Fletcher v. Dykes et al
Filing
77
MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 8/9/2018. (c/m 8/9/18 cags, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMONTE JAMAR FLETCHER,
Inmate Identification No. 422-651,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. TDC-17-0914
C.O. II CHASE DYKES,
C.O. II JOSEPH TILGHMAN,
C.O. II DOMINICK TIMMONS and
WARDEN RICKY FOXWELL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff
Jamonte
Jamar
Fletcher,
currently
incarcerated
Institution ("ECI") in Westover, Maryland, has filed suit under 42
at Eastern
u.s.c. 9
Correctional
1983
("9
1983")
against ECI Warden Ricky Foxwell ("the Warden") and ECI correctional officers Chase Dykes,
Joseph Tilghman, and Dominick Timmons (collectively, "the Officer Defendants").
Fletcher's
claims arise from a March 11, 2017 cell search by the Officer Defendants, the conditions of his
subsequent confinement
in ECI Cell 4C 1, and the denial by prison officials of his various
requests for relief. Presently pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, and Fletcher's "Request for Leave to Reply to
Defendants
Reply to Plaintiffs
Opposition
to Defendants
Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment," which the Court construes as a Motion for Leave
to File a Surreply.
necessary.
Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is
See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny
Fletcher's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply and grant in part and deny in part Defendants'
Motion.
BACKGROUND
I.
March 11, 2017 Cell Search and Transfer
On March 11, 2017, Defendants Dykes and Tilghman arrived at Fletcher's
announced that they were going to conduct a random search for contraband.
cellmate were thoroughly
cell and
Fletcher and his
patted down by the officers, and the cell search revealed no
contraband. Dykes then grabbed Fletcher, stated that he would conduct a strip search, and forced
Fletcher to strip down to his "shorts, boxers, and socks" and searched him a second time. Am.
Compi. at 1, ECF No. 3_1.1 According to Fletcher, Dykes found no contraband.
Fletcher then
stated "see I do not have anything on me." Id. Dykes replied that Fletcher was "making him
nervous" and conducted a third search of Fletcher's body, including "grabbing [his] private parts
and rubbing his hand between the crack of [his] butt." Id. After this third search, Fletcher told
Dykes "see now you know I don't have anything." Id.
The parties disagree on what happened next.
According to Fletcher, Dykes ordered
Fletcher to hand him "the shorts and drop the boxers then squat and cough."
Id.
Fletcher,
positioned with his back facing Dykes, complied by handing Dykes his shorts over his shoulder,
dropping his boxers to the ground, and coughing. Dykes then grabbed him by the neck and put
him in a chokehold.
Dykes, Tilghman, and Defendant Timmons, who had arrived at the cell
after the search began, then "began slamming [Fletcher's] head against the lockers, bunk and
floor." Id. at 2.
The page numbers for this document are the numbers assigned by the Court's CM/ECF
system.
2
In a Notice of Inmate Rule Violation, affirmed under penalty of perjury, Dykes provided
a different account of the incident. Dykes claims that Fletcher became "non-compliant"
"when
he was asked for his pants." Not. Inmate Rule Violation at 9, Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1, ECF No. 41-5.
Timmons arrived and noticed "what appeared to be a home-made weapon hanging out of
[Fletcher's] pants."
Id.
Fletcher allegedly reached for the weapon, which caused Dykes "to
gain[] control of [Fletcher's] head" and give "verbal commands to comply" while "Timmons
gained control of [Fletcher's] hands which caused the weapon to fall out of [Fletcher's] grasp."
Id. The officers recovered a "home-made weapon made of metal approximately 6" in length and
2" in width sharpened to a point with a cloth wrapped handle," which was then taken to an
evidence locker at the prison. Id.
According to Fletcher, no weapon was found.
Nevertheless, the three officers then
hogtied him and took him out of the cell. At some point during this transit, Fletcher was dropped
on his head by the officers from a height of 2 'li feet. According to Fletcher, he asked, "[W]hat
did I do? I didn't do anything" and offered to not write up a complaint if the officers would let
him return to his cell. Am. Compl. at 2. The officers replied that "[they] would but everyone on
the tier already saw them handcuff and force [Fletcher] out the cell and off the tier and they have
to cover their own asses." Id.
Fletcher states that he was then taken to an office in the prison and interrogated by the
three officers, including asking him "where are the drugs and weapons?"
Id.
Fletcher claimed
that he did not know what the officers were talking about and requested his glasses. Fletcher's
legs were then shackled and he was walked outside in what he describes as 20 degree weather
wearing only his boxers and socks.
At some point during this walk, Fletcher told one of the
3
Officer Defendants that his "private parts are hanging out," to which the officer laughed and
stated "his zipper is broken and his privates are hanging out, too." Id.
Fletcher was then taken to ECl's medical facility, where he told a nurse that he had been
assaulted by Dykes, Tilghman, and Timmons.
Nurse Tracey L. Hall noted that Fletcher was
"found to have a large reddened abrasions to [his] right anterior shoulder and [a] single 3 cm
scratch to his right lateral neck." 3/11/17 Med. Report at 2, Mot. Dismiss Ex. lA, ECF No. 41-6.
Nurse Hall also noted that Fletcher "was not fully cooperative with questioning" and stated that
he had "no pain." Id.
While in the medical unit, Fletcher was questioned by Lieutenant
Donald Adams.
According to Fletcher, Lt. Adams refused to allow Fletcher to write a statement about the
incident. An "Offender's / Detainee's Statement" form, signed by Lt. Adams, states that Fletcher
"refused to write [a] statement."
Statement at 2, Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1B, ECF No. 41-7. Adams
then took photos of Fletcher's injuries and directed the officers to put Fletcher in an orange
jumpsuit.
The jumpsuit, however, covered only Fletcher's legs because the officers refused to
uncuff Fletcher to allow him to put his arms through the top half of the jumpsuit.
II.
Staff Alert Confinement
Fletcher was then taken to Cell4C1 on ECl Housing Unit 4. Fletcher claims that while in
that cell, which he describes as "the butt-naked room" lacking a light, mirror, or mattress, Am.
Compi. at 3-4, he was denied clothes, forced to sleep on a concrete floor with only a thin blanket,
and subjected to cold conditions from a window that would not close that caused him to put
paper bags on his feet in an effort to stay warm. He further asserts that he was denied showers,
given his food in wax paper bags without any utensils, and denied sanitary items such as a
toothbrush and soap, which caused him to have to eat his food with his hands without washing
4
them after using the toilet. Fletcher states that he was moved from Cell 4C 1 to 4B lIon
March
17,2017 but did not receive his first shower until March 20,2017.
In a March 11, 2017 memorandum, Lt. Adams stated that he was putting Fletcher on
"Staff Alert" status because Fletcher "attempted to retrieve a homemade weapon observed in
undershorts as Ofc. C. Dykes & Ofc. J. Tilghman were conducting a strip search."
Mem. at 1, Mot. Dismiss Ex. 3, ECF No. 41-9. Cell4Cl
3/11/17
is one of the cells used for inmates on
Staff Alert status, from which mirrors were removed because inmates were removing the metal
from them.
On March 15, 2017, Lt. Adams stated that Fletcher's behavior had improved and
downgraded his status from "Staff Alert Level I to Staff Alert Level II."
3/15/1 7 Mem. at 2,
Mot. Dismiss Ex. 3, ECF No. 41-9. Adams again downgraded Fletcher's status on March 17,
2017 and removed him from Staff Alert status completely on March 21, 2017.
According to a log of Fletcher's time on Staff Alert, which tracks Fletcher's out of cell
activity, showers, and daily behavior, Fletcher was offered both recreation and a shower on
March 15 and March 17, 2017, but was not ready when they were made available.
The
maintenance logbook for Cell 4C 1 contains no repair orders for a broken window or a lack of hot
water during March or April 2017 ..
III.
Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings
Fletcher filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure complaint ("ARP") on March 18,
2017. In the ARP, Fletcher recounted the cell search, the alleged assault by Dykes, Tilghman,
and Timmons, and the conditions of Cell 4Cl.
The Warden responded to Fletcher's ARP on
March 27,2017 by stating that Fletcher's "request for Administrative Remedy has been reviewed
and is hereby dismissed for procedural reason(s]; this issue is being investigated by lID,"
referring to ECl's Intelligence & Investigative Division.
5
ARP No. ECI-0682-17 at 1, Mot.
Dismiss Ex. 7, ECF No. 41-13.
"Since this issue is being investigated by IID," the Warden
continued, "no further action will be taken through the ARP process." Id.
Fletcher was charged with three violations of prison disciplinary rules for possession of a
homemade knife. At his disciplinary hearing, a picture of the knife was introduced as evidence,
but Fletcher's medical records were deemed not relevant. Although Fletcher sought to call as a
witness Thomas Vito, another ECI inmate who allegedly witnessed the March 11, 2017 incident,
the institutional representative reported to the Hearing Officer that Vito declined to testify. In a
signed declaration, submitted by Fletcher as part of a Motion for Summary Judgment that was
previously denied by the Court, Vito stated that he "never denied to participate in the in-house
hearing as a witness."
Vito Decl. at 1, ECF No. 31. He further stated that "(o]n two occasions
an officer verbally asked me if! want to be a witness. At which both times I agreed.,,2 Id.
The Hearing Officer found Fletcher guilty of violating rules 105 (possession of a
weapon) and 400 (disobeying a direct lawful order). As punishment, Fletcher received 220 days
of administrative
segregation,
revocation
of good conduct credits of 185 days, and the
suspension of visitation privileges for one year. Fletcher's appeal of this decision to the Warden
was denied.
Throughout this period, Sgt. William Justice of the IID was separately investigating the
March 11, 2017 incident.
After interviewing
Dykes, Timmons, and Fletcher, Sgt. Justice
obtained a criminal summons charging Fletcher with possession of a deadly weapon.
charges resulted in a disposition of nolle prosequi on September 29,2017.
The
See State v. Fletcher,
2 Although Fletcher did not attach the Vito declaration as an exhibit to his Opposition to
Defendants' Motion, the Court will consider the document pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c)(3).
6
No. D-022-CR-17-000301
(Dist. Ct. Somerset Cty. 2017), available
at http://casesearch.
courts.state.md. us!casesearchlinquiry ByCaseNum.j is. 3
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion for Leave to File a Surreply
As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Fletcher's
Surreply.
Motion for Leave to File a
This Court's Local Rules provide that surreply memoranda are not permitted unless
otherwise ordered by the Court.
D. Md. Local R. 105.2(a).
Surreply briefs are generally
disfavored in this District, Chubb & Son v. C & C Complete Servs., LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 666,
679 (D. Md. 2013), but they may be permitted "when the moving party would be unable to
contest matters presented to the Court for the first time in the opposing party's reply," TECH
USA, Inc. v. Evans, 592 F. Supp. 2d 852, 861 (D. Md. 2009).
In his Motion, Fletcher argues that (l) Defendants have failed to produce various pieces
of evidence in their possession; (2) the chain of custody of the weapon allegedly found on
Fletcher during the search of his cell is deficient; and (3) various aspects of his prison
disciplinary proceeding violated his due process rights. None of these arguments are responsive
to issues raised by Defendants for the first time in their reply memorandum.
To the extent that
Fletcher seeks to add new claims to his Complaint, the Motion is an improper amendment and
inconsistent with the Court's May 16,2018 Order. Accordingly, the Motion for Leave to File a
Surreply is denied.
The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in Fletcher's criminal case. Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(2); Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hasp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that a
court may take judicial notice of matters of public record.)
3
7
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Although Fletcher does not identify the particular basis for his claims in the Amended
Complaint, the Court construes the claims as filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
S
1983. Section 1983
allows plaintiffs to sue persons acting under color of the law of "any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia" for violating their federal rights.
42 U.S.C.
S
1983 (2012).
As relief,
Fletcher seeks monetary damages of $250,000 to $500,000, as well as the criminal prosecution
of the Officer Defendants for assault, battery, and planting evidence and the prosecution of
Warden Foxwell for reckless endangerment.
In their Motion, Defendants characterize Fletcher's Complaint as alleging six separate
claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim for assaults he allegedly suffered during
the March 11, 2017 cell search; (2) a due process claim for allegedly false statements made in
correctional officer reports; (3) an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim based on
the condition of Cell 4C 1; (4) a claim that he was inappropriately placed on administrative
segregation; (5) violations of various prison policies and regulations; and (6) a claim that his
right to participate in the ARP process were denied.
Fletcher does not challenge these characterizations,
Complaint as alleging the above claims.
and the Court will construe the
However, the Court will combine claims (2) and (4)
into a single claim that his due process rights were violated in the disciplinary proceedings
relating to the March 11, 2017 incident.
The Court will also combine claims (5) and (6) into a
single claim that his rights under the ARP process were violated.
Defendants move for dismissal or summary judgment on the merits of each claim, and
assert three additional defenses: (1) Warden Foxwell is entitled to dismissal because there is no
doctrine of vicarious liability (respondeat superior) in
8
S
1983 cases; (2) Fletcher does not have a
right to the criminal prosecution
immunity.
of another; and (3) Defendants
are entitled to qualified
The Court will address each claim and argument in tum.
Defendants'
qualified
immunity argument will be discussed in conjunction with the analysis of specific claims to which
it may apply.
A.
Legal Standard
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment, to which they have attached 15 exhibits.
Typically, when deciding a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court considers only the complaint
and any attached documents "integral to the complaint."
Sec
y
of State for Defence v. Trimble
Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Rule 12(d) requires courts to treat such a
motion as a motion for summary judgment where matters outside the pleadings are considered
and not excluded.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Before converting a motion to dismiss to one for
summary judgment, courts must give the nonmoving party "a reasonable opportunity to present
all the material that is pertinent to the motion."
Id.
"Reasonable
opportunity"
has two
requirements: (l) the nonmoving party must have some indication that the court is treating the
12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment, and (2) the nonmoving party "must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity for discovery" to obtain information essential to oppose the
motion.
Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175,177
(4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
Here, the notice
requirement has been satisfied because the title of the Motion informed Fletcher of the possibility
that the Motion could result in summary judgment.
Fletcher has already requested and received
a limited opportunity for discovery in advance of the resolution of the Motion, and Fletcher has
attached his own exhibits to his memorandum in opposition to the Motion.
Court will construe the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
9
Accordingly, the
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court grants summary judgment if the
moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable
inferences drawn in its favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts
supported in the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings.
Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514,522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact is "material" ifit "might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material
fact is only "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of
fact to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-49.
B.
Excessive Force
Fletcher argues that Dykes' use of a chokehold, Tilghman's other assaults, and being
. hogtied and dropped on his head during and after the March 11, 2017 cell search constitute
excessive force on the part of the Officer Defendants.
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
This prohibition
"protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned."
Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Amendment is violated when an inmate
is subjected to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
To establish an Eighth
Amendment violation, an inmate must establish both that the prison official subjectively "acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind" and that the injury or deprivation inflicted was
objectively serious enough to constitute a violation.
10
Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. On the subjective
element, an inmate must show that the guards used force "maliciously or sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm" rather than "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline."
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986)).
In assessing this element, a court should consider "(1) the need for the application of
force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent
of any reasonably perceived threat;" and "(4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response."
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,239 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 321).
As for the objective level of harm, a party asserting an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim must demonstrate that the officer used a "nontrivial" amount of force.
Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010). "[N]ot every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action."
Id at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Although inmates must
show the application of nontrivial force, an Eighth Amendment violation can occur even if that
force did not cause serious injury. Id at 38 ("[A]n inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards
does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good
fortune to escape without serious injury.").
"When prison officials maliciously and sadistically
use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated."
Hudson, 503
U.S. at 9. The extent to which injuries are modest is accounted for in the award of damages. See
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40.
Although Defendants
have provided statements, given during the lID investigation,
attesting to their recovery of a weapon from Fletcher during the cell search, where Fletcher has
consistently stated in all of his filings that he did not have a weapon on March 11, 2017, they
have at most create a genuine issue of material fact on that point. As for whether Defendants
11
used excessive
allegations,
force, they have not provided
particularly Fletcher's
sworn statements directly addressing those
claims that he was placed in a chokehold, hogtied, and
dropped on his head. Although the photographs of Fletcher taken immediately after the incident
do not appear to show any visible injuries, and Fletcher told Nurse Hall that he was not in pain,
these facts does not necessarily negate Fletcher's factual allegations, because serious injuries are
not necessary to succeed on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. See Wilkins, 559 U.S.
at 38. Therefore, the issue requires credibility determinations not appropriate for resolution on
summary judgment.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Nor are Defendants entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, at least based on the
record before the Court.
qualified immunity.
Government officials sued in their individual capacity may invoke
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391 (4th Cir. 2013). "Qualified immunity
protects government officials from civil damages in a
S
1983 action insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."
1999)).
Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,250
To overcome a claim of qualified immunity from a
S
(4th.Cir.
1983 claim, there must be a
showing that (1) the government official violated a federally protected right of the plaintiff; and
(2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, in that a "reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. If the Court determines
that the government official took actions that a reasonable officer could have believed were
lawful, then the official is entitled to dismissal before discovery. Id.
As discussed above, there remains a genuine issue of material fact whether, as Fletcher
alleges, the Officer Defendants entered Fletcher's cell on March 11, 2017 and assaulted him
without justification, including placing him in a chokehold and dropping him on his head after he
12
was hogtied. Such actions, if proven, would violate Fletcher's clearly established right to be free
from the malicious or sadistic use of harm by correctional officers. See, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9. Accordingly, summary judgment on Fletcher's excessive force claim based on qualified
immunity is not warranted at this time.
Because there are genuine issues of material fact relating to the incident on March 11,
2017, the Court will deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to the excessive force claim.
C.
Conditions of Confinement
Fletcher also challenges the conditions of his confinement in Cell 4C 1 from March 11,
2017 to March 17, 2017. The Eighth Amendment "protects inmates from inhumane treatment
and conditions while imprisoned."
1ko, 535 F.3d at 238 (quoting Williams, 77 F.3d at 761).
Conditions of confinement that "involve wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain," or which
"deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," may amount to cruel
and unusual punishment.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). However, conditions
that are merely restrictive or even harsh "are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society."
punishment
!d. In order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual
in conditions of confinement, a prisoner must prove two elements:
that '''the
deprivation of [a] basic human need was objectively sufficiently serious,' and that subjectively
the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.'''
166 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
"These requirements
Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162,
spring from the text of the
amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be
called 'punishment,'
and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called 'cruel and unusual.'''
1ko, 535 F.3d at 238 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,298-300
13
(1991)).
The objective prong of a conditions of confinement
'''produce
claim reqUIres the prisoner to
evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions,' or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the
prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions."
Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (quoting
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993)). Thus, "a condition of confinement
that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month
or year" violates the Eighth Amendment, even if "the complaining inmate shows no serious
current symptoms."
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993); Webb v. Debao, 423 F.
App'x 299, 300 (4th Cir. 2011). To establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be
evidence of deliberate indifference, in that a known excessive risk of harm to the inmate's health
or safety was disregarded.
See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991) (applying the
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). "(TJhe test is whether the
guards know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the
danger easily yet they fail to do so." Brown v. NC. Dep't a/Carr., 612 F.3d 720,723 (4th Cir.
2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605,607 (7th Cir. 2002)).
In response to a court order, Defendants filed photographs ofCell4C1
taken on March 1,
2018. The photos show a toilet, sink, and window, but no mattress or mirror. Although these
pictures were taken nearly a year after the incident, Fletcher does not dispute that these photos
accurately depict the condition of Cell 4C 1 on March 11, 2017.
While Defendants have
provided records supporting their claim that no work maintenance requests were submitted
during Fletcher's time in Cell 4C 1 and that he was offered opportunities for recreation and
showers, they have not offered any evidence that Fletcher was provided with clothing, hygiene
materials, or a mattress. Nor have Defendants specifically refuted Fletcher's claim that the cell
14
window was broken and that he was exposed to approximately 20-degree weather for six nights
with only a "thin blanket" to keep warm. Am. Compi. at 7.
On this record, the Court finds that summary judgment is not presently appropriate on
this claim. Most importantly, Fletcher has alleged a deprivation of an identifiable human needwarmth-as
a result of being housed almost naked in a cell with an allegedly broken window
under cold weather conditions, combined with a failure by prison staff to alleviate this condition
by fixing the window and issuing Fletcher clothing or an adequate blanket. See Wilson, 501 U.S.
at 304 ("Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation "in
combination" when each would not do so alone ... for example, a low cell temperature at night
combined with a failure to issue blankets.")
Moreover, Fletcher's allegation of a failure to issue eating utensils and sanitary items
such as soap, which forced Fletcher to eat food with his unwashed hands after using the toilet,
could raise hygiene concerns that implicate the Eighth Amendment and thus warrants additional
factual development.
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (l993) (holding that prison
officials may not "ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering" under the Eighth Amendment); cf McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d
1287, 1292 (lOth Cir. 2001) ("Not surprisingly, human waste has been considered particularly
offensive so that courts have been especially cautious about condoning conditions that include an
inmate's proximity to it.").
While Fletcher does not describe any injury as a result of his confinement in detail, he
does state that he seeks relief for his "pain and suffering ...
and stinking in that dirty butt naked room at 4Cl."
[f]or the seven days [he] was cold
Am. Compi. at 8. Where Defendants have
not offered sufficient facts to complete the record on these issues, additional factual development
15
is necessary to assess the conditions of Cell 4C 1, including whether the window was in fact open
and the temperatures to which Fletcher was exposed, whether he was deprived of clothing and
soap, and whether prison officials were aware of Fletcher's lack of warmth and potentially
unsanitary conditions.
For these same reasons, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Prisoners have a clearly established
temperatures.
right to avoid being intentionally
subjected to cold
See, e.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304; Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164-65 (2d
Cir. 2001); Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1994); see also McCray v.
Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 365-66, 368 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that a prisoner who was kept naked in
a cell that was so cold that the prisoner ripped open a mattress and slept inside it to keep warm
"came perilously close to a denial of Eighth Amendment rights" but required additional factual
development on the actual temperature of the cell). Under Fletcher's version of events, which
the Court must accept at this stage, reasonable correctional personnel could not have believed
that placing a prisoner for up to a week in a cell with a broken window in cold weather
conditions and providing him no clothes, no mattress, and a "thin blanket" was lawful. See id.
Therefore, the Court finds that Fletcher has asserted a viable conditions of confinement
claim. However, there is no allegation that any of the Defendants were aware of the conditions
in Cell 4C 1. Because Fletcher has not stated a claim against any current Defendant, the Court
will grant the Motion as to Fletcher's conditions of confinement claim and dismiss the claim as
to Defendants, but grant Fletcher leave to file an amended complaint that name additional
Defendants who are allegedly responsible for the conditions Cell 4C 1 endured by Fletcher.
16
D.
Due Process
Construed liberally, Fletcher claims that his due process rights were violated by false
statements made by Defendants and other personnel that were used in the prison administrative
proceeding which resulted in "220 days on lock-up, a year loss of visits and 185 days loss of
good days." CompI. at 4-7. Fletcher claims that he was denied the right to call witnesses in his
defense at the April 4, 2017 hearing when the institutional representative falsely reported that
inmate Thomas Vito refused to testify on his behalf. Fletcher cites to WoljJv. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), which held that inmates have a right to certain procedural
due process
protections in prison disciplinary proceedings, including the right to notice of a hearing, the right
to present evidence and call witnesses at a hearing, and a written statement of the reasons for a
decision.
Id. at 563-66.
More broadly, Fletcher argues that he was the victim of perjured
testimony at the hearing, which also deprived him of his due process rights.
1.
Disciplinary Segregation
To the extent that Fletcher's
disciplinary
segregation,
it necessarily
claim alleges a due process violation leading to his
fails.
Prisoners have a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment in avoiding confinement conditions that impose "atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472,484 (1995); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In Sandin, an
inmate who was sentenced to 30 days of disciplinary segregation, served that time, then had the
disciplinary decision overturned on appeal, filed a due process claim under 42 U.S.C.
S 1983.
Id.
at 476. The Court held that the disciplinary segregation, which did not affect the duration of the
prison sentence, did not present the type of deprivation that implicates a constitutional liberty
interest giving rise to due process rights.
Id. at 486.
17
Likewise, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding, and thus
no due process claim stemming from, placement in administrative segregation.
Beverati v.
Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502-04 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a due process claim by inmates held in
administrative segregation for six months after disciplinary charges were resolved). The court so
held even though the actual conditions in segregation were markedly "more burdensome than
those imposed on the general prison population," because those conditions were "not so atypical"
that they "imposed a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id.
at 504 (noting the inmates' claims that segregation included vermin-infested cells, human waste
in cells, leaking toilets, unbearable heat, less food, reduced access to clean clothes and linens,
reduced out-of-cell time, no outdoor recreation time, and no educational or religious services).
Thus, a due process claim relating to placement in disciplinary segregation can succeed only if
the prisoner can show "(1) denial of an 'interest that can arise either from the Constitution itself
or from state laws or policies'
and that (2) 'this denial imposed on him an atypical and
significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Prieto v. Clarke, 780
F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174,202 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Here, while Fletcher has offered evidence on the conditions of his confinement in Cell
4C 1 before his disciplinary hearing, he has neither argued for nor offered evidence to support a
finding that the conditions during his post-hearing period of disciplinary
segregation went
beyond those of Sandin or Beverati to meet the requirement of atypical and significant hardship.
The Court therefore
finds no due process violation arising from Fletcher's
disciplinary segregation.
18
placement
in
2.
Visitation
Likewise, Fletcher's
protected liberty interest.
loss of visitation privileges did not implicate a constitutionally
See Williams v. Ozmint; 716 F.3d 801, 807-08 n.9 (4th Cir. 2013)
(holding, in the context of a qualified immunity analysis, that a two-year suspension of an
inmate's visitation privileges did not violate a clearly established constitutional right); White v.
Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 120 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd per curiam 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1978)
(holding that there is no constitutional
procedural due process protections).
right to prison visitation privileges giving rise to
Accordingly,
the Court will grant the Motion as to
Fletcher's due process claims arising from his loss of visitation privileges.
3.
Good Conduct Credits
The Court does, however, find that Fletcher has stated a viable due process claim relating
to his loss of good conduct credits. In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that where an inmate faces
the possible loss of diminution or good time credits, the inmate is entitled to certain due process
protections, including the right to a hearing at which the inmate may call witnesses and present
evidence, so long as doing so is not "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals."
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66; Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 454 (1985).
If these procedural protections are provided, due process requires only that
"some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time
credits." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. This standard is met if "there was some evidence from which the
conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced."
Id. (quoting United States ex reI.
Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)). Federal courts do not review the
correctness of a disciplinary hearing officer's findings of fact. See Kelly v. Cooper, 502 F. Supp.
1371, 1376 (E.D. Va. 1980).
19
The record shows that the Hearing Officer relied on the statements of the institutional
representative as well as the Notice of Inmate Rule Violation completed by Dykes in which he
asserted that the search of Fletcher on March 11, 2017 revealed a weapon. Therefore, where the
Hearing Officer relied on "some evidence," the Court will not conduct a de novo review of that
determination.
See Martinez v. Young, 653 F. App'x 835, 836 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that a
federal court "need not undertake
Accordingly, Fletcher's
a de novo review of a [prison's]
claims that Defendants made false statements in reports relied upon
during the disciplinary proceedings cannot succeed.
assessing
whether
findings of fact").
a disciplinary
See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (holding that
hearing comported
"independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses");
with due process "does not require
Kelly, 502 F Supp. at 1376; see also
Keaton v. Vance, 56 F.3d 1385, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (rejecting a prisoner's claim
that prison officials had lied during his disciplinary hearing because the prisoner's contention
"was directly controverted by the [prison officials]" in their testimony and therefore "there was
'some evidence' to support the disciplinary action").
However, Fletcher's claim relating to the failure to allow him to call a witness may
proceed.
The right to call witnesses may be qualified in that a prison may refuse to allow
witnesses where there may be a risk of reprisal or the undermining of authority.
Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 566. For example, the Fourth Circuit has upheld a prison policy that limited inmates in high
security facilities to presenting other inmate witnesses through written rather than live testimony,
for security reasons. Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 504, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2004). In contrast, a
policy that denies all inmates the right to call any witness who will not appear voluntarily was
invalidated as effectively eviscerating the right to call witnesses. See Dalton v. Hutto, 713 F.2d
75, 78 (4th Cir. 1983).
20
Here, Fletcher has alleged that he was denied the right to call Vito as a witness because
the institutional representative falsely informed the Hearing Officer that Vito had declined to
testify.
Rather than invoking a particular policy or security reason as justification
exclusion of Vito, Defendants
reported Vito's status.
never refused to testify.
assert simply that the institutional
representative
for the
accurately
Fletcher, however, has presented an affidavit from Vito stating that he
If the institutional representative had suppressed Vito's testimony by
falsely claiming that Vito would not testify, Fletcher would likely have a viable due process
claim arising from the denial of his right to call witnesses.
Because there is a genuine issue of
material fact on whether such a denial occurred, Fletcher is entitled to continue to pursue the
claim.
As with his conditions of confinement claim, however, Fletcher does not allege that any
of the named Defendants was responsible for the alleged violation of his due process rights.
There is no allegation that the Warden or any other Defendant
directed the institutional
representative to falsify Vito's refusal. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion as to the
due process claim arising from Fletcher's loss of good conduct credits and dismiss that claim as
to Defendants, but grant Fletcher leave to file an amended complaint that names additional
Defendants who are allegedly responsible for a denial of the right to call witnesses.
E.
ARP Procedures
Construed liberally, Fletcher alleges that his ARP was referred to IID in order to "sweep
it under the rug," which violated his rights to have his ARP properly adjudicated. Am. Compl. at
6. "[I]nmates have no constitutional entitlement or due process interest in access to a grievance
procedure."
Booker v. S. Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017).
Because prisons do not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause when they
21
adopt administrative
mechanisms for hearing and deciding inmate complaints, the failure to
abide by those administrative mechanisms does not create a constitutional claim. See Ewell v.
Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 487-88 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Robinson v. Wexford, No. ELH-17-1467,
2017 WL 4838785, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 26,2017) ("[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that defendants
. .. did not satisfactorily investigate or respond to plaintiff's
administrative
grievances, no
underlying constitutional claim has been stated."); Ireland v. Morgan, No. WDQ-I0-1943,
WL 503820, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2012).
2012
Therefore, even if prison officials did not
satisfactorily investigate or respond to Fletcher's ARP, his claim fails as he has not demonstrated
any constitutional
injury.
Likewise, Fletcher's
claims of violations of various other prison
regulations do not assert constitutional injuries that can be addressed under
S
1983. See Sandin,
515 U.S. at 481-84 (noting that prison regulations are "primarily designed to guide correctional
officials in the administration of a prison," not "to confer rights on inmates," and that the liberty
interests arising from prison regulations are limited to freedom from punishment that exceeds the
sentence or conditions that impose "atypical and significant hardship" beyond "the ordinary
incidents of prison life").
Furthermore, Fletcher does not offer any credible evidence that ECI officials mishandled
his ARP.
The ARP was in fact referred to IID for investigation, and the IID investigator
interviewed Fletcher, Dykes, and Timmons as well as collected relevant documentary evidence
from the March 11, 2017 incident.
Rather than "sweep the issue under the rug," it appears that
ECI officials
resources
devoted
significant
to investigate
the March
11, 2017 incident.
Accordingly, the Court shall grant the Motion as to Fletcher's claims arising from the handling
of his ARP.
22
F.
Warden Foxwell
Defendants argue that Warden Foxwell is entitled to dismissal because he can be held
personally
liable only for his own wrongdoing or supervisory actions that are themselves
unconstitutional.
The doctrine of vicarious liability does not apply in
S
1983 claims. See Love-
Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior
liability under
S
1983).
In a
S
1983 suit, liability of supervisory officials is "premised on a
recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may
be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care."
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368,
. 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). Thus, to establish supervisory liability under
S 1983,
a plaintiff must show
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in
conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to individuals such
as the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show
deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practice; and (3) that there
was a causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 235.
Fletcher first notified the Warden's
office of the March 11, 2017 incident and the
conditions of Cell 4C 1 through his ARP, which was filed on March 18, 2017 and received by the
Warden's office on March 20, 2017, after his period of Staff Alert confinement was completed.
See ARP No. ECI-0682-17.
Fletcher does not allege that the Warden was aware that the Officer
Defendants intended to assault him during the March 11, 2017 cell search, or that he was aware
of the conditions in Cell4C1 during Fletcher's confinement.
Nor is the Warden alleged to have
been aware of any attempt to prevent Vito from testifying at the April 4 Hearing.
23
With the
impending dismissal of the allegations relating to the ARP process, Fletcher has offered no facts
establishing any personal involvement by the Warden in the events relating to any remaining
claims. Accordingly, the claims against Warden Foxwell will be dismissed.
G.
Criminal Prosecution
Finally, to the extent that Fletcher's request that Defendants be subjected to criminal
prosecution can be deemed an additional claim, it must be dismissed. Fletcher, a private citizen,
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution or non-prosecution of another.
See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Otero v. United States Attorney
General, 832 F.2d 141 (1Ith Cir. 1987). He is therefore not entitled to this type of relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Fletcher's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply, is DENIED,
and Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is denied as to Fletcher's claims of
excessive force by the Officer Defendants and granted in all other respects. The Court finds that
Fletcher has stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim arising from his conditions of confinement
in Cell 4C 1 and a viable procedural due process claim arising from the loss of his good conduct
credits. The Court shall grant Fletcher leave to amend the Complaint to name Defendants as to
each of those claims. Defendant Warden Foxwell is dismissed as a defendant in this case.
24
The Officer Defendants shall be ordered to file an Answer to Fletcher's remaining claims.
Because the case will now move into discovery, Fletcher will need counsel in order adequately to
advance his case. The Court will therefore appoint counsel to represent Fletcher in this matter.
A separate order shall issue.
Date: August 9,2018
THEODORE D. CHU
United States Distric
25
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