Kaur v. Grigsby

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER affirming [4-20] Bankruptcy Court's Order dismissing Kaur's bankruptcy case; and directing the Clerk to Close this Case. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 9/13/2017. (tds, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
JASWINDER KAUR,

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Appellant,

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v.

Case No.: PWG-17-7
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NANCY SPENCER GRIGSBY,
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Appellee.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Debtor Jaswinder Kaur appeals from an Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Maryland dismissing her case without a hearing. Because the Bankruptcy Court
dismissed Kaur’s case after she failed to meet a filing deadline that the court had extended at her
request, and after the court warned her that failure to meet the deadline could result in dismissal
without a hearing, I conclude that the dismissal was proper, and I affirm.
Background
Kaur filed a Voluntary Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition on November 22, 2016.
Appellant’s Br. 2, ECF No. 9; Appellee’s Br. 3, ECF No. 12. The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Maryland set a deadline of December 6, 2016 for Kaur to file
“Schedules A/B-J, Chapter 13 Plan & Certificate of Service, Declaration of Schedules, Chapter
13 Income Form 122C-1, Statement of Financial Affairs, and Summary of Assets and
Liabilities,” and notified Kaur that if she missed the deadline, “the case would be dismissed
without a hearing.” Appellee’s Br. 4.

Kaur timely filed only Schedules A/B-J and the

Declaration of Schedules. Id. She also moved for an extension of the filing deadline, and the
Bankruptcy Court granted her request, extending the deadline to December 20, 2016, which was

the deadline she requested. Id.; Appellant’s Br. 2. Once again, the Bankruptcy Court cautioned
that missing the deadline could result in the dismissal of the case. Appellee’s Br. 4. Despite the
extension, “[t]he debtor missed the filings deadline.” Appellant’s Br. 2; see Appellee’s Br. 4.
On December 21, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court issued an Order Dismissing the Bankruptcy Case
for Failure to Complete Required Filings. Order, ECF No. 4-20; Appellant’s Br. 2; Appellee’s
Br. 3, 4. The Bankruptcy Court stated that it dismissed the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a)
and 1307(c).
It is from that Order that Kaur appeals, arguing that she “never had a day in court.”
Appellant’s Br. 2; see Appellant’s Reply 1, ECF No. 13. She views this as error, arguing that
she “did not file the Bankruptcy case in bad faith,” but she does not cite any case law that
supports her position. Appellant’s Br. 3–4.
Standard of Review
“The proper interpretation of the bankruptcy code is a question of federal law.” Butler v.
David Shaw, Inc., 72 F.3d 437, 441 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393,
397-98 (1992)). Therefore, I will review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision de novo. See id.
Notably, “the decision of a bankruptcy court ‘must be affirmed if the result is correct’ even if the
lower court relied upon ‘a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.’” Bellinger v. Buckley, No.
JKB-17-0068, 2017 WL 3722827, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2017) (quoting Okoro v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 567 B.R. 267, 271 (D. Md. 2017) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88
(1943))). This means that “this Court may ‘affirm the bankruptcy court on any ground supported
by the record.’” Id. (quoting LeCann v. Cobham (In re Cobham), 551 B.R. 181, 189 (E.D.N.C.),
aff’d, 669 F. App’x 171 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied (Nov. 29, 2016)).

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Discussion
11 U.S.C. § 105 provides that the court may, “sua sponte, tak[e] any action or mak[e] any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). “‘Any action’ includes dismissal.” Mustafa v.
Branigan, No. PJM 16-3828, 2017 WL 2634153, at *2 (D. Md. June 16, 2017) (citing In re
Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996)).
In Kestell, the Fourth Circuit observed that § 105 is “an omnibus provision phrased in
such general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power in the administration of a
bankruptcy case,” and that its “basic purpose . . . is to assure the bankruptcy courts power to take
whatever action is appropriate or necessary in aid of the exercise of its jurisdiction.” 99 F.3d at
148 (quoting 2 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy § 105.01, at 105-3 (1996)). The Kestell Court
explicitly stated that § 105 “grants judges the authority to dismiss a bankruptcy petition sua
sponte for ineligibility, for lack of good faith, or for one of the ‘causes’ enumerated in section
1112.” Id. at 149. The court did not, however, limit the Bankruptcy Court’s authority to dismiss
pursuant to § 105 to these circumstances alone. See generally id.
Moreover, “[f]ederal courts possess certain ‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or
statute, ‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.’” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962). And, “[t]hat authority includes ‘the ability to
fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.’” Id. (quoting
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991). Indeed, for more than two centuries, it
has been established that “[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution . . . . because they are necessary to the exercise of all

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others” and they enable courts “to preserve [their] own existence and promote the end and object
of [their] creation.” United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33–34 (1812); see
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34); Roadway Exp., Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (same), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in
Morris v. Adams–Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1357 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985). “This power is organic,
without need of a statute or rule for its definition, and it is necessary to the exercise of all other
powers.” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, “[d]ue to
the very nature of the court as an institution, it must and does have an inherent power to impose
order, respect, decorum, silence, and compliance with lawful mandates.” Id. at 461; see also
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (holding that trial courts are “vested, by their very creation, with
power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful
mandates”).
Therefore, federal courts have the “inherent power to control the judicial process and
litigation, a power that is necessary to redress conduct which abuses the judicial process.”
Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 505 (D. Md. 2009) (quoting United Med.
Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 263–64 (2007) (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–
46)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583,
590 (4th Cir. 2001); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 517–18 (D. Md.
2010); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003). The
court’s inherent authority to sanction arises when a party “abuses the process at a level that is
utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice or undermines the integrity of the
process.” Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d at 462. Courts may dismiss actions pursuant to this
authority. Id. at 461–62.

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Here, Kaur requested an extension of her filing deadline, and the Bankruptcy Court
granted the full extension. She could have requested a longer period or a second extension, but
she did not. In setting the original deadline and in granting the extension, the Bankruptcy Court
cautioned Kaur in writing that failure to meet the filing deadline could result in dismissal without
a hearing. Kaur’s delay in her bankruptcy case, which she voluntarily filed, affects not only
Kaur as the debtor but also any creditors, interested parties, the United States Trustee, and the
Bankruptcy Court. It is an abuse of the process Kaur elected to pursue to request an extension
and then fail to meet that extension without showing cause for the delay and timely seeking
additional time. Kaur readily acknowledges her failure to make the required filings within the
time she requested. She does not deny that she was cautioned by the Court twice, in writing, that
a failure to comply could result in dismissal of her case. And, she offers no explanation why she
did meet the extended deadline, or request another extension before the deadline expired. This
neglect demonstrates a lack of regard for her own case and the Bankruptcy Court’s orders.
Under these circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to dismiss Kaur’s case for failure to
meet the filing deadline, despite having been granted an extension for the amount of time she
sought, was proper. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1186; Mustafa, 2017 WL
2634153, at *2–3 (finding sua sponte dismissal “entirely appropriate” where the court did not
provide notice or a hearing but it first warned the debtor that “she would have one ‘final chance’
to submit a Chapter 13 plan that conformed to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code” and the
debtor had a “pattern of late, deficient submissions and missed meetings”). Because “the result
is correct,” I affirm. See Bellinger, 2017 WL 3722827, at *2.

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ORDER
Accordingly, it is, this 13th day of September, 2017 hereby ORDERED that the
Bankruptcy Court’s Order (ECF No. 4-20) dismissing Kaur’s bankruptcy case IS AFFIRMED;
and the Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.
/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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