Devi v. Prince George's County , et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/21/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LA’MOORE QUEEN DEVI
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-3790

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights

case

alternative,

are
for

partial
summary

motions
judgment

to

dismiss

filed

by

or,

in

Defendants

the

Prince

George’s County (the “County”) and Prince George’s County Police
Officers Alton Bradley and Daniel Conley.
The

issues

have

been

briefed,

hearing being deemed necessary.
following

reasons,

the

partial

and

the

(ECF Nos. 20; 29).
court

now

Local Rule 105.6.
motions

to

dismiss

rules,

no

For the
will

be

granted.
I.

Background1
On

March

8,

2015,

Plaintiff

La’Moore

Queen

Devi

(“Plaintiff”), while in transit to visit her brother Antonio
Thomas, was driving through the parking lot of Henson Creek
Apartments, when she was pulled over by private security for the
1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.

apartment complex for failing to stop at a stop sign.
1 ¶¶ 8-10).

(ECF No.

Mr. Thomas emerged from his apartment and notified

Plaintiff that the men were private security for the apartment
complex and that she should neither give them her identification
nor answer any questions.
warning

citation,

and

(Id. ¶ 12).

Mr.

Thomas

Plaintiff was issued a

and

the

security

guards

continued to argue about the guard’s treatment of visitors to
the apartment complex.

(Id. ¶¶ 13-14).

Plaintiff subsequently

left the apartment complex without further incident.

(Id. ¶

17).
The following day, Plaintiff returned to the Henson Creek
Apartments.

While inside Mr. Thomas’s apartment, Mr. Thomas’s

girlfriend informed Plaintiff that County police and apartment
security

had

blocked

in

her

vehicle

upstairs to Thomas’s apartment.
front

door

to

the

apartment,

and

were

(Id. ¶ 18).
Plaintiff

was

on

their

way

Upon opening the
met

by

Officers

Bradley and Conley, who allegedly forced their way through the
partially open door, grabbed Plaintiff by the neck, twisted her
arms behind her back, and slammed her against the wall with
sufficient force to break the dental retainer in her mouth.
(Id.

¶¶

20,

21,

23).

After

Plaintiff’s

arrest,

she

was

transported to the Upper Marlboro Department of Corrections and
charged

with

trespassing

upon

private

property,

resisting

arrest, and failure to obey a lawful order of a law enforcement
2

officer.

(Id. ¶¶ 24, 26).

Those charges were dismissed nolle

prosequi on December 7, 2015.

(ECF No. 1-4).

On November 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against
Defendants alleging claims for malicious prosecution (Count I);
unlawful custom, pattern, or practice of improper conduct under
Maryland law (Count II); gross negligence (Count III); § 1983
excessive force (Counts IV and V); and § 1983 Monell liability
(Counts VI and VII).

(ECF No. 1).

On February 7, the County

and Officer Bradley filed a partial motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 20).

moves to dismiss all claims except Count V.
and

Conley

move

to

dismiss

Counts

II,

The County

Officers Bradley

IV,

VI,

and

VII.

Plaintiff submitted her opposition to the County and Officer
Bradley’s motion on February 24 (ECF No. 24), and the County and
Officer Bradley replied on March 10 (ECF No. 25).

After Officer

Conley was served, he filed his motion adopting the arguments
made by Officer Bradley in the County and Officer Bradley’s
motion (ECF No. 29), to which Plaintiff submitted her opposition
on May 2, adopting all arguments made in her opposition to the
County and Officer Bradley’s motion.

3

(ECF No. 30).

II.

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.2
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Presley v. City of
Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff,

see

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.

2

The Defendants move to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment.
Material outside of the pleadings was not
submitted
with
Defendants’
motions.
Accordingly,
the
Defendants’ motions will be analyzed as motions to dismiss. See
Pruitt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. DKC-15-1308, 2015 WL
9490234, at *2 (“In reviewing [a] motion to dismiss, the court
may consider allegations in the complaint . . . . without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment.”).
4

1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

(4th

847

Cir.

1979);

see

also

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

Francis

v.

Ultimately, a

complaint must “‘permit[ ] the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct’ based upon ‘its judicial experience
and common sense.’”

Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d

187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III. Analysis
A.

Tort Claims against the County

The County argues that Counts I and III should be dismissed
against it because, as a municipality, it is immune from suit
based on the tortious acts of its employees.
A

state’s

right

to

governmental

immunity

is

“deeply

ingrained in Maryland law” and may not be waived in the absence
of

express

or

implied

statutory

authorization.

Montgomery Cty., 127 Md.App. 172, 182 (1999).

Nam

v.

A municipality,

such as the County, is also entitled to governmental immunity.
Id. at 183.

(“When the state gives a city or county part of its
5

police power to exercise, the city or county to that extent is
the state.”).

Specifically, municipalities are generally immune

from common law tort suits when engaged in governmental, as
opposed to proprietary, acts.
18,

47

(1999).

“The

governmental function.”

operation

law

tort

of

a

claims

asserted

against

of

is

a

the

Local

it

based

on

torts

See Gray–Hopkins v. Prince

George’s Cty., 309 F.3d 224, 234 (4th
5-303(b)

force

Thus, the County is immune as to

committed by its police officers.

Section

police

Hector v. Weglein, 558 F.Supp. 194, 206

(1982)(citations omitted).
common

Id.; DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md.App.

Cir. 2002).

Government

Tort

Although
Claims

Act

(“LGTCA”) requires the County to indemnify a judgment against
its employee for damages resulting from a tortious act committed
by the employee within the scope of employment, the LGTCA does
not permit a plaintiff to name the County directly in a common
law tort suit.
Martino

v.

Bell,

Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(b);
40

F.Supp.2d

719,

722

(D.Md.

1999)(citing

Dawson v. Prince George’s Cty., 896 F.Supp. 537, 539 (D.Md.
1995)).

Accordingly, governmental immunity bars Counts I and

III against the County, and the County’s motion will be granted
as to Counts I and III.

6

Monell Claims against the County3

B.

The County also asserts that Counts VI and VII must be
dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts
in her complaint under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).

Under Monell, municipal liability arises only where

the constitutionally offensive acts of its employees are taken
in furtherance of some municipal “policy or custom.”

Milligan

v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984).

A

policy or custom can arise in four ways: “(1) through an express
policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through
the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3)
through

an

omission,

officers,

that

rights

citizens’;

of

such

as

‘manifest[s]
or

(4)

a

failure

to

properly

deliberate

indifference

through

practice

a

that

train

to
is

the
so

‘persistent and widespread’ as to constitute a ‘custom or usage
with the force of law.’”

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th

Cir. 2003)(citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 217 (4th Cir.
1999)).

3

Although Plaintiff requests relief against all Defendants
on Counts VI and VII of her complaint, she concedes in her
opposition to Defendants’ motions that she has “no intention of
pursuing a Monell claim against [Officers Bradley and Conley],
and they are not named in the complaint.” (ECF No. 24, at 12).
Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot state a Monell claim against an
officer in his individual capacity.
Lee v. Queen Anne’s Cty.
Office of Sheriff, No. RDB-13-672, 2014 WL 476233 at *11 (D.Md.
2014)(citations omitted).
7

In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that a policy or custom of
the County has arisen through its failure to train its officers
with respect to the use of excessive force.

Plaintiff further

alleges that a policy or custom has also arisen through certain
practices that encourage officers to use excessive force.
1.

Failure to Train Properly

Count
liability

VI

of

Plaintiff’s

based

on

the

complaint

County’s

alleged

alleges
failure

municipal

properly

to

train its officers with respect to the use of excessive force.
Policy

or

custom

may

arise

through

an

omission,

such

as

a

failure properly to train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens.”

Id.

“‘Deliberate

indifference’ is a stringent standard, which is only met if
Plaintiff pleads facts such that the Court may draw a reasonable
inference that (1) the County has actual or constructive notice
of

a

deficiency

employees
that

despite

system.”
WL

to

in

violate
this

its

training

citizens’

knowledge,

program

that

constitutional
it

has

chosen

causes

rights
to

and

retain

its
(2)
that

McDonnell v. Hewitt-Angleberger, No. WMN-11-3284, 2012

1378636,

at

*4

(D.Md.

Apr.

19,

2012)(citations

omitted).

Without alleging any facts from which a reasonable inference may
be drawn, Plaintiff merely states in conclusory terms that the
County failed to “adequately train, supervise, and discipline
its

officers

against

the

use

of
8

excessive

force,”

thereby

“demonstrat[ing] a gross disregard for the constitutional rights
of the public and [Plaintiff],” leading to Plaintiff’s injuries.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 81).

Without more, Plaintiff has failed to allege

the

a

existence

of

policy

or

custom

through

purported failure to train its officers.

the

County’s

See Peters v. City of

Mount Rainier, No. GJH-14-00955, 2014 WL 4855032, at *5 (D.Md.
Sept. 29, 2014); see also Milligan, 743 F.2d at 230 (upholding
the district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s Monell claim
where the complaint alleged only that the City was “‘grossly
negligent’ in failing adequately to train its personnel and that
this

exhibited

‘callous

disregard’

for

[the

plaintiff]’s

constitutional rights.”).
2.

Unconstitutional Customs

Plaintiff further alleges municipal liability on the basis
of “formal and informal customs, policies, and practices that
foster, promote, and encourage officers to use excessive force,”
including: failure to effectively instruct officers that they
have

a

duty

to

prevent

and

report

excessive

force

when

it

occurs; failure to keep adequate record of acts of excessive
force;

failure

excessive

to

force

by

control
officers

and
who

monitor
have

the
a

recurrence

pattern

for

of
such

behavior; and failure to establish effective procedures, rules,
orders, guidelines, and practices to ensure that excessive force
will not be used.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 82(a)-(d)).
9

Policy or custom

may

arise

through

a

practice

that

is

so

“persistent

and

widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force
of law.”

Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471.

Plaintiff fails to allege any

facts to support a known history of “persistent and widespread”
constitutional deprivations on the part of County employees from
which to infer a policy or custom of the County.
Milligan, 743 F.2d at 229-30.
pattern

and

practice

of

See id.;

Plaintiff merely alleges that a

excessive

force,

failure

to

provide

adequate medical care, cover-up, and failure to investigate has
been

manifested

in

“other

prior

incidents

involving

town

officers” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 82(a)), without providing any reference
to

actual

prior

incidents

involving

County

officers.

See

Lanford v. Prince George’s Cty., 199 F.Supp.2d 297, 305 (D.Md.
2002)(finding that the plaintiff failed to provide support for
his Monell claim when he pleaded “conclusory factual allegations
devoid of any reference to actual events”); cf. Chen v. Mayor of
Balt.,

No.

L-09-47,

2009

WL

2487078,

at

*5

(D.Md.

Aug.

12,

2009)(permitting the plaintiff’s Monell claim to proceed past
the motion-to-dismiss stage because he had alleged two “separate
incidents,” occurring nearly one week apart, in which the city
had

purportedly

committed

analogous

due

process

violations);

Savage v. Mayor of Salisbury, No. CCB-08-3200, 2009 WL 1119087,
at *4 (D.Md. Apr. 22, 2009)(finding the plaintiff’s allegations
raised an inference of widespread police misconduct in light of
10

“[t]he number of officers involved, including repeat offenders,
the

allegations

of

a

‘special

task

force,’

and

the

blatant

illegality of their actions.”).
Here,
widespread

Plaintiff
conduct

fails
by

to

County

offer

allegations

employees

of

comparable

known,
to

that

allegedly committed by Defendants Bradley and Conley, Milligan,
743 F.2d at 230, and “a municipal policy or custom giving rise
to § 1983 liability will not be inferred merely from municipal
inaction in the face of isolated constitutional deprivations by
municipal employees.”

Id.

Plaintiff’s complaint “consists of

speculative, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations;
not facts supporting a plausible claim.”

Lewis v. Simms, No.

AW-11-2172, 2012 WL 254024, at *5 (D.Md. Jan. 26, 2012), aff’d,
582 F.App’x 180 (4th Cir. 2014).
the

pleading

requirements,

Plaintiff thus fails to satisfy

and

her

Monell

claim

must

be

dismissed.
In

Count

VII,

Plaintiff

makes

identical

allegations,

a

failure to train and certain improper practices, with respect to
making

arrests

and

imprisonment

without

probable

cause.

Plaintiff's allegations are identically general and fail for the
same

reasons.

Therefore,

the

granted as to Counts VI and VII.

11

Defendants’

motions

will

be

C.

Longtin Claim against Defendants

Defendants argue that Count II should be dismissed because
Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claim
and is unable to bring a Longtin claim against Officers Bradley
and Conley, in their individual capacities, under Maryland law.
“Longtin

claims

Monell claims.”

are

essentially

Maryland’s

government,

widespread

patterns

injuries.”

of

Rosa v. Board of Educ., No. AW-11-02873, 2012

WL 3715331, at *9 (D.Md. Aug. 27, 2012).
federal

version

imposes
or

liability

practices

“Maryland, like the

on

that

municipalities

cause

for

constitutional

McMahon v. Cty. Comm’rs, No. JFM-13-490, 2013 WL

2285378, at *4 n.6 (D.Md. May 21, 2013)(citing Prince George’s
Cty. V. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 494-98 (2011)).

For the same

reasons that Plaintiff’s Monell claims fail, Plaintiff’s Longtin
claim

fails

support

because

a

she

widespread

constitutional harm.

has

not

pattern

adequately
or

plead

practice

facts

of

to

causing

See McMahon, 2013 WL 2285378, at *4 n.6.

Maryland law does, however, recognize municipal liability based
on

respondeat

superior

for

civil

damages

arising

constitutional violations committed by employees.
not

asserted

a

violation

of

the

state

from

State

Plaintiff has

constitution

in

her

complaint.
Plaintiff argues in her opposition that she may bring a
Longtin

claim

against

Officers
12

Bradley

and

Conley

in

their

individual capacities because Maryland law recognizes a pattern
or

practice

government

claim

and

for

its

“unconstitutional

employees”.

Longtin, 419 Md. at 500).
language

“its

individual
upon

officers;

the

not

2013

WL

to

for

liability

support
the

24,

her

at

claim

language

local

13)(citing

the

at

*4

of

employee.

(“Maryland,

the

liability

actions

individual
n.6

against

creates

unconstitutional

upon

2285378,

No.

of

Plaintiff places emphasis on the

however,

municipality

employees,
McMahon,

employees”

(ECF

actions

unlike

its
See
the

United States, . . . imposes respondeat superior liability on
local

government

entities

‘for

civil

damages

resulting

from

State Constitutional violations committed by their agents and
employees

within

the

scope

of

the

employment.’”

(citation

omitted)).

Plaintiff has not identified any cases holding that

a

claim

Longtin

against

an

cognizable under Maryland law.

individual

officer

would

be

Accordingly, Count II must also

be dismissed as to Officers Bradley and Conley.

See Lee, 2014

WL 476233, at *17.
D.

Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

Defendants next argue that Count IV should be dismissed
because Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force during the course
of

her

arrest

is

governed

by

the

Fourteenth.

13

Fourth

Amendment,

not

the

The

Fourth

Amendment

governs

claims

of

excessive

force

during the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
seizure of a person, Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161 (4th
Cir.

1997),

detainee

whereas,

are

excessive

governed

by

force

the

Due

claims

of

Process

a

pretrial

Clause

of

the

Fourteenth Amendment, Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th
Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff
distinction
requires

a

occurred.
Officers

asserts

between

in
the

determination
However,

Bradley

and

her

opposition

Fourth
by

a

Plaintiff
Conley

and

jury

used

applying

Fourteenth
as

alleges

that

in

to

when

her

excessive

Amendments
her

arrest

complaint

force

this

when

that
they

physically restrained her inside her brother Thomas’s apartment,
before she was transported to the Upper Marlboro Department of
Corrections for processing.

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20-24).

An arrest

occurs when the arrestee is physically restrained or when the
arrestee is told of the arrest and submits.
300 Md. 485, 510 (1984).

Little v. State,

Because Plaintiff does not allege any

force used by Officers Bradley and Conley at any other time,
Plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred during the course of her
arrest and requires application of the Fourth Amendment, not the
Fourteenth Amendment, to her claim.
dismissed.

14

Accordingly, Count IV is

E.
Plaintiff May Not Recover Punitive Damages from the
County
Count V seeks both compensatory and punitive damages.

The

County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages
on the ground that punitive damages are not recoverable against
it.

“Maryland law disallows any such assessment of punitive

damages against a county.”

Robles v. Prince George’s Cty., 302

F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2002)(citing Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 5–303(c)(1)); see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc.,
from

453

U.S.

punitive

247,

271

damages

(1981)(finding

under

§

municipalities

1983).

Therefore,

immune

although

Plaintiff may seek punitive damages against Officers Bradley and
Conley

on

Count

V,

Plaintiff

will

not

be

permitted

to

seek

punitive damages against the County.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ partial motions to

dismiss will be granted.

Specifically, Counts II, IV, VI, and

VII are dismissed as to all Defendants.
dismissed as to the County only.

Counts I and III are

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

15