Thomas v. Sgt. Oliver et al

Filing 60

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/29/2018. (c/m 5/30/18 sp2, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHRISTINA THOMAS

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Plaintiff

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v

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SGT. OLIVER,
BETTY JOHNSON,
NICOLE JACKSON,
TIARA THOMAS, and
TIA GILES
Defendants

Civil Action No. DKC-16-3908

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants Tia Giles, Nicole Jackson, Sgt. Oliver, and Tiara Thomas filed a motion to
dismiss the above-entitled civil rights complaint on November 27, 2017.

ECF No. 51.

Defendant Betty Johnson was served with the complaint on December 19, 2017, but has not
answered or otherwise responded to the complaint.1 ECF No. 57. Plaintiff opposes the motion
to dismiss. ECF No. 56. No hearing is necessary to resolve the matters pending. See Local Rule
105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated below Defendants’ motion will be denied as to the
claims against Oliver, Thomas and Giles and granted as to Jackson.
Background
Plaintiff Christina Thomas, who at all times relevant to the complaint was incarcerated at
the Baltimore City Detention Center for Women, alleges that she was assaulted on July 8, 2015,
by correctional officers.

She explains that Officer Tiara Thomas became angry when the

dormitory “T.V. Card was misplaced.” ECF No. 33 at p. 2. Officer Thomas demanded to know
where the card was and threatened the entire dorm that if they did not tell her where it was they
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Johnson will be required to show cause why default judgment should not be entered against her in the
Order which accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

would not get the card back. The “dorm rep.” gave Officer Thomas the TV card, but Officer
Thomas angrily accused the entire dorm of playing games and threatened that if no one told her
who took the card, it would not be given back to the dorm. Id. The dorm rep. then told Officer
Thomas that Plaintiff had taken the card.2 Id.
Officer Thomas ordered Plaintiff to put her hands on the wall and spread her legs so she
could search Plaintiff even though Officer Thomas was already in possession of the TV card.
Officer Tia Giles arrived to assist in searching Plaintiff, as well as Plaintiff’s bed area and
property. Giles claimed that she found something that Plaintiff was not supposed to have and
Sgt. Oliver placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and left the area. ECF No. 33 at p. 2.
Plaintiff claims that after Sgt. Oliver left, Officer Thomas became disrespectful and
called her names. Plaintiff states that Officer Thomas then grabbed her and began shaking her
violently, stating that now she had a real reason to put Plaintiff on lock up. Officer Thomas then
allegedly pushed her hand into Plaintiff’s face and Plaintiff “came out of the handcuffs to block
her from hitting” her. ECF No. 33 at p. 2. Plaintiff maintains that she was defending herself. Id.
Plaintiff claims that Officer Thomas began violently striking Plaintiff with a closed fist
and Officer Giles began to attack Plaintiff by hitting her in the head, neck, and back. She further
alleges that Officer Giles held Plaintiff’s arms while Officer Thomas hit her numerous times,
“digging and scratching me in my eyes.” ECF No. 33 at p. 2. Plaintiff asserts that, “it was then
that Ofc. Thomas slammed me on the ground, banged my head several times” and then “took her
handcuffs and began beating me in my head numerous times repeatedly.” Id. Plaintiff states that
she bled severely from the right and middle side of her head, and sustained bruises to her eyes
and face, as a result of the beating. Id., see also ECF No. 37-2 at pp. 1-7 (medical records).
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Plaintiff admits to taking the card from the TV and claims she did so because her report to Officer Thomas
that she “felt threatened” on the dorm was not addressed. See ECF No. 37-1 at p. 5 (Inmate Statement dated July 9,
2015).

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Plaintiff states that, following the assault, she was placed in the medical dorm and claims
that she was never sent to an outside hospital for treatment. She further claims that pictures were
not taken of her injuries until five days after the assault, after the scratches to her face had
healed. ECF No. 33 at p. 2. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at p. 1.
Plaintiff was charged with assaulting a correctional officer in a Notice of Inmate Rule
Violation written by Officer Thomas. ECF No. 37-1 at p. 6. In addition, Officer Thomas
pursued criminal charges against Plaintiff and an investigation of the matter was referred to the
Internal Investigation Division (IID). Id. Questions arose from supervisory officers after reports
written by Oliver, Thomas and Giles were reviewed and Plaintiff’s injuries, which required
sutures to her scalp, were noted. Further investigation was ordered because Plaintiff’s injuries
did not match the description of the events provided by the officers; the conclusion was that
excessive force was used against Plaintiff. See ECF No. 37-6.
Plaintiff avers that Warden Betty Johnson is liable because she was responsible for
protecting Plaintiff from malicious behavior of the officers; Facility Administrator Nicole
Jackson was responsible for protecting Plaintiff from the violence of officers; and Sgt. Oliver
was the superior officer responsible for the officers involved in the assault. ECF No. 33 at p. 3.
Officers Thomas and Giles are named as Defendants for their alleged actions in assaulting
Plaintiff. Id.
Defendants Tia Giles and Tiara Thomas move to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim
raised in the amended complaint because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the time of the
alleged assault and as such the claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 51-1
at pp. 3-4. They conclude that the Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed with prejudice as
a matter of law with respect to all of the Defendants. Id. at p. 4. Defendants Oliver and Jackson

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aver that the amended complaint fails to state a claim against them as neither of them were
present during the alleged assault. ECF No. 51-1 at pp. 4-5.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir.
1997). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe PriceFleming Int’l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading
standard” of Rule 8(a)).
The Supreme Court of the United States explained a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does
not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 555. Instead, “once
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent
with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (citing Sanjuan
v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d, 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)) (once a claim
for relief has been stated, a plaintiff ‘receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the
hypotheses are consistent with the complaint’).
Analysis
Excessive Force Claim
The Supreme Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that “the appropriate standard for a
pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2466,
2473 (2015). It is enough that a pretrial detainee show that the “force purposely or knowingly
used against him was objectively unreasonable,” id., regardless of an officer’s state of mind, id.
at 2472 (cited in Dilwworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016). Pursuant to Kingsley,
this court must consider whether under the “facts and circumstances” of this particular case, and
from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” the force used against Plaintiff was
objectively excessive. Kingsley at 2473. Contrast this standard with that which applies in an
Eighth Amendment claim for a convicted prisoner which requires this court to inquire if “force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Further, in an Eighth
Amendment claim, if force is applied maliciously and sadistically liability is not avoided simply

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because the prisoner had the good fortune to escape serious harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.
34, 38 (2010). Thus, in the instant case, Plaintiff is not required to offer evidence of the officers’
states of mind during the use of force against her.
It borders on sophistry to suggest that the inartfully pled complaint of a self-represented
prisoner should be dismissed because she identified the incorrect constitutional amendment that
governs the claim asserted.

This Court is obliged to construe liberally self-represented

pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Where, as here, a colorable
claim has been presented, technical deficiencies in the manner in which it is pled are an
insufficient basis to dismiss the complaint.
Supervisory Defendants
It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983
claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior
liability under § 1983); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (no
respondeat superior liability in a Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on
ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative
factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.
1984)). Supervisory liability under § 1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the
supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an

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affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus more than
a simple allegation that a particular Defendant held a position that ostensibly imposed a duty
upon them to insure their subordinates did not engage in misconduct is required.
Defendants Jackson and Oliver assert they are entitled to dismissal from the case because
they were not involved in the incident. ECF No. 51. The asserted basis for the claim against
Defendant Jackson is her role as Facility Administrator. ECF No. 56. With respect to Defendant
Oliver, however, the complaint taken together with the exhibits submitted by Plaintiff separately
and taken as true establish that she was involved in the incident beyond merely being in a
supervisory position.
Sgt. Oliver’s Matter of Record (ECF No. 37-4 at pp. 13 – 15) indicates that she was there
during a portion of the incident and describes Plaintiff assaulting Officer Thomas. Statements
written by Officers Thomas and Giles indicate that Oliver placed Plaintiff in handcuffs before the
search of her property was conducted. ECF No. 37-4 at p. 17 (Thomas Statement), p. 8 (Giles
Statement). Oliver’s statement indicates she left after handcuffing Plaintiff and went to the
“bubble” to make an entry in the logbook. ECF No. 37-4 at p. 13.
Review of all statements made by the officers involved led the shift commander (Major
Karen Moore), the Security Chief, and the Managing Official to conclude that excessive force
was used against Plaintiff and that an investigation into the matter was required. ECF No. 37-6
at p. 5, see also ECF No. 37-5, p. 2 (statement of Det. Likin indicating discrepancy between
reports and injuries sustained by Plaintiff). Further, the Duty Captain, Captain Viola Hall, in a
memorandum to Shift Commander Major Karen Moore, stated that she contacted Sgt. Oliver to
obtain the Matter of Record reports from all officers involved and questioned why it took

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“several hours to prepare the reports.” ECF No. 37-6 at p. 6. After reviewing the reports, Hall
questioned Oliver on why she left the area while Plaintiff was handcuffed and a search was
taking place. Id. at p. 8. Oliver stated that she left because Plaintiff was “secured and not a
threat when I left to sign the log book.” Id. Oliver then told Hall that she refused to write that
she used any force during the encounter with Plaintiff and that the “two other Officers involved
in this Use of Force, used excessive force on the detainee Thomas, and coerced another detainee
in the dorm to write a statement, which read exactly like the statement submitted by the other
Officers.” Id. Despite being instructed to write an accurate report, Oliver indicated that she was
not going to write another report because she was “up for retirement.” Id. Oliver’s involvement
in the incident extends beyond the immediate use of force against Plaintiff and includes her
complicity in the institution of criminal charges against Plaintiff. The motion to dismiss with
respect to Oliver is denied.
Conclusion
Counsel will be appointed to represent Plaintiff for the remainder of this case. A separate
Order denying and granting in part the motion to dismiss and appointing counsel for Plaintiff
follows.

May 29, 2018

__________/s/__________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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