King et al v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc.

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 2/22/2018. (c/m 2/23/2018 heps, Deputy Clerk)

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,FIlED

J-f:G.-

ENltRfD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURlo-' _,toornJ_~ftCEi'iED
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

FEB 2 3 2018

SOlllftl'rn DiI'i.~io"

J..Y'•.•""_iENRELT

CLERK U.S, D!aTIliCT COU~T
[lIST!lCT O~ MAlM.J.11D

LAZINA KING, 1'1 al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

Case No.: G.IH-16-3.tR9

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CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC.,

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Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On September

22. 2017. the Court granted Delendant Caliber Ilome Loans, Inc.'s Motion

to Dismiss. e10sing Plaintiffs Lazina and Ria King's ("Plaintiffs"
arose out of the foreelosure

and subsequent

sale of Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs have since tiled a Motion to Reconsider

or ..the Kings") action which

home by Caliber. EC'!' No. 26.

the Granting of the Delendants'

1vlotion to

Dismiss. ECF No. 28. which Defendant has opposed. ECF No. 30. No hearing is necessary. St't'
Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2(16). For the tollo\ving reasons. Delendants'

Motion to Reeonsider

is

denied.
I.

BACKGROUND!
The Court thoroughly

September

Memorandum

addressed the factual and procedural

background

of this case in its

Opinion. ECF No. 26 at 2_5.2 The Kings became delinquent on their

mortgage in 2013. and in 2014 the mortgage was transterred

to Caliber. ECF No. 21 at 4-5. In

April 2014. the Kings requested that Caliber assist them with loan modification.

and lilxcd a list

Unless otherwise stated. the hackground facts are I[lkcll from Plaintiffs Complaint. ECF No.1. and arc presumed
be true.
1 Pin cites to documents
filed on the Court"s electronic filing system (eM/ECF) reler to Ihe page numbers generated
by that system.
I

10

of documents

to Caliber on April 9.2014.

would send Caliber documentation

ECF No. I at 3. (her

to start the loanmodilication

the Kings called to inquire about the status of the modilication.
had closed the Kings'
account.

preventing

the following

lile because of a purported

Caliber from contacting

process. ECF No. I at 3. When
they were inleJrlned that Caliber

cease and desist order listed on the Kings'

the Kings: the file was later reopened.

3-4. The Kings did not receive a decision on thcir loan modilication.
auction on September

Circuit Court requesting

procecdings

and their house was sold at

sent multiple letters and liled an emcrgency

a hearing to halt the foreclosure

"dual trackcd"

package.

proceedings

motion to the

on their property.

as

them: that is. had been moving lelr\\"ard with the lem:closurc

at the same timc they were requesting

modification

ECF No. I at

19. 2014.

The Kings subsequently

Caliber had allegedly

months. the Kings

information

from the Kings f()r a loan

lOCI' No. 17-4 at 2. The Circuit Court denied these letters and motions.

See ECF No. 14-4 at 5. The Kings appealed their matter to the Court of Special Appeals. again
arguing that Caliber had dual tracked them. ECF No. 4-4 at 13. On February 9. 2016. the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland
complaint.

concluding

order ratifying

dismissed

the Kings' appeal. without reaching the merits of the

that the Kings' notice of appeal was not liled "within thirty days of the

the foreclosure

sale'" ECF No. 17-8 at 4-5. The Kings also liled a "Motion

Appeal the Denial of the Stay of the Execution
raising the same arguments
of Appcals of Maryland

with the Maryland

they raise here. ECF No. 4-4 at 1. On Novembcr

denicd the Kings' requests.

The Kings filed their Complaint
of Columbia

of Eviction"

(""D.D.C.") on Novcmber

that easc. arguing that (1) the Complaint

to

Court of Appeals.

23.2015.

the Court

ECF No. 17-7 at 2.

in this case in thc Fcderal District Court lelr thc District
25. 2015. ECF No. I. Calibcr filcd a Motion to Dismiss in
was barred by resjlltliCl//a

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and thc Rooker-Feldll/{1/1

doctrine.

(2) venue was improper.

could be granted.

lOCI' NO.4. On Scptcmber

and ordered the case transferred
remaining

and (3) the Complaint

to this Court. ECF No.

before this Court as a renewed

Motion to Dismiss.

Opinion.

September

II.

proceedings.

Motion to Dismiss.

STANDARD

22. 2D 17
that

as the claims "arise out of the same transaction
ECF No. 26 at

Motion to Reconsider

ECF No. 28. which Calibcr opposed.

J

as

D. On

the Granting of the

ECF No. 3D.

OF IUWIF:\V

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
a motion l(lI' reconsideration

tiled within 28 days of the underlying

59 (e). Courts have recognized

injustice.

order is g<l\wned

three limited grounds

pursuant to Rule 59(e): (J) to accommodate

law: (2) to account lor ncw evidence:

prevent manifest

re-raised

Motion to Dismiss. reasoning

and state thc same allegations,"

i\ motion I()r reeonsidcration

in controlling

D. The D.D.C. did not reach the

Eel' No. 17-1. In its Scptember

27. 2D 17. the Kings liled the now-pending

Defendants'

J

the Court granted Caliber's

the Kings' claims were barred by resj/ldicala.
the Istate!I()reclosure

28. 2D 16. the D.D.C. ruled that venue was improper

Motion to Dismiss. id at II. which Caliber subscquently

merits ofCaliber's

Order and Memorandum

1~liled to statc a claim upon which relief

by

I(H'granting

an intervcning

change

or (3) to correct a clear error of law or

See Uni'ed5;'a'es ex rei. Becker \'. Weslingho/lse SaWlnnah Ril'er Co ..

3D5 F.3d 284. 290 (4'h Cir. 2DD2) (citin~ /'acific Ins. Co. \'. Alii. Nal'l Fire Ins. Co.. 148 F.3d 396.
403 (4'h Cir. 1998». cel'l. denied. 538 U,S, IDI2 (20D3). i\ Rule 59(e) motion"mav
to re-litigate

old matters. or to raise argumcnts

or present evidence

that could have been raised

prior to thc entry of judgment,"

/'acific Ins. Co.. 148 F,3d at 403 (quoting

Federal Practice and Proccdure

~ 28 J O. J. at J 27-28 (2d cd, 1995»). See also Sanders

ueorge\

II Wright. el al..

/'/lhlic School Syslelll. No. R WT 08-ev-50 I. 2D J I WL 4443441. at

21.20 II) (a motion !()r reconsideration

not be used

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I'.

/'rince

(D, Md. Sept.

is "not the proper place to relitigate a case after the court

has ruled against a party. as mere disagreement with a court's rulings will not support granting
such a rcquest".). "In gcneral. 'reconsideration of a'judgment alier its entry is an extraordinary
remedy which should be used sparingly .... Id (quoting Wright. el a/ .. slIl,,'a. ~ 2810.1. at 124).
This Court has noted that "[nleither Rule 59(e). nor Local Rulc 105.10 (providing the
dcadline fiJr a motion for rcconsideration). contains a standard for the application of Rule 59(c)
and the Fourth Circuit has not identified such a standard:' Bey

I'.

S!Iapi/'() Brml'/1 & A/I. LLP. 997

F. Supp. 2d 310.320 (D. Md.). afrd. 584 F. App'x 135 (4th Cir. 2(14). Thus. this Court has
previously looked to thc "widely citcd casc" ofAhol'e

,!Ie Be/I. 1/1c. \'. BolulI1/1a/1 Roofi/1g. 1/1('.
.

99 I'.R.D. 99 (E.D. Va.I9S3). for its reasoning that a "motion to reconsider would he appropriate
where. for example. the Court has patently misunderstood a party. or has made a decision outsidc
the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the partics. or has made an error not of rcasoning
but of apprehcnsion:'
III.

Bey. 997 F. Supp. 2d. at 320.

I)JSClJSSION

In their Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. the Kings argue
that their case is not barred by res/lldieala.

and that the Court erroncously relied on casc law that

predates ..the Consumer Financial Protection Board 2013 enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:' ECF No. 28-1 at 4 .. The Kings additionally raise

many of the same arguments that thcy made in response to Caliber's Motion to Dismiss. arguing
that they had not suffered all of their damages at the foreelosure proceeding. and that ecrtain
claims werc not ripc at that time. Eel' No. 28-1. The Court expressly rejected these arguments in
'The Courl takes judicial nolice of the facllhal Dodd-Frank was enacted in 2010. See "II.RAI73 - Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consulller Protection Act:" Congress.gov. Wips:!"" \\'\\ .col1~n.:s:-..!!.o\' bill'lll
tho
cong,rc5s,"holl~\'>bill"-l17 31l'\t (last accessed Feb. 2. 1018). The Court interprets Plaintiffs' Memorandum as referring
to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau' s January 10 I J issuance of rules restrict ing dual track ing. \\ hich were
issued under the authority dclcgated by Dodd-Frank. See "CFPB Rules Establish Strong Protections for
Ilol11cmvncrs Facing Force losure," Consul11crFin3ncc.gov, https: /\\ \\'\\'.col1slIl11l'rlln~!!!S_~.gov aboutliS Ilh:\\'SroOIll COilSUl1lt.:r- II nil IlC ia.l-prott.:ct iOil-bureau -rulcs-estab Iish -st rlln C.-DlQ!cct illll"- for- hOI!l~Ql\.!JS.D' J:li.,' i ll~ron."clos!Jr~ (last accessed Feb, 2. 2018).

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its September Opinion. See ECF No. 26 at 10. The Kings further argue that .lIcMilIiml \'.
IJiel"11lllll.ueesillg.

JVard & JVood Uc. No. WMN-I 1-2048. 2012 WL 425823 (D. Md. Feb. 8.

2012). cited by Caliber in its Motion to Dismiss. ECF NO.1 7-1 at 10. and by the Court in its
Opinion. Eel' No. 26 at 8-10. is inapplicable because it was decided beforc ..the Consumer
Financial Protection Board 2013 enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act:' ECF No. 28-1 at 4. The Kings' position is that ..the case law used to
decide this motion to dismiss is outdated at best:' !d at 6. The Kings Iinally argue that
"preclusion is inappropriate where. as he[rel. the underlying judgment was ti'audulently
procured:' !d
In opposition. Caliber argues that "Plaintiffs \llil to oner any ease law or argument to
show that this holding was clear error:' and that resjlldiCll/o

is appropriate here because

"PlaintilTs claim was fully adjudicated and rejected in the l(lreclosure case:' ECF No. 30 at 3.
Additionally. Caliber argues that McMillon

is not "outdated" precedent. as asserted by Plaintiffs.

because ..the issue in both this ease and McMillan

is whether resjudica/o

is a bar to a subsequent

action where the claims asserted therein were raised or could have been raised in a prior
loreclosure:'

!d at 4.

Plaintiffs have not articulated any intervening change in law or new evidence. Instead.
they largely raise the same arguments raised previously (that their claims were not ripe during
the toreclosure proceedings). and assert the new argument that McMillall is "outdated" because it
was decided prior to Dodd-Frank. To the extent that Plaintiffs raise the same arguments.
regarding ripeness. the COUl1reiterates that a motion 1(11" reconsideration is "not the proper place
to relitigate a case alier the court has ruled against a pm1y. as mere disagreement with a court's
rulings will not support granting such a request:' Somlers. 201 1 WL 4443441. at

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Regarding

PlaintitTs' point about McMillall. the fact that it was decided prior to the enactment of DoddFrank is irrclevant. The Court did not cite McMillall in its September Order for any proposition
regarding the underlying law ofPlaiotifl's' claims: rather. the Court relied on Mc.llillall as a
similar case involving resjudica(({ where ..there was a final decision by a state court regarding
the [plaintiffs'] foreclosure and subsequent eviction. the parties were the same or in privity. and
the claims being brought Iarose lout of the same transaction." ECF No. 26 at 10. The fact that the
CFPH's dual-tracking rules had not been issued at the time of McMillall docs not ehangc the
Court's analysis. As in McMillall-albeit

involving a different underlying claim-here

too. the

claims brought arise out of the same transaction as the foreclosure proceedings. and state the
same allegations. Plaintiffs have not shown that the Court made a clear error of law in its
September Order. that there are new facts that should be considered. or that the Court patently
misunderstood the Plaintiffs' argument. As such. the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Granting of the

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 28. is denied. A separate Order shall issue.

ff ~--(;~HAZEL

Date: FebruaryL'Z.-. 2018

United States District Judge

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