Johnson v. Board of Education of Prince George's County

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 1/28/2021. (heps, Deputy Clerk)

Case 8:17-cv-01246-GJH Document 22 Filed 01/28/21 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

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DR. RUTH JOHNSON,
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Plaintiff,
v.

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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY,

Case No.: GJH-17-1246

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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Dr. Ruth Johnson brought this civil action against Defendant Board of Education
of Prince George’s County, alleging Defendant unlawfully deprived her of her property interest
in her continued employment without due process, in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights, and retaliated against her for her previous complaints of discrimination
involving Defendant, in violation of Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation. ECF No. 1.
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment on Behalf of the Defendant (“Motion to Dismiss”). ECF No. 19. No hearing
is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background1

Plaintiff is a guidance counselor with a permanent back injury that makes it difficult for

1

Unless otherwise stated, the background facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 1, and are
presumed to be true.

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her to walk without assistance. ECF No. 1 at 3.2 In January 2008, Plaintiff was assigned to Largo
High School in order to accommodate her disability—her office was located near the student
record room and close to the bathroom, minimizing Plaintiff’s need to walk long distances—and
worked under Principal Angelique Simpson-Marcus. Id. at 3–4.
In October 2008, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Interim Superintendent Dr. William
Hite, during which she informed Dr. Hite that Principal Simpson-Marcus was harassing a white
teacher because of his race as well as harassing African American secretaries. Id. at 4. Dr. Hite
refused to accept documentation supporting Plaintiff’s complaints, and no investigation was ever
conducted regarding Plaintiff’s allegations. Id. Although Dr. Hite assured Plaintiff there would
be no retaliation, three days later, Principal Simpson-Marcus informed Plaintiff that she would
be moved, despite her disability, to a different office farther from the student records room and
the bathroom. Id. Plaintiff’s office was never moved, however, because Plaintiff filed a
retaliation complaint with the PGCPS Equity Assurance Office. Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff was
verbally insulted by Principal Simpson-Marcus until she was transferred to Bladensburg High
School in August 2009. Id. at 5.
In May 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court related to the aforementioned
events, alleging various claims against Defendant and Prince George’s County Educator’s
Association, including a Title VII claim for retaliation. Id. at 5; see Complaint, Johnson v. Bd. of
Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., No. 11-1195-PJM (D. Md. May 5, 2011), ECF No. 1.3 On
October 26, 2011, this Court issued a Scheduling Order, and, pursuant to that Order, Defendant

2

Pin cites to documents filed on the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system.
3
“[E]ven at the pleadings stage, the Court ‘may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including court and
administrative filings.’” Dyer v. Md. State Bd. of Educ., 187 F. Supp. 3d 599, 608 (D. Md. 2016) (quoting Fakhoury
v. Great N. Ins. Co., Civ. No. WDQ-12-02268, 2012 WL 1554487, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2012)).

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scheduled Plaintiff’s oral deposition for February 2012. ECF No. 1 at 5.
In November 2011, Principal Glynis Jordan, the principal at Bladensburg High School,
requested that Plaintiff review a student’s Section 504 Accessibility Plan.4 Id. This student had
not previously been assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff did not know the student. Id. Plaintiff,
however, attended a Student Instructional Team (“SIT”) meeting on November 30, 2011 in order
to get current information about the student. Id. at 6. Based on the information gathered at the
SIT meeting, Plaintiff updated and submitted the student’s Section 504 Accessibility Plan—as is
allegedly customary at Bladensburg High School. Id.
On February 8, 2012, Plaintiff received an email informing her that she was to attend a
meeting on February 16, 2012 in order to discuss an issue regarding a 504 plan. Id. The email
informed her that the meeting was a Loudermill hearing—i.e., a pre-termination hearing—but
did not include any other details. Id. The following day, Plaintiff requested a written explanation
as to what would be discussed at the Loudermill hearing, a production of all relevant documents,
information regarding whose 504 Plan was at issue, and a description of the alleged issue with
the 504 Plan. Id. In response, Plaintiff was informed that she was to report to the meeting on
February 16 and that all information would be provided to her and her union representative at
that time. Id. at 6–7. She was also informed that she would have an opportunity to review the
information and respond in writing. Id.
Plaintiff emailed the Director of Employee and Labor Relations for Prince George’s
County Schools, Mr. James Whattam, on February 11, 2012 to express concerns regarding the
upcoming meeting, explaining that she had an ongoing legal action against Prince George’s

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“A 504 Plan serves to provide a child who has a disability identified under the law, and who is attending an
educational institution, accommodations intended to ensure his or her academic success and access to the learning
environment.” In re J.B., No. 2147, 2017 WL 2729877, *2 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 26, 2017).

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County Schools. Id. at 7. In response, Mr. Whattam clarified that the “due process” meeting was
to address the legitimacy of a 504 plan dated November 30, 2011 that Plaintiff prepared for a
student. Id. Plaintiff then informed Mr. Whattam that she would choose her own representative
and that she would bring legal counsel. Id. Mr. Whattam responded that Plaintiff could bring a
union representative but she was not entitled to legal counsel; however, he informed Plaintiff that
her counsel could attend the meeting as a courtesy. Id.
The Loundermill hearing took place on February 16, 2012. Id. During the hearing,
Defendant accused Plaintiff of forging the names of other school employees on the 504 plan, an
accusation which Plaintiff denied. Id.
The following day, Defendant deposed Plaintiff pursuant to the October 2011 Scheduling
Order in the case initiated by Plaintiff’s May 2011 Complaint filed with this Court. Id. During
this deposition, Plaintiff gave sworn testimony that she had complained to Dr. Hite in October
2008 about Principal Simpson-Marcus’s harassment of staff and that Dr. Hite never followed up.
Id. at 7–8.
On March 21, 2012, Dr. Hite issued a letter informing Plaintiff that he would be
recommending to the Board of Education of Prince George’s County Public Schools—i.e.,
Defendant—that she be terminated as a Guidance Counselor. Id. at 8. Dr. Hite accused Plaintiff
of forging documents to show that a 504 meeting took place and of willful neglect of duty. Id.
The letter suspended Plaintiff from her position without pay. Id.
B.

Administrative and State Court Procedural Background5

Following Dr. Hite’s letter recommending Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff sought review
of her termination under Md. Code. Ann., Educ. § 6-202 by requesting a full evidentiary hearing

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The facts in this section are taken from court and administrative filings attached to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff has not contested the authenticity of these documents.

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before Defendant. ECF No. 19-3 at 2. The appeal was referred to a hearing examiner. Id.
After the referral of Plaintiff’s appeal but before the hearing took place, Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Dismiss with the hearing examiner. Id. at 3. Hearing Examiner Jerome Stanbury, Esq.
denied Plaintiff’s Motion after the issue was fully briefed. Id. In denying Plaintiff’s Motion to
Dismiss, Hearing Examiner Stanbury concluded that Plaintiff “received all procedural due
process required by law.” Id. Hearing Examiner Stanbury then conducted a hearing on June 25,
2014, and July 1, 2014, at which both parties were represented by counsel. Id.; ECF No. 19-4 at
2.
Hearing Examiner Stanbury issued his Findings of Fact and Law on September 28, 2014,
and recommended that Plaintiff be terminated for willful neglect of duty. ECF No. 19-3 at 3;
ECF No. 19-4 at 18–19. The hearing examiner’s findings included a finding that “Dr. Johnson’s
failure to perform a proper 504 meeting as requested by Glynis Jordan was both willful and
neglectful of her duty, which she owed to the student, the parent, the teacher, and the Principal of
Bladensburg High School.” ECF No. 19-4 at 18.
Defendant then heard oral argument on June 23, 2015, and, on July 15, 2015,
“ORDERED that the Board of Education upholds the Hearing Examiner’s recommendation that
the Appellant be terminated on the ground of willful neglect of duty[.]” ECF No. 19-3 at 3. In so
ruling, Defendant found that: (1) Plaintiff’s “argument that she has not received due process is
without merit[;]” and (2) Plaintiff’s “failure to perform a proper 504 meeting as requested . . .
was both willful and neglectful of her duty, which she owed to the student, the parent, the teacher
and the Principal of Bladensburg High School.” Id. at 3–4.
Next, Plaintiff timely appealed Defendant’s decision to the Maryland State Board of
Education (“State Board”). ECF No. 19-5 at 2. The State Board referred the case to the Office of

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Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) per the Code of Maryland Regulations. Id. at 2, 11.
Subsequently, on October 9, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Affirmance with the
OAH, which was denied on November 10, 2015. Id. at 11. Also on October 9, 2015, Plaintiff
filed a Motion to Supplement Record, “requesting that she be permitted to testify concerning
alleged procedural deficiencies in her pre-termination hearing.” Id. OAH granted Plaintiff’s
request. Id.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on December 14, 2014, where
both parties were represented by counsel. Id. At the hearing two issues were discussed: (1) Was
Plaintiff “provided with due process by way of a pre-termination hearing under Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)?”; and (2) Did the Defendant “properly
terminate[] [Plaintiff], as set forth in its notice of action?” Id. After considering both parties’
arguments and the record on appeal, on March 14, 2016, the ALJ issued a proposed decision
“recommending that the State Board uphold [Defendant’s] termination decision.” Id. at 2.
In the proposed decision, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s procedural argument was
founded in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 22, but found that, as a
matter of law, Plaintiff “was provided with sufficient pre-termination due process” under the
Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 34. The ALJ also found that the “record supports a finding that
[Plaintiff] willfully failed to schedule the required Section 504 Plan meeting for A.C. and that the
Board was justified in terminating [Plaintiff] as a result.” Id.
After the ALJ issued her decision, Plaintiff filed two exceptions to the proposed decision
with the State Board: (1) Plaintiff argued that she was denied due process as part of her pretermination hearing; and (2) Plaintiff argued she did not commit willful neglect of duty by failing
to schedule a Section 504 Plan meeting. Id. at 2, 4–9. The State Board heard oral argument on

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October 25, 2016, and ultimately denied Plaintiff’s exceptions and affirmed Defendant’s
termination of Plaintiff for willful neglect of duty. Id. at 2, 9.
Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff sought judicial review of the
State Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (“Circuit Court”). ECF
No. 19-6 at 3. A hearing was held on December 8, 2017, and both parties, through their
respective counsel, presented arguments. Id. at 8. The Circuit Court issued an oral ruling from
the bench, affirming the State Board’s decision and again upholding Plaintiff’s termination. Id.
Plaintiff again appealed. Appealing to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (“Court
of Special Appeals”), Plaintiff presented two questions for review: (1) “Did the State Board err
when it upheld [Defendant’s] determination that [Plaintiff] was afforded sufficient pretermination due process as provided in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 480 U.S.
532 (1985)?”; and (2) “Did the State Board err when it upheld [Defendant’s] decision to
discharge [Plaintiff] because she had willfully neglected her duty?” Id. at 3. On May 22, 2019,
the Court of Special Appeals—like the Hearing Examiner, the Local Board (Defendant), the
ALJ, the State Board, and the Circuit Court—rejected Plaintiff’s arguments and upheld
Plaintiff’s termination. Id. at 15 (“we find no error by the State Board in concluded that
[Plaintiff] was adequately informed of the nature of the charges against her, and, afforded
sufficient pre-termination due process”); id. at 18 (“there was substantial evidence to support the
State Board’s affirmance of [Defendant’s] decision to terminate [Plaintiff’s] employment for
willful neglect of duty”).
C.

Federal Court Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 15, 2017. ECF No. 1. Defendant filed a consent
Motion to Stay Further Proceedings on July 24, 2017, requesting that the Court stay this action

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pending the resolution of the parallel state court proceedings which involved “the same parties,
arises out of the same set of operative facts, and involves substantially the same questions of
law[.]” ECF No. 6 at 2. This Court granted the consent Motion to Stay on August 8, 2017. ECF
No. 7. The action remained stayed for over two years with the parties periodically filing Status
Reports, ECF Nos. 9, 11, 12, 15, to update the Court on the progress of the state court litigation.
On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a status report notifying the Court of the decision by
the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court. ECF No. 15. On October 16, 2019, the
Court ordered Defendant to file an answer or a motion to dismiss within twenty-one days. ECF
No. 18. Defendant complied, filing the instant Motion to Dismiss on November 6, 2019. ECF
No. 19. Plaintiff responded in opposition on November 18, 2019, ECF No. 20, and Defendant
replied in support of its motion on December 2, 2019, ECF No. 21.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not
to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of the claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). If an affirmative defense “‘clearly appears on the face of the

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complaint,’” however, the Court may rule on that defense when considering a motion to dismiss.
Kalos v. Centennial Sur. Assocs., No. CCB-12-1532, 2012 WL 6210117, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 12,
2012) (quoting Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000)) (granting defendants’
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds because plaintiff’s
statement in his complaint that bonds were fraudulent or invalid was refuted in prior judicial
proceedings). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” and must “draw all reasonable
inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon
Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles Cty
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations,
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
references to actual events, United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th
Cir. 1979). The Court must abide by its “affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Accepting the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true, see Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388,
390 (4th Cir. 2011), when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court “may consider documents
attached to the complaint, as well as documents attached to the motion to dismiss, if they are
integral to the complaint and their authenticity is not disputed[,]” Sposato v. First Mariner Bank,
No. CCB-12-1569, 2013 WL 1308582, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2013). The Court “may take
judicial notice of matters of public record, including court and administrative filings.” Dyer v.
Md. State Bd. of Educ., 187 F. Supp. 3d 599, 608 (D. Md. 2016) (taking judicial notice of

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documents attached to the parties’ briefings including “opinions and orders of the Maryland
OAH, the State Board, and state courts”). Specifically, in considering the res judicata and
collateral estoppel defenses at the motion to dismiss stage, a court may consider the “documents
from the underlying case.” King v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. GJH-16-3489, 2017 WL
4250509, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2017); see Lara v. Suntrust Mortg. Inc., No. DKC-16-0145,
2016 WL 3753155, at *1 n.1, *6 (D. Md. July 14, 2016) (considering “relevant documentation
regarding the Property and the foreclosure proceedings and sale” attached by Defendants to
motion to dismiss to substantiate a claim of res judicata); Johnson v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.,
No. PWG-15-558, 2015 WL 7769502, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 17, 2015) (granting defendant’s
motion to dismiss after determining, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, that plaintiff could
not relitigate “the bona fides of his purported settlement letter” which had been previously
rejected by another court).
III.

DISCUSSION
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant asserts that principals of administrative collateral

estoppel and res judicata bar Plaintiff’s claims in the instant case. ECF No. 19. Specifically,
Defendant claims that “[t]he dispositive issues of the instant action—i.e. whether Plaintiff was
accorded due process and whether there was a legitimate basis for her termination—have already
been decided by an administrative agency and affirmed upon judicial review[,]” precluding
Plaintiff from re-litigating those issues here. ECF No. 19-1 at 5. The Court will consider the
applicability of Defendant’s preclusion arguments to each of Plaintiff’s claims in turn below.
A.

Count I: Violation of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause

Plaintiff asserts in Count I of her Complaint that “the failure of the defendant to provide
her with copies of the documents she requested and or a full notice [of] the charges leveled

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against her violated her rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”6 ECF No. 1 at 11.7 This claim is clearly
precluded.
“The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, was designed to protect
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and [to
promote] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Graham v. Williams, No. JFM-151967, 2015 WL 7012720, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 10, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)). Under Maryland law,
application of res judicata requires satisfaction of three conditions “(1) the parties in the present
litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier litigation; (2) the claim
presented in the current action is identical to that determined or that which could have been
raised and determined in the prior litigation; and (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in
the prior litigation.” Cochran v. Griffith Energy Servs., Inc., 426 Md. 134, 140 (2012). These
preclusion principles apply to the judgment of a court which affirms or reverses administrative
determinations. Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 622 A.2d 774, 781 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (“it is
crystal clear that a final judgment of a circuit court affirming a decision of an administrative
agency . . . is entitled to full preclusive effect”).
All three conditions required for res judicata are met here. First, the parties in the instant

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Although Plaintiff mentions Equal Protection, it is clear from the Complaint that Plaintiff’s claim is founded on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Equal Protection Clause. ECF No. 1 at 8–11 (titling
Count I as “Violation of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause” and alleging procedural deficiencies in the pretermination hearing).
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Plaintiff also references the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but “[d]ue process claims under
the Fifth Amendment apply to federal actors, whereas due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment apply to
state actors.” White v. City of Greensboro, 408 F. Supp. 3d 677, 691 (M.D.N.C. 2019); see Dusenbery v. United
States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property
without ‘due process of law.’”).

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action are the same as the parties in the state court proceedings affirming the State Board’s
finding that sufficient due process was provided and upholding Plaintiff’s termination. See ECF
No. 19-6 at 2 (naming Plaintiff, Ruth Johnson, and Defendant, Prince George’s County Board of
Education, as parties in the judicial review proceeding in front of the Court of Special Appeals).
Second, Plaintiff’s due process claim presented in the current action is identical to the due
process claim that the ALJ, the State Board, the Circuit Court, and the Court of Special Appeals
all reviewed and rejected. See Nichols v. Caroline Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. WDQ-05-CV-2658,
2006 WL 4396326, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2006) (“The test for determining the identity of the
causes of action is whether the same evidentiary facts support both suits.”). Compare ECF No.
19-6 at 10 (Plaintiff “argues [to the Court of Special Appeals] that the State Board erred in
finding that she was afforded proper pre-termination due process rights under Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 [i.e., a Fourteenth Amendment due process case]. She argues that her due process rights
were violated because she was: 1) not given adequate notice of the specific charges prior to the
meeting; 2) not given documentary evidence prior to the meeting; and 3) denied the assistance of
counsel during the meeting.”) with ECF No. 1 at 11 (“Plaintiff submits [in her Complaint] that
the failure of the defendant to provide her with copies of the documents she requested and or a
full notice [of] the charges leveled against her violated her rights under the . . . Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment”). Finally, there was a final judgment on the merits. ECF No. 196 at 10–15 (holding that Plaintiff “was adequately informed of the nature of the charges against
her, and afforded sufficient termination due process” and affirming Defendant’s termination of
Plaintiff’s employment).
Because all of the conditions of res judicata are met with regard to Plaintiff’s due process
claim, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with regard to Count I.

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B.

Count II: Title VII Reprisal

Plaintiff also raises a retaliation claim under Title VII in Count II. ECF No. 1 at 12–15.
Plaintiff undisputedly did not raise a Title VII claim in the prior administrative proceedings nor
in the state court judicial review actions. ECF No. 19-6; ECF No. 20 at 3. Because Plaintiff’s
Title VII claim asserts a new cause of action, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.8 See
Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1201 (Md. 1992). However, under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, a second action may still be barred, even if it asserts a new cause of action, if it would
involve “relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.”
See id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326 n.5). Thus, the
Court will analyze whether Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is now barred by the prior administrative
and judicial proceedings under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
“Under Maryland law, preclusion principles apply to the judgment of a court which
affirms or reverses administrative determinations, and a party will be collaterally estopped from
relitigating issues decided in such an adjudication where: (1) the issue raised in the prior action is
identical with the issue presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final prior judgment on
the merits; and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior litigation.”
Batts v. Lee, 949 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (D. Md. 1996) (citations omitted). Moreover, Maryland
courts also give administrative decisions preclusive effect when: (1) the agency was acting in a
judicial capacity; (2) the issue presented to the district court was actually litigated before the
agency; and (3) whether the issue’s resolution was necessary to the agency’s decision. Batson v.
Shiflett, 602 A.2d at 1200.

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Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim “could have been asserted” in the prior proceedings; thus
implicating the doctrine of res judicata. ECF No. 19-1 at 13. However, because the Court finds the doctrine of
collateral estoppel precludes Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, the Court need not consider this issue.

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Defendant argues that the State Board’s determination that Plaintiff received sufficient
due process and was properly terminated for willful neglect of duty, as well as the Circuit
Court’s and Court of Special Appeal’s affirmations of those determinations, preclude Plaintiff’s
Title VII claim. ECF No. 19-1. Applying the factors of the two collateral estoppel doctrines
discussed above—administrative collateral estoppel and collateral estoppel based on a court’s
affirmation of an administrative decision—the Court finds that only one factor warrants in depth
analysis: Whether the issue litigated in the prior proceedings is the same as the issue presented in
the instant action.
It is uncontested that there has been a final judgment on the merits by the State Board, the
Circuit Court, and the Court of Special Appeals affirming the legality of Defendant’s termination
of Plaintiff’s employment and that Plaintiff was a party to these prior proceedings. ECF No. 19-5
at 34–35 (finding Plaintiff “was provided with sufficient pre-termination due process” and “was
properly dismissed for willful neglect of duty”); id. at 9 (State Board adopting ALJ’s proposed
decision and affirming Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff for willful neglect of duty); ECF No.
19-6 at 8 (“The circuit court issued an oral ruling from the bench affirming the decision of the
State Board.”); id. at 18 (Court of Special Appeals finding that there was “substantial evidence to
support the state Board’s affirmance of [Defendant’s] decision to terminate [Plaintiff’s]
employment for willful neglect of duty.”). Nor is it disputed that findings on the issues of
whether there was a proper justification for Plaintiff’s termination—willful neglect of duty—and
whether Defendant provided sufficient pre-termination process were necessary for each of these
administrative and judicial decisions. ECF No. 19-5; ECF No. 19-6. Finally, it cannot be
seriously questioned that the administrative proceedings were judicial in nature. See Batson, 602
A.2d at 1202. (“By conducting a hearing, allowing the parties to present evidence and ruling on a

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dispute of law, the [agency] acted in a judicial capacity.” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)). However, it is a closer question whether the key issues decided in these prior
administrative and judicial proceedings are outcome-determinative issues in the present action,
such that the Court must grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.
“Title VII prohibits an employer from taking ‘adverse employment action’ against an
employee on a prohibited basis[,]” and an “‘adverse employment action’ is one that constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” Hart v. Lew, 973 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579 (D. Md. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the “prohibited basis” that Defendant acted on in this case
was retaliation or reprisal. ECF No. 1 at 12–15. The elements of a retaliation claim under Title
VII are “(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal
link between the protected activity and the employment action.” Coleman v. Md. Court of
Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s failure to adequately plead any of these
elements would make dismissal here appropriate on that basis alone.
The Court assumes for the sake of argument that Plaintiff has adequately alleged
engagement in a protected activity and instead proceeds to identify the adverse employment
action at issue here. A first glance, one might assume that the adverse action at issue in
Plaintiff’s Complaint was Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff’s employment—a classic example
of an adverse employment action. See Hart, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 579.9 That is not what Plaintiff

9

It is worthy of note that such a claim would also be precluded by collateral estoppel. To succeed on a Title VII
claim where Plaintiff argues that Defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for a protected activity,
Plaintiff must adequately plead causation. See Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
“Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged
employment action.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). Plaintiff is foreclosed from
making such a showing by the previous administrative and judicial decisions finding that Defendant properly
terminated Plaintiff’s employment for willful neglect of duty. Cf. Johnson v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. PWG-

15

Case 8:17-cv-01246-GJH Document 22 Filed 01/28/21 Page 16 of 16

has pled, however. While the Complaint is not a model of clarity, Plaintiff seems to claim that
Defendant’s adverse employment action was not providing her sufficient process before
terminating her employment. ECF No. 1 at 15; ECF No. 19-1 at 9 (“[B]y Plaintiff’s own
allegations, her Title VII reprisal claim is inextricably tied to her procedural due process
claim.”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges “that the failure of the defendant to provide her with
copies of the documents she requested or a full notice [of] the charges leveled against her was an
act of reprisal under the provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” ECF No. 1 at 15.
Setting aside whether the failure to provide due process could ever be an adverse employment
action, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from arguing that she did not receive sufficient process.
See supra § III.A. Thus, her allegation that Defendant took an adverse employment action
against her by failing to provide adequate due process fails because it is barred by collateral
estoppel, and Defendant cannot establish the second element of her Title VII retaliation claim.
The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim,
Count II.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion

for Summary Judgment on Behalf of the Defendant, ECF No. 19, is granted. A separate Order
shall issue.

Date: January 28 , 2021

__/s/________________________
GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge

15-558, 2015 WL 7769502, at *8 (D. Md. Nov. 17, 2015) (holding that, since Plaintiff was barred by collateral
estoppel from arguing that his student loan debts were settled, Defendant’s reporting that the student loan debts were
delinquent was not inaccurate, and Plaintiff’s claim was barred because inaccuracy was an element of the claim).

16