Karn v. PTS of America, LLC
Filing
97
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 5/28/2020. (jf3s, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 5/29/2020 (jf3s, Deputy Clerk).
Case 8:16-cv-03261-GJH Document 97 Filed 05/28/20 Page 1 of 15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
WILLIAM JEFFREY KARN,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
Case No.: GJH-16-3261
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PTS OF AMERICA, LLC, et al.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff William Karn (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants PTS of
America, LLC (“PTS”), its employee, Jorge Santiago, its subsidiary Brevard Extraditions, LLC
d/b/a U.S. Prisoner Transport, Inc. (“Brevard”), and Brevard’s employees Christopher Cabrera,
James Lebron, and Robert King, Sr. (“Defendants”), seeking damages for injuries Plaintiff
sustained while Defendants transported him from Maryland to South Carolina in prisoner
transport vans in December 2015. In his Amended Complaint, ECF No. 40, the operative
pleading, Plaintiff asserts common law claims of negligence and negligent supervision, training,
and retention, as well as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights
by the individual Defendants and by PTS and Brevard. Pending before the Court are a Motion to
Dismiss by Defendants Cabrera and King, ECF No. 65, and Defendants’ Joint Motion to
Bifurcate and Stay Discovery with respect to the § 1983 claim against PTS and Brevard, ECF
No. 82. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.). For the following reasons, both
motions will be granted.
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I.
BACKGROUND
The Court has recounted in three prior Memorandum Opinions Plaintiff’s disturbing
allegations about the conditions and treatment he experienced in Defendants’ custody. See ECF
Nos. 21, 38, 71. In brief, Plaintiff alleges that on or about December 9, 2015, he was arrested in
Montgomery County, Maryland for failure to pay timely child support in Horry County, South
Carolina. ECF No. 40 ¶ 15. On the evening of December 23, 2015, Defendants Santiago and
Lebron arrived at the Montgomery County facility, shackled and handcuffed Plaintiff, and
brought him to a van containing ten other prisoners. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 22, 25. Plaintiff’s handcuffs
were so tight that he immediately lost feeling in his hands, but Santiago and Lebron ignored his
repeated complaints. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. The van then departed for South Charleston, West Virginia,
where it arrived at approximately 3:00 a.m., before departing for Kentucky at 3:30 a.m. Id. ¶ 37.
After two additional stops to pick up and drop off other prisoners, all ten prisoners in the
van were dropped off at 11:15 a.m. the next morning at PTS’s “hub” facility, a jail in
Hopkinsville, Kentucky. Id. ¶¶ 33, 37. On December 29, 2015, a different van, driven by
Defendants Cabrera and King, picked up Plaintiff and other prisoners in the early morning. Id. ¶¶
35, 37. Over the next two days, the van took Plaintiff through Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas,
and Tennessee again, before dropping him in Conway, South Carolina in the middle of the night
on December 31. Id. ¶¶ 37, 66. Plaintiff alleges that his total journey in the two vans was over
2,500 miles long and that Defendants took a circuitous route that passed through multiple states
more than once. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
At the center of this action are the conditions in the vans, which Plaintiff alleges were
“appalling.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 28, 42, 74. The prisoner compartments had benches along each side facing
a central metal divider, against which the prisoners’ knees were pressed. Id. ¶ 43. It was
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impossible for Plaintiff or the other prisoners to sleep in their forced upright position, and
because they were not belted or restrained, they were thrown into each other, the divider, and the
ceiling as the vans proceeded on their routes. Id. ¶¶ 44, 47. Though the vans did not contain
bathrooms, Defendants only stopped to allow the prisoners to relieve themselves every six to
eight hours. Id. ¶¶ 63–65. As a result, the prisoner compartments and the passengers inside,
including Plaintiff, became soiled with urine, vomit, and feces. Id. ¶¶ 63, 68, 69, 71, 72.
Defendants never cleaned the vans while Plaintiff was in their custody. Id. ¶¶ 74–76. Defendants
also provided the prisoners with little food and water and failed to prevent prisoners from taking
food meant for others, leaving Plaintiff dehydrated and with nothing to eat on more than one
occasion. Id. ¶¶ 49–56.
Plaintiff alleges that he developed sores, boils, rashes, and abrasions from the overly tight
shackles and handcuffs and states that he continues to suffer numbness and pain in the fingers of
his left hand. Id. ¶¶ 43, 58–59. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that at one point when he was told
to exit the van, he was unable to stand properly because his legs had become numb, causing him
to fall onto the pavement and injure his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 60–61. While either Santiago or Lebron
observed the fall, Plaintiff was simply told to get up and was not provided any assistance or
treatment. Id. ¶ 62. Plaintiff alleges that he continues to suffer pain from the shoulder injury. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that after two prisoners began fighting over medication, Santiago or
Lebron indiscriminately pepper sprayed the entire prisoner compartment, burning Plaintiff’s
eyes, which he could not reach because of his shackles and handcuffs. Id. ¶ 78. As a result of his
experiences, Plaintiff asserts that he suffers severe emotional distress and will require “treatment
into the foreseeable future.” Id. ¶ 85.
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Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant PTS and six “John Doe” employees on
September 26, 2016, asserting claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent hiring, training, and supervision, false imprisonment, violations of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 1. PTS moved to dismiss all
claims except the negligence claim, for which it filed a partial Answer. ECF Nos. 9, 10. Plaintiff
withdrew the false imprisonment claim and one of the § 1983 claims in his Opposition. See ECF
No. 21 n.1. In a Memorandum Opinion issued on September 19, 2017, the Court dismissed all of
the remaining claims except for the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the John Doe
employees in their personal capacities. Id. at 16–19. 1 The Court stated that Plaintiff would have
the opportunity in discovery to identify the individual employees and amend his pleading to add
specific allegations against them. Id. at 16 n.5.
Plaintiff moved for leave to file an Amended Complaint on April 17, 2018, having
identified Santiago, Lebron, Cabrera, and King as the employees who transported him and
having learned that were in fact employees of Brevard rather than PTS. ECF No. 32. The
proposed Amended Complaint added the four individual defendants and Brevard and included
five claims: negligence against all Defendants, a § 1983 claim against PTS, Brevard, and the
individual employees in their official capacities, a § 1983 claim against the individual employees
in their individual capacities, a claim for violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, and a claim of negligent training, supervision, and retention against PTS
and Brevard. ECF No. 32-1. Defendants opposed the Motion for Leave. ECF No. 33.
1
Pin cites to documents filed on the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system.
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On July 26, 2018, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting the Motion for
Leave as to all claims except the Maryland Declaration of Rights claim. ECF No. 38. The
Amended Complaint was therefore docketed as the operative pleading. ECF No. 40. On August
10, 2018, PTS submitted a motion challenging the venue of the action as improper or in the
alternative requesting transfer of venue to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee. ECF No. 49. Brevard and Lebron then filed Motions to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint, ECF Nos. 55, 64, and Cabrera and King filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, ECF No. 65. 2
On February 11, 2019, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion denying all of the
pending motions. ECF No. 71. The Court found that the venue of the action was proper because
a substantial part of the events at issue occurred in Maryland and that the grounds Defendants
offered for transfer were not sufficiently compelling to disturb Plaintiff’s choice of forum. Id. at
9–11. The Court also rejected Brevard and Lebron’s Motions to Dismiss because they offered
only arguments that the Court had already found meritless. Id. at 11–12 & 12 n.4. Finally, the
Court found that it has personal jurisdiction over Lebron because some of the tortious conduct he
allegedly engaged in took place in Maryland. Id. at 6–7.3 With respect to Cabrera and King,
however, the Court noted that King had filed an affidavit testifying to his lack of activity in the
state of Maryland, ECF No. 65-3, and further observed that Plaintiff had not alleged that either
Cabrera or King have had contacts with the state. Id. at 7. However, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
request to conduct limited discovery for 60 days on Cabrera and King’s activities in Maryland
and to show cause why they should not be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 7, 12.
2
The motions also sought dismissal of the Maryland Declaration of Rights claim, but Plaintiff conceded that that
claim was properly disposed of by the Court’s previous Order. See ECF No. 71 at 2 n.2.
3
The Court did not address jurisdiction over Santiago, who was apparently never served. See ECF No. 82-1 at 2 n.3.
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At the Court’s direction, id. at 7 n.3, Cabrera on February 13, 2019 filed an affidavit
detailing his transport of Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 73, 73-1. Brevard and PTS submitted Answers to
the Amended Complaint on February 14, 2019, ECF No. 74, and February 20, 2019, ECF No.
75, respectively. On April 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Motion in opposition to
Cabrera and King’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 76. Cabrera and King filed a Reply on April 29,
2019. ECF No. 78. On September 13, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Bifurcate and Stay
Discovery with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against PTS and Brevard. ECF No. 82.
Plaintiff filed an Opposition on October 11, 2019, ECF No. 86, and Defendants filed a Reply on
November 8, 2019, ECF No. 91.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The Court first considers whether Plaintiff has shown cause why Defendants Cabrera and
King should not be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to the Court’s February
11, 2019 Memorandum Opinion. ECF No. 71 at 7, 12; see ECF No. 72.
“[F]or a district court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under the state’s
long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs.,
Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of
Christ v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001)). In Maryland, the “long-arm statute is
coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set by the due process clause of the
Constitution,” id. (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 370 A.2d 551, 553 (Md. 1977)), and thus the
statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry, id. (citing Stover v. O’Connell Assocs.,
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Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1996)). “A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant comports with due process if the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum,
such that to require the defendant to defend its interests in that state ‘does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
“Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision have differentiated
between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984)). “Adjudicatory
authority is ‘specific’ when the suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum.’” Id. at 923–24 (alterations in original) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8). In
contrast, “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. at 919
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” Id. at 924.
In its previous Memorandum Opinion, the Court found that the record before it lacked
evidence that Cabrera and King had ever had contacts with the state of Maryland, nor had
Plaintiff alleged that they committed any activities in the state giving rise to his claims. ECF No.
71 at 7. Rather, the Amended Complaint alleges that Cabrera and King picked up Plaintiff in
Kentucky and had no contact with him in Maryland. ECF No. 40 ¶ 35. Because specific
jurisdiction arises only where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state provide the basis for
the suit, the Court directed that Plaintiff must establish general jurisdiction over Cabrera and
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King and granted Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on Cabrera and King’s
activities in Maryland. ECF No. 71 at 7.
Plaintiff offers the materials he has gathered in his Supplemental Motion in support of his
Opposition to Cabrera and King’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 76 at 2–3. The evidence, which
consists of interrogatory responses, includes statements by Cabrera that he believes he has picked
up inmates in Maryland for purposes of transportation or extradition, recalls stopping at the
Montgomery County Detention Center to provide inmates with restroom breaks, and believes he
has driven through every state in the contiguous United States to pick up or drop off prisoners.
Id. at 2–3 (citing ECF No. 76-1 at 3–4). King merely states that he “likely drove through
Maryland and/or made stops in Maryland” in the course of his employment, and that like Cabrera
he believes he has driven through every state to pick up or drop off prisoners. Id. at 3 (citing ECF
No. 76-2 at 4). Both Cabrera and King deny any connection to Maryland in regards to the
transportation of the Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 76-1 at 3; 76-2 at 3.
Plaintiff has pointed to no authority indicating that these very limited contacts, which are
unrelated to his case, are sufficient to meet the high threshold required for general jurisdiction.
“‘[O]nly a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to’ general
jurisdiction in [a] State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)). Here, Cabrera and
King have each submitted affidavits stating that they are residents of Florida, ECF No. 65-1 ¶ 1;
ECF No. 73-1 ¶ 1, ruling out general jurisdiction based on their domicile, “the paradigm forum
for the exercise of general jurisdiction” for individuals. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564
U.S. at 924. While an individual can reside in one state but be domiciled elsewhere, see Blake v.
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Arana, No. WQQ-13-2551, 2014 WL 2002446, at *2 (D. Md. May 14, 2014), Plaintiff has not
challenged that Cabrera and King here are Florida domiciliaries.
Plaintiff instead offers that because Defendants’ employment activities “involved the
transport of prisoners through Maryland and the picking up and/or dropping off of prisoners in
Maryland,” Defendants have each had “continuous and systematic” contact with the state. ECF
No. 76 at 5–6 (quoting Carefirst of Md., Inc., 334 F.3d at 397). District courts have split on
whether “continuous and systematic” analysis is applicable to individual defendants, or rather
whether natural persons are only subject to general jurisdiction in the courts of their state of
domicile. Compare Brown v. Advanced Dig. Sols., LLC, No. 5:17-CV-00034-RLV-DSC, 2017
WL 3838640, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2017) with Reynolds Foil Inc. v. Pai, No. 3:09CV657,
2010 WL 1225620, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2010); see also Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., Inc. v.
M & R Title, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 507, 514 & n.1 (D. Md. 2014) (expressing doubt that
continuous and systematic contacts can render a nonresident natural person subject to general
jurisdiction in Maryland under Maryland law).
Even if that analysis does apply to individuals, however, Plaintiff has failed to produce
evidence that Cabrera’s and King’s contacts with Maryland are so pervasive as to render them
subject to the Court’s general jurisdiction. As Judge Grimm of this Court has explained:
[C]ourts in Maryland have rejected the proposition that general
jurisdiction can be based upon occasional travel to Maryland, see Glynn v.
EDO Corp., 641 F. Supp. 2d 476, 488 (D. Md. 2009), conducting a small
portion of a defendant’s business in the State, Robbins v. Yutopian Enters.,
Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (D. Md. 2002) (finding that forty-six
business transactions in Maryland in less than one year was insufficient to
give rise to general personal jurisdiction); Rossetti v. Esselte–Pendeflex
Corp., 683 F. Supp. 532, 535 (D. Md. 1988) (finding several million
dollars’ worth of business insufficient where it was only a small minority
of the defendant's total business), or even possession of a license to do
business in the State, Congressional Bank v. Potomac Educ. Found., Inc.,
No. PWG–13–889, 2014 WL 347632 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2014) (finding that
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a Maryland CPA license was not sufficient to give rise to general personal
jurisdiction in Maryland).
Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d at 515. Cabrera states in his affidavit that his
only specific recollection of activity in Maryland is stopping at a detention facility, while King
denies any knowledge of trips or travel through Maryland and merely states his belief that he has
driven through every state in the contiguous United States to pick up or drop off prisoners. ECF
No. 76-1 at 3–4; ECF No. 76-2 at 3–4.
In short, “the links between [Cabrera and King] and Maryland are better viewed as
occasional and sporadic” than continuous and systematic, and therefore are insufficient for
general jurisdiction. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d at 515. And the Court has
already rejected the argument, which Plaintiff again alludes to in his Supplemental Opposition,
that jurisdiction attaches to Cabrera and King merely because their employer performs work in
Maryland. ECF No. 71 at 7. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to
demonstrate personal jurisdiction, Cabrera and King’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), ECF No. 65, will be granted, and
Cabrera and King will be dismissed as Defendants. Grayson v. Anderson, 815 F.3d 262, 268 (4th
Cir. 2016) (citing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.3d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)) (“Under Rule 12(b)(2), a
defendant must affirmatively raise a personal jurisdiction challenge, but the plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction at every stage following such a challenge.”).
B. Motion to Bifurcate and Stay
Also pending is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery. ECF No. 82.
Defendants request that the Court stay discovery with respect to Plaintiff’s claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against PTS and Brevard alleging that their policies, customs, or practices violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the Court bifurcate that claim from the remaining
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claims for trial. ECF No. 82-1 at 6–7; see ECF No. 82-8. Defendants refer to this claim as a
Monell claim, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), holding that “local governmental bodies may be liable
under § 1983 based on the unconstitutional actions of individual defendants, but only if those
defendants were executing an official policy or custom of the local government that resulted in a
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Bost v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. ELH-15-3278, 2017
WL 1862486, at *9 (D. Md. May 8, 2017) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91). The Court has
already determined that PTS and Brevard perform the traditional state function of prisoner
transport and are therefore subject to municipal liability under § 1983. ECF No. 21 at 14; ECF
No. 71 at 11–12.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), district courts may order a separate
trial of “one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims”
for “convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). “In
deciding whether to bifurcate, courts have broad discretion.” Shields v. Prince George’s Cty.,
No. GJH-15-1736, 2016 WL 4581327, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 1, 2016) (citing Dixon v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 990 F.2d 1440, 1443 (4th Cir. 1993)). “[A]lthough Rule 42 does not expressly
address the bifurcation of discovery, courts have looked to similar factors as those relevant to the
bifurcation of trial when determining whether discovery related to the deferred claims should be
stayed.” Ziemkiewicz v. R+L Carriers, Inc., No. RDB-13-00438, 2013 WL 2299722, at *2 (D.
Md. May 24, 2013) (quoting Cann v. Balt. Cty., No. WMN-10-2213, 2011 WL 588343, at *1 (D.
Md. Feb. 9, 2011)). Defendants also note Rule 26(d), which provides that “[a] party may not
seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f),
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except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when
authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” See ECF No. 82-1 at 6.
“Although the determination of whether bifurcation is appropriate is fact specific, the
Court often ‘orders bifurcation in § 1983 cases where, as here, a plaintiff has asserted claims
against individual government employees as well as the municipal entity that employs and
supervises those individuals.’” Shields, 2016 WL 4581327, at *3 (quoting Dodson v. Prince
George’s Cty., No. GJH-13-02916, 2014 WL 4799032, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2014)). As the
Court explained in Shields v. Prince George’s County:
Notably, the reason courts frequently order bifurcation in § 1983 cases is
that § 1983 cases do not permit vicarious liability under a respondeat
superior theory; meaning that while the establishment of the actively
involved officers’ liability must precede a finding of liability of the nonactive employer, it does not, without more, establish liability on the part of
the employer. See, e.g., Marryshow v. Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318, 319
(D. Md. 1991) (allowing bifurcation in a 1983 case because “to hold the
inactive Defendants liable, Plaintiff must first establish at least one active
Defendant violated his constitutional rights”). In such cases, if a plaintiff
prevails in establishing a claim against one or more of the active
defendants, he then “‘must establish that the actions of the active
Defendants subjecting him to Section 1983 liability were proximately
caused by a custom, practice or policy of an inactive Defendant’ – the
County.” Dawson v. Prince George’s Cty., 896 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Md.
1995) (quoting Marryshow v. Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318 (D. Md.
1991)). Thus, if a Court bifurcates a § 1983 claim and the officers are
determined not to be liable, the resources devoted to discovery and trial of
the municipality are conserved.
2016 WL 4581327 at *4; see also Bost, 2017 WL 1862486, at *9 (“Courts have consistently
found that ‘bifurcation of . . . Monell supervisory claims from the individual claims is
appropriate and often desirable.’” (quoting Brown v. Bailey, No. RDB-11-1901, 2012 WL
2188338, at *4 (D. Md. June 13, 2010)).
Defendants make two primary arguments in support of bifurcation and stay of discovery
with respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim. First, Defendants contend that bifurcation and stay
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serves judicial economy because PTS and Brevard can only be found liable under § 1983 if a
jury first finds that the individual Defendants caused Plaintiff damage by violating his
constitutional rights. ECF No. 82-1 at 8. Staying discovery and postponing trial of the Monell
claim, Defendants maintain, would conserve the parties’ and the Court’s resources because if the
individual Defendants are not found liable under § 1983, trial of the Monell claim would be
unnecessary, as would the extensive discovery relating to policies, procedures, and customs that
Plaintiff has sought in support of the claim. See id. at 8–9.
Plaintiff insists that this case is akin to others in which courts have declined to bifurcate
Monell claims because the plaintiff also brought vicarious liability claims against the municipal
defendants. ECF No. 86-1 at 6–8. Plaintiff points to his negligence and negligent training claims,
arguing that because PTS and Brevard would be required to defend them at the first of two
potential trials, bifurcating the Monell claim would not conserve the Court’s or the parties’
resources. Id. at 8. Plaintiff is correct that courts have in some cases denied bifurcation when a
plaintiff brings vicarious liability claims against a defendant employer in addition to a Monell
claim and the court determines that bifurcation would not conserve resources of the parties or the
Court. See Shields, 2016 WL 4581327, at *4 (collecting cases).
As Defendants respond, however, pretrial litigation of Plaintiff’s non-Monell claims
against PTS and Brevard would not require the same discovery with respect to the companies’
practices that the Monell claim necessitates. ECF No. 91 at 4. Plaintiff’s negligence claim
concerns only the conditions of his own transport, see ECF No. 40 ¶ 108, and under Maryland
law, a negligent training claim primarily involves an employer’s knowledge of a specific
employee’s incompetence or unfitness for a position rather than the employer’s broader policies
and procedures. See Jarvis v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 11-CV-00654-AW, 2012 WL
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527597, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 2012) (listing the elements of a negligent training, hiring, or
supervision claim); see also Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau, 923 F. Supp. 720, 751 (D. Md. 1996)
(noting that for a negligent training and supervision claim, the plaintiff must allege that employer
knew or should have known of the employee’s “conduct or general character which would have
caused a prudent employer in these circumstances to have taken action.”). Accordingly, the fact
that Plaintiff has brought these additional claims and that PTS and Brevard will be present at the
first of two trials does not weigh strongly against bifurcation in this case.
Defendants’ other primary argument is that bifurcation would help mitigate the risk of
prejudice to the individual Defendants that a single trial could present. ECF No. 82-1 at 10–13.
Defendants assert that because proving a Monell claim would require Plaintiff to rely on previous
incidents and lawsuits against PTS and Brevard, such evidence would likely be inadmissible
against the individual Defendants but would be difficult for the jury to selectively disregard.
Plaintiff responds that such prejudice can be avoided with curative jury instructions. ECF No.
86-1 at 10. Practically speaking, however, as the Court noted in Bost v. Wexford Health Sources,
“the reality is that it would be difficult for the jury to compartmentalize” evidence of similar
alleged misconduct by other employees in unrelated situations. 2017 WL 1862486 at *13
(collecting cases). This concern thus supports bifurcation. See Cann, 2011 WL 588343, at *1
(finding that bifurcation of claims against police officers and the county employing them was
warranted to help “[p]revent the prejudice to the individual defendants that might arise if prior
incidents of police brutality are introduced as evidence to establish a county custom or policy of
tolerating or prescribing the use of excessive force”).
In light of these considerations, the Court concludes that Defendants have sufficiently
demonstrated that bifurcation of Plaintiff’s Monell claim and a stay of discovery concerning that
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claim are warranted. Taking steps to avoid burdensome and resource-intensive discovery
concerning the Monell claim, as well as a trial of that claim that could prove unnecessary, would
serve the interest of convenience, avoid prejudice to the individual Defendants, and help
“expedite and economize” the progress of the litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Therefore,
Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery will be granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Cabrera and King,
ECF No. 65, and Defendants’ Joint Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery, ECF No. 82, will be
granted. A separate Order shall issue.
Date: May 28, 2020
/s/__________________________
GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge
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