Cline v. Thomas N. O'Connor Plumbing & Heating, LLC

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 5/15/2018. (jf3s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Soutltem Divisio/1

.JASON CLINE,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

Case No.: G.JH-17-2103

*
THOMAS N. O'CONNOR
& HEATING, LLC,

PLUMBING

*

Defendant.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

MEMORANDUM

*

*

*

Plumbing and I-Ieating. LLC C'O'Connor").

arising /i-om O'Connor's

termination

before the Court is O'Connor's

*

OPINION

Plaintiff Jason Cline brings this case against his former employer.
O'Connor

*

Defendant Thomas N.

for violations of federal and state law

of Cline's employment.

See ECF NO.6. Currently pending

Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 12. which has been fully briefed.

See ECF No. 14. ECF No. 15. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the
following reasons. Defendants'
I.

Motion to Dismiss is denied.

BACKGROUND1
O'Connor.

a Maryland corporation.

throughout

the Maryland

ECF No. 6

l~3-4.

Plumber/Mechanic:'
performance

and DC Metro area" and "employs more than fitly (50) employees'"

Cline began working for O'Connor
Id ~ 9. He was "successful"

reviews. raises. and promotions

he was promoted

"engages in the business of plumbing and heating

in June 01'2011 as a "Commercial

at O'Connor.

"receiving

consistently

during his tenure with the company:'

strong

!d In 2012.

to Lead Mechanic. and in January 01'2014. he was promoted to Plumbing

I Unless
otherwise stated. the background
presumed to be true.

facts are taken from Plaintiff~s Amended

Complaint.

ECF NO.6. and are

Supervisor.

It!. ~

! 10-13.

These promotions

As the Plumbing Supervisor,

came with raises and additional responsibilities.

Cline "attended regular weekly production

costs. labor. materials were reviewed with other members ofO'Connor
It!.

14. While employcd at O'Connor,

by Management:'

mectings. in which
Plumbing Management."

Cline "was regularly told he was doing an excellent job

"received above average performance

"worked a full time schedule:'

Id.

evaluations

from his supcrvisors:'

and received bonuses. lei. ~~ 15-18.

On October 19. 2016. Cline suffered a work-related

knee injury and damaged the

meniscus in his right knee: he reported the injury to his supervisor that day. and immcdiately
began to seek treatment from his doctors. It!.

I~19-20.

December 7. 2016. Cline provided a doctor's

note to O'Connor

After two months of modi lied work. on
notifying them that he had a torn

meniscus in his right knee and would require surgery. Id. ~ 24. O'Connor's

insurance company

approved Cline's surgery on February 9, 2017, and the surgery was scheduled for February 20.
2017. Id. ~ 28. Cline underwent
24.2017.

Id

the surgery on February 20. 2017, and was on leave until April

'j29-30.

Cline was cleared to return to work on April 24,2017. and he went to O'Connor's
and submitted
O'Connor's

his return paperwork.
managers.

office

Id ~ 38. The ncxt morning. April 25. 2017. onc of

Bobby Farrar. called Cline into his office for a meeting with Farrar and

another manager. Brian Ashby. Id. ~ 39-40. There. Farrar told Cline that he was being demoted
to the position of Mechanic.
company.

Id. ~ 40. This position was a "significantly

and "did not involve the same or substantially

similar duties:'

he was being demoted because he tiled a workers compensation
"have a few days to think about the demotion."

lower position" in the
Id 42. Cline asked if

claim.2 and asked ifhe could

It!. ~ 40. Farrar said that he "could have thc time

to think about it:' Id. That same day. however, Cline received a call from Farrar who informed
2

Cline does not allege that either manager responded

to this question.

2

him that management

had decided to terminate Cline's employment.

Id. 143. Cline subsequently

learned that Farrar had stated that Cline mis "milking his workers compensation"
had "faked an injury:'

Id. '144.

On July 26.2017.

Cline initiated this suit and filed a Complaint against O'Connor.

No. I. On August 4.2017,

Cline filed an Amended Complaint.

Article. ~ 9-11053 (Count I), id. ~ 48-55: unlawful interference

rights under 29 U.S.c. ~ 2615(a)( I
FMLA leave under 29 U.S.c.
O'Connor

r~
(Count

* 2615(a)(2)5

II). id. '1156-65;

ECF

ECF NO.6. In it. Cline asserted

claims of: wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Maryland's
Employment

and that Cline

and retaliation

Labor and
with his FMLA
for having taken

(Count Ill). id. ~ 66-73. On September

filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Cline had not sufficiently

19.2017.

pleaded any claims

to which relief could be granted. ECF No. 12-2 at 2." Cline opposed this Motion. ECF No. 14.
and O'Connor
II.

replied. ECF No. 15.

STANDARD

OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true. to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its f~lce"" Ashcrofi
v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662. 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic

(2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility
court to draw the reasonable

statements.

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare

mere conclusory

Corp. v. 7\l'omhly. 550 U.S. 544. 570

alleged:'

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly. 550 U.S. at 555 C'a plaintiffs

"An employer may not discharge a covered employee from employment solely because the covered employee files
a claim for compensation
under this title:' MD Code. Labor and Employment. ~ 9-1105.
~ .. It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with. restrain. or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise.
any right provided under this subchapter:'
29 U.S.c. ~ 2615(a)( I ).
5 "It shall be unlawful
for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for
opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter:'
29 USc. ~2615(a)(2).
(, Pin cites to documents filed on the COUl1'S electronic filing system (CM/ECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system.
3

3

obligation to provide the 'grounds'
conclusions.

of his 'entitle[ment]

to relief' requires more than labels and

and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do."».

The purpose of Rule 12(b)( 6) "is to test the suniciency
contests surrounding
City q(Charloffesvi/le,

of a complaint and not to resolve

the facts. the merits of a claim. or the applicability

of defenses."

Presley v.

464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). a court "must accept as true
all of the factual allegations
inferences

contained in the complaint:'

[from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff:'

Indlls .. Inc., 637 F.3d435.

and must "draw all reasonable
E.1. dll Pont de NeJllolirs & Co. \'. Kolon

440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court need not. however, accept unsupported

legal allegations.

see Revene v. Charles

COllnty COJllJll'rs. 882 F.2d 870. 873 (4th Cir. 1989). legal conclusions
allegations.

Papasan

couched as factual

v. A /lain, 478 U.S. 265. 286 (1986), or conclusory

devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters

factual allegations

<?fNOIfhlk v. Hirst. 604 F.2d

844. 84 7 (4th Cir. 1979).
III.

DISCUSSION
O'Connor

argues that Cline's case should be dismissed because he has not sufficiently

pleaded each of his claims. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Wrongful Discharge (Count I)
The parties do not dispute that it is in violation of public policy for an employee to be
terminated

solely for having filed a worker's

compensation

O'Connor

argues. however, that Cline has not sufficiently

claim. See ECF No. 12-2 at 5.
pleaded a claim for wrongful

discharge as he has not pleaded that his filing of a worker's compensation
reason for his termination.

Id. at 6. O'Connor

claim was the sale

points out that Maryland Code. Labor and

4

* 9-1105,

Employment,

covered employee
compensation

which Cline relies on, provides that "[a]n employer may not discharge a

from employment

solely because the covered employee

under this title." ECF No. 12-2 at 5-6. O'Connor

allege that the filing of the Workers'
termination."

Id.at 6 (emphasis

Compensation

files a claim for

points out that "Cline does not

claim ... was the sole reason for his

in original). O'Connor

Farrar allegedly made as being "without attribution"

attempts to discredit the statements that
and "made at an unknown time:' ECF No.

15 at 2.
Cline responds that the First Amended Complaint "unequivocally
was terminated

solely because he tiled a workers'

argues that. as this Court has held previously,
termination

compensation

claim:'

asserts that Mr. Cline
ECF No. 14 at 6. Cline

he may bring a wrongful discharge claim ifhis

was for multiple wrongful reasons: in this case, for filing a workers' compensation

claim and for taking the accompanying

FMLA leave. Id. at 8 (citing Ford v. Rigidply Rqfiers.

Inc., 999 F. Supp. 647. 650 (D. Md. 1998)).
Maryland recognizes

a cause of action for wrongful termination

in a limited number of

situations. Alder v. Am. Standard Corp .. 432 A.2d 464, 471 (Md. 1981); /li/akovi v.
Shelwin1Yilliams Co.. 561 A.2d 179. 182-91 (Md. 1989). "The general theme running through
the wrongful discharge

... decisions ... is the absence of any other remedy for the employee

discharged

in contravention

remediless

employee

of public policy. The tort was created so that the prospect of a

would not undercut the policies and goals that other laws sought to

further." Makol'i. 561 A.2d at 183. Thus. "Maryland
exception

to the terminable

courts have not recognized

a judicial

at will doctrine for a violation of clear public policy where a

statutory exception already exists to redress violations of that public policy:'
Realty. Inc.. 575 F. Supp. 715. 717 (D.Md.1983).

5

Chekey v. ETR

In Harris v. HousinK Authority (?f"Ba!till1ore City, the plaintiff brought
claims. a claim for wrongful termination
WL 5083502 (D. Md. Aug. 26.2015).
discriminatory

under the Americans

in violation of public policy. No. WDQ-14-3395,
The plaintifTargued

with Disabilities

Rights Act and that he was also discharged
While this Court acknowledged

among other

that his termination

Act the Rehabilitation

for filing a worker's

was

Act and the Civil
claim. Id at *7.

compensation

that "there is no cause of action for wrongful termination

violation of public policy to the extent that [plaintiffl is pleading wrongful termination
basis of race and disability."

this Court found that plaintiff had sufficiently

action on the basis that he was terminated

for filing a workers'

compensation

20 IS

in

on the

pleaded a cause of
claim, despite the

fact that he alleged that he had been fired for other wrongful reasons as well. Idat *8.
Harris is persuasive.
after receiving workers'
termination,
"milking

Cline has pleaded that he was terminated

compensation,

from his position shortly

that he was not provided with any reason for his

and that he learned that the individual who tired him stated that Cline had been

his workers compensation."

ECF No. 6 ~ 43--44. Assuming these facts to be true and

viewed most favorably to Cline, he has plausibly allegcd that he was terminated
workers'

compensation

termination

for filing a

claim in violation of Maryland public policy. The fact that his

may have been also motivatcd

by other unlawful reasons (e.g., in retaliation

for his

exercise of his FMLA rights) does not prcclude his claim of wrongful discharge. Thus, the Court
will not dismiss Count I.
B. Unlawful Interference

with FMLA Benefits (Count II)

As to Cline's second claim, that O'Connor
O'Connor

argues that "thcre is no allegation

unlawfully

interfered with his FMLA rights,

that Cline did not receive all of his FM LA benefits"

and that .'there is no specific allegation that Cline was terminated

6

because he received FMLA

benefits."

ECF No. 12-2 at 7-8. O'Connor

rate of payor
responds

also argues that "there is no allegation

that Cline's

other benefits were changed upon his return to work." ECF No. 15 at 2. Cline

that he was entitled to be reinstated

into his prior position, a right which O'Connor

denied him. ECF No. 14 at 9.
An employee
be restored

who takes FMLA leave "shall be entitled. on return from such leave (A) to

by the employer

commenced:

to the position of employment

or (B) to be restored to an equivalent

pay, and other terms and conditions
and conditions
responsibilities.

of employments"
privileges,

position with equivalent

of employment."

means those with "substantially

and status as the employee's

at his prior position.

* 2614(a)(

29 U.S.c.

(e). The Fourth Circuit has made clear that an employee
reinstated

held by the employee

* 2614(a)(

original position:'

Ahmed v. Salmfio17 Army, No. CCB-12-707,

the light most favorable
Amended
Supervisor,

Complaint

from Mechanic

job responsibilities,
significantly

to Cline, the Court denies O'Connor's

and the difference

his promotions

in the Amended

details his rise at O'Connor

including

being "responsible

position:'

See Waag v.

who does not

FMLA rights. See

(D. Md. Dec. 28, 2012).
Complaint

as true and viewed in

Motion as to Count II. Cline's
to Plumbing
how

came with pay raises and increased

for direct oversight
and provid[ing]

Id. ~~ 13. 18. When he returned

7

terms

* 825.215

ECF No. 6 ~ 9-13. Cline describes

Supervisor

increased job duties" and "manag[ing]

workers of up to 25 employees:'

29 C.F.R.

from the position of Mechanic

between these positions.
to the Plumbing

I). "[:quivalent

An employer

with an employee's

2012 WL 6761596

Here, taking all the factual allegations

benefits,

does not have an absolute right to be

but must be offered at least an "equivalent

I) may be liable for interfering

employment

similar duties, conditions.

So/era Defense Soill/ions. Inc., 857 F. 3d 179, 187 (4th Cir. 2017).
comply with

when the leave

of several job sites with
oversight

for crews of

from his FMLA leave,

however,

Cline was not offered the position of Plumbing

Supervisor

position:

instead. he was told that he was being "demoted

back to the position of Mechanic."

40. Cline pleads that .'(t]he demoted
than that of Plumbing

Supervisor

Id.

responsibilities'"

allegation

was a significantly

and did not involve the same or substantially

42. Cline has sufficiently

he was not reinstated
plausible

position of Mechanic

or an equivalent

interfered

Id.

lower position
similar duties and

pleaded that. upon his return from FMLA leave,

into his prior position or an equivalent
that O'Connor

supervisor

position. Thus, he has pleaded a

with his FMLA benefits. and O'Connor's

Motion

to Dismiss is denied as to Count II.

C. Retaliation
As for Cline's
O'Connor

(Count III)

third claim. that he was retaliated

against for taking FMLA leave,

argues that Cline has not pleaded "but-for causation"

on behalf of O'Connor."

ECF No. 12-2 at 8. Cline responds

or "any specific retaliatory

that he "was not required to recite

precise legal terminology,"

and that the "closeness

termination

to plead a "prima facie ease of causality."

were sufficient

intent

in time" between his FMLA leave and his
ECF No. 14 at 13 (quoting

in part Greene v. YRC. Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 644, 655 (D. Md. 2013».
In his Amended
2615(a)(2),
discharge

Cline identifies

Count III as being brought under 29 U.S.c.

see ECF NO.6 at 12, which provides that "P]t shall be unlawful for any employer to
or in any other manner discrililinate

made unlawful
opposing

Complaint.

by this subchapter."

an unlawful

filed for workers'

for opposing

any practice

Cline does not allege that he was fired for

practice; rather. Cline alleges that O'Connor

compensation.

action under FMLA."

However.

against any individual

and took the accompanying

ECF No. 6 ~ 62. Therefore.

terminated

FMLA leave, which is a protected

the Court construes

8

him because "he

Count III as being brought

~

not under 29 U.S.c.

*

2615(a)(2).

but as an FMLA retaliation

claim recognized

by the Fourth

Circuit.7
Construed

as such. Cline has sufficiently

plaintiff claiming

"must first make a pr;mafacie

retaliation

activity, that the employer
causally connected

alleged a claim of retaliation.

An FMLA

showing that he engaged in protected

took adverse action against him, and that the adverse action was

to the plaintitTs

protected

activity."

Yashenko v. Harrah's NC CashlO Co.,

LLC, 446 F.3d 541. 551 (4th Cir. 2006). Cline has pleaded that he requested and took FMLA
leave, and that as soon as he returned

from his FMLA leave, O'Connor

and then terminated

The close proximity

exercising

his employment.

his FMLA rights and his attempted

the same day he returned
demonstrate
closeness

demotion

from his FMLA leave-viewed

a causal connection.

attempted

of time between O'Connor's
and termination-Cline

IV.

to Cline,

See Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 551 ("While evidence as to the

in time far from conclusively

establishes

Thus, Cline has pleaded a prhnafacie

denied regarding

was terminated

in the light most favorable

the requisite causal connection,

satisfies the less onerous burden of making a prima facie case of causality.")
omitted).

to demote him

claim of retaliation,

it certainly

(internal quotations

and O'Connor's

Motion is

Count III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing

reasons, O'Connor's

Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No, 12. is denied. A

separate Order shall issue.
Date: May

fz
/

.2018
GEORGE .J. HAZEL
United States District .Judge

7 "While the FMLA does not specifically
forbid discharging an employee in retaliation for his use of FMLA leave.
29 C.F.R. ~ 825.220(c) states that employers are 'prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective
employees who have used FM LA leave' and that 'employers cannot use the taking of FM LA leave as a negative
factor in employment actions. such as hiring. promotions. or disciplinary actions.' Courts have recognized that the
FMLA provides a cause of action for retaliation:' Do/so// v. f'.f7:.er. I//c., 558 F.3d 284. 294-95 (4th Cir. 2009).

9