Barber v. Montgomery County Government et al
Filing
50
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 22 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint; granting 34 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply; granting as framed 27 Defendants' Motion for Sanctions and denying Plaintiff's 28 Cross-Motion for Sanctions and 49 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by Judge Frederick P Stamp, Jr on 5/8/2018. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m certified mail (7001 1140 0000 4881 1882) 5/10/18)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CLAUDIA BARBER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 8:17CV1948
(STAMP)
MONTGOMERY COUNTY GOVERNMENT
and BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT,
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE A SURREPLY,
GRANTING AS FRAMED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS,
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
I.
This
is
a
civil
Background
rights
case
arising
out
of
an
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
alleged
The pro
se1 plaintiff, Claudia Barber, filed this civil action in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. The defendants, the
Board of Education for Montgomery County Public Schools (the “Board
of
Education”)
and
Montgomery
County
Government
(the
“County
Government”), removed the case to the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, citing federal question jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The plaintiff filed an amended
complaint in the United States District Court, and the case was
1
“Pro se” describes a person who represents himself in a court
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer.
Black’s Law
Dictionary 1416 (10th ed. 2014).
later reassigned to the undersigned judge.
In her single-count
amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she is a 57-year-old
African American female who applied for several positions as a
substitute teacher and assistant general counsel for employment and
labor law with the Board of Education.
The plaintiff further
alleges that she was overqualified for all of the positions but
that she was not hired on the basis of her race, sex, age, and
color, in violation of Title VII.
The plaintiff previously filed
a motion to remand, which this Court denied by a prior memorandum
opinion and order.
The defendants have now filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.
The plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file her
surreply to the motion dismiss.
The defendants have also filed a
motion for sanctions, to which the plaintiff responded with a
cross-motion for sanctions.
The plaintiff has also filed a
separate motion for sanctions.
The motions are fully briefed at
this time and ripe for decision.
Court
grants
the
defendants’
For the following reasons, the
motion
to
dismiss
the
amended
complaint, grants the plaintiff’s motion to file her surreply to
the motion to dismiss, grants as framed the defendants’ motion for
sanctions, and denies the plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions
and motion for sanctions.
2
II.
A.
Applicable Law
Motion to Dismiss
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pled facts
contained in the complaint as true.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
However, “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and
bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to
constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”
Id.
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
This
Court
also
declines
to
consider
“unwarranted
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
inferences,
Wahi v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case.
5B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
1998).
The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
3
party
making
the
claim
and
essentially
the
court’s
inquiry
is
directed
to
whether
the
allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.’”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Facial
plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
B.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Motions for Sanctions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides in relevant part
as follows:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper–whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating it–an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: . . . the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
“[T]he standard is the same
for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the
4
pleadings . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to
1983 amendment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
stated as follows:
The language of Rule 11 requires that an attorney conduct
a reasonable investigation of the factual and legal basis
for his claim before filing. See Cleveland Demolition
Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 987 (4th Cir.
1987).
The prefiling investigation must appear
objectively reasonable. In re Kuntsler, 914 F.2d 505,
514 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 111
S.Ct. 1607, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991). Inexperienced or
incompetent attorneys are not held to a lesser standard
under Rule 11. Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th
Cir. 1987).
Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Fourth Circuit went on to state that:
[t]o be reasonable, the prefiling factual investigation
must uncover some information to support the allegations
in the complaint.
A complaint containing allegations
unsupported by any information obtained prior to filing
violates the required prefiling factual investigation.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516. That is, where there is
no factual basis for a plaintiff’s allegations, the
complaint violates Rule 11’s factual inquiry requirement.
The prefiling investigation must also uncover some basis
in law to support the claims in the complaint.
A
prefiling investigation of the law will not pass muster
under Rule 11 where the complaint has “absolutely no
chance of success under the existing precedent.”
Cleveland Demolition Co., 827 F.2d at 988.
Id.
Rule 11 includes a safe harbor provision which provides as
follows:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any
other motion and must describe the specific conduct that
allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion must be served
5
under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to
the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately
corrected within 21 days after service or within another
time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award
to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, incurred for the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
Sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 “‘shall be limited to
what is sufficient to deter repetition’ of the objectionable
conduct.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
This court has made ‘clear
that the primary . . . purpose of Rule 11 is to deter future
litigation abuse.’”
In re Sargent, 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir.
1998) (quoting In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522.
Furthermore,
[a]lthough Rule 11 does not specify the sanction to be
imposed for any particular violation of its provisions,
the Advisory Committee Note to the Rule’s 1993 amendments
provides guidance with an illustrative list. A court
may, for example, strike a document, admonish a lawyer,
require the lawyer to undergo education, or refer an
allegation to appropriate disciplinary authorities.
Note, FRCP 11; see also Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
136 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen a district
court finds that a disciplinary sanction more severe than
admonition, reprimand, or censure under Rule 11 is
warranted, it should refer the matter to the appropriate
disciplinary authorities.”).
Hunter v. Earthgrans Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 150-51 (4th Cir.
2002).
In awarding sanctions, a district court has the
discretion to consider a broad range of factors. Even
though an attorney has engaged in conduct which is
otherwise sanctionable, “a district court should reflect
upon equitable considerations in determining the amount
of the sanction.” Brown v. Federation of State Medical
Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987). “[A] district
court may, in its discretion, refuse to award attorney’s
6
fees even where it finds the existence of bad faith, if,
in balancing the equities, it nevertheless determines
that an award in a particular case would not serve the
interests of justice.” Perichak [v. Int’l Union of Elec.
Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 601, AFL-CIO], 715 F.2d
[78,] 80 [3d Cir. 1983]. In exercising this discretion,
a district court may consider such factors as an
attorney’s experience and whether the attorney entered
the case at an advanced stage. See Brown, 830 F.2d at
1439.
Blue v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546 (4th Cir. 1990)
III.
A.
Discussion
Motion to Dismiss
Even construing the pro se amended complaint liberally and in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this Court finds that
the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.2
Specifically, this Court finds that, under McCleary-
Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway
Administration, 780 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1162 (2016), the motion to dismiss must be granted on the basis
that the amended complaint does not contain sufficient factual
allegations.
2
This Court notes that the pro se plaintiff is an attorney.
The plaintiff does not attempt to hide that she is an attorney and
states in her complaint that she sought employment as assistant
general counsel for employment and labor law with the Board of
Education. Thus, the standard for this pro se plaintiff’s amended
complaint is slightly higher than it is for non-attorney pro se
plaintiffs.
However, even if this pro se plaintiff was not an
attorney, her amended complaint would still fail to state a claim
under Twombly and Iqbal.
7
McCleary-Evans is a case in which the plaintiff, an African
American female job applicant, brought a Title VII action against
the
defendant,
a
state
agency
employer.
The
McCleary-Evans
plaintiff alleged that the defendant did not hire her for the two
positions she applied for because of her race and gender.
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that
the
plaintiff
“claimed
in
conclusory
fashion
that
the
decisionmakers were biased when making the decision” and “did not
include any allegations regarding the qualifications or suitability
of the persons hired to fill the two positions.”
780 F.3d at 584.
McCleary-Evans,
In McCleary-Evans, the Fourth Circuit stated as
follows:
[The plaintiff’s] complaint leaves open to speculation
the cause for the defendant’s decision to select someone
other than her, and the cause that she asks us to infer
(i.e., invidious discrimination) is not plausible in
light of the “‘obvious alternative explanation’” that the
decisionmakers simply judged those hired to be more
qualified and better suited for the positions. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 682, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 567, 127 S. Ct. 1955). Indeed, the consequence
of allowing [the plaintiff’s] claim to proceed on her
complaint as stated would be that any qualified member of
a protected class who alleges nothing more than that she
was denied a position or promotion in favor of someone
outside her protected class would be able to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Such a result cannot be squared
with the Supreme Court’s command that a complaint must
allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Id. at 588.
Similarly,
allegations
are
in
this
that
the
case,
the
panel
8
that
plaintiff’s
conducted
only
her
factual
interview
contained no African American members and that the position in the
General Counsel’s office either remains unfilled or was filled by
an individual who is not African American.
Even if proven, those
allegations would not support a discrimination claim on the basis
of sex, age, or color. Thus, like in McCleary-Evans, the plaintiff
only claims in a “conclusory fashion” that the panel was biased in
their decision not to hire her and “leaves open to speculation the
cause for the defendant’s decision to select someone other than
her.”
Accordingly, the amended complaint fails under Twombly and
cannot survive the motion to dismiss.
In
response
to
the
defendants’
motion
to
dismiss,
the
plaintiff argues that she set forth a prima facie case as required
in EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001).
Sears Roebuck & Co. is a case in which the EEOC brought a civil
action against an employer alleging that the employer’s failure to
hire an applicant of Hispanic descent violated Title VII. However,
that case preceded both McCleary-Evans and Iqbal, and thus is not
the controlling precedent in this case.
Additionally, Sears
Roebuck & Co. is distinguishable from the present case because it
was on appeal on a summary judgment decision, not on a ruling on a
motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff also alleges in her amended complaint that
“Defendants [sic] violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the US Constitution by refusing to employ people of color such as
9
Plaintiff.”
ECF No. 15 at 2.
The defendants argue in their motion
to dismiss that the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV,
§ 2 of the United States Constitution is inapplicable in this
context because the plaintiff is a resident of Maryland.
Thus,
even if there was a factual allegation of depriving non-residents
of a protected privilege, the plaintiff would not have standing to
assert the claim.
This Court agrees with the defendants that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is inapplicable
because the plaintiff, as a resident of Maryland, does not have
standing to assert such a claim.
See United Bldg. and Constr.
Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council
of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984) (“[I]t is true that the
disadvantaged
New
Jersey
residents
have
no
claim
under
the
Privileges and Immunities Clause [for relief from a municipal
ordinance passed by the City of Camden, New Jersey].”).
In her response in opposition, the plaintiff argues that she
meant to file a claim under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
amend
the
claim
to
However, the plaintiff never moved to
assert
a
claim
under
the
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Privileges
or
And, even if she
had, nowhere in the amended complaint does the plaintiff explain
how her claim falls within Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities protections.
See Paciulan v. George, 229 F.3d 1226,
1229 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court declines to delineate
10
those privileges and immunities with specificity in the SlaughterHouse Cases, [83 U.S. 36 (1872),] but included within their ranks
‘some which owe their existence to the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws.’
. . .
The
courts and legal commentators have interpreted the decision as
rendering
the
Clause
essentially
nugatory.”).
Again,
the
plaintiff’s only factual allegations are that no African American
members sat on her interview panel and that the position in the
General Counsel’s office either remains unfilled or was filled by
an individual who is not African American.
These allegations are
not sufficient to support any possible Fourteenth Amendment claim
upon which relief could be granted.
In her response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
concedes that the County Government is not a proper defendant and
should be dismissed from this civil action.
This is because the
Board of Education is an instrumentality of the state, not the
County Government, and because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies against the County Government by failing to
name it in her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Charge of
Discrimination.
Thus, the motion to dismiss must be granted as to
the County Government.
Lastly, this Court grants the plaintiff’s motion to file a
surreply to the motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, this Court has
reviewed and considered the plaintiff’s surreply, but concludes
11
that
it
does
plaintiff’s
not
change
surreply
in
the
Court’s
large
part
above
addresses
findings.
the
The
affidavits
attached to the defendants’ reply to their motion to dismiss.
The
Court notes that it has not considered those affidavits because
doing so would convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment.
B.
Motions for Sanctions
The defendants filed a motion for sanctions in which they
contend that the allegations in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16 of
the plaintiff’s amended complaint are false.
Those paragraphs
allege that the plaintiff’s interview panel did not include any
African Americans, that no African Americans are employed by the
Office of General Counsel, and that the assistant general counsel
position either remains open or was filled by a person of lesser or
the same qualifications.
The defendants attached an affidavit to their motion for
sanctions from Montgomery County Public Schools General Counsel
Josh Civin.
That affidavit states that the individual hired for
the position was a Hispanic/Latino female who previously worked as
an Assistant United States Attorney and who has prior experience
practicing labor and employment law.
The affidavit of Stephanie
Proctor Williams, an Associate General Counsel in the Office of
General Counsel, states that she is an African American female who
12
has
been
employed
by
the
Board
of
Education
since
2005
and
participated in the plaintiff’s interview.
The defendants’ motion for sanctions represents that, before
filing the motion with this Court, “Defendant’s counsel sent
correspondence to Plaintiff requesting that she withdraw certain
false
allegations
contained
in
the
Amended
Complaint,”
compliance with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11.
at 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
in
ECF No. 27
The motion further indicates that
the plaintiff responded to the correspondence, but did not retract
the allegedly false allegations.
The defendants request sanctions
in the form of attorney’s fees.
The
plaintiff
filed
a
response
in
opposition
to
the
defendants’ motion for sanctions in which she does not contradict
the affidavits attached to the defendants’ motion for sanctions.
Rather than attempting to contradict the defendants’ affidavits,
the
plaintiff
reasserts
arguments
from
her
response
to
the
defendants’ motion to dismiss and argues that the defendants
misrepresented to the Court the manner of service of their motion
for
sanctions.
defendants
Specifically,
“falsely
stated
in
the
plaintiff
their
motion
argues
that
that
they
the
served
Plaintiff by electronic mail the Motion for Sanctions.” ECF No. 28
at
12.
This
Court
agrees
with
the
defendants
that
the
certification clearly indicates that copies of the documents were
served on the plaintiff by first class mail, that the plaintiff
13
does not deny receiving the mailed copies, and that the plaintiff
does not allege any prejudice from the manner of service.
This Court concludes that the plaintiff’s allegations in
paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16 of the amended complaint are false
based on the affidavits attached to the defendants’ motion for
sanctions.
The affidavits show that African American female
attorneys are employed by the Office of General Counsel, that an
African American female attorney was on the panel that interviewed
the plaintiff, and that the assistant general counsel position has
been filled by a suitably qualified person.
This Court also finds
that, after the defendants properly brought the false allegations
to the plaintiff’s attention, the plaintiff failed to withdraw the
false allegations.
After considering a broad range of factors and equitable
considerations
in
this
case,
this
Court
finds
that
it
is
appropriate to grant the defendants’ motion for sanctions as
framed.
Specifically, this Court finds that it is appropriate to
reprimand the plaintiff for her filings, but does not find that the
defendants’ requested sanction of an award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate.
measured
This Court finds that a reprimand is the best
approach
in
this
case
in
part
because,
while
the
plaintiff’s pro se status is a factor, it does not entirely absolve
the plaintiff of sanctions.
See Blue, 914 F.2d at 546 (“In
awarding sanctions, a district court has the discretion to consider
14
a broad range of sanctions.”).
Accordingly, this Court reprimands
the plaintiff for failing to withdraw her false allegations after
the defendants brought their falsity to her attention.
As
part
of
her
response
to
the
defendants’
motion
for
sanctions, the plaintiff also filed a cross-motion for sanctions.
This Court finds that the plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions
must be denied because the plaintiff did not comply with the safe
harbor requirement of Rule 11.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
The Rule
11(c)(2) safe harbor provision is intended to ensure “that a party
will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party’s
motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw
that position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently
have evidence to support a specified allegation.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
“Although we have not held the safe harbor provision to be
jurisdictional, we recently noted that many courts have decided
that compliance with it is mandatory.”
Hunter, 281 F.3d at 152
(citing Rector v. Approved Fed. Sav. Bank, 265 F.3d 248, 251 (4th
Cir. 2001); see also Francisco v. Verizon South, Inc., 272 F.R.D.
436, 441 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“There is no showing here that the
parties attempted to confer regarding the request for sanctions.
Accordingly, the Court having discretion whether to issue sanctions
under Rule 11, declines to do so here.”).
15
Accordingly, the
plaintiff’s cross-motion for sanctions is denied for failure to
comply with Rule 11(c)(2).
The plaintiff later filed a separate motion for sanctions,
which she asserts complies with the requirements of Rule 11(c)(2).
The plaintiff filed the motion for sanctions with this Court on
February 26, 2018, and states in the motion that, on January 30,
2018, she served “a draft motion to all defendants along with a
cover letter explaining the necessary defects that need to be
cured.”
ECF No. 49 at 2.
The plaintiff argues that sanctions
against the defendants in the form of attorney’s fees are warranted
because
the
defendants
have
failed
to
comply
with
the
Case
Management Order and failed to cure the alleged defects in the
removal of this civil action.
The plaintiff also argues that
sanctions are warranted because the defendants failed to provide
the plaintiff with a photograph of the African American member of
the interview panel.
The plaintiff further contends that the
affidavits attached to the defendants’ motion for sanctions are
“perjured” and “self-serving.”
ECF No. 49 at 6.
This Court finds that the plaintiff’s separate motion for
sanctions must be denied on the merits.
First, after this civil
action was transferred to the undersigned judge, this Court entered
an order amending the Case Management Order to no longer require a
notice of intent to file a motion, noting that a telephonic
conference is not necessary before a motion is filed.
16
ECF No. 32.
Second, this Court already addressed the plaintiff’s arguments
regarding
the
defendants’
allegedly
improper
removal
in
its
Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.
In that memorandum opinion and order, this Court found “that ‘the
failure to include all state court pleadings and process with the
notice
of
removal
is
procedurally
incorrect
but
is
not
a
jurisdictional defect’ and, thus, does not warrant remand. Cook v.
Randolph County, Ga., 573 F.3d 1143, 1150 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing
Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 251 F.2d 930, 933 (5th
Cir. 1958)).”
ECF No. 47 at 8-9.
Just as this Court found that
the procedural defect did not warrant remand, this Court also finds
that it does not warrant sanctions against the defendants.
See
Blue, 914 F.2d at 546 (stating that the awarding of sanctions is in
the discretion of the district court).
Third, this Court finds that the defendants were not required
to produce a photograph of the African American member of the
interview panel and that the defendants’ affidavits were sufficient
to prove that there was an African American person on the panel.
Lastly, this Court finds that the plaintiff offers no affidavits of
her own or any other evidence to support her conclusion that the
defendants’
affidavits
are
“perjured”
and
“self-serving.”
Accordingly, this Court must deny the plaintiff’s separate motion
for sanctions on its merits.
17
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion to
dismiss
the
amended
complaint
(ECF
No.
22)
is
GRANTED,
the
plaintiff’s motion to file her surreply to the motion to dismiss
(ECF No. 34) is GRANTED, the defendants’ motion for sanctions (ECF
No. 27) is GRANTED AS FRAMED, and the plaintiff’s motion for crosssanctions (ECF No. 28) and motion for sanctions (ECF No. 49) are
DENIED. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED and
STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court.
The plaintiff may
appeal the final judgment of this Court to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by filing a notice of appeal with
the Clerk of this Court within thirty days after the date of the
entry of the judgment order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to the pro se plaintiff by certified mail and to
counsel of record herein.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment on this
matter.
DATED:
May 8, 2018
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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