Clark v. Colvin

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 5/24/2017. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BENITA MONIQUE CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY
Defendant.
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Case No.: SAG-16-4009

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On December 16, 2016, Plaintiff Benita Monique Clark (“Ms. Clark”) petitioned this
Court to review the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for
disability benefits. [ECF No. 1]. Currently pending is the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Clark’s Complaint. [ECF No. 12]. Ms. Clark, who is represented by counsel, has not filed a
response. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the
reasons explained below, I will grant the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss.
On October 11, 2016, the Appeals Council mailed Ms. Clark notice of its decision
denying her request for review of an adverse decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge,
regarding her claim for benefits. [ECF No. 12, Chung Decl., Ex. 2]. That notice also advised
Ms. Clark of her statutory right to commence a civil action within sixty days from receipt of the
notice. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h). The Commissioner’s implementing regulations have
interpreted the statute to permit sixty-five days from the date of the notice, to allow sufficient
time for mailing the notice. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 422.210(c). Ms. Clark has not alleged that
she received the notice outside of the statutory time period. She therefore had to file her civil

action on or before December 15, 2016. Instead, Ms. Clark filed her complaint one day late, on
December 16, 2016. [ECF No. 1].
Congress has authorized lawsuits seeking judicial review of decisions by the
Commissioner only under certain limited conditions, including specified filing deadlines. City of
Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 336 (1958). The limitations period must
therefore be strictly enforced, absent (1) an agreement by the Commissioner to toll the deadlines,
or (2) a valid basis for equitable tolling of the deadlines. “[B]ecause of the importance of
respecting limitations periods, equitable tolling is appropriate only ‘where the defendant has
wrongfully deceived or misled the plaintiff in order to conceal the existence of a cause of
action.’” Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Service, 223 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing English v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987)). Ms. Clark has not alleged, and the
record does not reflect, any misconduct on the part of the Commissioner in this case. As a result,
equitable tolling is not warranted. Ms. Clark filed her case after the statutory limitations period
had run. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 12], is
GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
A separate order follows.

Dated: May 24, 2017

/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge