Gbadamosi v. Stewart, Warden
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 1/3/2018. (c/m 1/4/2018 aos, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 1/4/2018 (aos, Deputy Clerk).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TAOFIK GBADAMOSI,
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Petitioner,
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v.
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TIMOTHY STEWART, WARDEN,
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Respondent.
Civil Action No. PWG-17-1210
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-Represented Petitioner Taofik Gbadamosi, a federal inmate currently housed at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his prison disciplinary conviction for fighting
with another inmate. Pet., ECF No. 1. Gbadamosi seeks an expungement of the guilty finding
and a remand to the institution to restore 27 days of lost good conduct time (“GCT”) days. Id.
Pending before this Court is Respondent Warden Timothy Stewart’s Motion to Dismiss,
or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Resp’t’s Mot., ECF No. 3. Stewart argues that
Gbadamosi is not entitled to the relief he seeks because he failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies regarding his disciplinary hearing and he has received all of the due process to which
he was entitled. Id. Gbadamosi has filed a response in opposition, Pet.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 7, and
Stewart has filed a reply, Resp’t’s Reply 10. After review of the record, exhibits, and applicable
law, I have concluded that a hearing is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016).
For reasons set forth below, the Stewart’s motion, construed as a Motion for Summary
Judgment, shall be GRANTED, and the petition shall be DENIED and DISMISSED.
Background
Gbadamosi is currently serving an aggregated seven-year sentence following his
convictions for conspiring to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. Gyurke Aff. ¶ 3,
ECF No. 3-2. On September 21, 2016, Gbadamosi was involved in an altercation with another
inmate while standing in line for dinner. See Gyurke Aff. ¶ 5; Pet. 7. The inmate hit Gbadamosi
in the face. See Gyurke Aff. ¶ 5; Pet. 7; Discipline Rep. 2, ECF 1-1. Gbadamosi then pushed the
inmate back in his chest and grabbed him by his shirt, pinning the inmate against the sink behind
the serving line. Discipline Report 2. Gbadamosi maintains that he was acting in self-defense.
See Pet. 7. Both inmates were then separated, at the direction of staff. Id.
The next day, Gbadamosi received an incident report charging him under Code 201 with
fighting. Discipline Report. On September 28, 2016, the charge was presented to the Unit
Discipline Committee (“UDC”), which found that the sanctions warranted were not available at
the UDC level. Gyurke Aff. ¶ 6. The UDC referred the matter to the Discipline Hearing Officer
(“DHO”) and recommended that if Gbadamosi was found guilty, he should receive the maximum
loss of GCT and visitation. Id. That same day, Gbadamosi received and signed a “Notice of
Discipline Hearing Before the DHO,” acknowledging that he had read and understood his rights.
Gyurke Aff. ¶ 7; Discipline Report 1. The form reflects that Gbadamosi was advised of his right
to the assistance of a staff representative, to call witnesses, and present documentary evidence on
his behalf at the discipline hearing. Discipline Report 1. Gbadamosi initially requested a staff
representative, but ultimately stated that he wished to proceed with the hearing without one. Id.
Gbadamosi also declined to call witnesses on his behalf. Id.
The DHO conducted the discipline hearing on October 5, 2016, and concluded that the
greater weight of the evidence supported the charge of fighting, based on the incident report
written by an officer who witnessed the altercation as well as the supporting memoranda from
staff, clinical assessments of both Gbadamosi and the inmate, and Gbadamosi’s own statements.
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Gyurke Aff. ¶ 9–10.
The DHO considered Gbadamosi’s statement of self-defense and
determined that Gbadamosi’s actions demonstrated that he was a mutual participant in the
argument and physical altercation. Id. at ¶ 10. The DHO sanctioned Gbadamosi with the loss of
27 days of GCT and 90 days of commissary privileges, and imposed seven days of disciplinary
segregation. Id. These sanctions were within the applicable sanction guidelines for a Code 201
offense. Id.
Gbadamosi appealed the DHO finding by filing an administrative remedy submission at
the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office level.
Discipline Report 4.
On January 31, 2017,1
Gbadamosi’s appeal was denied. Id. at 5. Gbadamosi alleges that he then appealed that denial to
the Central Office. See Pet. 7; Discipline Report 6. There is nothing in the record, however, to
indicate that the Central Office received such an appeal. Under the Administrative Program,
upon receiving a request or appeal, the administrative remedy clerk stamps the form with the
date received, and logs it into the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) SENTRY index as
received on that date. Admin. Remedy Program 9, ECF 10-1. Nothing in the SENTRY records
show that Gbadamosi appealed to the Central Office. According to Gbadamosi, Central Office
“ignored [his] appeal submission” and as such, he urges this Court to deem his administrative
remedies exhausted. Pet. 7.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The court should “view the evidence in the
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The administrative paperwork denying Gbadamosi’s appeal appears to have an error. The date
on which the appeal was denied was stamped as January 31, 2016, although the appeal was not
filed until December 8, 2016. Discipline Report 5. Howard Williams’s Affidavit confirms that it
was denied on January 31, 2017. Williams Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 3-3.
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light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing
the evidence or assessing the witness’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc.,
290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that
any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
The court reviewing the motion must abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial
judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v.
Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)). “A party opposing a properly supported
motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. at 522 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A dispute of material fact is only “genuine” if
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for
that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
Administrative Exhaustion
The Administrative Remedy Procedure in place for BOP facilities provides that if an
inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he may file a formal written complaint on
the proper form within 20 calendar days of the date of the occurrence on which the complaint is
based. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If an inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response, he
may appeal to the Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the Warden’s response. See 28
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C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If the inmate still is not satisfied, he may appeal the Regional Director’s
response to the Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C., using the appropriate form. Id.
The inmate must file this final appeal within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director
signed the response. Id.
An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies until he has filed
his complaint at all levels. See id.; see also Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir.
2003) (noting that a prisoner must appeal administrative rulings “to the highest possible
administrative level”). The Supreme Court has held that “proper exhaustion of administrative
remedies . . . ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the
agency addresses the issues on the merits).’” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir.2002)).
Here, it is undisputed that Gbadamosi appealed the DHO’s decision to the Regional
Director.
There is insufficient evidence, however, to show that Gbadamosi appealed the
Regional Director’s denial to the Office of General Counsel. While Gbadamosi claims that he
mailed the appropriate form to the General Counsel in February of 2017, his documentation
indicates otherwise. Along with his Petition to this Court, Gbadamosi attached the form that he
allegedly sent to the General Counsel. That form, however, does not reflect that it was ever
properly submitted and received at the Central Office, both on its face and as recorded in the
BOP’s administrative remedy records. Rather, BOP records show that Gbadamosi never filed
any further administrative appeals.
Accordingly, Gbadamosi failed to fully exhaust his
administrative remedies and his Petition is dismissed.
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Due Process
But even if Gbadamosi fully exhausted his administrative remedies, he presents no
grounds for habeas relief. Gbadamosi alleges that another inmate, Robinson, witnessed the
altercation, but Robinson was not interviewed despite Gbadamosi’s request that Robinson’s
account of the altercation be placed on the record. To the extent Gbadamosi is asserting that his
procedural due process rights were violated by not being afforded the opportunity to call
Robinson as a witness at his DHO hearing, this claim is without merit. Moreover, the DHO’s
finding that Gbadamosi committed the prohibited act of fighting was supported by
constitutionally adequate evidence.
The Supreme Court has articulated the standards to which all prison disciplinary
proceedings must adhere in order to ensure that inmates’ liberty interests are protected by due
process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings
are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply.” Id. Rather, where an inmate faces the possible disciplinary
sanctions, he is entitled to certain due process protections, including: (1) written notice of the
charges at least 24 hours in advance of his appearance before the prison disciplinary board; (2)
an impartial decision-maker; (3) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence
at the hearing where such would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals; (4) the opportunity to have non-attorney representation when the inmate is illiterate or the
disciplinary proceeding involves complex issues; and (5) a written statement by prison
disciplinary officials as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for taking any disciplinary
action. Id. at 564-71; see also Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2004). As long as
these requirements are met, due process is satisfied. See id. at 563.
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Here, Gbadamosi was not denied any due process rights afforded to him under Wolff.
First, he was provided written notice of his charges in the form of the incident report on
September 22, 2016, which was more than 24 hours prior to the hearing held on October 5, 2016.
Second, the matter was heard by the DHO, who was not a witness to the incident. Third,
Gbadamosi was afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence on
his behalf, but he declined to do so. Gbadamosi’s decision not to call any witnesses is evident
from his signature on two separate forms stating that he did not wish to call witnesses. Fourth,
he was offered the assistance of a staff representative at the hearing. Although Gbadamosi
initially requested a staff representative, he ultimately declined the assistance. Finally, he was
provided a written statement, the DHO report, stating the evidence relied upon and reasons for
taking the disciplinary actions. As such, Gbadamosi failed to state a claim for relief for violation
of his due process rights.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the “requirements of due process are
satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good
time credits.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
“This standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the
administrative tribunal could be deduced.’” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r
of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)). In essence, “courts are to give deference to prison
officials and should intercede in prison discipline cases only when the sanctions are wholly
unsupported by the record.” Gomez v. Graves, 323 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Hill,
472 U.S. at 455-56).
For example, in Hill, the Supreme Court found that a prison disciplinary board met due
process requirements when it revoked inmates’ good time credits based on an officer’s indirect
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observation that they had assaulted another inmate. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 447-48, 456-57. There,
the officer heard an inmate twice loudly say, “What’s going on,” saw an inmate bleeding from
the mouth and suffering from a swollen eye, and saw the charged inmates jogging away from the
scene. Id. at 447–48. Even though there was no direct evidence that any one of the charged
inmates had committed the assault, the Court concluded that the “meager” evidence was
nevertheless sufficient to meet the due process requirement. Id. at 457.
In this instance, the evidence was far from meager. The DHO relied on direct evidence
from the reporting officer, who stated that he saw another inmate push Gbadamosi in the face
and that Gbadamosi shoved the inmate back in his chest and grabbed him by the shirt, pinning
the inmate against a nearby sink.
In addition to this eyewitness account, the DHO also
considered Gbadamosi’s admission that he put his hands on the inmate’s chest to stop him. Id.
After considering the report and Gbadamosi’s defense, the DHO determined that Gbadamosi’s
actions demonstrated that he participated in the prohibited act of fighting. Taken together, there
is much more than “some evidence” to support this finding. Accordingly, the Petition is denied.
Conclusion
I conclude that no genuine issue as to any material fact is presented and Respondent is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment shall be entered in favor of
Respondent and the petition shall be denied and dismissed by separate Order.
Dated: January 3, 2018
/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge
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