,

procedure . . . . The

an
of

basis

order

from

the

administrative

authority

for

the

administrative procedures was based on statutes and codes of the
State of Maryland[.]”)).

His claim appears to be based on the

argument that the foreclosure action was in violation of the
Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution, and
that

he

is

not

“subject”

to

the

laws

or

jurisdiction

of

Maryland.

(Id. at 2).

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s

arguments

on

in

dismiss,

immunity

although

he

his

opposition

argues

that

violated the Seventh Amendment.
Plaintiff’s
proceedings

claim
and

challenges

the

laws

the

(See
the

and

to

the

motion

foreclosure

process

ECF No. 9 ¶ 5).
underlying

procedures

to

As

foreclosure

governing

those

proceedings, it is clearly premised on the fact that Defendant
executed a court-ordered writ of possession.
Quasi-judicial
Defendant.

immunity

bars

As Judge Blake has noted:
3

Plaintiff’s

suit

against

Absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to
non-judicial officers “performing tasks so
integral or intertwined with the judicial
process that those persons are considered an
arm of the judicial officer who is immune.”
Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir.
1994). The basis for affording non-judicial
officials absolute immunity is to avoid the
“danger that disappointed litigants, blocked
by the doctrine of absolute immunity from
suing the judge directly [would] vent their
wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other
judicial adjuncts.”
Sindram v. Suda, 986
F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (alteration
in
original)
(quoting
Dellenbach
v.
Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Courts have therefore extended absolute
immunity to protect, among others, clerks of
court, law enforcement officers, and others
who enforce court orders. See, e.g., Foster
v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding the clerk of court to be absolutely
immune for issuing an erroneous warrant
pursuant to the court’s order); Henry v.
Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 123839
(7th
Cir.
1986)
(“[Police
officers,
sheriffs, and other court officers who act
in reliance on a facially valid court order
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from
suit.”).
Kendrick v. Cavanaugh, No. CCB-10-2207, 2011 WL 2837910, at *4
(D.Md. July 14, 2011); see also Horowitz v. Mason, No. DKC-153478, 2016 WL 1536321, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 15, 2016).

Here,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant took action pursuant to the
Circuit Court’s order.
court
immune

in

executing

from

suit.

Defendant was acting as an arm of the

the

writ

of

Accordingly,

Defendant will be dismissed.

4

possession

and

Plaintiff’s

is
claim

therefore
against

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff stated that Defendant
was “required to answer this complaint within 30 days after
service.”

(ECF No. 3, at 3).

On August 29, he filed the

pending motion for default judgment, arguing that Plaintiff had
failed to answer the complaint within 30 days and requesting the
court grant a default judgment in the amount of $11.5 million.
(ECF No. 17).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern this

action, and Plaintiff’s pleading did not alter those procedures.
Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s complaint by timely filing a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which tolls the
time period for serving an answer until the court denies the
motion,

postpones

its

disposition

until

motion for a more definite statement.
Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

trial,

or

grants

a

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4).

default

judgment

will

be

denied.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Melvin C. High will be granted, and the motion for
default judgment filed by Plaintiff Slyvester O. Okere will be
denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
5