Retes v. Prince George's County, Maryland et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying without prejudice 21 Motion to Bifurcate trial. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 12/13/2017. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DAMARIS LEANOR RETES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. TDC-16-2784

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,
MARYLAND and
DET. TIMOTHY MALLICOTE,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Damaris Leanor Retes filed suit against Defendants Detective Timothy Mallicote
("Det. Mallicote") and Prince George's County, Maryland ("the County") asserting, in relevant
part, a claim against Det. Mallicote for excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

9

1983

("9

1983")

based on his alleged sexual assault of Retes immediately before he arrested her for prostitution,
and a

9 1983 claim

against the County pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging that the County had an unconstitutional policy,
custom, or practice of deliberate indifference
prostitution arrests.

to sexual assaults during or in relation to

The parties are engaged in discovery.

Defendants have filed a Motion for

Bifurcation of Trial, arguing that discovery and trial on the claims against the County should be
bifurcated from discovery and trial on the claims against Det. Mallicote.

Retes opposes the

Motion. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court finds no hearing necessary. See D.
Md. Local R. 105.6.

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE to renewal after the close of discovery.

A court may order separate trials of one or more separate issues or claims "(f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Only one
of these criteria must be met to justify bifurcation.

Houseman v. Us. Aviation Underwriters,

171 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1999). Once a criterion is satisfied, the court "must be satisfied
that the decision to bifurcate does not unfairly prejudice the non-moving party." Id. However,
"separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered," Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory
committee's note to 1966 amendment; rather, "(eJach case must be considered in light of its
particular facts and circumstances."

Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318, 319

(D. Md. 1991). The decision on bifurcation is committed to the trial court's sound discretion.
Houseman, 171 F.3d at 1121.
Here, Defendants request that the Court hold a trial on Det. Mallicote's liability first, then
hold a separate trial on the County's liability in the event that Det. Mallicote is found liable.
Defendants argue that separate trials are warranted because it would be "confusing" and unduly
prejudicial to Det. Mallicote for the jury to consider in the same trial both evidence relating to
Det. Mallicote's

actions and evidence offered against the County of "prior actions of or

complaints against other police officers."

Mot. Bifurcation at 2-3. Defendants assert that such

bifurcation would also preserve resources because a jury verdict in Det. Mallicote's favor would
obviate the need for a trial on the County's liability.
At this time, the Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.

Discovery on the claims

against Del. Mallicote has not yet been completed, and discovery on the claim against the
County has not yet begun. With the universe of relevant evidence yet to be established, there is
not yet a basis to conclude that evidence against the County would unduly prejudice Det.
Mallicote or confuse the jury in a manner that could not be remedied by relevant jury

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instructions.

See generally Conn. v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 n.14 (1983) (noting that courts

"must assume that juries for the most part understand and faithfully follow instructions").

If the

serious allegations against Det. Mallicote are substantiated by the evidence, it arguably could
benefit him to have his alleged misconduct placed in the context of a larger, systemic problem.
As for conservation of resources, a

S

1983 claim of an unconstitutional municipal custom

or policy, at least in the context of inadequate training, generally may succeed only if there is a
finding of a constitutional violation by an individual defendant.

See Temkin v. Frederick Cty.

Comm 'rs., 945 F.2d 716,724 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding that "[a] claim of inadequate training
under section 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a
constitutional violation on the part of the person being supervised").

But see Fairley v. Luman,

281 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court did not err by denying a
municipality's motion for judgment as a matter of law after the individual defendant had been
exonerated because, in some instances,
deprivation

was "a consequence

S

1983 liability may still attach where a constitutional

of [municipal] policy," regardless

of the liability of an

individual defendant); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (noting that a
city could be held liable under

S

1983 for failure to train police officers even though no

individual defendants were sued). However, bifurcation would not necessarily be more efficient,
because if Retes were to prevail at a trial against Det. Mallicote only, it is likely that the
witnesses and evidence presented in that first trial would be relevant to the claim against the
County and would be properly presented a second time in the trial against the County. Because
the allegations against Det. Mallicote are serious, the weight of the evidence against him has yet
to be discerned, and discovery against the County has yet to commence, it is premature for this
Court to determine whether bifurcation would advance or undermine judicial economy.

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Finally, the Court notes that bifurcation presents a risk of unfair prejudice to Retes
because it imposes a significant barrier to her ability to pursue a claim against the County to
vindicate systemic concerns by increasing the resources required to do so.

Without a fuller

understanding ofthe record through discovery on all issues, the Court cannot properly weigh this
and other considerations to determine whether bifurcation is warranted under the particular facts
and circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for Bifurcation of Trial, ECF No.
21, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2017 Order, the

Parties must submit to the Court within 14 days of the date of this Order a joint status report
proposing a schedule for the completion of any remaining discovery.

SCg;~

Date: December 13,2017

THEODORE CH;
D.

United States District Judge

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