Meadows v. Charles County School Board of Education et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 6/16/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/16/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DEBRA F. MEADOWS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-2897

:
CHARLES COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF
EDUCATION, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

employment discrimination case are a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Helen E. Keller (ECF No. 22); a motion for summary
judgment

by

Defendant

Charles

County

Board

of

Education

(“Charles County Schools” or the “Board”) (ECF No. 48); and two
papers filed by Plaintiff Debra Meadows (“Plaintiff”) (ECF Nos.
52;

62)

that

complaint.1

appear

to

be

motions

for

leave

to

amend

her

The issues have been briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, Ms. Keller’s motion will be granted,
the Board’s motion will be granted, and both of Plaintiff’s
motions will be denied.

1

Although the clerk did not docket these papers as motions
for leave to amend, they will be construed as such based on
their content. Indeed, the Board understood at least one of the
papers to be a motion for leave to amend and responded in
opposition to it. (ECF No. 54).

I.

Background2
The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are not entirely

clear.

Plaintiff began working for Keller Transportation, Inc.

(“KTI”), a bus company that has a contract with Charles County
Schools, in 2011.
subsidized

federal

(ECF No. 1, at 7).
housing

suffers from dyslexia.
When

Plaintiff

with

her

Plaintiff lives in

children.

(Id.).

She

(Id. at 8).
filed

her

discovered several problems.

taxes

in

(Id. at 7).

early

2015,

she

First, she found out

that she was categorized an independent contractor and sought to
correct the Board’s employment records to reflect that she was
an employee of Charles County Schools.

Second, she found that

KTI’s human resources department had classified her and her son
as “border and migrant workers.”

(Id.).

Third, she discovered

that KTI had reported her income as being “extremely high,” too
high for her subsidized housing.

(Id.).

This discrepancy led

to Plaintiff and her nine-year-old daughter being assigned a
$500,000.00 debt.

When the new school year started later in

2015, Plaintiff was given no vacation or sick leave for her
position.

When Plaintiff was on workers’ compensation leave in

November 2015, KTI told Plaintiff that she should contact the
unemployment benefits office.

That office, however, informed

2

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.
2

her that KTI had not reported her employment with the company
and that she was not entitled to any unemployment benefits.
II.

Procedural History
Plaintiff

filed

a

charge

with

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on June 2, 2016, and the EEOC
issued her a right to sue notice on June 15.

(ECF No. 1, at 6).

She filed this suit on August 18 against Ms. Keller, KTI, the
Board, and “Keller Jr[.] Keller III Ernest Bus Service Inc.,”
alleging ongoing discrimination on the basis of her religion,
national origin, and disability in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§

12101,

et

seq.

(Id.

at

2-5).3

She

also

alleged

that

Defendants retaliated against her in violation of Title VII.
(Id. at 5).
A schedule was set and discovery began (ECF No. 27), but
the parties have had numerous discovery disputes.

Magistrate

Judge Timothy J. Sullivan was assigned to the case on December
19, 2016 (ECF No. 29), and continues to supervise the discovery
issues between the parties.

Plaintiff has recently filed an

3

As discussed below, the identity of the fourth defendant
in this case is unclear, but it appears this defendant has not
yet been served. (ECF No. 10).
3

interlocutory appeal based on one of Judge Sullivan’s decisions.
(ECF No. 64).4
On November 23, Ms. Keller moved to dismiss all claims
against her.

(ECF No. 22).

Plaintiff was provided with a

Roseboro notice (ECF No. 24), which advised her of the pendency
of the motion to dismiss and her entitlement to respond within
seventeen days from the date of the letter.

See Roseboro v.

Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975).

Plaintiff responded

on

supplement

December

5

(ECF

No.

26)

and

filed

response on March 6, 2017 (ECF No. 50).

a

her

The Board filed its

pending motion for summary judgment on March 1, 2017.

4

to

(ECF No.

“[W]hile the filing of a notice of appeal ‘confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district
court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal[,]’” the district court does not lose jurisdiction when a
litigant appeals an unappealable order. United States v. Jones,
367 F.App’x 482, 484 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)); accord 16A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3949.1 (4th ed. 2017) (“The weight of authority holds
that an appeal from a clearly non-appealable order fails to oust
district court authority; older cases holding to the contrary
have been rejected.” (footnotes omitted)). Although the precise
nature of Plaintiff’s appeal is not clear, it appears that
Plaintiff appealed a non-final order and did not seek a
certificate of appealability. See United States v. Hinton, 420
F.App’x 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2011) (dismissing appeal where denial
of motion for recusal was “neither a final order nor an
appealable interlocutory or collateral order”); Poux v. FCI
Bennettsville SC, 418 F.App’x 157, 157 (4th Cir. 2011)
(dismissing appeal of order staying discovery); Stephens v.
Muncy, 918 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1990) (dismissing appeal of order
granting leave to file motion to dismiss).
Accordingly, the
court retains jurisdiction over the case and may resolve the
pending motions.
4

48).

Plaintiff was provided a Roseboro notice for the Board’s

motion (ECF No. 49), and she responded on March 13 (ECF No. 51).
Plaintiff filed her pending motions on March 28 and April 26.
(ECF Nos. 52; 62).
III. Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend
A.

Standard of Review

A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within twenty-one days after serving it or within twenty-one
days

after

service

whichever is earlier.

of

a

motion

under

Fed.R.Civ.P.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1).

12(b),

When the right to

amend as a matter of course expires, “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).

Whether to grant leave

to amend is a matter left to the discretion of the district
court, see Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d
754, 769 (4th Cir. 2011), though courts should “freely give leave
when justice so requires,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).

Denial of

leave to amend is appropriate “only when the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on
the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co.,
785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).

Generally, pro se pleadings

are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard
5

than pleadings drafted by lawyers.
89,

94

(2007)

(quoting

Estelle

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
v.

Gamble,

429

U.S.

97,

106

(1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff

has

submitted

two

papers

–

one

labeled

a

“Memorandum to Amend and Correct” and the other labeled a “Rule
2-341. Rule -341 Amending and Pleading to Correct in Plaintiff
Defen[ses]” – that appear to be efforts to amend her complaint.
(ECF

Nos.

62).5

52;

additional

facts

claims.

She

violations

of

In

related
also

other

to

these
her

mentions
federal

papers,

Plaintiff
Title

existing

numerous

laws,

provides
and

ADA

allegations

of

the

of

new

including

VII

Freedom

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; the Economic Espionage Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; mail
fraud

statutes,

18

U.S.C.

§§

1341,

1346;

the

Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1691, et
seq.; conspiracy to defraud the government; § 1981; § 1983; and
multiple provisions of the federal tax code.
Charles County Schools responded in opposition to one of
Plaintiff’s

motions.

(ECF

No.

54).

The

Board

argued

that

Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend her complaint because

5

Rule 2-341 appears to be a citation to Maryland state
rules of civil procedure, which do not apply in federal court.
6

her proposed changes would be futile and because she failed to
comply with Local Rule 103.6.

(ECF No. 54-1, at 2-4).

Local Rule 103.6(a) requires that a plaintiff submit an
“original of the proposed amended pleading” separately from her
motion for leave to amend.

Local Rule 103.6(c) states that the

moving party “shall file and serve (1) a clean copy of the
amended pleading and (2) a copy of the amended pleading in which
stricken material has been lined through or enclosed in brackets
and new material has been underlined or set forth in bold-faced
type.”

Local Rule 103.6(d) mandates that a plaintiff seeking

leave to amend shall first “attempt to obtain the consent of
other

counsel”

and

shall

“state

in

the

motion

whether

the

consent of the other counsel has been obtained.”
In a number of respects, Plaintiff’s motions for leave to
amend fail to adhere to the requirements of the Local Rules.

In

both papers, Plaintiff simply provided a single document with
new allegations.

Additionally, Plaintiff failed to attach red-

line versions comparing her original complaint with her amended
ones.

Plaintiff’s

motions

also

did

not

state

whether

any

Defendants had consented to the amended pleadings, and the Board
avers that Plaintiff did not attempt to obtain its consent.
Failure to comply strictly with the dictates of Local Rule
103.6 by itself is not fatal to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
amend, especially in light of her pro se status.
7

See Milligan

v. Brady, No. RWT–10–2107, 2011 WL 1833346, at *1 n.1 (D.Md. May
13, 2011) (“As a pro se litigant, [the plaintiff’s] failure to
comply with Local Rule 103.6 is not fatal to her request for
leave to amend, and the Court concludes that her filing contains
sufficient

information

to

consider

her

request

without

additional briefing.”); see also Awah v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt.
Cty., No. WMN–09–1044, 2010 WL 1929908, at *2 (D.Md. May 11,
2010) (refusing to deny pro se plaintiff’s motion to amend on
the ground that he had not filed a red-line copy where there was
no prejudice to defendant).
Rules is not optional.

However, compliance with the Local

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183,

191 (2010) (noting that local rules “have the force of law”);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 83(a)(1).

The rules pertaining to amendments, for

instance,

that

help

information

it

ensure
needs

appropriately granted.
follow them.

to

the

court

determine

As such, even

has

available

whether
pro se

leave

all

the

can

be

litigants must

See Cmty. Connections, Inc. v. Parker, No. RWT-07-

3282, 2010 WL 148332, at *2 (D.Md. Jan. 12, 2010) (“The Court
can neither act as counsel for a pro se litigant nor excuse a
pro se litigant’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, or the orders of this Court
due to ignorance of the law.”).
Additionally, as noted above, Plaintiff’s papers include a
large number of new allegations and cite to a wide variety of
8

federal
amended

statutes.

If

complaints,

deficiencies.

Plaintiff’s

they

First,

would

neither

papers
suffer

satisfies

were
from

construed
some

federal

as

notable

procedural

standards that call for claims to be set forth “in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set
of

circumstances.”

Fed.R.Civ.P.

10(b).

Second,

and

more

importantly, Plaintiff’s allegations are overwhelmingly unclear.
It is well-settled law that complaint allegations must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”
U.S.

506,

Although

512

(2002)

Plaintiff

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

(internal

need

only

quotation
satisfy

marks

the

omitted).

standard

of

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
Fed.R.Civ.P.
sufficient

8(a)(2),

to

support

she

must

her

legal

provide

factual

conclusions.

allegations
United

Black

Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see
also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Even after affording the papers a generous construction, the
court cannot determine the precise nature of Plaintiff’s new
claims.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s presently pending motions will be
denied.
claims,

If Plaintiff wishes to allege new facts or add new
she

must

resubmit

a

motion
9

that

complies

with

the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules.

She is

advised that her complaint should: (1) clearly and separately
identify each law that she alleges a defendant has violated; (2)
identify which defendant has violated each law; (3) describe how
each defendant violated each law; and (4) explain how those
violations give her a cause of action against each defendant –
that is, explain why she has a right to sue the defendant for
each legal violation.
Finally,

there

is

some

uncertainty

as

to

whether

defendants in this case have been properly identified.

all

Given

their responsive pleadings and motions, it is clear that Ms.
Keller,

KTI,

and

the

effectively served.

Board

have

been

adequately

named

and

It is unclear whether Plaintiff intended to

file suit against any other defendants.

The fourth defendant on

the docket, “Keller III Bus Service Incorporated,” appears to be
a division of KTI.6

Keller Bus Service thus need not, and

cannot, be sued separately from KTI.

6

Therefore, Plaintiff will

Maryland corporations can be identified using the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation (“SDAT”) website:
http://dat.maryland.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
There are no SDAT
records for “Keller III Bus Service Incorporated.” The website
lists “Keller Bus Service, Inc.” as having forfeited its
corporate status in 1992. In a more recent document provided by
Plaintiff, Keller Bus Service is identified as a division of
KTI. (See ECF No. 21-1, at 12).
10

be directed to show cause why this fourth defendant should not
be dismissed.7
IV.

Defendants’ Motions
A.

Standard of Review

As noted above, Ms. Keller and the Board have both filed
dispositive motions as to the claims currently filed against
them.

(ECF Nos. 22; 48).

standards

of

review.

Ms.

Their arguments implicate multiple
Keller

moves

to

dismiss

because

Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, an argument
that is analyzed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because it could
deprive this court of jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims.
See Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus, Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406
(4th Cir. 2013); Onuoha v. Grafton School, 182 F.Supp.2d 473, 481
(D.Md.

2002).

Generally,

“questions

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction must be decided ‘first, because they concern the
court’s very power to hear the case.’”

Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.

Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 442 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 2 James
Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.301 (3d ed. 1998)).
The

plaintiff

always

bears

the

burden

of

demonstrating

that

subject matter jurisdiction properly exists in federal court.
7

Plaintiff’s summonses also identified Ernest Keller, Jr.
and Ernest Keller, III as defendants (ECF No. 6), though neither
was named individually in the complaint.
It appears that
Plaintiff named these individuals on the summonses as agents for
KTI or Keller Bus Service. Accordingly, Plaintiff will also be
directed to notify the court if she intended to sue either or
both of these persons.
11

See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int’l Corp.,
166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).

In a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

motion, the court “is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence
on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings
without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States,
945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Adams v. Bain, 697
F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).
matter

jurisdiction

is

Dismissal for lack of subject

appropriate

“only

if

the

material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is
entitled

to

prevail

as

a

matter

of

law.”

Richmond,

Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768 (citation
omitted).
As noted above, pro se pleadings are liberally construed
and held to a less stringent standard.

Liberal construction

means that the court will read the pleadings to state a valid
claim to the extent that it is possible to do so from the facts
available; it does not mean that the court should rewrite the
complaint

to

include

claims

never

presented.

Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).

Barnett

v.

That is, even

when pro se litigants are involved, the court cannot ignore a
clear

failure

to

allege

facts

that

support

a

viable

claim.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.
1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB–12–969, 2012 WL 6087491, at *3
12

(D.Md.

Dec.

4,

2012)

(“[E]ven

a

pro

se

complaint

must

be

dismissed if it does not allege a plausible claim for relief.”).
The Board’s motion for summary judgment, which also raises
questions

of

subject

different standard.

matter

jurisdiction,

is

viewed

under

a

Summary judgment will be granted only if

there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

250

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

A

dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such

that

a

nonmoving

reasonable

party.”

jury

could

a

Lobby,

Liberty

return

verdict

477

U.S.

at

for

the

249.

In

undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the
reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom

“in

the

light

most

favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Matsushita Elec.
Indus.

Co.

(quoting

v.

Zenith

United

Radio

States

Corp.,

v.

Diebold,

475

U.S.

Inc.,

574,

369

587

U.S.

(1986)

654,

655

(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute
of

material

fact

through

inferences,”

Shin

v.

mere

Shalala,

2001) (citation omitted).

speculation
166

or

F.Supp.2d

compilation
373,

375

of

(D.Md.

To prevail on a motion for summary

judgment, the moving party generally bears the burden of showing
13

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

On

issues for which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof,
such as subject matter jurisdiction here, however, it is her
responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with an
“affidavit

or

other

evidentiary

showing”

there is a genuine issue for trial.

demonstrating

that

See Ross v. Early, 899

F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md. 2012), aff’d, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir.
2014).
B.

Analysis

Both Ms. Keller and the Board support their motions on the
basis

that

Plaintiff

failed

to

exhaust

her

administrative

remedies as to any claims against them because they were not
named in Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint.
Typically,

“[t]he

scope

of

the

(ECF No. 22-1, at 8).

plaintiff’s

right

to

file

a

federal lawsuit is determined by the charge’s contents[, and]
[o]nly those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge,
those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those
developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint
may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.”

Jones v.

Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009).
civil

action

may

be

brought

after

administrative

“[A]

proceedings

have ended or conciliation attempts have failed only ‘against
the respondent named in the [administrative] charge.’”

Alvarado

v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 458 (4th
14

Cir. 1988) (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1)); accord Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir.
1998).

The naming requirement “is not a mere technicality.”

Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 458.

It is necessary because it both

“notifies

of

“brings

the
the

charged
charged

party
party

the

before

asserted
the

violation”

EEOC[,]

and

permit[ting]

effectuation the Act’s primary goal, the securing of voluntary
compliance with the law.”

Id. at 458-59.

Here, Plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint only against KTI.
(ECF No. 22-2, at 2).

In Plaintiff’s responses to each of the

pending motions, she argues that KTI, Ms. Keller, and the Board
“are incorporated as one body.”
No. 51, at 11).

(ECF No. 26, at 3; see also ECF

Although a plaintiff’s failure to name a party

within an EEOC charge ordinarily would prohibit suit against
that party for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, some
courts have recognized the “substantial identity” exception to
the naming rule, whereby a plaintiff may bring suit against a
defendant unnamed in an EEOC charge.

See, e.g., Sedlacek v.

Hach, 752 F.2d 333, 334–36 (8th Cir. 1985); Romero v. Union Pac.
R.R., 615 F.2d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 1980).
States

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Fourth

Although the United
Circuit

has

not

explicitly adopted the “substantial identity” exception, it has
cited the exception with approval in dicta.

See Alvarado, 848

F.2d at 461 (finding it unnecessary to apply the exception in
15

the case sub judice, but citing district court decisions within
the Fourth Circuit that have applied it); EEOC v. Am. Nat’l
Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1186 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981) (reasoning that
jurisdiction is proper “where it is clear that the defendant
through some relationship with the named respondent had notice
of the charges and participated in the conciliation process”).
To

determine

entities,

whether

the

court

substantial
should

identity

consider:

exists
“(1)

between

two

similarity

of

interests between named and unnamed parties; (2) ability of the
plaintiff to ascertain the unnamed party at the time of the EEOC
charge; (3) notice of the EEOC charge by the unnamed party; and
(4) prejudice.”
867

(D.Md.

Zhang v. Sci. & Tech. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 864,
2004)

(citing

Thomas

v.

BET

Sound–Stage

Rest./BrettCo, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 448, 457–58 (D.Md. 1999)).
Even

if

Plaintiff’s

responses

are

construed

to

argue

substantial identity among KTI, Ms. Keller, and the Board, these
arguments fail.

Charles County Schools, a public educational

entity, clearly has very limited similarity of interests with
KTI, one of its contractors focused solely on transportation.
Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why she could not have
identified Charles County Schools in her EEOC complaint, and the
Board has provided unrefuted affidavit evidence that it was not
made

aware

of

Plaintiff’s

Plaintiff filed this suit.

EEOC

complaint

against

(ECF No. 48-2 ¶ 8).
16

KTI

until

Although Ms.

Keller,

as

owner

of

KTI,

could

be

expected

to

have

some

similarity of interests with that business entity and is more
likely

than

the

Board

to

have

charge, neither is conclusive.
that

Ms.

Keller

was

Ms.

Keller’s

differ

the

interests

made

aware

of

the

EEOC

The complaint does not indicate

actually

Importantly,
from

been

notified

individual
of

a

of

interests

corporate

the

charge.

likely

entity

she

would
owns,

especially where, as here, the governing statutes distinguish
between individual and employer conduct.8

8

As with the Board,

Title VII and the ADA “do not provide for causes of action
against defendants in their individual capacities.”
Jones v.
th
Sternheimer, 387 F.App’x 366, 368 (4
Cir. 2010) (citing Baird
ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999)); Lissau
v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“[S]upervisors are not liable in their individual capacities
for Title VII violations.”).
Limited individual liability is
one of the key legal benefits of incorporation.
Courts have
occasionally considered a corporate entity and its owner a
single integrated entity for Title VII purposes, but “[s]uch
situations are the exception,” and “limited liability remains
the rule.” See Johnson v. Flowers Indus., 814 F.2d 978, 981 (4th
Cir. 1987). To the degree that Plaintiff argues in her response
to the motion that Ms. Keller and KTI are a single entity, she
fails to plead facts that would support considering Ms. Keller
her employer.
See Johnson, 814 F.2d at 982 (“One-hundred
percent ownership and identity of directors and officers are,
even together, an insufficient basis for applying an alter ego
theory to pierce the corporate veil.”); see also Wood v. S. Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 725 F.Supp. 1244, 1249 (N.D.Ga. 1989) (finding
that the “existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not
enough to impose liability on the parent” because corporate
ownership encompasses certain rights to control the corporation,
“such as the right to choose directions and set general
policies,
without
forfeiting
the
protection
of
limited
liability” (citing Baker v. Raymond Int’l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173,
180 (5th Cir. 1981))).
For the forgoing reasons, even if
Plaintiff had exhausted her administrative remedies, Ms.
17

Plaintiff was able to identify Ms. Keller at the time of her
EEOC charge, yet chose not to include her.

Accordingly, neither

the Board nor Ms. Keller have substantial identity with KTI, and
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as
to her claims against both parties.

Both motions will therefore

be granted.9
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant

Helen

E.

Keller

will

be

granted,

the

motion

for

summary judgment filed by Defendant Charles County, Board of
Education will be granted, and Plaintiff’s motions to amend will
be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

Keller’s motion to dismiss would be granted on the ground that
she does not qualify as Plaintiff’s employer under the relevant
statutes.
9

Because Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as to Ms. Keller and the Board precludes subject matter
jurisdiction over the current claims against them, the parties’
other arguments as to the merits are not considered in this
opinion.
18