Ayele v. Washington Adventist Hospital et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/e/m and m/ to Plaintiff 9/5/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/5/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MICHAEL AYELE
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-3778

:
WASHINGTON ADVENTIST HOSPITAL,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

are:

(1)

a

motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Montgomery County Police
Department

(“MCPD”)

and

J.

Thomas

Manger,

Chief

of

Police

(collectively, the “MCPD Defendants”) (ECF No. 6); (2) a motion
to dismiss filed by Defendants Washington Adventist Hospital,
Terry Forde — President and CEO of Adventist HealthCare, Inc.,
and

Erik

Wangsness

Washington

Adventist

—

President

Hospital

of

Adventist

(collectively,

the

HealthCare
“Washington

Adventist Defendants”)(ECF No. 8); (3) a motion to strike filed
by

the

motion

Washington
to

amend

(“Plaintiff”)

(ECF

Adventist
the
No.

Defendants

complaint
13);

(5)

by
a

(ECF

No.

Plaintiff
motion

to

11);

(4)

Michael
end

a

Ayele

modern

day

slavery filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 20); and (6) a motion to
request video recordings filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 22).

The

issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following

reasons, the motion to amend the complaint will be granted in
part and denied in part, the motions to dismiss will be granted,
the motion to end modern day slavery will be denied, the motion
to

strike

will

be

denied,

and

the

motion

to

request

video

records will be denied as moot.
I.

Background

Plaintiff filed a previous suit against the Defendants on
August 29, 2016, but that case was dismissed without prejudice
when

Plaintiff

failed

to

return

a

court

proceed in forma pauperis and complaint.

approved

motion

to

Order Dismissing Case,

Ayele v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. PX-16-3011 (D.Md. Oct.
28, 2016) (ECF No. 4).1

On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff brought

this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the MCPD Defendants,
the

Washington

Adventist

Defendants,

and

the

Maryland

Crisis

Team,2 alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment Rights.
(ECF No. 1, at 4).

This complaint alleges that Plaintiff was

improperly detained at a McDonald’s restaurant in Silver Spring,

1

Plaintiff also brought suit against the MCPD Defendants in
a separate action for libel per se but that case was dismissed
when Plaintiff failed to supplement his complaint with the
allegedly defamatory statements about which he complained.
Ayele v. My Montgomery Cty. Media, DKC-16-3900 (D.Md. May 19,
2017).
2

When Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant Maryland Crisis
Team with a summons or a copy of the complaint within 90 days of
filing and failed to respond within 30 days to an Order to Show
Cause (ECF No. 12), Defendant Maryland Crisis Team was dismissed
from the case. (ECF No. 15).
2

Maryland.

He

was

taken

from

the

McDonald’s

to

Washington

Adventist Hospital against his will, where he was held for a
period of time.

He purports to make a claim pursuant to the

Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 1).
On January 26, 2017, the MCPD Defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.

(ECF No. 6).

On February 1, the

Washington Adventist Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and lack of jurisdiction.

(ECF No. 8).

On

February 7, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Michael Ayele
Analysis and Comments to Judge Peter Messit[t]e Order: Request
for

Introduction

of

a

Court

Appointed

Technologies, and Jury Trial.”
reiterated

parts

of

the

Lawyer,

Communication

(ECF No. 10).

complaint,

requested

The document
appointment

of

counsel, and requested that all court proceedings be recorded
and made available to Plaintiff.

On February 24, the Washington

Adventist Defendants moved to strike the document.
11).

On May 19, Plaintiff responded to the MCPD Defendants’

motion to dismiss and moved to amend the complaint.
13).

(ECF No.

On

July

15,

an

order

was

issued

denying

(ECF No.
Plaintiff’s

request for appointment of counsel and directing the Washington
Adventist Defendants to mail Plaintiff a copy of their motion to
dismiss.

The order gave Plaintiff until August 16 to respond to

the motions.

(ECF No. 18).

On August 25, Plaintiff filed a

3

motion to end modern day slavery (ECF No. 20), and a motion to
request video recordings of court sessions (ECF No. 22).
Plaintiff’s
additional

motion

details.

to

(ECF

amend

his

13).

He

No.

complaint
alleges

contains

that

stopped him at the McDonald’s in early August 2015.

police

He alleges

that, at that time, he “was posing no harm to [himself] or
others.”

(Id. at 2).

the hospital.

The police took him in a police car to

It appears he was held at the hospital pursuant

to Maryland’s civil commitment procedure.
hospital

forced

him

to

take

He alleges that the

psychotropic

medication.

hospital discharged him sometime before early November.

The

(Id. at

3-5).
II.

Motion to Amend

A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within 21 days after serving it or within 21 days after service
of

a

motion

under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1).

Rule

12(b),

whichever

is

earlier.

When the right to amend as a matter of

course expires, “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing

party's

Fed.R.Civ.P.

written

15(a)(2).

consent
Rule

or

15(a)(2)

the

court's

provides

that

leave.”
courts

should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,”
and commits the matter to the discretion of the district court.
See Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 769
(4th Cir. 2011).

Denial of leave to amend is appropriate “only
4

when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party,
there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the
amendment would be futile.”

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178

F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).
Leave to amend may be denied as futile “if the proposed
amended

complaint

fails

to

satisfy

the

requirements

of

the

federal rules,” including federal pleading standards. Katyle v.
Perm

Nat.

Gaming,

Inc.,

637

F.3d

462,

471

(4th

Cir.

2011)

(quoting United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)); Oroweat Foods Co., 785
F.2d at 510 (“Leave to amend, however, should only be denied on
the ground of futility when the proposed amendment is clearly
insufficient or frivolous on its face.” (citations omitted)).

A

pleading need not contain detailed factual allegations, but the
plaintiff must allege enough facts to make the claim appear
“plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007); see

Ashcroft

U.S.

v.

Iqbal,

556

662,

678

(2009)

(“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory

statements,

do

not

suffice.”

(citation

omitted)).

Accordingly, denial of leave to amend is appropriate if the
court, taking as true the allegations of the proposed amended
pleading, would be compelled to dismiss the action.

See Kellogg

Brown & Root, 525 F.3d at 376 (affirming the district court's
5

denial of leave to amend because the “proposed amended complaint
does not properly state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)”).
Plaintiff’s

motion

to

amend

related to his initial detention.
motion

requests

additional

contains

additional

facts

Based on these facts, the

damages.

(ECF

No.

13,

at

1-5).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) mandates that courts “freely give leave”
to amend.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff supplements the

initial complaint with additional facts related to his detention
by MCPD Defendants and the Washington Adventist Defendants and
based on these new facts increases the amount of damages, his
motion to amend will be granted.
The
Maryland

motion

also

Department

(ECF No. 13, at 3-5).

requests
of

to

Health3

as

add

Amanda

defendants.

Street
In

and

the

support,

Plaintiff states:
I would like to re-iterate here that I have previously
requested Medical Information and Arrest Reports via
postal mail and e-mail to appropriate channels
handling FOIA questions at the Department of Mental
Health and Hygiene (DHMH) of Maryland, namely Amanda
Street . . . . For that reason, and because of her
failure to give [me an] official position in the form
of a letter acknowledging receipt of my FOIA requests
and the reasons for which she was not able to retrieve
requested records, I have decided to add her name in
this complaint.

3

During the pendency of this case, the Maryland legislature
changed the name of this department from the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene to the Department of Health.
“Department of Health and Mental Hygiene – Renaming,” 2017
Maryland Laws Ch. 214 (S.B. 82).
6

(ECF No. 13, at 4).

Plaintiff has not pled facts that support a

legal claim for relief against Ms. Street and the Department of
Health.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to add Amanda

Street and the Maryland Department of Health as defendants, his
motion will be denied.
The motion also requests to add Springfield Hospital Center
and six of its employees as defendants.

(ECF No. 13 at 4-6).

The motion explains that, after he was released from Washington
Adventist
trespass.

Hospital,

he

Apparently,

was
he

later
was

arrested

taken

to

and

charged

Springfield

with

Hospital

Center where the doctors found him incompetent to stand trial.
He alleges that he was mistreated during his stay there.

(ECF

No. 13 at 4-6).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “plaintiff may
join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff
asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that
arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents
questions

of

law

or

fact

common

to

all.”

7

Charles

Allen

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice &
Procedure Civil § 1655 (3d ed. 2009).

Thus, “Claim A against

Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against
Defendant 2.”

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

2007).

7

Here,

Plaintiff

tries

multiple defendants.

to

join

unrelated

claims

against

He was committed to Washington Adventist

Hospital in August after being detained at a McDonald’s, and he
was released sometime before November.

He describes Washington

Adventist as an “asylum.” (ECF No. 13, at 4).
he

never

got

a

chance

to

consult

an

He alleges that

attorney

during

the

commitment process and that he was held at Washington Adventist
Hospital based on the proceedings of a “kangaroo court inside
the [h]ospital” (ECF No. 1, at 6).
In

early

November,

after

his

release

from

Washington

Adventist Hospital, police arrested him and charged him with
trespass.

Unlike

his

experience

with

Hospital, Plaintiff had an attorney.
appears

to

have

committed

him

Washington

Adventist

In this case, a court

after

an

evaluation

by

a

Springfield Hospital Center employee found him incompetent to
stand trial.
take

Although he claims both hospitals forced him to

medication,

he

only

alleges

that

Springfield Hospital Center was abusive.
Because
detention,
hospitals

the

circumstances

the

commitment

process,

were

different,

“[t]he

the

staff

at

the

(ECF No. 13, at 4-8).

surrounding
and
claims

the

his

initial

treatment

arise

from

at

the

separate

events . . . . As such this complaint comprises multiple law
suits,

rather

3:09cv00043,

than

2010

WL

one

suit.”

724023,

*8
8

Jackson
(E.D.

Va.

v.

Olsen,

March

1,

No.
2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Saval v. BL Ltd., 710
F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court’s
conclusion

that

problems

arising

from

automobiles were not properly joined).

four

different

Jaguar

Therefore, to the extent

his motion to amend seeks to add additional defendants involved
in his commitment to the Springfield Hospital Center, it will be
denied.
III.

Motions to Dismiss
A.

Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

Presley v. City of

Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A complaint

need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is

entitled

to

relief.”

“Rule

8(a)(2)

still

requires

a

‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.”
(2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3
That showing must consist of more than “a formulaic

recitation

of

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action”

or

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
stage,

all

considered

well-pleaded
as

true,

allegations

Albright

v.

in

a

Oliver,

complaint
510

U.S.

“naked

Ashcroft
At this
must
266,

be
268

(1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
9

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

See

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

(4th

847

Cir.

1979);

see

also

Francis

v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.

Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
pleadings

Liberal construction means that the court will read the
to

state

a

valid

claim

to

the

extent

that

it

is

possible to do so from the facts available; it does not mean
that the court should rewrite the complaint to include claims
never presented.
Cir. 1999).

Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th

That is, even when pro se litigants are involved,

the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that
support a viable claim.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB–12–969,
10

2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (“[E]ven a pro se
complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible
claim

for

relief.”

(citation

and

internal

quotation

marks

omitted)).
B.
“Under

MCPD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Maryland

law,

it

is

well-established

that

county

police departments are agents of the county and not treated as
separate legal entities.”
AW-10-2851,

2011

WL

LaPier v. Prince George’s Cty., No.

4501372,

at

*3

(D.Md.

Sept.

27,

2011).

Thus, MCPD is not a suable entity. Mason v. Montgomery Cty.
Police Dep’t, No. AW-13-1077, 2013 WL 6585928, at *1 (D.Md. Dec.
13, 2013).

To the extent Plaintiff brings a claim against MCPD,

the claim will be dismissed.
Plaintiff

fails

to

allege

that

Defendant

Manger

was

personally involved in Plaintiff’s detention, and, therefore, to
the extent Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendant Manger in
his individual capacity, it will be dismissed.

To state a claim

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Manger in his
official capacity (which is simply a suit against the entity
which he represents), a plaintiff must allege “a direct causal
link

between

a

municipal

policy

constitutional deprivation.”
378, 385 (1989).
a

government’s

or

custom

and

the

alleged

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

A municipal policy includes “the decisions of
lawmakers

[and]
11

the

acts

of

its

policymaking

officials[.]” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011).
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to identify a specific policy, act,
or decision of the County that has a causal connection to the
alleged
brings

violation,
a

claim

and,

therefore,

against

Defendant

to

the

Manger

extent
in

Plaintiff

his

official

capacity, it will be dismissed.
C.

Washington Adventist Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss

Section 1983 “imposes liability only where a person acts
‘under

color’

of

a

state

‘statute,

ordinance,

regulation,

custom, or usage.’” Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403
(1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Private actors, such as the

Washington Adventist Defendants, can be liable if “the conduct
allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly
attributable to the State.”
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.,
The United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit has identified three circumstances where
“[a] private entity regulated by the state acts under color of
state law (1) when there is either a sufficiently close nexus,
or joint action between the state and the private party; (2)
when

the

state

has,

through

extensive

regulation,

exercised

coercive power over, or provided significant encouragement to,
the private actor; or (3) when the function performed by the
private

party

has

traditionally

12

been

an

exclusive

public

S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 269 (4th

function.”
Cir. 1998).
private

In that case, the court specifically held that a

medical

involuntary

professional

commitment

acting

statute

is

pursuant

to

acting

under

not

Maryland’s
color

of

state law.
Here,

Plaintiff

has

only

provided

conclusory

statements

about the Washington Adventist Defendants’ relationship to the
government.

(ECF No. 13, at 3).

He has not alleged facts to

support a conclusion that the Washington Adventist Defendants
were acting under color of state law, and, therefore, his claims
will be dismissed as to these defendants.4
IV.

Motion to Strike

Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s “Analysis
and Comments.”
to

strike

(ECF No. 11).

“from

a

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) allows a court

pleading

any

impertinent, or scandalous matter.”

redundant,

immaterial,

Plaintiff’s “Analysis and

Comments” (ECF No. 10), is not construed as a pleading, and,
therefore, the motion to strike will be denied.

4

The Washington Adventist Defendants also argue that there
is no federal jurisdiction.
Although Plaintiff’s complaint is
not a model of clarity, to the extent it raises a claim, the
claim is a violation of federal law. Thus, jurisdiction exists
to decide the matter.
13

V.

Motion to End Modern Day Slavery

Plaintiff’s

motion

to

end

modern

day

slavery

does

not

request any relief that can be granted by the court system.
Therefore, the motion will be denied.
VI.

Motion to Request Video Recordings

Plaintiff
proceedings.

requests

video

recordings

of

all

court

Having dismissed the rest of his action, this

motion will be denied as moot.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to amend filed by
Plaintiff will be granted in part and denied in part, the motion
to dismiss filed by the MCPD Defendants will be granted, the
motion to dismiss filed by the Washington Adventist Defendants
will be granted, the motion to strike filed by the Washington
Adventist Defendants will be denied, the motion to end modern
day slavery will be denied, and the motion to request video
recordings

will

be

denied

as

moot.

A

separate

order

follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

14

will