Hicks et al v. BWW Law Group LLC et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 10 MOTION for Injunctive Relief filed by Pierre Hicks, Tanya Hicks. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/13/2016. (c/m 10/13/2016 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

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PIERRE HICKS, et al.,

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PLAINTIFFS,

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CASE NO.: PWG-16-2859

v.

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BWW LAW GROUP LLC, et al.,

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DEFENDANTS.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Pierre Hicks and Tanya Hicks, who are proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint on
August 12, 2016 alleging that Defendants! violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (the
"FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C.

S

1692, through their attempts to collect a purported debt from Plaintiffs

and their "illegal non-judicial

forced sale of the consumer's

consumer goods with false

representation of the character, and legal status of the alleged debt." Compi. 3, ECF NO.1.

On

October 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Request for Injunctive Relief ("Motion"), and
Mr. Hicks filed a letter seeking further relief. See PIs.' Mot., ECF No. 10; Mr. Hicks Ur., ECF
No. 9.2 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants "conducted an illegal debt collection action" in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County and "were granted a Judgment of Possession."

PIs.' Mot.

1. They attach the state court judgment, awarding possession of Plaintiffs' real property at

Defendants include BWW Law Group LLC, Carrie M. Ward, Howard N. Bierman, Jacob
Geesing, Pratima Lele, Joshua Coleman, Richard R. Goldsmith, Jr., Ludeen McCartney-Green,
Jason Kutcher, Elizabeth C. Jones, Nicholas Derdock, John E. Driscoll, David K. McCloud, and
Alex Cooper Auctioneers, Inc.
Having reviewed Plaintiffs' filings, I find that neither Defendants' response nor a hearing
is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.2(a), 105.6.

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10406 Damascus Park Lane, Damascus, Maryland 20872 to U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee.

ECF

No. 10-1. Plaintiffs ask "to be protected by an order of injunction concerning consumer goods
that were obtained for personal, family and household purposes."

Id. In the accompanying

letter, Mr. Hicks claims that the Defendants persist with the collection activity that is the subject
of Plaintiffs' Complaint and "are seeking to dispossess [Mr. Hicks] and [his] family from [their]
dwelling." Mr. Hicks Ur. 1. He asks the Court "to issue an order to the Respondents to cease all
collection activities until this case is resolved." Id. I construe both filings together as a motion
for injunctive relief.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Because Plaintiffs have not shown that they are

likely to succeed on the merits and because some of the relief they seek runs contrary to the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C.

S 2283,

I will deny their request for injunctive relief.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to "protect the status quo and to prevent
irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit, ultimately to preserve the court's ability to
render a meaningful judgment on the merits."
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2003).
nonmovant.

In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d

A preliminary injunction cannot be issued without notice to the

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(l).

Here, Plaintiffs provide a Certificate of Service,

stating that Mr. Hicks mailed the Motion to "Carrie M. Ward, et al." ECF No. 10-1.
To prevail on a motion for injunctive relief, a party must "establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in the public interest."

Winter v.

Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum
Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff must satisfy each requirement for the Court
to grant injunctive relief. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm 'n, 575 F.3d 342,

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347 (4th Cir. 2009). Importantly, injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
Plaintiffs' Motion does not show how they likely would succeed on the merits because
their Motion is "conclusory [and] relies entirely on the allegations of the complaint."
Bounassissi, No. DKC-I0-2245,

2010 WL 5139032, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2010).

Sal! v.
Although

Plaintiffs' Complaint only references consumer goods, Mr. Hicks's letter seeking further relief
references their real property.

CompI.; Mr. Hicks Ltr.

Consequently,

it is unclear whether

Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated the FDCPA in regards to their personal or real property.
Nonetheless,

Plaintiffs'

pleadings include correspondence

between the parties, apparently to

show Defendants' alleged FDCPA violations. See Exs. A-K, ECF Nos. 1-2 - 1-12; Fed. R. Civ.
P. 1O(c). Exhibit I is correspondence between Mr. Hicks, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, and Defendant BWW Law Group ("BWW").

See Ex. I, ECF No. 1-10.

In the

correspondence, BWW stated that Plaintiffs' allegations of FDCP A violations were "not true."
Id. BWW asserted that Hicks sent it "a letter disputing the debt and seeking verification of the
debt ...

six years after [BWW's] initial disclosures were made to him under the FDCPA."

Id.

Further, BWW "advertised the sale [of Mr. Hicks's real property] as required by law and mailed
notice of the sale to the complainant."

Id.

Moreover, Hicks "participated

in the pending

foreclosure action ... [by] fil[ing] a motion to stay the foreclosure sale alleging that [BWW] had
no right to foreclose. That motion was denied." Id. This suggests that BWW complied with the
FDCPA.
However, Plaintiffs identify evidence that contradicts BWW's assertions.

Specifically,

Mr. Hicks states that BWW's "initial illegal debt collection case ... was opened on 6/8/2010 and
dismissed with prejudice on 5/3/2011."

Ex. I.
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Additionally, Mr. Hicks claims that BWW

"initiated a new illegal debt collection case ... on 11/17/2015" but neglected to provide him with
a debt verification letter. Id. at 3. Given the lack of clarity as to how Defendants violated the
FDCP A, Plaintiffs did not show that they are "likely" to prevail on their claim that Defendants
violated the FDCPA, only that the Defendants may have violated the FDCP A. See Winter, 555
U.S. at 21.

Consequently,

Plaintiffs have not shown that this Court should exercise this

"extraordinary remedy" and grant injunctive relief. Id. at 22. Moreover, Plaintiffs' failure to
satisfy the first requirement for injunctive relief is dispositive because a plaintiff must meet all
four requirements for a Court to grant injunctive relief. Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at
347.
Finally, insofar as Plaintiffs

seek relief with regard to the state court judgment

specifically, this Court cannot issue an injunction to protect Plaintiffs from a judgment entered
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The Anti-Injunction Act states that a federal court
cannot grant "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
an Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."

28 U.S.C.

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2283.

This Court cannot enjoin the Circuit Court for Montgomery

County because the "three specifically defined exceptions" do not apply to this case. Atl. Coast
Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970); see Henry v. Aurora Loan
Servs., LLC, No. TDC-14-1344, 2016 WL 1248672, at *3 (D. Md. March 25, 2016).
Accordingly, on this lith day of October, 2016, Plaintiffs' motion for injunctive reliefIS
DENIED.

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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