English v. Santander Consumer USA
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 4/27/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 4/27/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ERIC LAMAR ENGLISH
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 16-2745
:
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case are
(1) a motion (ECF No. 16) filed by Defendant Santander Consumer
USA (“Defendant”) to strike the answer and counterclaim filed by
Plaintiff Eric English (“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 15); (2) a motion
to amend its answer and counterclaim, filed by Defendant (ECF
No. 17); (3) two motions to compel discovery information, filed
by
Defendant
(ECF
Nos.
18;
21);
(4)
a
motion
to
amend
the
scheduling order and extend discovery, filed by Plaintiff (ECF
No.
20);
and
(5)
a
motion
Defendant (ECF No. 24).
for
summary
judgment,
its
Local Rule
For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to amend
counterclaim,
motions
judgment will be denied.
granted.
by
The issues have been briefed, and the
court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
105.6.
filed
to
compel,
and
motion
for
summary
Defendant’s motion to strike will be
Plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order will
be granted.
I.
Background1
Defendant
provided
automobile
financing
through Toyota of Bowie in December 2015.
to
Plaintiff
(ECF No. 24, at 1).
Plaintiff contends that he sent a cashier’s check to Defendant
for the full remaining amount of his loan on March 19, 2016.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 1).
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff failed to
make a single payment on the loan.
(ECF No. 24, at 2).
2016, Defendant repossessed Plaintiff’s vehicle.
In May
(ECF No. 7 ¶
2).
Plaintiff brought the instant dispute on August 2, alleging
that Defendant stole the cashier’s check that he sent, illegally
repossessed his vehicle, and violated the Fair Debt Collections
Practices
Act
(“FDCPA”)
and
the
Truth
in
Lending
Act
continuing to pursue the debt it believed Plaintiff owed.
No. 1).
by
(ECF
Defendant filed its answer on October 20, along with
counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract.
(ECF No. 7).
The court issued a scheduling order on October 31, requiring
that initial disclosures be served by November 14 and that all
depositions and other discovery be completed by March 15, 2017.
(ECF No. 11).
failed
to
As discussed below, it appears Plaintiff has
provide
initial
disclosures
or
respond
to
any
of
Defendant’s discovery requests.
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are undisputed.
2
II.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(1) a party is required to “state in
short
and
against
plain
it”
and
terms
to
its
“admit
defenses
or
deny
to
the
each
claim
asserted
allegations
asserted
against it by an opposing party” in its answer.
In his answer
to Defendant’s counterclaim, Plaintiff argues that he is “not
legally obligated to address this claim” because Defendant did
not respond to his debt validation letter in May of 2016, which
he alleges was a violation of the FDCPA.
(ECF No. 15, at 1-2).
Any violations of the FDCPA will be resolved on the merits in
this
litigation.
Although
pro
se
pleadings
are
liberally
construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), Plaintiff must still abide by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this court.
the
court
will
strike
Plaintiff’s
answer,
instructed to file a new responsive pleading.
and
he
Therefore
will
be
Plaintiff should
admit or deny the numbered allegations Defendant has asserted
against him and state his defenses to Defendant’s claims in
compliance with Rule 8(b)(1).2
2
Plaintiff also included a “counterclaim” in his answer, in
which he references the “Consumer Rights Act of 2015” and “Fraud
and Unfair Business Practices.” (ECF No. 15, at 2-3). To the
degree that Plaintiff seeks to raise new claims, he may seek
leave to amend his complaint to do so.
The court notes,
3
III. Discovery-Related Motions
Plaintiff
discovery.
also
appears
not
to
have
taken
part
in
any
Defendant has filed a motion to compel Plaintiff to
provide initial disclosures (ECF No. 18) and a motion to compel
Plaintiff
to
respond
to
interrogatories (ECF No. 21).
requests
for
production
and
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a), a party
may move to compel discovery if the other party (1) “fails to
make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a),” (2) “fails to answers
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33,” or (3) “fails to
produce documents . . . as requested under Rule 34.”3
Plaintiff
responded to Defendant’s motion to compel initial disclosures by
arguing that he has been unable to respond because of a “severe
financial hardship and the lack of monetary resources.”
No. 19, at 1).
He has filed a motion to amend the scheduling
order. (ECF No. 20, at 1).
A scheduling order may be modified
“for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”
16(b)(4).
(ECF
Fed.R.Civ.P.
In Plaintiff’s motion, he further explains that, at
however, that the Consumer Rights Act of 2015 appears to be a
British law, and that the “Fraud and Unfair Business Practices”
section of the counterclaim seeks information about Defendant’s
conduct and may be better suited for discovery.
3
Rule 37(a)(1) also requires that the motion to compel
“include a certification that the movant has in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party
failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain
it without court action.” Defendant states that it sent letters
to Plaintiff after the pertinent discovery deadlines had expired
requesting disclosures, documents, and interrogatory responses,
but that Plaintiff never responded. (ECF Nos. 18 ¶ 3; 21 ¶ 4).
4
the time of the scheduled discovery, he was unemployed, without
a bank account, and dependent on family to cover his food costs
and other expenses.
now
employed,
(ECF No. 20, at 1).
however,
and
that
he
He states that he is
intends
to
provide
initial disclosures and to seek the advice of an attorney.
Nos. 19, at 2; 20, at 2).
his
(ECF
In response to Plaintiff’s motion to
modify the scheduling order, Defendant maintains that it does
not object to a reasonable modification of the schedule, but
asks that Plaintiff first be required to provide responses to
Defendant’s outstanding discovery requests.
Defendant
has
also
filed
a
motion
(ECF No. 23).
for
summary
judgment
premised on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to its requests for
admission,
which
qualify
36(a)(3) (ECF No. 24).
as
admissions
under
Fed.R.Civ.P.
Rule 36(a)(3) states that “[a] matter is
admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to
whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a
written answer or objection.”
Subsection (b), however, provides
that admissions under Rule 36(a) may be withdrawn or amended on
a motion by the party that fails to respond “if it would promote
the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is
not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in
maintaining or defending the action on the merits.”
In
light
of
Plaintiff’s
pro
se
status,
his
apparent
financial difficulties, and the court’s preference to resolve
5
cases on the merits, Plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery will
be granted.
Plaintiff will have fourteen days to provide his
initial disclosures and discovery will be extended for sixty
days,
during
which
Plaintiff
must
respond
to
discovery requests and may serve his own requests.
Defendant’s
Plaintiff is
encouraged to submit discovery requests quickly so as to allow
Defendant
time
to
respond
extension of the deadline.
be
denied
without
to
any
requests
extend
the
prejudice
scheduling
further
Defendant’s motions to compel will
to
bringing
them
Plaintiff fail to meet the amended schedule.
to
without
order
will
also
again
should
Plaintiff’s motion
be
construed
as
a
motion to withdraw his admissions, and Defendant’s motion for
summary
judgment
will
therefore
similarly
be
denied
without
prejudice.
IV.
Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Finally,
counterclaim
Defendant
to
add
a
moves
count
for
leave
seeking
a
to
amend
declaration
its
that
Plaintiff’s debts to it were not discharged in Plaintiff’s 2016
bankruptcy proceedings.
(ECF No. 17).
Defendant argues that it
can show that Plaintiff did not include it on his bankruptcy
schedule and that it therefore had no notice of Plaintiff’s
bankruptcy case.
It further argues that it will be able to show
that Plaintiff’s debt was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2).
6
Although “failure to receive notice of the bankruptcy is
probably sufficient” cause to reopen a case on a motion by a
creditor,
see In re Mutts, 131 B.R. 306, 307 (Bankr.E.D.Va.
1991) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950)), bankruptcy code dictates that a case should be
“reopened in the court in which such case was closed.”
11
U.S.C. § 350(b); see also Fed.R.Bankr.P. Rules 4007(a); 5010.
Local Rule 402 also directs that, “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
157(a), all cases under Title 11 of the United States Code and
proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to
cases under Title 11 shall be deemed to be referred to the
bankruptcy judges of this District.”
Defendant should therefore
bring any action related to the bankruptcy court proceedings in
that court in the first instance.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to amend its
counterclaim, motion for summary judgment, and motions to compel
will be denied.
Plaintiff’s
granted.
Defendant’s motion to strike will be granted.
motion
to
amend
the
scheduling
order
will
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
7
be
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