Abdullah v. Stewart

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 4/16/2018. (c/m 4/17/2018 tds, Deputy Clerk)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ABDUL ABDULLAH, #690331-054,

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Petitioner

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v.

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TIMOTHY STEWART, Warden,

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Civil Action No. PWG-17-2195

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Respondent

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
While confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland ("FCICumberland"), Petitioner Abdul Abdullah, acting without counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
finding him guilty of possession

S 2241,

challenging the validity of a disciplinary hearing

of a cell phone during his confinement

at the Federal

Correctional Institution at Joint Base Maguire Dix in Lakehurst, NJ ("FCI-Fort Dix,,).l ECF No.
1. Respondent, the Warden of FCI-Cumberland, moves to dismiss or for summary judgment.
ECF NO.6. Because Abdullah cannot prove a violation of his Constitutional rights based on the
undisputed material facts, Respondent's unopposed motion,2 construed as a motion for summary
judgment, shall be granted; and the Petition shall be denied and dismissed.

1 Although the claim arose while Abdullah was housed at FCI-Fort Dix, Abdullah filed his
Petition while housed at FCI -Cumberland. A S 2241 Petition must be filed in the jurisdiction
where the Petitioner is confined. See 28 U.S.C. S 2241(a). Although Abdullah subsequently was
transferred from FCI-Cumberland to FCI-Fairton in New Jersey, see Jimenez Decl. ~ 4 & Ex. B,
ECF No. 6-2, at 3, 12, this Court retained jurisdiction. See Griffin v. Ebbert, 751 F.3d 288, 290
(5th Cir. 2014) ("Jurisdiction attached on [an] initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it was
not destroyed by the transfer of petitioner and accompanying custodial change.").

2 Pursuant to the dictates of Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Clerk of
Court on November 7, 2017 informed Abdullah that Respondent had filed a dispositive motion;
that Abdullah had seventeen days in which to file a written opposition to the motion; and that if

Background
Abdullah is servmg a five year sentence, with a current projected release date of
September 12,2019.

Jimenez Decl. ~ 3 & Att. A (Inmate Data), ECF No. 6-2, at 3-4, 8.3 On

June 8, 2016, while housed at FCI -Fort Dix, Abdullah was charged with a possession of a cell
phone, which is deemed a violation of "Code 108," "possession of a hazardous tool." Pet. Ex. A,
ECF No. 1-3; Jimenez Decl. ~ 5 & Att. B (Inmate History) & C (Incident Report), ECF No. 6-2,
at 4, 12, 14-19.

Officers conducting a pat search of inmates inside Cell 218 had instructed

Abdullah to remove his shoes as part of the search. Pet. Ex. A, ECF No. 1-3; Jimenez Decl. Att.
C, ECF No. 6-2, at 14-15. An officer charged Abdullah with possession of a cell phone, which
the officer claimed was found in one of Abdullah's just-removed shoes. Pet. Ex. A, ECF No. 13; Pet'r Mem. 3, ECF No. 1-1; Jimenez Decl. Att. C, ECF No. 6-2, at 14-15.
The Unit Disciplinary Committee ("UDC") held a hearing on June 14, 2016 and noted
that Abdullah "stated that the phone was not his, and he was set up." Jimenez Decl. Att. C, ECF
No. 6-2, at 13-14.

Due to the severity level of the offense and "the seriousness/repetitive

behavior of the incident report," the UDC referred the charge to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer
("DHO").

ld. ~ 6 & Att. C, ECF No. 6-2, at 3, 14, 16. Abdullah received notice of the hearing,

declined staff representation, and waived his right to call witnesses. ld. Att. D (Notice), ECF No.
6-2, at 23. The DHO conducted a hearing on June 23, 2016, and found Abdullah committed the
violation. ld. ~ 9 & Att. F (DHO Report), ECF No. 6-2, at 4, 28-29; Pet. Ex. B (DHO Report),
ECF No. 1-3. The DHO's decision "was based on the evidence supplied by the reporting officer
in the incident report detailing the search of Petitioner and the discovery of the cellular phone
Abdullah failed to respond, summary judgment could be entered against him without further
notice. ECF NO.7. Abdullah failed to respond.
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This opinion cites to pagination assigned by the electronic docket.
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inside Petitioner's

shoe" when Abdullah removed his shoe, and Abdullah's

admission at the

DHO hearing "that the phone belonged to him." Jimenez Decl.~ 9 & Att. F, ECF No. 6-2, at 4,
28-29.

Additionally,

"[p]hotographs

of the phone corroborated

the reporting

officer's

statement." ld.
Because the offense is categorized at the greatest security level, the DHO had full
discretion to "[f]orfeit and/or withhold earned statutory good time or non-vested good conduct
time (up to 100%) and/or terminate or disallow extra good time .... " Jimenez Decl. ~ 10 & Att.
G (Program Statement 5270.09), ECF No. 6-2, at 4-5, 74-75.

Abdullah received sanctions,

including the disallowance of forty days good conduct time ("GCT"), the forfeiture of fourteen
days of non-vested

GCT,

and privileges,

correspondence and telephone communication.

including

a three year restriction

Pet. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-3; see Pet. 2. Abdullah's

appeals of the conviction and sanctions were unsuccessful.
Req. to Staff Member Resp.).

on email

Pet. Ex. G, ECF No. 1-9 (Inmate

Abdullah now seeks restoration of the GCT and restoration of

those privileges. Pet. 8; Pet'r Mem. 6.
Abdullah alleges that the DHO's

finding was based on insufficient

evidence, his

procedural due process and equal protections rights were violated, the sanctions imposed were
too harsh, and the administrative grievance process is abusive and racially discriminatory.
7-8.

The crux of Abdullah's

Pet.

claim that the DHO's decision was improper centers on his

assertion that the phone discovered during a search did not come from his shoe, but rather was in
a shoe found among many other shoes in the dorm. Pet'r Mem. 3. Abdullah also insists that he
never admitted that the phone was his. ld. He further alleges the reporting officer violated
protocol by failing to secure the area prior to the search. ld. at 4. Abdullah states, generally, that
the decisions of the DHO, Regional Director, and Central Office were biased and rooted in racial
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discrimination, and that the decision-makers failed to "follow their own rules and regulations"
and were part of a conspiracy to deny due process rights to a person of color. Id. at 4-5.
Standard of Review
Respondent filed its motion as one, in the alternative, for summary judgment,

and

submitted evidence for the Court's reVIew; Abdullah has not requested an opportunity for
discovery (or otherwise responded to the motion); and I will consider the evidence in my
analysis. Accordingly, the motion is construed properly as a motion for summary judgment.

See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Walker v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., No. CCB-12-3151, 2013 WL
2370442, at *3 (D. Md. May 30, 2013); Ridgell v. Astrue, No. DKC-10-3280, 2012 WL 707008,
at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012).
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through "particular
parts of materials

in the record, including

depositions,

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ...

documents,

electronically

stored

, admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials," that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of
Greensboro,

714 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 2013). If the party seeking summary judgment

demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party to identify evidence that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material
facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 & n.10
(1986). The existence of only a "scintilla of evidence" is not enough to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Instead, the
evidentiary materials submitted must show facts from which the finder of fact reasonably could
find for the party opposing summary judgment. Id. The Court considers the undisputed facts, and
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to the extent there is a genuine dispute of material fact, "this Court reviews the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Downing v. BaIt. City
Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, No. RDB-12-1047, 2015 WL 1186430, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 13,2015)
(citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).
Analysis
Due Process
Prisoners retain rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's

Due Process Clause, but

"prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of
rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply."

WolfJv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)).

In prison disciplinary

proceedings where an inmate faces the possible loss of diminution credits, he is entitled to
certain procedural

protections, including: (1) "advance written notice" of the charges against

him; (2) "a written statement of ... the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
action taken"; (3) a hearing where he is afforded the right to call witnesses and present evidence
when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns; (4) the
opportunity to have legal assistance-albeit

not from an attorney-when

the inmate is illiterate

or the disciplinary hearing involves complex issues; and (5) an impartial decision-maker.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66,570-71,578-79.

See

There is no constitutional right to confront and cross-

examine witnesses or to retain or be appointed counsel. See id.; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308,322 (1976); Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501,504-05 (4th Cir. 2004).
Substantive due process is satisfied if "some evidence" supports the disciplinary hearing
decision. Superintendent, Mass. Carr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Federal courts do
not review the correctness of a disciplinary hearing officer's findings of fact.

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See Kelly v.

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Cooper, 502 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (E.D.' Va. 1980). The findings will only be disturbed when
unsupported by any evidence, or when wholly arbitrary and capricious.
456; see also Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 933 (4th Cir. 1990).

See Hill, 472 U.S. at

As long as there is some

evidence in the record to support a disciplinary committee's factual findings, a federal court will
not review their accuracy. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
Abdullah received advance written notice of the charges against him and the hearing, and
declined a staff representative and witnesses.

Be presented his testimony at the hearing.

The

DBO weighed that testimony against evidence presented by prison staff and found that Abdullah
had possession of the cell phone. The DBO issued a written decision that provided an evidentiary
basis for the ruling. Further, there is no evidence that the DBO was not impartial. Additionally,
the DBO's decision was supported by "some evidence." Therefore, it satisfies the constitutional
standard for disciplinary proceedings.

See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66,

570-71,578-79.
Equal Protection
A party claiming a violation of equal protection must "demonstrate that he has been
treated differently from other with whom he is similarly situated individuals and that the unequal
treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination."

Morrison v. Garraghty,

239 F.3d 648,653 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439-40 (1985)).
Abdullah does not present any evidence to support his inference that the guilty finding
and subsequent punishment were the result of discrimination.

Be does not claim procedural

infirmities occurring in the hearing itself that violated applicable rules or that ran afoul of the due
process protections to which he was entitled; nor can he on the record before this Court.

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The

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<

prohibited act-possession

of a hazardous tool (a cell phone)-. is among the greatest severity

level offenses, and the penalty imposed is within the parameters of sanctions permitted in
accordance with Bureau of Prisons policy and federal regulation.
the punishment imposed are not evidence of racial bias.

Thus, the guilty finding and

Abdullah's unsupported, conclusory

claim that he was charged and convicted of a rule violation simply because of his race cannot
form the basis of a viable equal protection claim, and his claim that the administrative grievance
procedure is racially biased is equally flawed.
Conclusion
Respondent is entitled to summary judgm

~

Date

is favor. A separate Order follows.

Paul . Grimm
United States District Judge

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