Ayele v. Washington Adventist Hospital et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/e/m and m/ to Plaintiff 9/5/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/5/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MICHAEL AYELE
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 16-3778
:
WASHINGTON ADVENTIST HOSPITAL,
et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
are:
(1)
a
motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Montgomery County Police
Department
(“MCPD”)
and
J.
Thomas
Manger,
Chief
of
Police
(collectively, the “MCPD Defendants”) (ECF No. 6); (2) a motion
to dismiss filed by Defendants Washington Adventist Hospital,
Terry Forde — President and CEO of Adventist HealthCare, Inc.,
and
Erik
Wangsness
Washington
Adventist
—
President
Hospital
of
Adventist
(collectively,
the
HealthCare
“Washington
Adventist Defendants”)(ECF No. 8); (3) a motion to strike filed
by
the
motion
Washington
to
amend
(“Plaintiff”)
(ECF
Adventist
the
No.
Defendants
complaint
13);
(5)
by
a
(ECF
No.
Plaintiff
motion
to
11);
(4)
Michael
end
a
Ayele
modern
day
slavery filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 20); and (6) a motion to
request video recordings filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 22).
The
issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following
reasons, the motion to amend the complaint will be granted in
part and denied in part, the motions to dismiss will be granted,
the motion to end modern day slavery will be denied, the motion
to
strike
will
be
denied,
and
the
motion
to
request
video
records will be denied as moot.
I.
Background
Plaintiff filed a previous suit against the Defendants on
August 29, 2016, but that case was dismissed without prejudice
when
Plaintiff
failed
to
return
a
court
proceed in forma pauperis and complaint.
approved
motion
to
Order Dismissing Case,
Ayele v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. PX-16-3011 (D.Md. Oct.
28, 2016) (ECF No. 4).1
On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff brought
this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the MCPD Defendants,
the
Washington
Adventist
Defendants,
and
the
Maryland
Crisis
Team,2 alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment Rights.
(ECF No. 1, at 4).
This complaint alleges that Plaintiff was
improperly detained at a McDonald’s restaurant in Silver Spring,
1
Plaintiff also brought suit against the MCPD Defendants in
a separate action for libel per se but that case was dismissed
when Plaintiff failed to supplement his complaint with the
allegedly defamatory statements about which he complained.
Ayele v. My Montgomery Cty. Media, DKC-16-3900 (D.Md. May 19,
2017).
2
When Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant Maryland Crisis
Team with a summons or a copy of the complaint within 90 days of
filing and failed to respond within 30 days to an Order to Show
Cause (ECF No. 12), Defendant Maryland Crisis Team was dismissed
from the case. (ECF No. 15).
2
Maryland.
He
was
taken
from
the
McDonald’s
to
Washington
Adventist Hospital against his will, where he was held for a
period of time.
He purports to make a claim pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 1).
On January 26, 2017, the MCPD Defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.
(ECF No. 6).
On February 1, the
Washington Adventist Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and lack of jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 8).
On
February 7, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Michael Ayele
Analysis and Comments to Judge Peter Messit[t]e Order: Request
for
Introduction
of
a
Court
Appointed
Technologies, and Jury Trial.”
reiterated
parts
of
the
Lawyer,
Communication
(ECF No. 10).
complaint,
requested
The document
appointment
of
counsel, and requested that all court proceedings be recorded
and made available to Plaintiff.
On February 24, the Washington
Adventist Defendants moved to strike the document.
11).
On May 19, Plaintiff responded to the MCPD Defendants’
motion to dismiss and moved to amend the complaint.
13).
(ECF No.
On
July
15,
an
order
was
issued
denying
(ECF No.
Plaintiff’s
request for appointment of counsel and directing the Washington
Adventist Defendants to mail Plaintiff a copy of their motion to
dismiss.
The order gave Plaintiff until August 16 to respond to
the motions.
(ECF No. 18).
On August 25, Plaintiff filed a
3
motion to end modern day slavery (ECF No. 20), and a motion to
request video recordings of court sessions (ECF No. 22).
Plaintiff’s
additional
motion
details.
to
(ECF
amend
his
13).
He
No.
complaint
alleges
contains
that
stopped him at the McDonald’s in early August 2015.
police
He alleges
that, at that time, he “was posing no harm to [himself] or
others.”
(Id. at 2).
the hospital.
The police took him in a police car to
It appears he was held at the hospital pursuant
to Maryland’s civil commitment procedure.
hospital
forced
him
to
take
He alleges that the
psychotropic
medication.
hospital discharged him sometime before early November.
The
(Id. at
3-5).
II.
Motion to Amend
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within 21 days after serving it or within 21 days after service
of
a
motion
under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1).
Rule
12(b),
whichever
is
earlier.
When the right to amend as a matter of
course expires, “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing
party's
Fed.R.Civ.P.
written
15(a)(2).
consent
Rule
or
15(a)(2)
the
court's
provides
that
leave.”
courts
should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,”
and commits the matter to the discretion of the district court.
See Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 769
(4th Cir. 2011).
Denial of leave to amend is appropriate “only
4
when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party,
there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the
amendment would be futile.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).
Leave to amend may be denied as futile “if the proposed
amended
complaint
fails
to
satisfy
the
requirements
of
the
federal rules,” including federal pleading standards. Katyle v.
Perm
Nat.
Gaming,
Inc.,
637
F.3d
462,
471
(4th
Cir.
2011)
(quoting United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)); Oroweat Foods Co., 785
F.2d at 510 (“Leave to amend, however, should only be denied on
the ground of futility when the proposed amendment is clearly
insufficient or frivolous on its face.” (citations omitted)).
A
pleading need not contain detailed factual allegations, but the
plaintiff must allege enough facts to make the claim appear
“plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007); see
Ashcroft
U.S.
v.
Iqbal,
556
662,
678
(2009)
(“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory
statements,
do
not
suffice.”
(citation
omitted)).
Accordingly, denial of leave to amend is appropriate if the
court, taking as true the allegations of the proposed amended
pleading, would be compelled to dismiss the action.
See Kellogg
Brown & Root, 525 F.3d at 376 (affirming the district court's
5
denial of leave to amend because the “proposed amended complaint
does not properly state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)”).
Plaintiff’s
motion
to
amend
related to his initial detention.
motion
requests
additional
contains
additional
facts
Based on these facts, the
damages.
(ECF
No.
13,
at
1-5).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) mandates that courts “freely give leave”
to amend.
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff supplements the
initial complaint with additional facts related to his detention
by MCPD Defendants and the Washington Adventist Defendants and
based on these new facts increases the amount of damages, his
motion to amend will be granted.
The
Maryland
motion
also
Department
(ECF No. 13, at 3-5).
requests
of
to
Health3
as
add
Amanda
defendants.
Street
In
and
the
support,
Plaintiff states:
I would like to re-iterate here that I have previously
requested Medical Information and Arrest Reports via
postal mail and e-mail to appropriate channels
handling FOIA questions at the Department of Mental
Health and Hygiene (DHMH) of Maryland, namely Amanda
Street . . . . For that reason, and because of her
failure to give [me an] official position in the form
of a letter acknowledging receipt of my FOIA requests
and the reasons for which she was not able to retrieve
requested records, I have decided to add her name in
this complaint.
3
During the pendency of this case, the Maryland legislature
changed the name of this department from the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene to the Department of Health.
“Department of Health and Mental Hygiene – Renaming,” 2017
Maryland Laws Ch. 214 (S.B. 82).
6
(ECF No. 13, at 4).
Plaintiff has not pled facts that support a
legal claim for relief against Ms. Street and the Department of
Health.
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to add Amanda
Street and the Maryland Department of Health as defendants, his
motion will be denied.
The motion also requests to add Springfield Hospital Center
and six of its employees as defendants.
(ECF No. 13 at 4-6).
The motion explains that, after he was released from Washington
Adventist
trespass.
Hospital,
he
Apparently,
was
he
later
was
arrested
taken
to
and
charged
Springfield
with
Hospital
Center where the doctors found him incompetent to stand trial.
He alleges that he was mistreated during his stay there.
(ECF
No. 13 at 4-6).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “plaintiff may
join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff
asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that
arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents
questions
of
law
or
fact
common
to
all.”
7
Charles
Allen
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice &
Procedure Civil § 1655 (3d ed. 2009).
Thus, “Claim A against
Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against
Defendant 2.”
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2007).
7
Here,
Plaintiff
tries
multiple defendants.
to
join
unrelated
claims
against
He was committed to Washington Adventist
Hospital in August after being detained at a McDonald’s, and he
was released sometime before November.
He describes Washington
Adventist as an “asylum.” (ECF No. 13, at 4).
he
never
got
a
chance
to
consult
an
He alleges that
attorney
during
the
commitment process and that he was held at Washington Adventist
Hospital based on the proceedings of a “kangaroo court inside
the [h]ospital” (ECF No. 1, at 6).
In
early
November,
after
his
release
from
Washington
Adventist Hospital, police arrested him and charged him with
trespass.
Unlike
his
experience
with
Hospital, Plaintiff had an attorney.
appears
to
have
committed
him
Washington
Adventist
In this case, a court
after
an
evaluation
by
a
Springfield Hospital Center employee found him incompetent to
stand trial.
take
Although he claims both hospitals forced him to
medication,
he
only
alleges
that
Springfield Hospital Center was abusive.
Because
detention,
hospitals
the
circumstances
the
commitment
process,
were
different,
“[t]he
the
staff
at
the
(ECF No. 13, at 4-8).
surrounding
and
claims
the
his
initial
treatment
arise
from
at
the
separate
events . . . . As such this complaint comprises multiple law
suits,
rather
3:09cv00043,
than
2010
WL
one
suit.”
724023,
*8
8
Jackson
(E.D.
Va.
v.
Olsen,
March
1,
No.
2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Saval v. BL Ltd., 710
F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court’s
conclusion
that
problems
arising
from
automobiles were not properly joined).
four
different
Jaguar
Therefore, to the extent
his motion to amend seeks to add additional defendants involved
in his commitment to the Springfield Hospital Center, it will be
denied.
III.
Motions to Dismiss
A.
Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Presley v. City of
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
A complaint
need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is
entitled
to
relief.”
“Rule
8(a)(2)
still
requires
a
‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.”
(2007).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3
That showing must consist of more than “a formulaic
recitation
of
the
elements
of
a
cause
of
action”
or
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
stage,
all
considered
well-pleaded
as
true,
allegations
Albright
v.
in
a
Oliver,
complaint
510
U.S.
“naked
Ashcroft
At this
must
266,
be
268
(1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
9
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff.
See
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal
allegations
not
need
be
accepted.
Revene
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
v.
Charles
Cty.
Legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604
F.2d
844,
(4th
847
Cir.
1979);
see
also
Francis
v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
pleadings
Liberal construction means that the court will read the
to
state
a
valid
claim
to
the
extent
that
it
is
possible to do so from the facts available; it does not mean
that the court should rewrite the complaint to include claims
never presented.
Cir. 1999).
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th
That is, even when pro se litigants are involved,
the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that
support a viable claim.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901
F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB–12–969,
10
2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (“[E]ven a pro se
complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible
claim
for
relief.”
(citation
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
B.
“Under
MCPD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Maryland
law,
it
is
well-established
that
county
police departments are agents of the county and not treated as
separate legal entities.”
AW-10-2851,
2011
WL
LaPier v. Prince George’s Cty., No.
4501372,
at
*3
(D.Md.
Sept.
27,
2011).
Thus, MCPD is not a suable entity. Mason v. Montgomery Cty.
Police Dep’t, No. AW-13-1077, 2013 WL 6585928, at *1 (D.Md. Dec.
13, 2013).
To the extent Plaintiff brings a claim against MCPD,
the claim will be dismissed.
Plaintiff
fails
to
allege
that
Defendant
Manger
was
personally involved in Plaintiff’s detention, and, therefore, to
the extent Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendant Manger in
his individual capacity, it will be dismissed.
To state a claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Manger in his
official capacity (which is simply a suit against the entity
which he represents), a plaintiff must allege “a direct causal
link
between
a
municipal
policy
constitutional deprivation.”
378, 385 (1989).
a
government’s
or
custom
and
the
alleged
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
A municipal policy includes “the decisions of
lawmakers
[and]
11
the
acts
of
its
policymaking
officials[.]” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011).
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to identify a specific policy, act,
or decision of the County that has a causal connection to the
alleged
brings
violation,
a
claim
and,
therefore,
against
Defendant
to
the
Manger
extent
in
Plaintiff
his
official
capacity, it will be dismissed.
C.
Washington Adventist Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss
Section 1983 “imposes liability only where a person acts
‘under
color’
of
a
state
‘statute,
ordinance,
regulation,
custom, or usage.’” Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403
(1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Private actors, such as the
Washington Adventist Defendants, can be liable if “the conduct
allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly
attributable to the State.”
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.,
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has identified three circumstances where
“[a] private entity regulated by the state acts under color of
state law (1) when there is either a sufficiently close nexus,
or joint action between the state and the private party; (2)
when
the
state
has,
through
extensive
regulation,
exercised
coercive power over, or provided significant encouragement to,
the private actor; or (3) when the function performed by the
private
party
has
traditionally
12
been
an
exclusive
public
S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 269 (4th
function.”
Cir. 1998).
private
In that case, the court specifically held that a
medical
involuntary
professional
commitment
acting
statute
is
pursuant
to
acting
under
not
Maryland’s
color
of
state law.
Here,
Plaintiff
has
only
provided
conclusory
statements
about the Washington Adventist Defendants’ relationship to the
government.
(ECF No. 13, at 3).
He has not alleged facts to
support a conclusion that the Washington Adventist Defendants
were acting under color of state law, and, therefore, his claims
will be dismissed as to these defendants.4
IV.
Motion to Strike
Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s “Analysis
and Comments.”
to
strike
(ECF No. 11).
“from
a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) allows a court
pleading
any
impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
redundant,
immaterial,
Plaintiff’s “Analysis and
Comments” (ECF No. 10), is not construed as a pleading, and,
therefore, the motion to strike will be denied.
4
The Washington Adventist Defendants also argue that there
is no federal jurisdiction.
Although Plaintiff’s complaint is
not a model of clarity, to the extent it raises a claim, the
claim is a violation of federal law. Thus, jurisdiction exists
to decide the matter.
13
V.
Motion to End Modern Day Slavery
Plaintiff’s
motion
to
end
modern
day
slavery
does
not
request any relief that can be granted by the court system.
Therefore, the motion will be denied.
VI.
Motion to Request Video Recordings
Plaintiff
proceedings.
requests
video
recordings
of
all
court
Having dismissed the rest of his action, this
motion will be denied as moot.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to amend filed by
Plaintiff will be granted in part and denied in part, the motion
to dismiss filed by the MCPD Defendants will be granted, the
motion to dismiss filed by the Washington Adventist Defendants
will be granted, the motion to strike filed by the Washington
Adventist Defendants will be denied, the motion to end modern
day slavery will be denied, and the motion to request video
recordings
will
be
denied
as
moot.
A
separate
order
follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
14
will
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