Reed v. Management Solutions Consulting Group, Inc. et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 1/18/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ANDREA REED
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-2442

INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT
:
STRATEGISTS,INC. and MANAGEMENT
SOLUTIONS CONSULTING GROUP, INC.:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

employment case are: (1) a motion to transfer filed by Defendant
Innovative Management Strategists, Inc. (“IMS”) (ECF No. 19);
(2) a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by IMS
(ECF

No.

20);

and

a

motion

to

dismiss

filed

by

Defendant

Management Solutions Consulting Group, Inc. (“MSCG”) (ECF No.
32).1

The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no

hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

following

to

reasons,

the

motions

dismiss

or

for

For the
summary

judgment will be granted for both Defendants, and IMS’s motion
to transfer will be dismissed as moot.

1

MSCG styled its motion as a motion to dismiss, but it
requests in a footnote that that the motion alternatively be
treated as one for summary judgment if necessary to consider the
attached documents. (ECF No. 32-2, at 4). As discussed below,
the motion will be converted to one for summary judgment with
regard to Plaintiff’s claims under the Prince George’s County
Human Rights Ordinance.

I.

Background2
Plaintiff Andrea Reed, a Virginia resident, began working

as a Logistics Coordinator for MSCG in in January 2013.
No.

14

¶¶

principal

13-14).

office

is

MSCG
in

is

a

Glenn

Maryland

Dale,

corporation

Maryland.

(Id.

(ECF
whose

¶

10).

Plaintiff worked at MSCG’s office in Lanham, Maryland, which is
in Prince George’s County.
In

October

2014,

(Id. ¶ 15).

MSCG

President

Kelly

Burks

talked

to

Plaintiff about moving to a new role as a Logistics Coordinator
for IMS.
venture,

(Id. ¶ 20).
and

IMS

MSCG and IMS had developed a joint

would

be

opening

an

office

in

Woodbridge,

Virginia, which was much closer to Plaintiff’s Virginia home.
(Id. ¶¶ 19-20).

Plaintiff agreed to the transfer and, according

to her employment letter, was scheduled to start with IMS on
Monday, November 3, 2014.

(ECF No. 32-3, at 2).

On Friday, October 31, Plaintiff received an email from
IMS’s

Human

information
forthcoming.

Resources
on

IMS’s

Consultant
employee

(ECF No. 14 ¶ 27).

Joanna

Vasconi

benefits

stating

package

would

that
be

Plaintiff and her husband

wanted to start a family in the near future, and she became
concerned that the transfer to IMS would cause her to lose more
than 30 hours of paid leave that she had accrued with MSCG, as
2

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined in this section
are set forth in the complaint or undisputed and construed in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
2

well as maternity leave, disability benefits, and life insurance
benefits.

(Id. ¶¶ 25, 26).

Plaintiff emailed Ms. Burks and IMS

President Latonya Dunlow the next day asking to delay her move
to

IMS

because

of

her

discuss her benefits.

concerns

and

(Id. ¶ 28).

requesting

a

meeting

to

Ms. Dunlow set the meeting

for 8:30 a.m. Monday morning, Plaintiff’s first day with IMS, at
a Panera Bread restaurant in Woodbridge, a location where she
frequently held meetings because IMS was not yet able to move
into its Woodbridge office space.
meeting,

Plaintiff

expressed

(Id. ¶¶ 29-30).

concerns

about

losing

At the
her

MSCG

benefits and what options she would have if she became pregnant.
According

to

the

complaint,

Ms.

Dunlow

“became

visibly

concerned” and stated, “Well, are you pregnant now? If you’re
not pregnant now, then there is no real rush or worry to have
the

benefits

right

now.”

(Id.

¶

32).

Ms.

Plaintiff’s request to postpone her start date.

Dunlow

denied

(Id. ¶ 33).

Plaintiff began work for IMS that day, but continued to
work in MSCG’s Lanham office.

She alleges that she continued to

report to the same direct supervisor, MSCG’s Logistics Manager
Ramona Davis.

(Id. ¶ 23).

On November 5, Plaintiff asked Ms.

Dunlow if she could telework until the Woodbridge office opened
because all of her duties could be fulfilled remotely and her
roundtrip commute to Lanham was between three and four hours per
day.

(Id.

¶

35).

Although

Ms.
3

Dunlow

had

allowed

other

employees to telework until the Woodbridge office opened, she
denied Plaintiff’s request.

(Id. ¶¶ 34, 37, 38).

The following

week, Plaintiff submitted requests to telework on specific days
during November and December to accommodate her holiday plans.
(Id. ¶ 39).
others.

Ms. Dunlow approved some of these dates but denied

(Id. ¶ 40).

Plaintiff asked for reconsideration with

regard to the other days she had requested because she wanted to
travel out of town, but Ms. Vasconi responded that IMS did not
have a telecommuting policy and that it was “a benefit based on
the needs of the job, work group, and company at the time of the
request.”

(ECF No. 32-6, at 2).3

On December 9, Plaintiff took an at-home pregnancy test
which indicated that she was pregnant.
to

suffer

from

fatigue,

nausea,

and

(Id. ¶ 43).
vomiting

She began

due

to

her

pregnancy and, on December 23, left work early because she was
feeling

unwell.

(Id.

¶¶

45-46).

Linda

Martin,

her

supervisor that day, approved her request to leave early.
¶ 46).

onsite
(Id.

Plaintiff then emailed Ms. Dunlow to inform her that she

had left early and to request permission to work from home the
following day; Ms. Dunlow again denied her request.
48).

(Id. ¶¶ 47-

Plaintiff responded to Ms. Dunlow, stating that she felt

3

The content of the emails denying Plaintiff’s telework
requests are integral to the complaint and therefore may be
considered on Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Philips v. Pitt
th
Cnty. Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4 Cir. 2009).
4

she was being treated unfairly with regard to teleworking.

(Id.

¶ 49).
On

December

29,

Ms.

Dunlow

requested

a

meeting

with

Plaintiff later that day in Woodbridge and fired Plaintiff at
that meeting.

(Id. ¶¶ 51-52).

IMS has stated that Plaintiff

had been fired for leaving the office early without supervisor
permission on December 23.

(Id. ¶ 53).

Plaintiff maintains

that Ms. Martin was her supervisor under the terms of the IMS
employee handbook and had approved her early departure.

(Id. ¶

40).
Plaintiff timely filed a charge of discrimination with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
which issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on March 31, 2016.
(Id. ¶ 6).

She filed the instant suit on June 29, alleging

claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for (1) discrimination on the
bases of her sex and pregnancy and (2) retaliation for engaging
in protected activity.

(ECF No. 1).

After Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint to add counts under the Prince George’s County
Human Rights Ordinance for (1) discrimination based on her sex,
(2)

discrimination

based

on

her

familial

status,

and

(3)

retaliation (ECF No. 14), IMS filed the pending amended motions

5

to

transfer4

and

to

dismiss

responded on October 3.

on

September

15,

and

(ECF Nos. 19; 20; 28; 29).

Plaintiff
MSCG filed

its pending motion to dismiss on October 17; Plaintiff responded
and MSCG replied.
II.

(ECF Nos. 32; 33; 34).

Title VII Claims
A.

Standard of Review

IMS

and

MSCG

(together,

“Defendants”)

both

have

filed

motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
a

motion

sufficiency

to

dismiss
of

Charlottesville,

the

under

Rule

complaint.

464

F.3d

12(b)(6)
See

480,

483

The purpose of

is

Presley
(4th

Cir.

to
v.

test

the

City

of

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

At

this

stage,

all

well-pleaded

Fed.R.Civ.P.

allegations

in

a

complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S.

266,

268

(1994),

and

all

factual

allegations

must

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

be
see

Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783
(4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
4

The motion to transfer cites to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a
discretionary venue transfer provision.
The issues raised are
not jurisdictional and need not be considered prior to
addressing the motions to dismiss. The transfer motion will be
denied as moot.
6

1130,

1134

however,

(4th

Cir.

unsupported

1993)).
legal

In

evaluating

allegations

need

the

not

be

complaint,
accepted.

See Revene v. Charles Cty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.
1989).

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a

blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.
That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).

Legal conclusions couched

as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to
actual events, see United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d
844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
B.

Failure to State a Claim for Discrimination

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a
proper claim for discrimination under Title VII.

Ultimately, to

succeed on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must provide direct
evidence of unlawful discrimination or, if direct evidence is
lacking,

follow

the

burden-shifting

framework

established

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

in
The

elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII
are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job
performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different
7

treatment

from

similarly

protected class.

situated

employees

outside

the

Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,

190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Coleman v. Court of Appeals
of Md., 132 S.Ct. 1327 (2012).

At the motion to dismiss stage,

however, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination

under

the

McDonnell

Douglas

framework.

See

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (noting
that “[t]he prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary standard,
not a pleading requirement”).

Rather, “to survive a motion to

dismiss, the complaint must ‘state a plausible claim for relief’
that ‘permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct’ based upon ‘its judicial experience and common
sense.’”

Coleman,

626 F.3d at 190 (4th

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Cir. 2010) (quoting

A plaintiff must allege a situation

that is more than consistent with discrimination; it must “alone
support

a

reasonable

inference

that

motivated by [impermissible] bias.”

the

decisionmakers

were

McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t

of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir.
2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Indeed, in McCleary-

Evans, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld

the

district

court’s

dismissal

of

an

employment

discrimination complaint because it left “open to speculation
the cause for the defendant’s decision,” and discrimination was

8

not

plausible

explanation.”

in

light

of

another

“obvious

alternative

Id.

Defendants

argue

that

the

complaint

must

be

dismissed

because Plaintiff has not alleged that a non-pregnant employee
was

not

fired

replace her.
Plaintiff
“remotely

under

similar

circumstances

(ECF No. 32-2, at 19).

alleges
suggest

a

comparator,

that

the

family

only

one

none

of

termination

was

planning

interaction

that

or

Plaintiff

was

hired

to

According to MSCG, unless

expression of intent to become pregnant.”
provides

or

her

prompted

(Id.).

discussion
alleges

allegations
by

her

The complaint

of

should

pregnancy

or

support

the

necessary inference: When Plaintiff brought up trying to get
pregnant at the November 3 meeting, Ms. Dunlow “became visibly
concerned” and said, “Well, are you pregnant now? If you’re not
pregnant now, then there is no real rush or worry to have the
benefits right now.”

(ECF No. 14 ¶ 32).

This statement does

not suggest that IMS began denying Plaintiff’s telework requests
and

ultimately

pregnant.

fired

Nothing

her
in

because

these

she

was

allegations

planning

offers

a

to

get

sensible

rationale for why Plaintiff’s attempts to get pregnant would
justify denying her telework requests just a few days later.
The explanation IMS gave to the state that she was fired for
leaving without permission may be disputed given that Plaintiff
purports to have received permission to leave from Ms. Martin,
9

but Plaintiff’s repeated requests for telework after being told
that she needed to work from Lanham raise an obvious alternative
explanation: that her termination was the result of her repeated
attempts to avoid going to the office and Ms. Dunlow’s questions
about “Plaintiff’s work ethic and abilities.”
short,

Plaintiff’s

assertions

that

(Id. ¶ 42).

Defendants’

decisions

In
and

conduct were motivated by her attempts at pregnancy “are simply
too conclusory.
complaint.”

Only speculation can fill the gaps in [her]

McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 586.

Plaintiff pleads

facts potentially showing that she was treated differently than
other employees, but, much like in McCleary-Evans, the complaint
fails plausibly to allege that any difference was the result of
prohibited

discrimination

as

opposed

to

differences

in

job

duties, personal conflict between her and Ms. Dunlow, or other
non-prohibited reasons.
C.

Failure to State a Claim for Retaliation

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff fails to state a
proper claim for retaliation for engaging in protected activity.
(ECF

No.

32-2,

at

19-23).

Plaintiff

contends

that

(1)

a

conversation she had with Ms. Burks about Ms. Dunlow treating
her unfairly and (2) her email to Ms. Dunlow about being treated
unfairly

constitute

protected

activities

because

“protected

activity includes ‘utilizing informal grievance procedures as
well as . . . voicing one’s opinions in order to bring attention
10

to an employer’s discriminatory activities.’”

(ECF No. 33, at

14 (quoting Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551
(4th Cir. 1999)).
her

pregnancy,

Plaintiff does not allege that she mentioned

sex,

or

any

other

either of these conversations.

type

of

discrimination

in

Indeed, in her conversation with

Ms. Burks, she raised only non-protected issues, such as Ms.
Dunlow being critical of Plaintiff’s work ethic and abilities.
(ECF No. 14 ¶ 42).
complains

of

being

In her email to Ms. Dunlow, Plaintiff
treated

unfairly,

but

not

due

to

her

pregnancy or sex.

(Id. at 49; ECF No. 32-8, at 2).

Because

Plaintiff

properly

in

has

not

alleged

that

she

engaged

any

protected activity, her retaliation claims will be dismissed.
III. Prince George’s County Claims
With

the

dismissal

of

Plaintiff’s

federal

claims,

only

state law claims within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction
remain.

Under

these

circumstances,

“when

a

court

grants

a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the
court

generally

retains

discretion

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over pendent statelaw claims.”

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

Because these claims can easily be resolved, the court will
retain jurisdiction at this juncture.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims under the Prince
George’s County Human Rights Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) must
11

fail because she has not exhausted her administrative remedies.
Maryland law provides that a person may bring a civil action
against an employer for violating the Ordinance so long as the
action is commenced no sooner than 45 days after the plaintiff
filed a complaint with the county authority.
State

Gov’t,

§

20-1202(b),

(c)(2)(i).

Md. Code Ann.,

In

Prince

George’s

County, that filing authority is the Executive Director of the
Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission (the “PGHRC”).
Prince

George’s

Plaintiff’s

Cty.

complaint

Code,

12

alleges

Human
only

Relations,
that

she

§

2-201.

filed

discrimination charges with the EEOC, not with the PGHRC.

her
(ECF

No. 14 ¶ 6).
A.

Standard of Review

As noted above, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
a

court

necessary

only

considers

documents

Affirmative

attached

defenses

motion to dismiss.

allegations

are

or

rarely

in

integral
capable

the
to
of

complaint
that

and

complaint.

resolution

on

a

Here, whether Plaintiff filed with the PGHRC

is not evident from the face of her complaint.

As a result, the

court will consider matters outside of the pleadings in its
analysis.

“Ordinarily, a court cannot consider matters outside

the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007).

See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510
When the court considers matters
12

outside the pleadings, “the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be
given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that
is

pertinent

to

the

motion.”

Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(d);

see

also

Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp.,
109

F.3d

993,

opportunity”
opposing

997

entails

party

must

(4th

Cir.

two
have

1997).

basic
some

The

term

requirements.
indication

that

treating the motion as one for summary judgment.
Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985).

“reasonable
First,

the

court

the
is

See Gay v.

A party’s awareness

that material outside the pleadings is pending before the court
satisfies this notice requirement.

See id.; Warner v. Quilo,

No. ELH–12–248, 2012 WL 3065358, at *2 (D.Md. July 26, 2012)
(“When

the

movant

expressly

captions

its

motion

‘in

the

alternative’ as one for summary judgment, and submits matters
outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties
are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may
occur[.]” (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149
F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998))).

Second, courts must satisfy

themselves that the nonmoving party has had a fair opportunity
to discover information essential to oppose the motion.

See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5 (1986)
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)).

13

IMS styled motion as a “motion to dismiss and or summary
judgment.”

(ECF No. 20, at 1).

MSCG styled its motion solely

as a motion to dismiss, but requests in a footnote that that the
motion alternatively be treated as one for summary judgment if
necessary to consider the attached documents.
4).

(ECF No. 32-2, at

Plaintiff had notice by virtue of the title of IMS’s motion

and MSCG’s footnote.

Although a footnote might not always be

sufficient, Plaintiff’s opposition to MSCG’s motion acknowledged
MSCG’s request for summary judgment in the alternative (ECF No.
33,

at

16),

judgment

in

discussed
its

legal

the

standard

standards

of

section

review
(Id.

for
at

summary

5-6),

and

included its own attachments of extrinsic evidence (ECF No. 332).

It is thus appropriate to consider the extraneous materials

submitted

by

all

three

parties

under

the

summary

judgment

standard.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

250
A

dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such

that

nonmoving

a

reasonable

party.”

jury

Liberty

could

return

a

Lobby,

477

U.S.

14

verdict
at

for

249.

the
In

undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the
reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom

“in

the

light

most

favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Matsushita Elec.
Indus.

Co.

(quoting

v.

Zenith

United

Radio

Corp.,

v.

Diebold,

States

475

U.S.

Inc.,

574,

369

587

U.S.

(1986)

654,

655

(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute
of

material

fact

inferences.”

through

mere

speculation

or

compilation

of

Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md.

2001) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party generally bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.5

No genuine dispute of

material fact exists, however, if the nonmoving party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case as
to which he or she would have the burden of proof.
U.S.

at

322–23.

nonmoving

party

Therefore,
has

the

on

those

burden

issues

of

proof,

Celotex, 477
on
it

which
is

the
his

responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with an
“affidavit

or

other

evidentiary

5

showing”

demonstrating

that

The parties have not addressed whether Plaintiff generally
bears the burden of proving exhaustion before moving forward
with a claim under the Ordinance or whether Defendants must
plead and prove a failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense.
Even if Defendants bear the burden of proof, however, they have
produced evidence sufficient to meet the burden, as discussed
below.
15

there is a genuine issue for trial.

See Ross v. Early, 899

F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md. 2012), aff’d, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir.
2014).
B.

Failure to Exhaust

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s claims under the Ordinance
as

being

barred

for

failure

remedies under the Ordinance.
15).

to

exhaust

her

administrative

(ECF Nos. 22, at 3; 32-2, at 14-

In her opposition to the motions, she contends that, by

alleging that the discrimination charge was filed with the EEOC,
Plaintiff also alleged that her complaint was filed with the
PGHRC.

(ECF

regulations,
matter

Nos.
where

29,
an

jurisdiction

at

14;

“approved

over

the

33,

at

local

same

16).

Under

authority”

discrimination

has

federal
subject

charge,

EEOC will cross-file the charge with the local agency.
C.F.R. § 1601.13.

the

See 29

The PGHRC is an approved local authority.

29

C.F.R. § 1601.74.
Defendants

point

out,

however,

that

Plaintiff’s

EEOC

complaint explicitly names the local authorities with which it
would be cross-filed and does not include the PGHRC.

The charge

filings against both IMS and MSCG state that the charge will be
cross-filed with the Maryland State Commission on Human Rights
and the Prince William County, Virginia Human Rights Commission.
(ECF No. 32-12, at 3, 12).
approved

local

authorities

Both of these agencies are also
under
16

the

federal

regulations,

29

C.F.R. § 1601.74, and the EEOC regulations are clear that the
EEOC

may

not

authority.

send

the

filing

to

every

applicable

local

29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(d) (“Where both State and local

[] agencies exist, the [EEOC] reserves the right to defer to the
State [authority] only.”); id. (“[W]here there exist agencies of
concurrent jurisdiction, the [EEOC] may defer to the [] agency
which would best serve the purposes of title VII.”); see also 29
C.F.R.

§

1601.74

n.2

(“It

is

advisable

for

individuals

contact the [local] agency to confirm coverage.”).

to

This court

has also previously held that these warnings “would seem to
indicate to any reasonable person exercising due diligence that
a referral to the PG[]HRC . . . would not be automatic after a
claim had already been filed with the Maryland Human Relations
Commission.”

Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc., 247 F.Supp.2d 734,

744 (D.Md. 2003).

The court in Rachel-Smith granted summary

judgment in favor of the employer for the PGHRC claims where the
plaintiff similarly failed to exhaust based on an assumption
that the EEOC filing would trigger cross-filing with the PGHRC.
Id.

Although that case involved a more circuitous path to the

PGHRC – Plaintiff expected the State authority to send it to the
EEOC and then the EEOC, knowing the state authority already had
the filing, to send it to the PGHRC – its logic applies here as
well.

Plaintiff signed her EEOC charge filings that named only

the local authorities for the State of Maryland and the county
17

where Woodbridge, Virginia is located.

In light of the specific

naming of the other local authorities and the absence of the
PGHRC on the face her EEOC charge filing, Plaintiff’s contention
is insufficient to create a dispute over whether a charge was
filed

with

the

PGHRC.

Therefore,

Defendants’

motions

for

summary judgment will be granted with regard to these claims.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss or for

summary
granted.

judgment

filed

by

Defendants

IMS

and

MSCG

will

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

18

be