Sewell, M.ED. v. Pritchard
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 12/22/2017. (c/m 12/22/2017 aos, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
STARSHA M. SEWELL, M.ED.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK PRITCHARD,
Defendant.
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Civil No.
PJM 17-1439
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Starsha Sewell has sued Mark Pritchard of the Regional Transportation
Agency of Central Maryland (“RTA”) and Judge John P. Davey of the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, alleging that she was fired from a job as a Bus Operator with RTA for
discriminatory and retaliatory reasons. Sewell includes Judge Davey in her Complaint (ECF No.
1) because he was the state court judge who issued an order requiring her to pay child support
through the Maryland Child Support Enforcement Agency which was then forwarded to the RTA
for garnishment. On June 1, 2017, the Court dismissed the claim against Judge Davey as barred
by the doctrine of judicial immunity. ECF No. 3. On July 10, 2017, Pritchard filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 9.
In his Motion, Prichard also asks for an injunction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(2000),
restricting Sewell from filing vexatious submissions or additional lawsuits in any way relating to
the matters addressed in her Complaint.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sewell began her at-will employment with the RTA as a bus driver on January 22, 2017.
On or about February 13, 2017, RTA received an order from the Prince George’s County Office
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of Child Support directing RTA to withhold certain amounts from Sewell’s pay to cover current
and past due child support. Complaint at 2, ECF No. 1. Sewell also received a copy of the Order
and, on the evening of February 13, 2017, she sent an email to RTA’s Chief Financial Officer
Suzanne Brown, RTA Operations Administrator Cindy Gibson and Judge Davey. Id.; Exhibit A,
ECF No. 8-2. She indicated that the subject of the email was “Unlawful Wage Garnishment
Attempt- Civil Rights Complaint of Discrimination Will Be Filed if Enforced.” Exhibit A, ECF
No. 8-2.
In the text of Sewell’s email, she accused Judge Davey, who had presided over a
domestic relations matter involving custody of her children, of violating the rights of a “United
States Treasury Whistle-blower” and of engaging in human trafficking. Id. She also accused
Judge Davey and two social workers, whom she personally named in the email, of slandering
her. Id. She further accused the Child Support Enforcement Division of the “Department of
Human Resources” of conspiring with the Maryland Mortgage Task Force to engage in
racketeering. Id. Finally, she asked the attorney copied on the email to add her to a lawsuit
against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), alleging that Judge
Davey served on its Board of Directors. Id. Sewell attached documents to the email which
included, among other things, an order issued by the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland on September 17, 2012, remanding a domestic relations case to state court. Id.
The following morning Sewell was notified that she was being placed on unpaid
administrative leave pending the RTA’s review of her email. Exhibit 2A, ECF No. 1-3. On
February 17, Mark Pritchard, RTA’s General Manager, sent Sewell a letter notifying her of
RTA’s decision to terminate her employment. Exhibit 5, ECF No. 1-9. The letter set forth RTA’s
conclusions that Sewell had violated two provisions of the Employee Handbook, Section 11.1
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that states that “threats, harassment, [and] intimidation” are prohibited, and Section 11.2
prohibiting discourteous or inappropriate behavior towards other employees. Id.
On February 15, 2017, prior to her termination, Sewell had filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex and
retaliation. Exhibit 4, ECF No. 1-8. Eight days later, on February 23, 2017, RTA received notice
of the EEOC Charge. ECF No. 8-1 at 8. The proceeding was administratively closed by the
EEOC on February 27, 2017. Id.
On February 27, 2017, Sewell filed yet another Charge of Discrimination with the
Howard County Office of Human Relations (the “HCOHR Charge”), which was co-filed with
the Baltimore office of the EEOC. In the HCOHR Charge, Sewell alleged that she was
terminated in retaliation for filing the District of Columbia Charge of Discrimination. Sewell has
not indicated whether she received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC as to this second
Charge.
On May 24, 2017, Sewell filed the present Complaint against Pritchard and Davey.
Although her Complaint is difficult to decipher, she appears to allege that she was terminated in
retaliation for her February 13, 2017 email and her February 15, 2017 EEOC filing. On June 1,
2017, this Court issued an Order dismissing the claim against Davey as barred by the doctrine of
judicial immunity. Sewell then filed a “Motion to Stay Barring of Claims Against Judge Davey”
(ECF No. 4), which the Court interpreted as a Motion to Reconsider its June 1, 2017 Order
dismissing Davey from the case. The Court denied that Motion on June 7. On June 8, 2017,
Sewell filed a Rule 62(b)(3) Motion To Stay of Proceeding to Enforce a Judgment of Court,
which the Court interprets as a second Motion to Reconsider its June 1, 2017 Order. ECF No. 7.
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On July 7, 2017, Prichard filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 9. Sewell responded with a Motion for Default
Judgment of Plaintiff’s Rule 62(b) Motion to Stay, which the Court interprets as a Response in
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 10.
II. STANDARDS OF LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) prescribes “liberal pleading standards,” requiring
only that a plaintiff submit a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he or she] is
entitled to relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must
plead facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). But this standard requires “more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a
court will accept factual allegations as true, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Indeed, the court need not
accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Associates Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175,
180 (4th Cir. 2000). In the end, the complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to
apprise a defendant of “what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
While federal courts are obliged to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s claims in applying
the above analysis, this requirement “does not transform the court into an advocate.” United
States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has noted that “[w]hile pro se complaints may ‘represent the work of an
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untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude,’ a district court is not required to recognize
‘obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.’” Weller v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986)). Accordingly, although
the facts alleged in a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must ordinarily be taken as true, bare
conclusory statements “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658
F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Prichard’s Motion to Dismiss
There are three bases on which Pritchard is entitled to dismissal of Sewell’s Complaint.
First, employees, including supervisors, are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII
violations. Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998).
Second, plaintiffs alleging discrimination or retaliation may only file a lawsuit after the
EEOC issues a Notice of Right to Sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). To the extent that Sewell’s
allegations are premised upon retaliation for filing the February 15, 2017 pre-termination EEOC
Charge, she has not demonstrated that the EEOC issued her a Notice of Right to Sue.
Finally, in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009)) (quotation marks omitted). She has not done so.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under Title VII, a plaintiff must
offer evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that: (1) she engaged in a
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protected activity; (2) her employer took adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Honor v. Booz-Allen &
Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 188 (4th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
action. Once the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the
proffered reason is a pretext for retaliation. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973).
Sewell has failed to establish a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliatory
discharge. To the extent that she alleges she was terminated in retaliation for her February 13,
2017 email, no reasonable trier of fact could find that this email was a protected activity, since it
consisted of no more than threats to file a complaint of discrimination if Human Resources
employees complied with a patently valid child support order from a state court. Sewell has
provided no basis on which it could reasonably be concluded that the child support order, or
RTA’s compliance with that order, was motivated by discrimination or retaliation. Nor, in any
case, would this federal Court be authorized to look beyond the face of the state court order, a
matter which would be within the exclusive purview of a state appellate court.
Additionally, Sewell alleges that she was discharged on February 17, 2017 in response to
her February 15, 2017 EEOC Charge of Discrimination, but the indisputable evidence is that
Pritchard did not receive notice of that Charge until February 23, five days after Sewell was
terminated. Sewell has alleged no facts to suggest that Prichard or RTA received notice of the
EEOC Charge prior to Sewell’s termination, or even before February 23, nor, in any case, that
Pritchard—following Sewell’s repetitive and vexatious filings—had anything other than a
legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for terminating her, which was and is in no conceivable way
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a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. As such, Sewell has failed to show that Prichard or
anyone else at the RTA terminated her employment discriminatorily or in retaliation for the
EEOC Charge.
B. Pritchard’s Motion for Injunctive Relief
In addition to dismissal of the Complaint, Pritchard asks the Court for an injunction,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(2000), restricting Sewell from filing vexatious submissions or
additional lawsuits for the matters addressed in this Complaint.
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(2000), grants federal courts the authority to limit
vexatious and repetitive litigants access to the courts. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc.,
390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004), Sewell v. Strayer Univ., PWG-16-cv-159 (D. Md. Jan. 5,
2017). A pre-filing injunction is “[o]ne means of limiting access . . . based on a litigant’s
demonstrated vexatious or repetitive filing of meritless motions and other requests for relief.”
Sewell, at 15. A pre-filing injunction is appropriate where, as here, “there exist exigent
circumstances, such as a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless
and repetitive actions.” Id. at 15-16 (citation and quotation omitted).
Cronter lists four factors for a court to consider when deciding whether to issue a prefiling injunction: (1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether she has filed
vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for
pursing the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and
other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.
Cromer at 817.
Like the plaintiff in Jarvis, Sewell has a clear history of filing vexatious litigation, to wit,
she has brought over seventeen meritless lawsuits in Maryland and Missouri. This includes an
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extensive practice of filing numerous post-dismissal motions and requests for relief within those
cases, as was noted by Judge Chasanow in Sewell v. Fid. Nat'l Fin., Inc., DKC-16-cv-906 (D.
Md. April 18, 2016). Sewell has not stopped there. She has filed appeals to the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court, and has sued Judges in Maryland Circuit Court, the District Court of
Maryland and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. She has been warned previously by
federal judges about her conduct and has had pre-filing injunctions issued against her.
Sewell’s “repeated filing of unmeritorious post-dismissal motions and related requests for
relief constitutes vexatious filings before this Court and therefore there was good cause for the
imposition of a pre-filing injunction.” Sewell, PWG-16-cv-159 at 16-17. Her litigation history
has not abated in the least. As the court noted in Sewell v. Strayer Univ., of the no less than
seventeen cases she has filed since 2012, at least two resulted in the imposition of sanctions
against her. Id. at 17. The Court finds that Sewell’s filings have not been founded on good faith
and have placed an undue burden on the courts and the defendants she has named (some more
than once). Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Prichard’s request for a pre-filing injunction.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Prichard’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED
WITH PREJUDICE. Sewell’s Rule 62(b)(3) Motion To Stay of Proceeding to Enforce a
Judgment of Court (ECF No. 7) is DENIED, and Sewell’s Motion for Default Judgment on
Plaintiff's Rule 62(b) Motion to Stay of Proceeding to Enforce a Judgment of Court (ECF No.
10) is DENIED.
Further, SEWELL is ENJOINED from filing further suits or pleadings against
Defendants Pritchard, Davey, or any employee of the RTA without prior approval of this or any
other member of this Bench.
A separate Order will issue.
/s/
_
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
December 22, 2017
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