Meadows v. Charles County School Board of Education et al

Filing 80

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 12/5/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/5/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DEBRA F. MEADOWS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-2897

:
CHARLES COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF
EDUCATION, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

employment case is the motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, for summary judgment, and for judgment on
the

pleadings

(“Defendant”).

filed

by

Defendant

(ECF No. 75).

Keller

Transportation,

The issues have been briefed, and

the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule

105.6.

For

the

Inc.

following

reasons,

the

motion

Local

will

be

granted.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background1

Plaintiff’s complaint is not a model of clarity.

Plaintiff

lives in federally subsidized housing with her children, started
working for Defendant in 2011, and suffers from dyslexia.
No. 1, at 7-8).

Although not stated in the complaint, she

stated in the EEOC charge that she is Jewish.
1

(ECF

(ECF No. 75-5).

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant changed her status from
employee to independent contractor for the purposes of her 2015
tax refund.

Plaintiff further alleges that she incurred a debt

related to her housing after Defendant misreported her income
and misclassified her and her daughter as “border[s] and migrant
workers.”

(ECF No. 1, at 7).

She also alleges that Defendant

did not give her vacation leave or sick leave and refused to pay
her for work she had done during the 2015 school year.
alleges

that

[p]ool[.]”

Defendant

put

her

in

a

“group

She

[i]nsurance

(Id.).

On March 26, 2015, Plaintiff contacted her Congressman to
explain the problem she was having with her taxes.
1, at 6-7).

(ECF No. 1-

Plaintiff was injured on November 2, 2015, and she

quit working for Defendant on February 26, 2016.

(ECF No. 1, at

7-8).
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff

filed

a

charge

with

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on June 2, 2016, alleging that
her former employer, Keller Transportation, Inc., discriminated
against

her

on

the

basis

of

religion,

national

origin,

and

disability when it changed the way it deducted taxes from her
paycheck, did not compensate her for time worked, and denied her
leave.

(ECF No. 75-5).

notice on June 15.

The EEOC issued her a right to sue

(ECF No. 1, at 6).
2

Plaintiff filed suit on

August 18 against Defendant, Helen Keller, the Charles County
Board of Education (the “Board”), and “Keller Jr[.] Keller III
Ernest Bus Service Inc.,” alleging discrimination on the basis
of disability, religion, and national origin in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq.
alleged retaliation.

Plaintiff also

(Id. at 5).

On November 23, Ms. Keller moved to dismiss all claims
against

her.

(ECF

No.

22).

judgment on March 1, 2017.

The

Board

(ECF No. 48).

moved

for

summary

On June 16, the court

granted Ms. Keller’s motion to dismiss and the Board’s motion
for summary judgment.
Keller

III

Ernest

Bus

(ECF No. 67).
Service

Inc.”

Because “Keller Jr[.]
was

never

properly

identified and served by Plaintiff, it was dismissed on July 6.
(ECF No. 70).

After discovery closed, Keller Transportation,

Inc., the only remaining defendant, moved to dismiss for lack of
subject
judgment

matter
on

the

jurisdiction,
pleadings

for
on

summary

August

21.

judgment,
(ECF

or
No.

for
75).

Plaintiff has not responded, despite receiving notice of the
opportunity and necessity to respond.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).

3

(ECF No. 76); Roseboro v.

II.

Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
A.

Standard of Review

Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
burden

of

proving

that

subject

exists in the federal court.

The plaintiff bears the

matter

jurisdiction

properly

See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a

Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
In a 12(b)(1) motion, the court “may consider evidence outside
the pleadings” to help determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the case before it.

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac

R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see
also

Evans,

166

F.3d

at

647.

The

court

should

grant

the

12(b)(1) motion “only if the material jurisdictional facts are
not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law.”
B.

Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768.

Analysis

Defendant first argues that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because many of Plaintiff’s claims exceed the scope
of the EEOC charge.

(ECF No. 75-1, at 9-11).

Although courts

have occasionally mislabeled the requirement that a Title VII
complaint not exceed the scope of an EEOC charge as a procedural
bar, see, e.g., Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711
F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2013)(quoting Chacko v. Patuxent Inst.,
429 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) and Dennis v. Cnty of Fairfax,
4

55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995), the scope of the EEOC charge is
a jurisdictional bar.

See, e.g., Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd.,

551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Importantly, a failure by the
plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies concerning a Title
VII

claim

deprives

the

federal

courts

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction over the claim.”); Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc.,
288 F.3d 124, 133 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Therefore, because the scope
of Bryant’s complaint exceeds the limits set by the allegations
of

Bryant’s

administrative

complaint,

we

cannot

analyze

the

merits of Bryant’s retaliation or color and sex discrimination
claims.”).

An EEOC charge, however, “does not strictly limit a

Title VII suit which may follow.”

Chisholm v. United States

Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
An EEOC “charge[] must be construed with utmost liberality
since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of
formal pleading,”

Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery Cmty.

Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kaplan v. Int'l
Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Emps., 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th
Cir. 1975)), and it exhausts not only those facts contained in
the charge but also all factual allegations that “a reasonable
investigation

of

[the]

administrative

charge

would

uncovered[.]”

Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d at 512.

have
The

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found
that a reasonable investigation would uncover additional facts,
5

not identified in the original charge, related to the subject
matter of the original charge.
(“The

allegation

in

the

See Chishom, 665 F.2d at 491

administrative

complaint

that

USPS

discriminated in promotions sufficed to put USPS on notice that
the entire promotional system was being challenged, including
aspects of the system such as discipline and testing which were
not specifically enumerated in the complaint.”).

The Fourth

Circuit has also found that a reasonable investigation would not
uncover

a

different

discriminatory

conduct

form
not

of

discrimination

identified

in

the

or

types

initial

charge

perpetrated by people not identified in the initial charge.
Chacko,

429

F.3d

at

512

(“[A]

reasonable

of

investigation

See
of

discrete instances of supervisor misconduct not involving name
calling could not be expected to lead to a continuous pattern of
nonsupervisory
Bryant,

288

misconduct
F.3d

at

which

133

did

involve

(“Administrative

name

calling.”);

investigation

of

retaliation, and color and sex discrimination, however, could
not reasonably be expected to occur in light of Bryant’s sole
charge of race discrimination”).
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant discriminated against her
when it “stopped taking taxes out of my paycheck, stopped paying
for time worked, and stopped giving leave” in her EEOC charge.
(ECF No. 75-5, at 2).

In her Title VII suit, Plaintiff has

alleged, in addition to the claims in her EEOC charge, that she
6

incurred a housing debt because her employer overreported her
income and was placed in a “group [i]nsurance [p]ool.”
1, at 8).

(ECF No.

The claim that Defendant misreported Plaintiff’s

income to housing authorities does not relate to any actions
identified

in

the

EEOC

complaint

investigation would have uncovered.
different

action

involving

a

or

that

a

reasonable

This complaint centers on a

different

government

agency

therefore is outside the scope of the EEOC charge.

and

Likewise,

the claim of being placed in the wrong insurance plan does not
have

any

connection

Therefore,

to

Plaintiff’s

the

facts

alleged

discrimination

before

claims

the

related

EEOC.2
to

her

insurance plan and housing debt will be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff also brings a claim for retaliation. At times, “a
plaintiff may raise the retaliation claim for the first time in
federal court.”
1992).

Courts

Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir.
can

hear

claims

of

retaliation,

even

if

not

brought before the EEOC, when an employee is retaliated against
for filing the initial EEOC charge.
the

retaliation

claim

is

reasonably

2

Id.

In such a situation,

related

to

the

charge.

Defendant identifies a possible claim related to pension
benefits. The complaint is confusing, but, despite a reference
to a pension, the pension issue does not appear to be related to
any cause of action. (See ECF No. 7-8). If it were, the court
would lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Chacko, 429 F.3d at
512.
7

Hentosh v. Old Dominion Univ., 767 F.3d 413, 416-17 (4th Cir.
2014).

If, however, the retaliation is unrelated to the EEOC

charge itself, and arose prior to the filing of the EEOC charge,
then a failure to raise the retaliation claim before the EEOC
will divest the courts of subject matter jurisdiction.

See

Sloop v. Mem’l Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir.
1999).
Plaintiff did not identify retaliation as a basis for her
EEOC charge.
Congressman

If she claims that reporting the tax issue to her
was

protected

activity,

and

that

any

retaliatory

actions occurred before she left Defendant’s employment, then
the actions were taken prior to the filing of the EEOC charge,
and should have been included in the EEOC charge.
extent
based

that
on

Plaintiff

her

letter

intended
to

the

to

raise

congressman,

a

Thus, to the

retaliation
the

claim

claim

will

be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3
III. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A.

Standard of Review

Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed
— but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.”

Under the circumstances presented

3

As will be discussed in the next section, if Plaintiff
contends that the filing of the EEOC complaint was her protected
activity, she fails to identify any potentially retaliatory
adverse employment actions and the complaint will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
8

here, the motion is governed by the same standard governing
motions

to

12(b)(6).

dismiss

for

failure

to

state

a

claim

under

Rule

Burbach Broad Co. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d

401, 405–06 (4th Cir. 2002).
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

Presley v. City of

(4th

Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2). “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a
blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n. 3 (2007).

Bell. Atl. Corp.
That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).
B.

Analysis

As best as can be discerned, Plaintiff is alleging that she
was misclassified as an independent contractor instead of an
employee and that she was denied sick leave, vacation time, and
payment for work performed.

(ECF No. 1, at 7-8).

She is

alleging all this was done in violation of Title VII and the
ADA.

(Id.

at

4).

Plaintiff
9

is

also

alleging

retaliation.

(Id.).

Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings.

(ECF No.

75).
To state a plausible claim of discrimination under Title
VII and the ADA, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that she
was discriminated against.
F.3d

187,

190

(4th

Cir.

Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626
2010).

Here,

Plaintiff’s

complaint

contains only a legal claim of discrimination and allegations
about disputes between her and her employer.
not

relate

to

nationality,

mistreatment

and,

due

therefore,

to

her

disability,

complaint

plausible claim of discrimination.

The allegations do

does

religion,
not

state

or
a

See McCleary-Evans v. Md.

Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin, 780 F.3d 582, 585-86 (4th
Cir. 2015); Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th
Cir.

2001).

Plaintiff’s

discrimination

claims

will

be

dismissed.
To state a plausible claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must
allege: “(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse
employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected
activity and the employment action.”

Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.

As noted earlier, Plaintiff has failed to identify any adverse
employment

action

after

the

filing

of

her

EEOC

charge.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant retaliated
against her after she filed the EEOC charge, her claim will be
dismissed.
10

Because Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings,
its motion for summary judgment does not need to be addressed.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, for judgment on the pleadings,
and

for

summary

judgment

filed

by

Defendant

Transportation, Inc. (ECF No. 75) will be granted.

Keller

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

11