King v. Mitchell et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 8/30/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/30/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ROBERT JOSEPH KING
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 16-3804

:
DENNIS SCHRADER,1 et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution are a motion to
substitute parties filed by Plaintiff Robert King (“Plaintiff”)
(ECF No. 7), and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Dennis
Schrader, John Robison, Thomas Lewis, Inna Taller, Aram Faramarz
Mokhtari Aria, Wayne Noble, and Chandra Wiggins (“Defendants”).
(ECF No. 8).

The issues have been briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
For

the

following

reasons,

the

motion

Local Rule 105.6.
to

dismiss

will

be

granted, and the motion to substitute parties will be denied as
moot.

1

On July 1, 2017, Dennis Schrader became the Acting
Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and is
substituted
as
the
proper
defendant
pursuant
to
Fed.R.Civ.P.25(d).

I.

Background
Factual Background2

A.

Plaintiff
Center

is

a

(“Perkins”),

Maryland

Department

patient
a
of

at

Clifton

psychiatric
Health.

T.

hospital

(ECF

No.

Perkins
operated

1

Parties,

Hospital
by

the

¶

2).3

Perkins operates a work adjustment program (“WAP”) which places
patients at jobs and pays them the current minimum wage of $8.75
per hour.

(Statement of Facts, ¶ 2).

On March 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a grievance with Perkins
stating that he “had waited for seven or eight months” without
receiving a job from WAP and alleging that he “was, for some
reason, being discriminated against.”
3).

On

March

29,

Defendant

Noble,

(Statement of Facts, ¶
a

member

of

Plaintiff’s

treatment team, responded to the grievance and explained that
Plaintiff had not received a job placement because Plaintiff was

2

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.
Although the complaint refers to purportedly
attached
exhibits,
the
document
originally
submitted
by
Plaintiff to the court did not contain any attached exhibits.
Because Defendants referred to those exhibits in their papers,
the court assumed that the copy of the complaint served on them
did contain the exhibits, and so counsel were directed to
provide copies to the court. Defendants did so in ECF No. 23.
Plaintiff takes issue with some of those attachments and
provided the court with the versions he contends are correct.
(ECF No. 25.)
3

The complaint begins numbering the paragraphs in each
section with number 1. Thus, the name of the section as well as
the number of the paragraph will be provided.
2

struggling to control his behavior and his treatment team did
not

believe

(Statement

placing
of

Facts,

him

in

¶

a

job

5).

At

would

that

help

time,

his

Noble

recovery.
said

the

treatment team determined the best course of action would be to
wait for Plaintiff to show a better ability to “manage his anger
and frustration” before placing him in a job.

(Id.).

On April 5, Defendant Wiggins, an employee of WAP, told
Plaintiff he had been placed in a job with the horticulture
program.

(Statement

of

Facts,

¶

6).

The

two

discussed

Plaintiff’s schedule and when he would be available to work.
Wiggins informed Plaintiff that he would also need to speak with
Carol Adams, the program supervisor.

(Id.).

The next day Ms.

Adams and Plaintiff met, and Ms. Adams informed Plaintiff that
he would need a doctor’s note to participate in the program due
to his urinary incontinence.

(Statement of Facts, ¶ 7).

On April 7, Plaintiff met with his treatment team, and they
informed him that he would be limited to five hours of work per
week and that if his disabilities interfered with the job, then
he would not be allowed to work.

(Statement of Facts, ¶ 10).

On April 12, however, Wiggins told Plaintiff that he would “not
be working in Horticulture.”
explained

that

the

(Statement of Facts, ¶ 16).

treatment

team

did

not

believe

She
the

horticulture program was an appropriate placement for Plaintiff.

3

(Id.).

Wiggins offered Plaintiff a job in Perkins’ canteen.

(ECF No. 25-7).4
B.
In

Procedural History
mid-April

2016,

Plaintiff

filed

a

grievance

alleging

that he was being denied an opportunity to work because of his
disability.

(ECF

grievance.

No.

25-8,

2-3).5

at

Perkins

Facts, ¶ 21).

November

Defendants,

a
of

Hygiene,

in

alleged

they

(Statement of

On August 31, the EEOC dismissed his complaint

and issued a right to sue notice.

Secretary

the

On August 7, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

On

denied

21,

variety
the
their

Plaintiff
of

Maryland

his

brought

Perkins’

and

rights

this

officials

Department

individual

violated

(Statement of Facts, ¶ 22).

of

and

Health

official
under

action

against

the
and

then-

capacities.

Mental

the

Americans

He
with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., because:
(1) they terminated his job in the horticulture program due to
his urinary incontinence; (2) they refused to offer a reasonable
4

Ms. Wiggins states that Plaintiff accepted the canteen
position.
Plaintiff’s complaint is unclear about whether he
accepted the canteen position.
The complaint does note that
there would be a similar lack of restroom access there.
(ECF
No. 1, Statement of Facts, ¶ 25). In a later filing, Plaintiff
asserts that he worked in the canteen for one day. (ECF No. 101, at 5).
5

The grievance also alleged retaliation for filing a
previous grievance. (ECF No. 25-8, at 2-3). Plaintiff did not
allege retaliation before this court.
4

accommodation (access to restroom facilities) that would allow
him to work in the horticulture program; and (3) they refused to
hire him to work elsewhere in Perkins (other than horticulture
or the canteen) because of his disability.
Questions, ¶¶ 1-3).

(ECF No. 1, Federal

Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive

damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and his release from
Perkins.

(Id.).

On January 9, Plaintiff moved to substitute

Dennis Schrader, the then-Secretary of the Maryland Department
of Health and Human Hygiene, for Van T. Mitchell, the former
Secretary
Hygiene.
On

of

the

Maryland

Department

of

January

31,

2017,

Defendants

(ECF No. 8).

moved

Human

Defendants replied.

to

dismiss

for

Plaintiff submitted his

response in opposition and three supplements.

II.

and

(ECF No. 7).

failure to state a claim.

14; 16).

Health

(ECF Nos. 10; 13;

(ECF No. 12.)

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

Presley v. City of

Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A complaint

need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is

entitled

to

relief.”

“Rule

8(a)(2)

still

requires

a

‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3
5

(2007).

That showing must consist of more than “a formulaic

recitation

of

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action”

or

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
stage,

all

considered

well-pleaded
as

true,

allegations

Albright

v.

in

a

Oliver,

complaint
510

U.S.

“naked

At this
must
266,

be
268

(1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

See

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

(4th

847

Cir.

1979);

see

also

Francis

v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.

Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
pleadings

Liberal construction means that the court will read the
to

state

a

valid

claim
6

to

the

extent

that

it

is

possible to do so from the facts available; it does not mean
that the court should rewrite the complaint to include claims
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th

never presented.
Cir. 1999).

That is, even when pro se litigants are involved,

the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that
support a viable claim.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No. RDB–12–969,
2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (“[E]ven a pro se
complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible
claim

for

relief.”

(citation

and

internal

quotation

marks

omitted)).
III. Analysis
A.

Motion to Substitute Parties

Plaintiff moved to substitute Dennis Schrader for Van T.
Mitchell

because,

at

time,

and

“Department

Mental
of

Hygiene

Health

and

the
to

name
the

Mental

of

Health

the

–

Mental

Department

Department

Hygiene

and

the

Since the motion to substitute parties was filed, the
changed

of

was

Hygiene.

legislature

Department

Schrader

for

Health

Maryland

Dennis

Secretary

Maryland

the

that

of

of

Health,

Renaming,”

2017

Maryland Laws Ch. 214 (S.B. 82), and Dennis Schrader’s position
has

changed

Schrader,

from

Secretary

Maryland

to

Acting

Department

Secretary.
of

Dennis

Health,

http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/16dhmh/html/msa14162.html
7

R.

(last visited Aug. 25, 2017).

As such, Plaintiff’s motion to

substitute parties is denied as moot.
Fed.R.Civ.P.

25(d),

capacity

Acting

as

Dennis

Nevertheless, pursuant to

Schrader

Secretary

of

is

the

substituted

Maryland

in

his

Department

of

Health.
B.

Motion to Dismiss

1.

Individual Capacity Claims

Plaintiff

brings

ADA

claims

against

Defendants

individual capacities. (ECF No. 1, at 3).
dismissed

because

“the

ADA

does

not

in

their

These claims will be

authorize

individuals for violating its provisions.”

suit

against

Altevorgt v. Kirwan,

No. WDQ–11–1061, 2012 WL 135283, at *5 (D.Md. Jan. 13, 2012);
Jones

v.

Sternheimer,

387

F.App'x

366,

(4th

368

Cir.

2010)

(“Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA . . . do not provide for
causes

of

action

against

defendants

in

their

individual

capacities.”); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 471-72
(4th Cir. 1999).
2.

Official Capacity Claims - Damages

Plaintiff’s

complaint

seeks

compensatory

and

punitive

damages against Defendants in their official capacities.
No. 1, at 4).

(ECF

Official capacity claims are properly construed

as “a suit against the official’s office” and as such are “no
different from a suit against the State itself.”

Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

For a suit to

8

proceed against a state, either the state must have consented to
being sued or Congress must have validly abrogated the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v.

Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990).

Maryland did not consent to

suits

Md.

under

the

ADA.

McCray

v.

Dep’t

of

Transp.,

Md.

Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014).
In

enacting

the

ADA,

Congress

validly

abrogated

states’

immunity for claims brought under Title II of the ADA but not
for claims brought under Title I.

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.

509, 533-34 (2004); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Al. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 360 (2001).

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment

discrimination whereas Title II prohibits discrimination in the
provision

of

public

services.

42

U.S.C.

§§

12112,

12132.

Plaintiff does not identify explicitly the Title of the ADA he
claims was violated, but he and Defendants refer exclusively to
employment issues.

If the claim is employment based, Plaintiff

cannot rely on Title II.

See Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., 789

F.3d 407, 420-21 (4th Cir. 2015).
Although there is a dearth of precedent addressing whether
a patient committed to a state mental hospital performing work
in or through the hospital is an employee for the purposes of
the ADA, many courts have examined whether prisoners performing
work in or through the prison are employees for the purposes of

9

related

employment

rights

statutes.6

Courts

have

stated

generally that prisoners working directly for a prison pursuant
to

a

state

law

requiring

them

to

work

are

not

employees

protected under employment rights statutes, but may be entitled
to

employee

protections

when

work

is

optional

and

done

for

See Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1385 (9th

economic reasons.

Cir. 1994), amended, 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]nmates
performing
training,

work
or

assignments

that

resemble

that
work

include

release

compensation

rather

than

or

forced

labor, are employees entitled to Title VII protection.”); Watson
v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-56 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that inmates who worked for the sheriff in an unauthorized work
release program and not as part of their sentence were employees
for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)).

In

these situations, there is a “‘bargained-for exchange of labor’
for mutual economic gain that occurs in a true employer-employee
relationship.”

Harker v. State Use Industries, 990 F.2d 131,

133 (4th Cir. 1993).
On the other hand, when work is part of a punishment or
done for rehabilitative purposes, a prisoner does not establish
an

employer-employee

relationship.

6

See

Castle

v.

Eurofresh,

Statutory definitions are sufficiently similar under the
ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA that courts can rely on cases
arising under any.
Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 701 F.3d
th
143, 155 (4 Cir. 2012).
10

Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a prison
inmate was not an employee for the purposes of Title I of the
ADA because the inmate was obligated to work as a condition of
his confinement);

Harker, 990 F.2d at 133 (holding a prison

inmate working in a prison shop was not an employee under FLSA
because the work was performed “as a means for rehabilitation
and job training.”); Williams v. Mease, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th
Cir. 1991) (concluding a prisoner did not have rights as an
employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)
or Title VII because his relationship with the prison “[arose]
out of his status as an inmate, not an employee.”).

Indeed, in

situations where a prison work program serves rehabilitative and
educational
participate
violation.

purposes,
because

of

refusing
a

to

allow

disability

a

could

prisoner

to

be

a

II

Title

Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).

Similarly, a patient working in a mental hospital is an
employee

when

the

patient

can

choose

performs the work for economic gain.
State

Indus.,

952

F.

Supp.

652,

whether

to

work

and

See McCaslin v. Cornhusker
655-57

(D.

Neb.

1996)

(collecting cases concerning whether prisoners were entitled to
employee

protections).

allegations

in

the

In

this

complaint,

case,

according

participation

in

WAP

mandatory, and not all patients are able to participate.
who do participate receive minimum wage.
11

to

the

is

not

Those

The complaint contains

no

allegations

opportunities.

that

WAP

provided

educational

or

vocational

Although not alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff

asserts that the State of Maryland considers WAP participants
“contractual employees.”
does

not

provide

(ECF No. 10-1, at 5).

educational

or

rehabilitative

Because WAP
services

and

instead provides an opportunity to work for patients who choose
to do so, a patient performing work through WAP is an employee
for purposes of Title I.

See Baker v. McNeil Island Corr. Ctr.,

859 F.2d 124, 128 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding an inmate could be an
employee if the job was optional and not required as part of his
sentence).

Plaintiff’s

complaint

thus

raises

a

claim

of

disability discrimination in violation of Title I of the ADA.
See § 12112(b)(5)(B).
Because

Congress

did

not

abrogate

the

states’

Eleventh

Amendment immunities for suits under Title I, Plaintiff cannot
recover damages, either compensatory or punitive, and his claim
for monetary relief must be dismissed.

See Bd. of Trs. of Univ.

of Al., 531 U.S. at 360.
3.

Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff requests a “declaratory judgment” but does not
specify what the judgment should say.
complaint
Twombly,

“requires
550

U.S.

more
at

than

555.

(ECF No. 1, at 24).

labels
The

and

conclusions[.]”

complaint

“sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.”
12

A

must

contain

Jarallah v.

Thompson, 123 F.Supp.3d 719, 729 (D.Md. 2015).

Courts are not

“required to construct a party’s legal argument for him.”
v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993).

Small

In this case,

the complaint would require judicial reconstruction plausibly to
state a claim for declaratory relief, and, therefore, it must be
dismissed.7
4.

Injunctive Relief

While a suit for damages is foreclosed, a private person
may

still

seek

injunctive

relief

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, n. 9.

under

Title

I

of

the

ADA.

Even if Plaintiff has stated an

ADA claim,8 he has not stated a sufficient claim for injunctive
relief.

Plaintiff’s complaint broadly requests “[i]njunctive

relief” but does not specify the type of injunction sought (ECF
No. 1, at 24).

(He also separately seeks release from Perkins,

which will be discussed in the next section.) In construing pro
se complaints, “[d]istrict judges are not mind readers. Even in
the

case

construct

of

pro

full

se

litigants,

blown

claims

they
from

cannot

be

sentence

expected

to

fragments[.]”

7

Even if the complaint were read to request a declaration
related to the alleged ADA violations, sovereign immunity
prevents a declaration that state officials “violated federal
law in the past[.]”
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985). Thus, Plaintiff’s request for
declaratory relief would still be dismissed.
8

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not and cannot state a
viable claim under the ADA.
The court need not address those
arguments at this time.
13

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff

has

not

specified

the

injunction

he

seeks

or

the

behavior he wants enjoined, or why any such relief would be
available under the ADA.
complaint
relief.

does

not

Without this information, Plaintiff’s

state

a

cognizable

claim

for

injunctive

It is not at all clear that, absent the availability of

money damages or unconditional release, Plaintiff would seek to
pursue an ADA claim.

Out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiff

will be given a brief period to amend the complaint, if he
wishes to pursue the limited type of injunctive relief that may
be sought.
5.

Unconditional Release

Plaintiff requests his unconditional release from Perkins.
Plaintiff’s

complaint

contains

no

facts

explaining

why

his

release from Perkins is necessary or how it relates to his ADA
claims.
Plaintiff

In

his

response

suggests

his

to

Defendants’

relief

could

be

motion
a

to

judicial

dismiss,
remedy

pursuant to Section 3-119 of the Maryland Criminal Procedure
Article (ECF No. 10-1, at 13), but Section 3-119 only governs
the method of applying for a release.

The standard for release

is that a person would not be a “danger . . . to self or to the
person or property of others if discharged.”
Crim. Pro. § 3-114.

Md.Code Ann.,

His pleading contains no facts that relate

14

to

this

standard,

and,

therefore,

his

request

for

an

unconditional release is dismissed.
6.

Attorney’s Fees

The ADA allows a prevailing party to receive reasonable
fees.

42 U.S.C. § 12205.

Plaintiff is not a prevailing party

and is therefore not entitled to Attorney’s fees.

See § 12205;

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to substitute parties

filed by Plaintiff will be denied, (ECF No. 7), and the motion
to dismiss filed by Defendants will be granted.

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

15