Robertson v. Samuels et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 9/13/2016. (c/m 09/14/2016 jf3s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MARCO MIGUEL ROBERTSON #62151-066 *
Petitioner

*

v.

*

FBOP DIRECTOR SAMUELS
DOC of MARYLAND COMMISSIONER

CIVIL ACTION NO. PJM-16-3071

*
*

Respondents
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marco Miguel Robertson, presently confined in the Special Management Unit at the
United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, asserting that he
has been denied a Maryland state parole hearing which he was entitled to receive. By way of
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), a Magistrate Judge in that District found that Robinson’s
issues relating to his entitlement to parole presented a colorable habeas corpus issue, but
supplemental claims concerning conditions of confinement and the need to transfer to another
facility for medical treatment and counseling lie outside the purview of habeas review. The
R&R, later adopted by the District Court, dismissed the Petition to the extent that it raised
conditions of confinement requiring his transfer, and permitted the claims regarding Robinson’s
state parole issue to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF Nos. 6-8. Thereafter, the
Petition was transferred to this Court from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania and received on September 7, 2016.
The Petition shall be construed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For reasons noted herein, the
Petition shall be denied and dismissed and a Certificate of Appealability shall not issue.

Background
This Petition represents Robertson’s second attempt to obtain § 2241 habeas relief from
this Court. As determined in Robertson v. Comm’ner of DOC of Maryland, et al., Civil Action
No. PJM-12-35 (D. Md.) (“Robertson I”), Robinson is in federal custody pursuant to the
Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”),1 serving aggregate sentences of life imprisonment plus
twenty-four years’ incarceration following his Maryland convictions for first-degree murder, use
of a handgun, assault with intent to maim and second-degree assault.2 Id., ECF No. 12, Exhibits
1-3.
Robertson I contained a claim that Robertson’s due process rights were violated because
he was not permitted to attend his Maryland parole hearing while housed in a federal facility
outside Maryland. Id., ECF No. 1 at 4. In a supplement to that Petition, Robertson implied that
he had never been scheduled for a parole hearing, but that if such a hearing was held, it should be
reconvened so that he could attend in person or via videoconference. Id., ECF No. 11 at 1-2.
Following further briefing, the undersigned on June 22, 2012, dismissed Robertson I and
declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability. Id., ECF Nos. 14 and 15.
In the instant Petition, Robertson reiterates his claim that he should be given a parole
hearing that he could attend in person or via videoconference. ECF No. 1 at p. 9, Request for
Relief. He further argues that a “thorough psychological evaluation” and his federal Bureau of
Prisons record should be presented to the Maryland Parole Commission for consideration prior to
the parole hearing. Id.

1

The ICC is applicable to Maryland prisoners pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 8-601 et seq.

2

See http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiryDetail.jis?caseId=CT971600X&loc=65&detailLoc=PG;
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiryDetail.jis?caseId=02K97000484&loc=60&detailLoc=K; and
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiryDetail.jis?caseId=02K02001407&loc=60&detailLoc=K.

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Standard of Review
Petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are subject to the exhaustion requirement of
28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b). See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976) (“This Court has long
recognized that in some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly
administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas
corpus power.”); see also Timms v. Johns, 627 F. 3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying
exhaustion requirements to 2241 petition challenging civil commitment); see also Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (state courts must be afforded the first opportunity to review
federal constitutional challenges to state convictions).
Thus, before this Court can review the merits of his habeas petition, Robertson must
exhaust each claim presented by pursuing remedies available in state court. See Rose v. Lundy,
455 U. S. 509, 521 (1982). Both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles must be
exhausted. See Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In
Maryland, exhaustion includes appellate review in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and
the Maryland Court of Appeals, see Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987).
Analysis
Based on the uncontroverted record evidence presented in Robertson I, Robertson was
sentenced to life plus twenty years’ incarceration commencing January 31, 1997. On March 2,
1999, he received an additional fifteen year sentence, commencing March 2, 1999, concurrent to
the sentences already imposed. On September 20, 2002, he received an additional four year
sentence, to be served consecutive to any sentence then being served. Given those sentences, it

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is not apparent whether he is eligible for parole consideration at this time.3 If in fact he is parole
eligible, Robertson is not without recourse to obtain the relief he seeks. He should direct his
parole eligibility claim to the appropriate Maryland court. See Maryland House of Correction v.
Fields, 686 A. 2d 1103, 1105 (1996) (habeas relief is appropriate where prisoner alleged that
prison officials= actions were unauthorized and he was unlawfully detained and was entitled to
immediate release). His responses to the Petition suggest that he has not attempted to obtain
such relief by way of an appropriate action in the Maryland courts.
To the extent Robertson claims that Maryland parole officials have violated his due
process rights by failing to schedule a parole hearing, his claim cannot be adjudicated here.
Violation of a state law or regulation which does not infringe upon a specific constitutional right
is cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings only if it amounts to a Afundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice@. Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112,
115 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962)). The Constitution
itself does not create a protected liberty interest in the expectation of early release on parole. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 7 (1979); see
also Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U. S. 14, 18 (1981) (mutually explicit understanding that inmate
would be paroled does not create liberty interest). AThere is no constitutional or inherent right of
a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.@
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.

AIt is therefore axiomatic that because . . . prisoners have no

protected liberty interest in parole they cannot mount a challenge against a state parole review
procedure on procedural (or substantive) Due Process grounds.@ Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d
299, 308 (5th Cir. 1997).
3

Md. Code Corr. Serv. § 7-301(d) provides that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole
consideration until s/he has served fifteen years or the equivalent of fifteen years after consideration of diminution
credits.

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When a district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on procedural grounds, a
certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.’ ” Rouse v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Robertson’s Petition does not meet this
standard. For reasons set forth above, a separate order will be entered dismissing this case
without prejudice and denying a certificate of appealability.

_____________/s/__________________
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

September 13, 2016

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