Edwards v. USA - 2255
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 9/30/2016. (c/m 09/30/2016 bus, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMES HENRY EDWARDS
Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent
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Civil No. PJM 16-2919
Criminal No. PJM 05-179
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Edwards, pro se, has filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court will treat this
Memorandum of Law as a renewed Motion under § 2255. But, for the reasons set forth below,
the Court DENIES said Motion WITH PREJUDICE.
I. FACTS
On April 6, 2006, pursuant to a Plea Agreement, Edwards pled guilty to one count of
Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or More of a Mixture or
Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The base
offense level for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 under the United States Sentencing Commission
Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) then in effect was a 32. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). However, because
Edwards had at least two prior felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, he was a
“career offender” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and his offense level was 37. Edwards received
a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, his total adjusted offense
level was 35. Edwards’s criminal history category was VI not only because he was assigned
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fourteen criminal history points, but also because he was a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.1.
On June 21, 2006, Edwards was sentenced to 292 months imprisonment, within the guideline
range for an offense level of 35 and criminal history category of VI, which, in 2006, was 292 to
365 months.
No direct appeal was taken. However, on February 28, 2007, Edwards filed a pro se
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing, among other
things, that no appeal had been taken because his counsel did not act at his request to file the
appeal. The Court felt that the easiest solution would be to permit Edwards to pursue his direct
appeal and therefore denied his § 2255 Motion without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court
vacated its original June 21, 2006 judgment and re-entered it, effective May 30, 2007, to allow a
new period of appeal to run. The May 30, 2007 Memorandum Opinion and Order directed the
Clerk to mail copies of same to Edwards, who was serving his sentence for the underlying
offense. On January 31, 2008, however, Edwards wrote the Court inquiring about the status of
the case, asserting that, while he had received notice of the May 30, 2007 Order, he had not
received a copy either of it or the accompanying Memorandum Opinion. Therefore, Edwards
indicated that he had missed the new window in which to note a direct appeal. In a Memorandum
Opinion and Order on October 31, 2008, the Court entered yet another date on the Order of
Judgment and Commitment in order to provide Edwards with yet another window in which to
take a direct appeal. ECF Nos. 589-90.
On November 1, 2008, Edwards filed a Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 591, and, on June 23,
2009, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment. ECF No. 645. The Fourth Circuit held
that, on direct appeal, it could not rule with respect to any ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Accordingly, the issue of ineffective assistance remained open.
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By statute, Edwards had one year, i.e. until June 23, 2010, to file a motion with this Court
under § 2255. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). He did not in fact do so. It was not until September 17,
2010, that he filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 681. Edwards apparently believed that
his original § 2255 motion was still in effect, despite the fact that it had been denied without
prejudice more than three years earlier. Be that as it may. There is no need to dispose of
Edwards’s case on technical procedural grounds.
The Court will treat his Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ECF No. 681, as a timely filed Motion
under § 2255, but for the reasons that follow, it will deny the Motion on the merits.
II. ANALYSIS
Edwards’s Memorandum, treated as a subsequent § 2255 Motion, presents two questions:
(1) Was his counsel ineffective for failing to seek vacatur of the state controlled substance
offense convictions, which caused him to qualify as a career offender? and (2) Was Edwards
contractually entitled to an offense level of 32 based upon promises made to him in the Plea
Agreement?
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Edwards asserts that he was not represented by counsel in two state controlled substance
offense convictions (Maryland cases CT891221A and CT891200X) that were used to determine
his status as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. According to Edwards, if his
attorney in the instant case had sought vacatur of those convictions, he would not have been
labeled a career offender and his offense level would have totaled 30 (a base offense level of 32
with a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility), rather than 35 (the career offender
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level of 37 with a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility). Accordingly, Edwards
argues that, but for the ineffective assistance of his counsel, his sentence would have been
shorter.
Edwards is correct that if he were not a career offender, the sentencing guideline range
would have been different.1 However, as the Court now explains, Edwards’s state convictions
would not have been vacated. As a result, he was correctly labeled a career offender, and his
offense level of 35 was proper.
First, it is clear Edwards was represented by counsel in both state convictions. His
Presentence Report in the present case states that he was “[r]epresented by legal counsel” in both
case CT891221A and case CT891220X, and the Court has independently verified with the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland that Edwards had legal counsel in both of
those cases.2
Second, even if one of these prior controlled substance offenses had been vacated,
Edwards had previously been convicted of a third controlled substance offense, i.e. in 1993, he
was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland of “Conspiracy to Distribute
PCP.” United States v. Edwards, Case No. 93-cr-269-WDQ. Pursuant to § 4B1.1, a controlled
substance offense includes conspiring to commit such offenses. That would still give Edwards
the two predicate drug offenses justifying his classification as a career offender.
This dispenses of Edwards’s first § 2255 issue.
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In 2006, an offense level of 30 with a criminal history category of VI indicated a guideline range of 168
to 210 months. An offense level of 35 with a criminal history category of VI – as was applied to Edwards
– resulted in a guideline range of 292 to 365 months.
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The fact that Edwards was represented by counsel in the state proceeding would obviously undercut any
basis for the grant of vacatur.
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B. Entitlement to Offense Level 32 Based Upon the Plea Agreement
Edwards submits that his Plea Agreement contained a stipulation that his base offense
level would be a 32, and that the Government breached the Agreement when he was sentenced as
a career offender. Specifically, Edwards points to Paragraph 6 of the Agreement, which states, in
pertinent part, “The base offense level is 32 pursuant to §2D1.1(c)(4) because the Defendant
conspired to distribute between 5 and 15 kilograms of cocaine powder.” According to Edwards,
because the prosecutors breached the Plea Agreement, resentencing is required.
This issue is procedurally defaulted inasmuch as it could have been raised on direct
appeal and was not. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492–93 (4th Cir.1999)
(citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982)). But the Court need not hang its hat
on that peg.
On the merits, Edwards’s argument fails for several reasons. First, he ignores Paragraphs
8 and 9 of the Agreement, which clearly state that the Court could use Edwards’s prior
convictions to determine whether he was a career offender. Paragraph 8 states that, while the
prosecutors would not “rely on the Defendant’s prior felony drug convictions to enhance the
mandatory minimum sentence to which the Defendant is subject,” it does not “prevent the Court
from relying on the Defendant’s prior convictions to calculate the Defendant’s criminal
history under the sentencing guidelines or in determining whether he is a career offender or
an armed career criminal.” (emphasis added). Similarly, Paragraph 9 adds that “The Defendant
understands that there is no agreement as to his criminal history or criminal history category, and
that his criminal history could alter his offense level if he is a career offender. . . . The parties
explicitly understand that, if the defendant qualifies as a career offender, his guideline range may
be up to and including life imprisonment.” (emphasis added).
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Second, Edwards was advised several times of the potential that he could qualify as a
career offender and the effect that that could have on his sentence. Assistant U.S. Attorney David
Salem met with him in a proffer session and reiterated the meaning of paragraphs 8 and 9,
explaining that the Government was not in a position to agree to Edwards’s criminal history
category or career offender status. Additionally, at Edwards’s Guilty Plea hearing on April 6,
2006, the Court asked Edwards whether he had read the Agreement and had signed it voluntarily.
When he answered in the affirmative, the Court then asked AUSA Salem to recite the important
provisions of the Agreement, wherein he proceeded to explain that “under paragraph nine . . .
there is no agreement as to criminal history or criminal history category. That will be determined
with the help of the Probation Office.” See Transcript of Guilty Plea, ECF No. 613.
Third, the statutory maximum penalty for Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute
Five Kilograms or More of a Mixture or Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 was, at all relevant times, life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). This fact was detailed in Paragraph 3 of the Plea Agreement and yet again at
Edward’s Guilty Plea hearing, as was the possibility that the Court could sentence Edwards
above the range of the sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, notwithstanding the mention of an
offense level of 32 in one part of the Plea Agreement, another term in the Agreement expressly
put Edwards on notice that the Court could have sentenced him to any term up to life
imprisonment.
There is no basis to alter the finding that Edwards’s proper offense level was 35.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Edwards’s Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 681) is treated as
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a renewed Motion under § 2255, and said Motion is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE, as set forth
in the accompanying Order.
/s/
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PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
September 30, 2016
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