Hamilton v. Prince George's County Police Department et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/16/2018. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
NARICA HAMILTON
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 17-2300

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights case is the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary

judgment

(ECF No. 14).

filed

by

Defendant

Prince

George’s

County.

The issues have been briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

Defendant’s motion is confusing, to say the least.

While

counsel has purported to articulate the proper standards for
either

a

motion

to

dismiss

or

memorandum is hopelessly jumbled.

for

summary

judgment,

the

The discussion meanders from

failure to ALLEGE something, to inability to PROVE something.
It is not this court’s role to parse the arguments in this
fashion.
Plaintiff counsel did little better in pleading and arguing
Plaintiff’s case.

The complaint was not a “short and plain

statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), but rather a long
and unwieldy document which failed appropriately to explain the

events

giving

rise

to

Plaintiff’s

claims.

Although

counsel

recognized the applicability of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d), they failed
to file the Rule 56(d) affidavit.

In several instances, counsel

advances

to

arguments

in

response

contradict the complaint.

Defendant’s

motion

that

Counsel would be well advised to file

an amended complaint.
Given the deficiencies on both sides, the pending motion
will

be

entirety.

treated

as

a

motion

for

summary

judgment

in

its

It will be granted as to the state law claims but

denied as to the federal claims.
I.

Background
A.

Factual History1

Prince George’s County Police Department hired Plaintiff
NaRica Hamilton in 2006.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was

the only female in her unit, and her immediate supervisor was
Sergeant Gerald Manley, a male.
Plaintiff

always

received

performance reviews.

Prior to November 12, 2015,

satisfactory

or

better

on

her

(ECF No. 17-3 ¶¶ 1, 3, 4).

While under Sergeant Manley's supervision,
[Plaintiff]
was
routinely
subjected
to
verbal harassment. This harassment included
1

Because of the posture of this case, the court has to
determine whether the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s affidavit
and her supporting evidence construed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff create genuine disputes of material fact.
Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
set forth in Plaintiff’s affidavit and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in her favor.
2

berating [her] in front of other members of
[her] squad and/or [her] superior officers .
. . . and sharing private information that
should have only been shared with [her]
supervising officers, and referring to [her]
by [her] first name only[.]
(ECF No. 17-3 ¶ 5).

The parties also agree that Sgt. Manley

listened to radio shows at work which were offensive to women
and minorities.

(ECF No. 14-1 ¶ 74).

On October 7, 2015,

Plaintiff expressed her concern about the discrimination she was
experiencing to her Lieutenant, Lt. Popielarcheck.

On October

8, she emailed a union shop steward about the discrimination.
On

October

15,

at

a

squad

meeting,

Sgt.

Manley

humiliated Plaintiff for asking a question.
anyone else that way.

mocked

and

He did not treat

On October 22, Plaintiff filed a formal

complaint with the police department.

(Id. ¶¶ 6-10).

On October 26, Plaintiff found out she was pregnant, and
her doctor told her that she needed to be placed on light duty
because

of

complications

from

the

pregnancy.

Plaintiff

requested an accommodation to ensure she did not have to a)
stand for long periods, b) drive more than 30 miles each day, or
c) lift more than twenty pounds.
November

2,

Department.

and

Plaintiff

was

The request was granted on
transferred

to

the

Records

Even though Plaintiff was not supposed to drive

other than from home to work and back, she was ordered to drive

3

to the station on November 10, 11, and 12.

(ECF No. 17-3 ¶¶ 12-

14).
Plaintiff
November

14

found

and

out

that

underwent

a

she

had

related

had

a

surgical

miscarriage

on

procedure

on

November 15.

Plaintiff was on leave from November 15 until

December 30.

When she returned, “Sergeant Manley continued to

make offensive and derogatory comments to [her] and continued to
treat [her] in a discriminatory and hostile manner.”
17-3 ¶ 19).

(ECF No.

She was then granted a transfer request to a patrol

assignment and involuntary reassigned to the night shift.

(Id.

¶ 20).
B.

Procedural Background

On June 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court
for Prince George’s County, Maryland, against Prince George’s
County and the Prince George’s County Police Department.
No. 2).

(ECF

Plaintiff brought 16 claims under an assortment of

federal and state laws alleging discrimination on the basis of
sex, pregnancy, disability and related claims of retaliation.
On August 11, Defendant Prince George’s County removed the case.
Defendant Prince George’s County moved to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment on September 15.
14).

(ECF No.

Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 17), and Defendant replied

(ECF No. 20).

4

II.

State Discrimination Claims
A.

Prince George’s County Police Department

Plaintiff brought claims against the Prince George’s County
Police

Department.

issue,

Although

Defendant

17(b)(2)

states

Fed.R.Civ.P.

has

not

that

a

raised

this

corporation’s

capacity to be sued is determined by the law under which it was
organized.
Charter

Pursuant to state law, the Prince George’s County

mandates

that

the

corporate

name

of

the

County

is

“Prince George’s County, Maryland,” and that the County shall be
designated as such in all actions and proceedings touching its
liabilities and duties.

Prince George’s County Charter § 103.

Thus,

the

a

claim

against

“Prince

George’s

County

Police

Department” should be brought as a claim against the county
itself.

See

Hines

v.

French,

157

Md.App.

536,

573

(2004).

Where the county is already named in the suit, claims against
the

Prince

dismissed.

George’s

County

Police

Department

are

properly

See, e.g., Dodson v. Prince George’s Cty., No. JKS-

13-2916, 2016 WL 67255 (D.Md. Jan. 6, 2016); Stewart v. Prince
George’s Cty., No. AW-01-302, 2001 WL 759890 (D.Md. May 23,
2001).

Accordingly, the claims against Prince George’s County

Police Department will be dismissed with prejudice.
B.

Local Government Tort Claim Act

Counts IX through XVI of Plaintiff’s complaint assert state
law claims.

(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 109-187).
5

Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s
properly

state

to

law

provide

claims

are

barred

notice

as

required

Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”).

because

she

under

the

failed
Local

(ECF No. 14-1, at 15).

Compliance with the LGTCA is necessary to effectuate a waiver of
immunity for local governments in Maryland.

Plaintiff contends

that her claims are not subject to the LGTCA and that even if
the

LGTCA

applied,

requirements

by

she

complied

reporting

Commission on Civil Rights.

with

the

the

incidents

notice
to

and

the

timing

Maryland

(ECF No. 17-1, at 20-21).

Plaintiff cites to Md.Code, State Gov’t § 20-903, to argue
that Defendant cannot assert immunity.

(ECF No. 17-1, at 20).

Section 20-903 provides, “The State, its officers, and its units
may not raise sovereign immunity as a defense against an award
in

an

employment

Defendant

is

a

discrimination

county,
of

the

and

case

Section

Maryland

under
20-903

Code

does

this
of

title.”

the

not

State

Government

Article

apply

to

counties.

See Md.Code, State Gov’t § 1-101(b), (e) (defining

county and state); see also Prince George’s Cty. v. Silverman,
58 Md.App. 41, 51-52 (1984) (explaining Defendant’s status as a
charter

county

Constitution).

pursuant
Therefore,

to

Article

the

waiver

XI-A
of

of

the

Maryland

sovereign

immunity

cited by Plaintiff does not apply.
The

LGTCA

applies

to

suits

against

Defendant,

White

v.

Prince George’s Cty., 163 Md.App. 129, 141-144 (2005), and it
6

applies regardless of whether an action is a common law tort,
constitutional

tort,

Md.Code,

&

Cts.

unliquidated
government
required

damages

or

by

Jud.

its

this

or

a

statutory

Proc.
may

§

section

5-304(b)(1)

not

employees

be

given

the

of

action.

(“[A]n

brought

unless

is

cause

within

action

against

notice
1

See

of

year

for

a

local

the

claim

after

the

injury”) (emphasis added); Rounds v. Maryland-Nat. Capital Park
& Planning Comm’n, 441 Md. 621, 636 (2015) (“[W]e hold that,
generally, the LGTCA notice requirement applies to both state
constitutional

and

non-constitutional

tort

claims

for

unliquidated damages.”); Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670
(2011)

(applying

the

LGTCA

to

a

claim

of

discriminatory

discharge).
Before bringing suit, the LGTCA requires notice “be given
in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested” to an
identified representative of the county.
Proc. § 5-304(c)(1).
notice

should

be

304(c)(3)(iii).

Md.Code, Cts. & Jud.

In the case of Prince George’s County,

provided

to

Plaintiff

the

did

county
not

attorney.

follow

these

§

5-

steps.

Plaintiff contends that the requirement can be excused pursuant
to Section 5-304(e) which provides that the notice requirement
“does

not

apply

if,

within

1

year

after

the

injury,

the

defendant local government has actual or constructive notice of:
(1) [t]he claimant’s injury[.]”

(See ECF No. 17-1, at 21).
7

Section 5-304(e)(1) was approved on May 19, 2016.

“Local

Government Tort Claims Act – Notice Requirement – Exception,”
2016 Maryland Laws Ch. 624 (H.B. 637).

Section 1 of the Act is

codified at Md.Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(e)(1).

Section 2

of the Act states, “this Act shall be construed to apply only
prospectively and may not be applied or interpreted to have any
effect on or application to any cause of action arising before
the effective date of this Act.”
was October 1, 2016.
of the 2015 year.

The effective date of the act

Plaintiff’s action accrued around the end

(See ECF No. 17-1, at 16).

Indeed, prior to

the effective date of this act, Plaintiff filed her claims with
the

Maryland

Commission

on

Civil

Rights.

(ECF

No.

17-15).2

Thus, Section 5-304(e)(1) does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff further argues her failure to follow the notice
requirement can be excused pursuant to Section 5-304(d) of the
Courts
(ECF

and
No.

Judicial
17-1,

Procedure
at

Article

21).

of

Section

the

Maryland

5-304(d)

Code.

states,

“Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, unless
the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been
prejudiced by lack of required notice, upon motion and for good
cause shown the court may entertain the suit even though the
2

Despite Plaintiff identifying one date in the complaint,
July 21, 2016 (ECF No. 2 ¶ 6), Plaintiff’s supporting
documentation provides a different date, August 1, 2016 (ECF No.
17-15). It is an elementary rule of pleading that the complaint
should accurately explain what happened and when it happened.
8

required notice was not given.”

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff

has “identified no circumstances preventing [her] from notifying
[Defendant]

of

[her]

grievances

within

the

180-day

window.”

Martino v. Bell, 40 F.supp.2d 719, 722 (D.Md. 1999); see White,
163 Md.App. at 152 (identifying criteria to determine whether
good cause can be shown for a failure to comply with the notice
requirement).

Plaintiff

has

not

shown

good

cause

for

her

failure to comply with the statute, and Defendant is entitled to
judgment.
III. Standard of Review
Defendant responded to the complaint by filing a muddled
and disorganized motion in which it requested summary judgment
even though discovery has not begun.

Rule 56(d) allows district

courts to deny summary judgment or delay ruling on the motion
until

discovery

has

occurred

if

the

“nonmovant

shows

by

affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present

facts

essential

to

justify

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) (emphasis added).
failed

to

comply

with

this

its

opposition.”

In her response, Plaintiff

important

procedural

requirement.

Nonetheless, as a general matter, “summary judgment [must] be
refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to
discover information that is essential to the motion.”

Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5 (1986).

A party,

however,

sake

“cannot

simply

demand
9

discovery

for

the

of

discovery.”
F.Supp.2d

Hamilton v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 807
331,

342

(D.Md.

2011)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
A nonmovant’s request for discovery will be denied if the
request

would

not

affect

a

party’s

entitlement

to

summary

judgment, Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191,
195 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), and a
party is entitled to summary judgment if there exists no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

A

dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such

that

a

reasonable

nonmoving party.”

jury

could

return

a

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

verdict

for

the

In undertaking

this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable to the
party

opposing

the

motion,”

Matsushita

Elec.

Indus.

Co.

v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also
EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir.
2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material
fact

through

mere

speculation

or

10

compilation

of

inferences.”

Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation
omitted).
IV.

Title VII Discrimination Claims
A.

Hostile Work Environment

“To

state

a

hostile

work

environment

claim,

[Plaintiff]

must allege that: (1) she experienced unwelcome harassment; (2)
the harassment was based on her gender, race, or age; (3) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and
(4) there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer.”
Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003).

Defendant’s

motion

argues

that

Plaintiff

cannot

demonstrate that the conduct was based on gender or was severe
and pervasive and that no basis exists for imputing liability to
the employer.

(ECF No. 14-1, at 23-24).

1.

Based on Gender

Plaintiff argues that she was treated differently than male
colleagues

and

discrimination.

therefore

established

gender-based

To prevail on a gender-based claim of hostile

work environment, the plaintiff must show that the mistreatment
was because of the victim’s gender.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

“An

employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against ‘because
of’ his or her gender if, ‘but for’ the employee’s gender, he or
she

would

not

have

been

the

victim
11

of

the

discrimination.”

Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir.
2000).
Here,
Plaintiff

Plaintiff
also

humiliating

was

was

the

treatment

treatment.

the

only
and

only

person

was

female

in

subject

repeatedly

to

her

squad.

demeaning

subject

to

or

such

The comments from the radio show were offensive to

women and not men.

Thus, the only woman faced mistreatment that

no man faced which demonstrates mistreatment because of gender.3
2.
A

hostile

plaintiff

was

Severe or Pervasive
work

environment

subject

to

claim

conduct

requires

showing

“sufficiently

that

severe

or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.”
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB

Plaintiff argues that she

suffered from a pattern of mistreatment.

(ECF No. 17-1, at 23-

24, 28).
The

severity

and

pervasiveness

necessary

to

establish

a

hostile work environment claim relies on “[c]ommon sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context . . . to distinguish
between simple teasing or roughhousing . . . and conduct which a

3

Defendant, somewhat confusingly, discusses an internal
complaint Plaintiff filed and argues that the internal complaint
does not have sufficient facts to show that Plaintiff was
subject to discrimination on the basis of gender. (ECF No. 141, at 23).
This internal complaint is irrelevant to this
action.
12

reasonable
severely
Servs.,

person

hostile
Inc.,

in
or

523

the

plaintiff’s

abusive.”

U.S.

75,

Oncale

82

position
v.

(1988).

would

Sundowner
Here,

find

Offshore

Plaintiff

was

subject to verbal harassment and demeaning treatment in front of
her

coworkers.

information

Her

about

supervisors

her

occurred frequently.

with

her

shared

personal

coworkers.

and

The

private

misconduct

Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to

create a dispute of material fact at this stage.
3.

Basis for Imputing Liability

Defendant

asserts

that

there

is

no

basis

to

impute

liability because it had a policy reasonably aimed to prevent
harassment.

(ECF No. 14-1, at 24).

Plaintiff does not contest

the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s policy.
28).

Instead,

without

citing

any

(ECF No. 17-1, at

relevant

law,

Plaintiff

responds that the harassment was done by her supervisors.
at 25).

(Id.

Plaintiff appears to be asserting a case for strict

liability.

(Id.).

supervisors

take

An

employer

tangible

is

employment

strictly

liable

actions.

when

Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).

Tangible

employment actions include “discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment.”

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,

808 (1998) (emphasis added).
Here,
policing

Plaintiff

to

a

was

patrol

transferred

squad

and
13

from

moved

to

community
the

oriented

night

shift.

Plaintiff asserts that the change resulted in different work
tasks.

In other words, it was an undesirable reassignment.

Defendant’s

motion

as

to

Plaintiff’s

claim

of

hostile

work

environment will be denied.
B.

Disparate Treatment

Count I alleges disparate treatment on the basis of gender.
Count VII alleges disparate treatment on the basis of pregnancy
which, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, is a type
of gender-based disparate treatment.
U.S.

701,

719

(2009).

AT&T Corp v. Hulteen, 556

Defendant’s

motion

contends

that

Plaintiff’s gender-based disparate treatment claims fail because
Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse action.

(ECF No. 14-1, at

18,

lower

26).

Plaintiff

responds

that

the

performance

evaluation and reassignment constitute adverse action.

(ECF No.

17-1, at 24).
“A work reassignment may constitute an adverse employment
action when the change is so substantial and material that it
alter[s] the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
Trask v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1194
(11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Trask v. Shulkin, 137 S.
Ct. 1133 (2017); Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir.
1999) (“[R]eassignment can only form the basis of a valid Title
VII claim if the plaintiff can show the reassignment has some
significant detrimental effect on her.”).
14

Plaintiff received a

transfer away from community oriented policing to a patrol unit.
She was also involuntarily given the night shift.
took

her

excelled
paltry

away

from

at.

At

the

community
stage

provided

briefing

this

by

work

without
both

that

she

discovery

parties,

This transfer
enjoyed

and

and

with

Defendant

the

has

not

demonstrated that no dispute of material fact exists.4
V.

Title VII & ADA Retaliation
Title

VII

discrimination

and

against

the

employees

respective statutes outlaw.
2000e-3(a)).

ADA

prohibit
who

oppose

employers
actions

that

from
the

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); 42 U.S.C. §

The elements for retaliation under either statute

mirror each other and can be analyzed together.

Adams v. Anne

Arundel Cty. Pub. Sch., 789 F.3d 422, 431 (4th Cir. 2015).

For

the burden-shifting framework, Plaintiff must establish: “(1)
engagement

in

a

protected

activity;

(2)

adverse

employment

action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and

4

Again, it is worth noting an inconsistency between the
complaint and Plaintiff’s supporting documents.
The complaint
asserts, “On or about December 1, 2015, Plaintiff was given an
involuntary shift change from day to night shift.” (ECF No. 2 ¶
30).
The same paragraph states, “Plaintiff was transferred to
the records department” leading to the logical conclusion that
she was transferred to the records division on or about December
1.
According to Plaintiff’s affidavit, she was transferred to
the records division around November 2.
She went on medical
leave from the middle of November until December 30.
When she
returned, she then requested a transfer, and, it was that
transfer which entailed working the night shift.
(ECF No. 173).
Counsel may need to amend the complaint to ensure the
complaint and any supporting evidence are consistent.
15

the employment action.”

Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.

Defendant

argues that Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity, did
not suffer an adverse action, and that Plaintiff cannot raise an
inference of discrimination.
A.

Protected Activity

For

Title

(ECF No. 14-1, at 25-27).

“oppos[ing]

VII

any

practice[.]”

purposes,
practice

protected
made

an

and

procedures

as

“encompasses
well

as

conduct

employment

Protected activity is

utilizing

staging

is

unlawful

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).

expansive

activity

informal

informal
protests

grievance
and

voicing

one’s opinions in order to bring attention to an employer’s
discriminatory activities.”

Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports

Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998).

At a minimum, to

qualify as protected activity, a person must attempt to assert
federal rights against discrimination.

See Treglia v. Town of

Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff argues that

she made a series of informal complaints which are protected
activities.
Under

(ECF No. 17-1, at 29).
Title

VII,

complaints

are

protected

activity

when

“the employee ‘communicates to her employer a belief that the
employer

has

engaged

discrimination.’”
F.Supp.3d

242,

in

.

.

.

a

form

of

employment

Bowman v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 173

248

(D.Md.

2016)

(quoting

Crawford

v.

Metro.

Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009)).
16

Here, Plaintiff filed an internal complaint stating that she had
been

subject

to

“discrimination,”

that

her

“work

environment

[was] . . . hostile,” that her supervisor was “sexist,” that her
supervisor

was

“uncomfortable”

“demeaning
because

“with prejudice.”

her

[her],”

and

supervisor

(ECF No. 14-15).

that

always

she

reacted

was

to

her

Informal complaints are not

done by lawyers and do not need to use legally actionable words
or cite specific statutes.

It is sufficient to state generally

that a person is a victim of discrimination.

See Okoli v. City

of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 224 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Here, it was enough
for

[plaintiff]

Plaintiff’s

to

informal

twice

complain

complaint

of

‘harassment[.]’”).

qualifies

as

a

protected

activity.
A

request

for

accommodation

activities for ADA purposes.

is

paradigmatic

protected

Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252

F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff made a request

for an accommodation in mid-October.

(ECF No. 2 ¶ 23).

Thus,

she also engaged in protected activity for the purposes of her
ADA retaliation claim.
B.

Adverse Employment Action

Adverse employment action refers to acts that are “harmful
to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker
from

making

or

supporting

a

charge

of

discrimination.”

Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57
17

(2006) (“Burlington N.”).

In Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650

F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit concluded a change in responsibilities
from a mechanic on an assembly line to a largely janitorial role
was an adverse action for the purposes of a retaliation claim.
Here, as in Hoyle, Plaintiff was moved from her desired work to
a different role.
C.

This alone constitutes adverse action.

Causation

“[A]

plaintiff

making

a

retaliation

claim

.

.

.

must

establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause
of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”

Univ. of Tx.

Sw. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).

Close temporal

proximity between a protected activity and an adverse action
“tends
Eastern

to

show

Shore,

causation[.]”

Foster

787

253

F.3d

243,

v.

(4th

Univ.
Cir.

of

Maryland-

2015).

Plaintiff engaged in protected activity in October.
reassigned

within

sufficiently
record

a

few

months.

demonstrated

stands,

Accordingly,

causation

Defendant

is

not

at

this

She was

Plaintiff

stage.

entitled

Here,

to

As

has
the

judgment.

Defendant’s motion will be denied.
VI.

Americans with Disabilities Act Discrimination
A.

ADA Failure to Accommodate

Counts

IV

and

VI

of

the

discrimination under the ADA.

complaint

bring

claims

(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 61-70).
18

for
“[I]n

order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case against
[her] employer for failure to accommodate under the ADA, the
plaintiff must show: (1) that [s]he was an individual who had a
disability

within

the

meaning

of

the

statute;

(2)

that

the

employer had notice of his disability; (3) that with reasonable
accommodation [s]he could perform the essential functions of the
position;

and

(4)

accommodations.”

that

the

employer

refused

to

make

such

Wilson v. Dollar General Corp., 717 F.3d 337,

345 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not disabled and

that it made a reasonable accommodation.

(ECF No. 14-1, at 30-

31).
1.

Disability

Defendant
qualify

as

a

argues

that

disability

Plaintiff’s

citing

(ECF No. 14-1, at 29-30).

to

pregnancy

Plaintiff’s

does

doctor

not
note.

Plaintiff responds that “she has a

condition relating to reproductive functions, which is episodic
in nature as it manifests only during pregnancy and necessitates
light duty[.]”
The

ADA

(ECF No. 17-1, at 33).
defines

impairment

that

activities

of

“Although

“disability”

substantially
such

pregnancy

as

limits

a
one

“physical
or

more

individual.”

42

U.S.C.

itself

an

impairment

is

not

§

or

mental

major

life

12102(1)(A).
within

the

meaning of the ADA, and thus is never on its own a disability,
19

some

pregnant

pregnancies
Equal

workers

that

qualify

have

impairments

as

disabilities

Opportunity

Employment

Pregnancy

may

Commission,

Discrimination

and

Related

related
under

to

the

ADA[.]”

Enforcement

Issues,

their

Guide:

available

at

https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm#%20ame
r;

accord

Khan

v.

Midwestern

Univ.,

147

F.Supp.3d

718,

723

(N.D.Il. 2015); Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Civ No. 13349-LM,

2015

WL

1523094

(D.N.H.

April

3,

2015);

Annobil

v.

Worcester Skilled Care Ctr., Inc., No. 11–40131–TSH, 2014 WL
4657295 (D.Mass. Sept. 10, 2014); Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No.
12-21578-CIV, 2012 WL 3043021, *5 (S.D.Fl. July 25, 2012).

A

medical condition arising out of a pregnancy is a disability if
the condition “substantially limits the ability of an individual
to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in
the

general

population.”

29

C.F.R.

§

1630.2(j)(1)(ii);

42

U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A).
Here, due to Plaintiff’s pregnancy related complications,
she

was

told

to

avoid

squatting,

significant

driving,

and

lifting more than twenty pounds.

She was also told to request

light

Plaintiff

duty.

(ECF

No.

14-6).

argues

that

these

limitations affected her ability to perform her job.

Defendant

do not contest that working is a major life function.

Based on

the

record,

disputes

of

material

fact

exist

as

to

whether

Plaintiff was substantially impaired in a major life function.
20

2.

Reasonable Accommodation

Defendant argues that it “granted Plaintiff a reasonable
accommodation and placed her on light-duty assignment[.]”
No. 14-1).
her

Plaintiff asserts that although Defendant granted
accommodation,5

an

(ECF

Defendant

refused

to

honor

the

accommodation and that “the accommodation was truly on paper
only.”

(ECF No. 17-1, at 34).

“Cases involving reasonable

accommodation turn heavily upon their facts and an appraisal of
the reasonableness of the parties’ behavior . . . . [A] court
should

take

a

‘totality

of

the

circumstances’

approach

and

consider whether the combination of accommodations provided by
the

employer

Mobility

was

Puerto

reasonable.”

Rico,

Inc.,

673

Sanchez-Rodriguez
F.3d

1,

12

(1st

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

v.

AT&T

Cir.

2012)

Plaintiff’s

doctor recommended Plaintiff not have to drive more than 30
miles per day, but Defendant required Plaintiff to drive to the
station on November 10, 11, and 12, 2015.

Plaintiff also says

that she could have stayed with the community policing unit and
did not need to be transferred to the records department.
No. 17-3).

(ECF

A dispute exists as to whether Defendant reasonably

5

Plaintiff’s complaint states on almost a dozen occasions
that her accommodation was denied on November 12, 2015.
(ECF
No. 2 ¶¶ 24, 67, 72, 84, 95, 101, 146, 151, 163, 174, 180).
Bafflingly, in response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff stated
that her accommodation was granted on November 2, 2015.
(ECF
No. 17-1, at 34).
21

accommodated

Plaintiff,

and,

therefore,

Defendant

is

not

entitled to judgment.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion filed by Defendant
Prince George’s County will be granted, in part, and denied, in
part.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

22