Moment v. Mortel

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/15/2017. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 2/15/17)

FlED.

EN1£REO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

-RECEIVED

FEB 15 20n
NOELl

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COURT

~1ll!C!OF"'AIMANO DiPlJry

MICHAEL MOMENT, #16-02335,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

Civil Action No. PWG-16-3966

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RENEE MORTEL, Siale 's Allorney's Office,
also known as Renee Morlel Joy,
Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM

OPINION

On December 12,2016, Michael Moment filed suit pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 91983 against
Renee Mortel, alleging that on February 3, 2011, Mortel illegally initiated an indictment against
him in Montgomery County, Maryland.

He claims Mortel was an "ordinary citizen" without

legal authority to investigate or indict him for a crime committed outside Prince George's
County.

He claims that he was subjected to illegal prosecution and illegal imprisonment, and

seeks $5 million dollars in damages. Compl. 2-3, ECF No. I.
Background
On February 4, 20 J I, Moment was indicted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
for intimidating or corrupting an officer of the court and threatening a state official. Docket No.
2, Maryland v. Momenl, No. 117643C (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cty., Md. Feb. 4, 2011). The Chief
Judge of the Maryland Court of ~ppeals designated the Honorable Dwight D. Jackson, Associate
Judge of the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George's County, to sit alone or with one or
more other judges as a judge of the Circuit Court of Maryland for Montgomery County to hear
the case. ld. Docket No. 10. Assistant State's Attorney Renee Mortel Joy was the prosecutor in

the case. Jd. Docket NO.3. On August 8, 2011, Moment was found guilty on all counts and was
later sentenced to a term of incarceration. Jd. Docket Nos. 126,145.
Discussion
Moment filed the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

S

1915, I which permits an indigent prisoner

to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the filing fee.

To protect against

abuse of this privilege, the statute requires a court to dismiss any claim that fails to state a claim
for which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief." 28 U.S.C.

SS

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), 1915A(b)(I), (2). This Court is mindful of its

obligation to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants such as Moment. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, a plaintiff's allegations are
assumed to be true.

Jd. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Nonetheless, liberal construction does not mean that a court can ignore a clear failure in the
pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller
v. Dep't a/Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); Beaudett v. City a/Hampton,

775

F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a district court may not "conjure up questions never
squarely presented").
A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

S

1983 addresses unlawful conduct under color of

law. See Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorney Office, 767 FJd 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014). To
state a claim under 42 U.S.c.

S 1983, a plaintiff

must demonstrate (I) that he was "deprived of a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" and (2) that "the alleged

I At the time Moment filed this Complaint
he provided an address corresponding to the
Montgomery County Detention Center at 1307 Seven Locks Road in Rockville, Maryland.
Compl. I. On December 20, 2016, Moment notified the Court that he has changed his address.
ECF NO.4. On the date this Memorandum Opinion and Order were signed, Moment was not
listed on the Maryland Inmate Locator. It thus appears he has been released from incarceration.

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deprivation was committed under color of state law." Am. Mfrs. Mul. Insur. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Specifically, the person charged with the civil rights violation must be a
state official; someone who has acted with a state official; someone who has obtained significant
aid from a state official; or someone whose conduct is somehow attributable to the state. Id. at
57-58.
under

If a defendant was acting as a private citizen, then the defendant is not amenable to suit

S

1983. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Mortel Joy was acting as "an ordinary citizen" without

legal authority when she prosecuted him. Compl. 2. Under these alleged facts, Defendant is not
amenable to suit under

S

1983. Consequently, this matter must be dismissed for failure to state a

claim.
Despite what Plaintiff claims, it is likely Defendant was actually acting in her capacity as
an Assistant State's Attorney in the matter at issue.

If so, Defendant is entitled to absolute

immunity from civil liability for alleged conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachlman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). "In other words, absolute
immunity is afforded prosecutors when acting 'within the advocate's

role.' " Dababnah v.

Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259,278 (1993)).
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In Imbler, the Supreme Court stated that a prosecutor, acting within the scope of his or

her duties in initiating and prosecuting a case, has the'same absolute immunity from liability for
damages for alleged violation of another's

constitutional

right, notwithstanding

that such

immunity leaves the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a p_r_o_s_ec_u_t_o_r
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whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him or her of liberty. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. The
Court explained that if the prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of litigation
would undermine performance of the prosecutor's duties. Public trust of the prosecutor's office

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would suffer if he or she were constrained in making decisions by potential liability for damages.
And if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time he or she was charged with
wrongdoing, attention would be diverted from the duty of enforcing criminal laws. Jd. Noting
that prosecutors often act under strict constraints of time and a prosecutor may make decisions
that engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation, the Court reasoned that defending
such decisions could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor. Jd. at 426.
Therefore, the Court concluded that permitting only qualified immunity to a prosecutor could
have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system. Jd. at 426-27.
As noted, absolute prosecutorial immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is engaged
In other tasks, such as investigative or administrative

assignments. Jd. at 430; Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n.16 (1982); Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342-43
(2009). Therefore,

when asked to determine

whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute

immunity, a court examines "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor
who performed it." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,229 (1988). Preparation of the indictment
is clearly within the ambit of the protection contemplated by absolute judicial immunity. See
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (upholding absolute immunity for prosecutor's
actions related to the preparation and. filing of charging documents); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273
(holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for "the professional evaluation of the
evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or
before a rand'ur

after a decision to seek an indictment has been made").

Moment's claims

against Defendant directly challenge her involvement in the preparation of the indictment which
is a prosecutorial function clearly within the judicial phase of the criminal process. Defendant's

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actions initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution against him fit squarely within the range of
absolute immunity.
Even if a colorable claim were raised, the Complaint presents questions concernmg
timeliness. While

S

1983 provides a federal cause of action, it "looks to the law of the State in

which the cause of action arose," adopting the statute of limitations applicable in the relevant
state for personal-injury

torts. Wallace v. Kala, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (citing Owens v.

Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985».

In

Maryland the applicable statute of limitations is three years from the date of the occurrence. See
Md. Cts & Iud. Proc. Code Ann.
when Moment was sentenced.

S 5-101.

At the latest, this claim arose on November 7, 2011,

When Moment filed this Complaint on December 12, 2016, the

three-year limitations period had long expired. Consequently, this matter must also be dismissed
as time barred.
The in forma pauperis statute at 28 U.S.C.

S

1915(g) provides that a prisoner may not

bring a civil action without complete prepayment of the appropriate filing fee if the prisoner has
brought, on three or more occasions, an aciion or appeal in a federal court that was dismissed as
frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless
the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. As Moment was incarcerated at
the time he initiated this Complaint and for the reasons stated above, the Complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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M_o_m_e_n_t
Qursuant to 28 U.S:C.

s 1915(g).

Accordingly, a first "strike" will be assigned to
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Conclusion
For these reasons,' tlie Court will deny and dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. A "first strike" will be assigned to Moment pursuant to 28 U.s.c.
1915(g) in a separate Order to follow.

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Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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