Devi v. Prince George's County , et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/24/2018. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LA’MOORE QUEEN DEVI
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-3790

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights

case

Defendants

is

the

Prince

motion

George’s

for

summary

County

(the

judgment

“County”)

filed
and

by

Prince

George’s County Police Officers Alton Bradley and Daniel Conley.
(ECF No. 42).

The issues have been fully briefed, and the court

now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will
be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background1

On

March

(“Plaintiff”)

8,
was

2015,
driving

Plaintiff
through

the

La’Moore
parking

Queen
lot

Devi
of

an

apartment complex in Temple Hills, Maryland, when she was pulled
over by private security for the apartment complex for failing
to stop at a stop sign.
1

(ECF No. 43-2, at 4).

The security

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.

officer informed Plaintiff that he was going to issue her a
citation for failing to stop at the stop sign.2
That

same

day,

after

Plaintiff

left

the

(Id. at 5).

apartment

complex,

Defendant Bradley was dispatched to the apartment complex in
response to a call for trespassing.

(ECF No. 42-4, at 4-5).

The apartment security officers informed Defendant Bradley that
they banned Plaintiff from the premises.
security

officers

did

not

provide

(Id. at 5).

Defendant

Bradley

The

with

a

citation issued to Plaintiff for trespass but stated that they
verbally

informed

premises.

(Id.).

Plaintiff

that

recording

was

banned

from

the

Plaintiff disputes that she was informed that

she was banned from the premises.
(Video

she

of

Plaintiff’s

(ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:05-9:12
arrest

shows

that

Plaintiff

asked what was she being arrested for and responded that she was
not trespassing but was only stopped by security officers the
day before for failing to stop at a stop sign); 43-2, at 4
(Plaintiff’s testimony in deposition that she was “trying to
figure out” why she was “getting locked up”)).
On March 9, Jabari Bishop, another security officer for the
apartment complex who “knew that [Plaintiff] was barred from the
apartment

complex

complaint

for

2

It
citation.

is

on

trespass

March

unclear

8,”

after

he

whether

called

observed

Plaintiff
2

911

and

reported

Plaintiff

actually

on

a

the

received

a

premises of the apartment complex.

(ECF Nos. 42-7 ¶¶ 2-5; 44-1

(audio recording of the 911 call)).
Conley

arrived

at

the

apartment

Defendants Bradley and

complex

in

response

to

Mr.

Bishop’s call, and Mr. Bishop informed them that Plaintiff had
returned to the premises after being banned the day before.
(ECF No. 42-7 ¶¶ 6-7).
Defendants submitted a video recording obtained from a body
camera worn by one of the security officers that depicts the
following events.

As seen in the video, Defendants Bradley and

Conley and the security officers walked to the apartment that
Plaintiff was in, and Defendant Bradley knocked on the door.
(ECF Nos. 42-3, at 7:20-8:10; 42-4, at 10).

Plaintiff answered

the door, and Defendant Bradley advised Plaintiff that she was
under

arrest.

Plaintiff

(ECF

responded,

Nos.

42-3,

“What

at

for?”

9:04;

(ECF

42-4,

No.

at

42-3,

10-11).

at

9:05).

Defendant Bradley advised Plaintiff that she was under arrest
for

trespassing.

(ECF

Nos.

42-3,

at

9:06;

42-4,

at

11).

Plaintiff replied that she was not trespassing and explained to
Defendant Bradley that she was stopped by a security officer the
day before for not stopping at a stop sign.
9:07-9:12).

Defendant Bradley asked Plaintiff whether she was

going to put her bags down.
at 11).

(ECF No. 42-3, at

(ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:12-9:13; 42-4,

Plaintiff went into the apartment to put her bags down,

and Defendants Bradley and Conley entered into the apartment
3

behind

her.

(ECF

Nos.

42-3,

at

9:24-9:35;

Plaintiff disputes that she resisted arrest.

42-4,

at

11).

The video shows

that when Defendant Bradley attempted to grab Plaintiff’s arm to
effectuate the arrest, Plaintiff swung her arm in the air while
walking away from Defendant Bradley.
9:40;

42-4,

at

12).

Officer

(ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:38-

Conley

stepped

in

front

of

Plaintiff to stop her from walking any further, and Defendants
Bradley and Conley then pushed Plaintiff to a nearby wall to get
her arms behind her back and handcuff her.
9:40-10:30).

Plaintiff

again

explained

(ECF No. 42-3, at
that

she

was

only

stopped the day before for not stopping at a stop sign, and
Defendants Bradley and Conley escorted her out of the apartment.
(Id. at 10:32-10:55).
Plaintiff

was

charged

with

trespassing

upon

private

property, resisting arrest, and failing to obey a lawful order
of a law enforcement officer.

(ECF No. 43-6).

were dismissed nolle prosequi on December 7, 2015.

Those charges
(ECF No. 1-

4).
B.

Procedural Background

On February 2, 2018, Defendants moved for summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s remaining claims of malicious prosecution (Count
I) and gross negligence (Count III) against Defendants Bradley
and Conley and Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force (Count V)

4

against

Defendants.3

all

Plaintiff

filed

a

(ECF

response

42).

On

opposition

in

No.

February

(ECF

No.

43),

16,
and

Defendants replied (ECF No. 44).
II.

Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there

exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
prevail

on

a

motion

for

summary

judgment,

the

moving

250
To

party

generally bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.
248-50.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.”
inquiry,

a

court

must

Id. at 249.

view

the

facts

In undertaking this
and

the

reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable to the
party

opposing

Zenith

Radio

the

Corp.,

motion,”
475

U.S.

Matsushita
574,

587

Elec.

Indus.

(1986)(quoting

Co.

v.

United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also
EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir.

3

Plaintiff’s other claims were dismissed at the motion to
dismiss stage. (ECF Nos. 31; 32).
5

2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material
fact

through

mere

speculation

or

compilation

of

inferences.”

Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation
omitted).
III. Analysis
A.

Malicious Prosecution Claim

Defendants

Bradley

and

Conley

argue

that

Plaintiff’s

malicious prosecution claim fails because probable cause existed
to arrest Plaintiff for trespass.

(ECF No. 42-1, at 8).

To

establish the tort of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
show: 1) the defendant instituted a criminal proceeding against
the plaintiff; 2) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor; 3) the defendant did not have probable cause
to institute the proceeding; and 4) the defendant acted with
malice or a primary purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice.

Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 183 (2000).

“Probable
within

an

reasonably

cause

officer’s

exists

when

knowledge

trustworthy

–

the

facts

or

information

of
–

and

which
are

circumstances
he

possesses

sufficient

in

themselves to convince a person of reasonable caution that an
offense has been or is being committed.”

Wadkins v. Arnold, 214

F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2000).
To determine whether an officer had probable
cause, . . . the reviewing court necessarily
must relate the information known to the
6

officer to the elements of the offense that
the officer believed was being or had been
committed.
The officer, of course, must
undertake the same analysis in determining,
in the first instance, whether the person
may lawfully be arrested.
DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 32 (1999).

Wanton trespass on

private property prohibits a person from (1) entering private
property, (2) after being notified by the owner or the owner’s
agent not to do so, (3) unless entering under good faith claim
of right or ownership.

Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law § 6-403(a) (West

2010).
Here, Defendants Bradley and Conley had probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff was trespassing.
before

Plaintiff’s

arrest,

Defendant

On March 8, the day

Bradley

arrived

apartment complex in response to a call for trespass.
42-4,

at

4-5).

Defendant

Bradley

was

informed

at

the

(ECF No.

by

private

security for the apartment complex that they banned Plaintiff
from the premises and verbally informed her of such.
5).

(Id. at

On March 9, Defendants Bradley and Conley arrived at the

apartment

complex,

in

response

to

Mr.

reporting that Plaintiff was trespassing.
44-1).

Bishop’s

911

call

(ECF Nos. 42-7 ¶ 6;

Mr. Bishop informed Defendants Bradley and Conley that

Plaintiff was back on the premises after being banned the day
before (ECF No. 42-7 ¶ 7), and Defendant Conley heard Defendant
Bradley

state

that

he

was

at

the

7

apartment

complex

the

day

before and was informed by the security officers that Plaintiff
was banned from the premises (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 6:47-6:53; 42-5,
at 6).

Although Plaintiff expressed that she was only stopped

by the security officers the day before for failing to stop at a
stop sign, Defendants Bradley and Conley were informed that the
security

officers

verbally

banned from the premises.4

notified

Plaintiff

that

she

was

“Reasonable law enforcement officers

are not required to . . . resolve every doubt about a suspect’s
guilt before probable cause is established.”

Wadkins, 214 F.3d

at 541 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Krause
v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[P]robable cause
does

not

require

prosecution

of

an

the

officer

arrestee

to

be

certain

that

will

be

successful.”).

subsequent
Rather,

“officers must be given leeway to draw reasonable conclusions
from

confusing

and

contradictory

information.”

Farmer, 13 F.3d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 1993).

Taylor

v.

Defendants Bradley and

Conley had no reason to question the reliability of the security
officers who had first-hand knowledge of Plaintiff being banned
from the premises on March 8.

Defendants Bradley and Conley

4

Tyesha Roberts, the tenant of the apartment where
Plaintiff was located, explained to Defendants Bradley and
Conley that Plaintiff did nothing wrong the day before.
(ECF
No. 42-3, at 7:06-7:08).
However, it is immaterial why
Plaintiff was banned. Defendants Bradley and Conley only needed
to believe that Plaintiff returned to the apartment complex
after being notified by the security officers that she was
banned from the premises.
8

reasonably concluded from the information they received from the
security officers on March 8 and March 9 that Plaintiff entered
upon

private

property,

after

being

notified

by

the

owner’s

agent, i.e., the private security officers, not to do so, and
that she did not enter the property under a good faith claim of
right

or

ownership.

institute

the

Therefore,

criminal

probable

proceeding

cause

against

existed

Plaintiff

to
for

trespass, and Plaintiff has failed to meet an essential element
of her malicious prosecution claim.

Additionally, Plaintiff has

not established that Defendants Bradley and Conley acted with
malice or a primary purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice.

Plaintiff relies solely on a lack of probable cause to

infer prejudice.
probable
proof

cause

that

(ECF No. 43, at 21).
existed

Defendants

for

Plaintiff’s

Bradley

and

As considered above,
arrest.

Conley

Without

acted

with

any

malice,

Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim fails for an additional
reason.

Summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants

Bradley

and

Conley

as

to

Plaintiff’s

malicious

prosecution

claim.
B.

Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

Section 1983 prohibits a person acting under the color of
law

from

depriving

another

of

“any

rights,

privileges,

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
1983.

or

42 U.S.C. §

In Count V of Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff alleges
9

that Defendants Bradley and Conley deprived her of her Fourth
Amendment rights in violation of § 1983 when they arrested her
without probable cause.

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 77, 78).

Plaintiff does

not assert a claim against the County under Count V but requests
relief

against

Defendants

jointly and severally.

Bradley,

(Id.

Conley,

at 13).

and

the

County,

Plaintiff incorrectly

asserts that “the County is a proper party to this claim as an
indemnitor

in

violations.”
the

Local

connection

with

the

(ECF No. 43, at 19).

Government

Tort

alleged

constitutional

Although Section 5-303(b) of

Claims

Act

(“LGTCA”)

requires

the

County to indemnify a judgment against its employee for damages
resulting from a tortious act committed by the employee within
the scope of employment, the LGTCA does not permit a plaintiff
to sue the County directly.

Williams v. Prince George’s Cty.,

112 Md.App. 526, 554 (1996) (citing Khawaja v. Mayor & City
Council,

City

of

Rockville,

89

Md.App.

314,

325-36

(1991)).

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and the
County can be sued directly under § 1983 only if the alleged
unconstitutional action Plaintiff complains of resulted from a
County policy, practice or custom.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978).
against

the

failure

to

County
train

in

Count

properly

VI

and

of

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Plaintiff brought claims
her

complaint,

unconstitutional

alleging

customs

with

respect to excessive force, which were dismissed at the motion
10

to dismiss stage (ECF No. 31, at 8-11).

Therefore, the County

cannot be sued directly for Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
against

Defendants

Bradley

and

Conley

and

judgment

will

be

entered in favor of the County.
Plaintiff argues that because there was no probable cause
for her arrest, any force used by Defendants Bradley and Conley
was excessive, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
43, at 14).
Plaintiff’s

(ECF No.

As previously mentioned, probable cause existed for
arrest,

and

her

argument

to

the

contrary

fails.

Plaintiff alternatively argues that “even if the officers had
probable cause to effectuate an arrest, the amount of force used
in

this

case

was

excessive.”

(Id.).

The

Fourth

Amendment

prohibition on unreasonable seizures bars police officers from
using excessive force during the course of an arrest.
Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011).
has

used

excessive

force

objective reasonableness.”

is

analyzed

Id.

Henry v.

“Whether an officer

under

a

standard

of

“[T]he question is whether the

officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the
facts

and

“officers
Graham

v.

circumstances
are

often

Connor,

confronting

forced

490

U.S.

to

make

386,

396

them,”

recognizing

split-second
(1989).

that

judgments.”
This

inquiry

“requires careful attention to . . . the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is
11

actively

resisting

flight.”
seem

Id.

arrest

or

attempting

to

evade

arrest

by

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later

unnecessary

in

the

peace

of

violates the Fourth Amendment.”

a

judge’s

chambers

.

.

.

Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).
Plaintiff appears to argue that no force was necessary at
all to effectuate her arrest.

Plaintiff contends that “[a]

reasonable officer would have called out or given some form of
verbal

command

prior

to

using

excessive

force[,]”

and,

“[a]lternatively, the officers could have proceeded to confirm
that [Plaintiff] was not wanted on the property, and merely
escorted [her] of[f] the premises[.]”

(ECF No. 43, at 17).

“[T]he right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it
the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat
thereof to effect it.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

Although

Plaintiff contends that she was compliant and did not resist
arrest, the video recording clearly shows that any force used by
the

officers

movement
trespass.5

was

after

minimal

being

and

advised

due
that

to
she

Plaintiff’s
was

under

continuous
arrest

for

When Defendant Bradley attempted to grab Plaintiff’s

5

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, the court should not adopt
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)
(emphasis added) (finding that the videotape in the record
12

arm to effectuate her arrest, Plaintiff swung her arm in the
air,

breaking

Bradley.

his

hold,

while

walking

away

from

(ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:38; 42-4, at 12).

Defendant

Plaintiff then

swung her other arm and threw her keys to the tenant of the
apartment, Ms. Roberts, while Officer Bradley attempted to get
Plaintiff’s hands behind her back to handcuff her.
3, at 9:38-9:41).

(ECF No. 42-

Officer Conley stepped in front of Plaintiff

to stop her from walking any further, and Defendants Bradley and
Conley then pushed Plaintiff to the nearby wall to get her arms
behind

her

back

and

handcuff

her.

(Id.

at

9:40-10:30).

Officers Bradley and Conley only used the force necessary to
handcuff Plaintiff who was continuously moving during the course
of her arrest.

This force was not excessive, and judgment will

be granted in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim.
C.

Gross Negligence

Defendants Bradley and Conley argue that Plaintiff’s gross
negligence

claim

fails

because

they

“acted

reasonably

and

arrested Plaintiff based on probable cause” and “did not act
recklessly
actions.”

with

disregard

for

the

consequences

of

their

(ECF No. 42-1, at 17).

clearly contradicted the nonmoving party’s version of the facts
and that the lower courts had to view the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape).
13

Under

Maryland

law,

gross

negligence

is

viewed

“as

something more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to
reckless conduct.”

Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007)

(citing Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 384 Md.
213, 229 (2004)).
Gross negligence is “an intentional failure
to perform a manifest duty in reckless
disregard of the consequences as affecting
the life or property of another, and also
implies a thoughtless disregard of the
consequences without exertion of any effort
to avoid them.
Stated conversely, a
wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or
acts wantonly and willfully only when he
inflicts injury intentionally or is so
utterly indifferent to the rights of others
that he acts as if such rights did not
exist.”
Id.

(citations

negligent

when

omitted).
they

“An

officer’s

‘so

heedless

are

actions
and

are

grossly

incautious

as

necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton, manifesting such a
gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily
careful and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to
furnish evidence of indifference to consequences.’”
F.3d at 536 (citation omitted).
facts

of

disregarded

this

case

show

[Plaintiff’s]

that

rights

Henry, 652

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he
the
when

defendants
they

willfully

unlawfully

used

excessive force in grabbing [Plaintiff’s] arms and pushing her
up

against

a

wall[,]”

and

that

“[t]he

ensuing

arrest

in

prosecution of [Plaintiff] further violated her rights as there
14

was no probable cause[.]”
cause

existed

for

(ECF No. 43, at 24).

Plaintiff’s

arrest

Defendants was not excessive.

and

Again, probable

the

force

used

by

The actions of Defendants do not

constitute a “gross departure” from ordinary conduct or reckless
conduct.

Therefore,

judgment

will

be

granted

in

favor

of

Defendants Bradley and Conley as to Plaintiff’s gross negligence
claim.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed by Defendants Prince George’s County, Alton Bradley, and
Daniel Conley will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

15