Williams v. Berryhill

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas M. DiGirolamo on 6/22/2018. (jrs, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
TAFT WILLIAMS, JR.,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
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Deputy Commissioner for Operations,
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Social Security Administration,
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Defendant.1
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************

Civil No. TMD 17-1083

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR REMAND
Plaintiff Taft Williams, Jr., seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or the
“Commissioner”) denying his applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and alternative motion for
remand (ECF No. 15) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20).2 Plaintiff
contends that the administrative record does not contain substantial evidence to support the
1

The positions of Commissioner of Social Security and Deputy Commissioner of Social Security
are vacant. Nancy A. Berryhill is performing the delegable duties and functions of the
Commissioner of Social Security. Brief for Respondent at 1 n.1, Culbertson v. Berryhill, No. 17773 (U.S. filed Apr. 5, 2018).
2

The Fourth Circuit has noted that, “in social security cases, we often use summary judgment as
a procedural means to place the district court in position to fulfill its appellate function, not as a
device to avoid nontriable issues under usual Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards.”
Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 289 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). For example, “the denial of summary
judgment accompanied by a remand to the Commissioner results in a judgment under sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is immediately appealable.” Id.

Commissioner’s decision that he is not disabled. No hearing is necessary. L.R. 105.6. For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.
I
Background
Born in 1962, Plaintiff has a GED and previously worked as a maintenance engineer and
quilting machine operator. R. at 24, 39-40. Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB on
April 4, 2013, and for SSI on April 19, 2013, alleging disability beginning on September 15,
2009, due to depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.

R. at 14, 212-15, 228.

The

Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and again on reconsideration, so Plaintiff
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). R. at 83-134, 139-52. On
July 31, 2015, ALJ Michael Carr held a hearing in Washington, D.C., at which Plaintiff and a
vocational expert (“VE”) testified. R. at 31-82. On August 26, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision
finding Plaintiff not disabled from the alleged onset date of disability of September 15, 2009,
through the date of the decision. R. at 11-30. Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the
Appeals Council, which denied Plaintiff’s request for review on February 15, 2017. R. at 1-5, 8.
The ALJ’s decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner.

See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.981, 416.1481; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 2083
(2000).
On April 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking review of the
Commissioner’s decision. Upon the parties’ consent, this case was transferred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment.

The case subsequently was

reassigned to the undersigned. The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully
submitted.

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II
Summary of Evidence
A.

State Agency Consultants
The ALJ noted in his decision:
Dr. Walls, the state agency reviewing psychologist, opined in June 2013 that
[Plaintiff] can understand and remember very short, simple instructions. He can
remember simple work locations and procedures.
He will have some
distractibility and slowed work pace because of his symptoms, but he can
maintain attention and concentration for two-hour periods over an eight-hour day
to carry out simple tasks at a productive pace. He will function best at tasks
involving little to no interaction with others, and he will have limited tolerance for
frequent, recurrent contact with the public. He can adapt to most changes and
task demands on a sustained basis[.]

R. at 22; see R. at 87-92, 98-103.
The ALJ further noted:
Dr. Mihm, the state agency reviewing psychologist, noted in August 2013
that [Plaintiff] can understand and remember very short, simple instructions. He
can remember simple work locations and procedures. He will have some
distractibility and slowed work pace because of his symptoms, but he can
maintain attention and concentration for two-hour periods over an eight-hour day
to carry out simple tasks at a productive pace. Occasionally his symptoms may
intrude on his concentration and the completion of a workday. He can relate to
others in the workplace on a superficial level, but he will perform best in a setting
that does not require extensive social interaction. He can avoid ordinary hazards,
and adapt to simple changes in the workplace, though changes should be
introduced slowly. He can set goals and plans in the workplace[.]
R. at 22; see R. at 112-17, 125-30.
B.

Plaintiff’s Testimony
The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s testimony in his decision:
[Plaintiff] is a 52-year-old man who is currently homeless, and splits time
between his mother’s apartment and a friend’s house. He testified that his mental
impairments prevent him from working because he is easily irritated, has a short
attention span, does not trust or get along with others, and has frequent
hallucinations. He receives treatment for these problems, but his symptoms
persist. He is able to shop, and use public transportation, though he is
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uncomfortable when the bus is crowded. He cleans his area when he is staying
with his mother, prepares his own meals, and does his own dishes, but he relies on
his mother to do his laundry. He goes shopping with assistance, and he is capable
of caring for his personal needs, but he does not always choose to do so. During
the day, he prepares breakfast and spends most of his time watching television or
sleeping. He has trouble following the plot of a television show, and can read for
just two or three minutes before he gets distracted. In the past, he used drugs and
alcohol, but he has remained substance-free since December 2014. Elsewhere,
[Plaintiff] added that he manages his own funds and follows instructions without
difficulty. He avoids spending time with others, and he does not deal well with
stress or changes to his routine[.]
R. at 20 (citing R. at 236-52, 261-69); see R. at 39-71.
C.

VE Testimony
The VE testified that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s same age, education, and

work experience and with the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) outlined below in Part III
could perform the jobs of hand packager, laundry worker, floor waxer, small-parts assembler,
electronics assembly worker, or laundry folder. R. at 74-76, 79-80. All work in the competitive
market would be unavailable to a person off task 20% of an eight-hour workday. R. at 80. The
tolerable threshold for off-task behavior in an eight-hour workday is up to 10%, in addition to
regular breaks. R. at 80. With the exception of her testimony regarding productivity levels,
among other things, the VE’s testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles.3 R. at 81.

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“The Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice of the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, which is published by the Department of Labor and gives detailed physical
requirements for a variety of jobs.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007);
see Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015); DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d
148, 151 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d)(1), 416.966(d)(1). “Information
contained in the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles] is not conclusive evidence of the existence
of jobs in the national economy; however, it can be used to establish a rebuttable presumption.”
English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1085 (4th Cir. 1993).
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III
Summary of ALJ’s Decision
On August 26, 2015, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability of September 15, 2009; and (2) had an
impairment or a combination of impairments considered to be “severe” on the basis of the
requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (but did not have any medically determinable
impairment as of his date last insured of December 31, 2011); but (3) did not have an impairment
or a combination of impairments meeting or equaling one of the impairments set forth in 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; and (4) was unable to perform his past relevant work; but
(5) could perform other work in the national economy, such as a hand packager, laundry worker,
floor waxer, small-parts assembler, electronics assembly worker, or laundry folder. R. at 16-25.
The ALJ thus found that he was not disabled from September 15, 2009, through the date of the
decision. R. at 25.
In so finding, the ALJ found that, with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace,
Plaintiff had moderate difficulties. R. at 18.
He has indicated that he has trouble sustaining attention for items he does not find
interesting, and he testified that he can read for just two or three minutes before he
gets distracted. Nonetheless, treating and examining clinicians typically fail to
describe any deficits in his attention, concentration, or memory during
appointments, and he is able to prepare meals, manage his own funds, and take
public transportation, which all require him to sustain some degree of attention
and concentration. For these reasons, he has a moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
R. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: he is limited to performing
simple, routine, repetitive tasks. He is limited to making simple work-related decisions. He can
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tolerate occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers, but he cannot tolerate contact with
the public.” R. at 19. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s credibility and found that his “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;
however, [his] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” R. at 20.
IV
Disability Determinations and Burden of Proof
The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can
be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the
region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”

42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124
S. Ct. 376, 379-80 (2003). “If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made,
the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further.” Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24, 124 S. Ct. at
379; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production

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and proof at steps one through four. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct.
2287, 2294 n.5 (1987); Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s work activity. If the claimant is
engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled.

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner
looks to see whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment, i.e., an impairment or combination
of impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),
404.1521(a), 416.920(c), 416.921(a).4
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the
medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively
disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled,
regardless of age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Radford, 734 F.3d at 293.
Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the
presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant’s RFC to
determine the claimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements”
of the claimant’s past relevant work.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4),

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The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do
most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include
(1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching,
carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding,
carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes
in a routine work setting. Id. §§ 404.1521(b)(1)-(6), 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Yuckert, 482 U.S. at
141, 107 S. Ct. at 2291.
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416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite
his or her limitations. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).

The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the

Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant’s RFC, but the Commissioner is
responsible for developing the claimant’s “complete medical history, including arranging for a
consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the
claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant’s] own medical sources.”

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical
evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to
perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled.

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant’s RFC as determined in step four will not allow the claimant to
perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is
other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s RFC as determined at step four, age,
education, and work experience. See Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012).
The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant’s RFC will allow the claimant to make
an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.

See Walls, 296 F.3d at 290; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not
disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will
find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).

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V
Substantial Evidence Standard
The Court reviews an ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards and whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. See
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). In other words, the issue before the Court “is
not whether [Plaintiff] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the
relevant law.” Id. The Court’s review is deferential, as “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this standard, substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is
enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.
See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct.
1420, 1427 (1971).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court does “not
conduct a de novo review of the evidence,” Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir.
1986), or undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Rather, “[t]he
duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court.” Smith v.
Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). When conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to
differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.
Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

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VI
Discussion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously assessed his RFC contrary to Social Security
Ruling5 (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3-7,
ECF No. 15-1. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to perform properly a function-by-function
assessment of his ability to perform the physical and mental demands of work. Id. at 5. In
particular, he contends that, although the ALJ found that he had moderate difficulties with regard
to concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ failed to include any limitation on concentration,
persistence, or pace in the RFC assessment. Id. Rather, the ALJ limited him to the performance
of “simple, routine, repetitive tasks.” Id. For the reasons discussed below, the Court remands
this case for further proceedings.
SSR 96-8p explains how adjudicators should assess RFC and instructs that the RFC
“assessment must first identify the individual’s functional limitations or
restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function
basis, including the functions” listed in the regulations. “Only after that may
[residual functional capacity] be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of
work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy.” The Ruling further
explains that the residual functional capacity “assessment must include a narrative
discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific
medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily
activities, observations).”
Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held, however, that a per se rule requiring remand

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Social Security Rulings are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and
interpretations” that the Social Security Administration has adopted. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1).
Once published, these rulings are binding on all components of the Social Security
Administration. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 1532, 1534 n.3 (1984);
20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). “While they do not have the force of law, they are entitled to
deference unless they are clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the law.” Pass, 65 F.3d at 1204
n.3.
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when the ALJ does not perform an explicit function-by-function analysis “is inappropriate given
that remand would prove futile in cases where the ALJ does not discuss functions that are
‘irrelevant or uncontested.’” Id. (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam)). Rather, remand may be appropriate “where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s
capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where
other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Id. (quoting Cichocki,
729 F.3d at 177). The court in Mascio concluded that remand was appropriate because it was
“left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions on [the claimant’s] ability to perform
relevant functions” because the ALJ had “said nothing about [the claimant’s] ability to perform
them for a full workday,” despite conflicting evidence as to the claimant’s RFC that the ALJ did
not address. Id. at 637; see Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 187-88 (4th Cir. 2016) (remanding
because ALJ erred in not determining claimant’s RFC using function-by-function analysis; ALJ
erroneously expressed claimant’s RFC first and then concluded that limitations caused by
claimant’s impairments were consistent with that RFC).
The Fourth Circuit further held in Mascio that “an ALJ does not account ‘for a claimant’s
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to
simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.’” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011)). “[T]he ability to perform simple tasks
differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would account for a claimant’s
limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. The court in Mascio remanded the case for
the ALJ to explain why the claimant’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace
at step three did not translate into a limitation in the claimant’s RFC. Id. In other words,
“[p]ursuant to Mascio, once an ALJ has made a step three finding that a claimant suffers from

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moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ must either include a
corresponding limitation in her RFC assessment, or explain why no such limitation is necessary.”
Talmo v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec., Civil Case No. ELH-14-2214, 2015 WL 2395108, at *3 (D. Md.
May 19, 2015), report and recommendation adopted (D. Md. June 5, 2015).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace were moderate because he “remains able to prepare simple meals, take public
transportation, and manage his own funds, which all require him to follow instructions or
procedures and sustain some degree of attention and concentration.” R. at 22; see R. at 19. The
ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE and the corresponding RFC assessment limiting Plaintiff
to “performing simple, routine, repetitive tasks” where he “can tolerate occasional contact with
supervisors and coworkers, but he cannot tolerate contact with the public” (R. at 19; see R. at 7475) do not account for Plaintiff’s moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace, however. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638; Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting contention that “the ALJ accounted for [the claimant’s]
limitations of concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the inquiry to simple, routine
tasks that do not require constant interactions with coworkers or the general public”); 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.00(C)(2). Because the Court cannot discern the reason why the
ALJ’s RFC assessment did not include any limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to sustain tasks, the
Court remands this matter for further proceedings. See Claiborne v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Civil No. SAG-14-1918, 2015 WL 2062184, at *3-4 (D. Md. May 1, 2015).
The ALJ, moreover, failed to explain how, despite Plaintiff’s moderate difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, he could remain on task for at least 90% of an
eight-hour workday. The ALJ “must both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and

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‘build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.’”

Woods v.

Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at
189). In particular, the ALJ “must build a logical bridge between the limitations he finds and the
VE evidence relied upon to carry the Commissioner’s burden at step five in finding that there are
a significant number of jobs available to a claimant.” Brent v. Astrue, 879 F. Supp. 2d 941, 953
(N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011)). An ALJ’s failure to
do so constitutes reversible error. See Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 (4th Cir. 2017). In
short, the inadequacy of the ALJ’s analysis frustrates meaningful review.

See Lanigan v.

Berryhill, 865 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (remanding because, inter alia, ALJ did not build
accurate and logical bridge between claimant’s moderate difficulties in various functional areas
and ALJ’s finding that claimant would not be off task more than 10% of workday); Ashcraft v.
Colvin, No. 3:13-cv-00417-RLV-DCK, 2015 WL 9304561, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2015)
(remanding under fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because court was unable to review
meaningfully ALJ’s decision that failed to explain exclusion from RFC assessment an additional
limitation of being 20% off task that VE testified would preclude employment). Remand under
the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) thus is appropriate for this reason as well. See Mascio,
780 F.3d at 636.
VII
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) is
DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s
alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED. Defendant’s final decision is

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REVERSED under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A separate order will issue.

Date: June 22, 2018

/s/
Thomas M. DiGirolamo
United States Magistrate Judge

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