Hamilton v. Prince George's County Police Department et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/28/2020. (sat, Chambers)

Case 8:17-cv-02300-DKC Document 67 Filed 05/28/20 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
NARICA HAMILTON
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 17-2300

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
MARYLAND

:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

is

defendant

Prince George’s County, Maryland’s (“Prince George’s County”)
motion for reconsideration.

(ECF No. 60).

For the following

reasons, the motion will be denied.
I.

Background
The bulk of the factual and procedural background in this

case is detailed in the court’s opinion of September 30, 2019,
(ECF No. 58), and will not be repeated here.

In that opinion,

this court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all but one
of

Plaintiff

court,

Narica

however,

Plaintiff’s

Hamilton’s

denied

retaliation

summary
claim

eight-claim
judgment

which

arose

complaint.

on

the

from

Parker’s (“Cpt. Parker”) comments to Plaintiff.

portion
Captain

of

Adam

On October 10,

2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
60).

The

(ECF No.

Plaintiff responded, (ECF No. 63), and Defendant replied,

(ECF No. 64).

Case 8:17-cv-02300-DKC Document 67 Filed 05/28/20 Page 2 of 4

II.

Standard of Review
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), a court may revise a non-final

order at any time before entry of a final judgment.

Although

the restrictive standards for review under Rules 59 and 60 are
not binding under Rule 54, courts often look to those standards
for guidance.

Vetter v. American Airlines, Inc. Pilot Long-Term

Disability Plan, 2019 WL 398679 *2 (D.Md. January 31, 2019).

As

Judge Grimm concluded:
In keeping with these standards, this Court has
held
that
“[a]
motion
for
reconsideration
is
appropriate to ‘correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence,’ or where
there has been an intervening change in controlling
law.”
Potter [v. Potter], 199 F.R.D. [550 (D.Md.
2001)] at 552 n.1. (citations omitted). It “is not a
license for a losing party’s attorney to get a second
bite at the apple.” Id. at 552-53 (quoting Shields v.
Shetler, 120 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D.Co. 1988).
These
“rules of constraint . . . make sense when a district
court is asked to reconsider its own order” because
“‘[w]ere it otherwise, then there would be no
conclusion to motions practice, each motion becoming
nothing more than the latest installment in a
potentially endless serial that would exhaust the
resources of the parties and the court—not to mention
its patience.’” Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430,
452-53 (4th Cir. 2005)(quoting Potter, 199 F.R.D. at
553).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s motion merely reiterates arguments previously
made

and

rejected.

Defendant

argues

1)

that

there

was

no

adverse action taken against Cpl. Hamilton, 2) that there was no
causal connection between Cpl. Hamilton’s protected action and

2

Case 8:17-cv-02300-DKC Document 67 Filed 05/28/20 Page 3 of 4

Cpt. Parker’s threat, and 3) that “[t]he Court failed to address
the County’s legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the comment
and whether Plaintiff proved pretext.”

(ECF No. 60-1).

The first of these arguments turns on a semantic quibble:
because,

Defendant

argues,

Cpt.

Parker

left

his

threat

sufficiently vague, it did not constitute a “threat” within the
dictionary

definition

Therefore,

Defendant

distinguishable

from

of

that

term.

argues,
the

(ECF

Cpt.

case

the

No.

60-1,

Parker’s

court

at

comment

relied

on

for

6).
was
the

proposition that “[a]t least one court has found threats of
retaliation
action’

in

sufficient
the

to

constitute

retaliation

an

context.”

‘adverse

(ECF

No.

employment

58,

at

17).

Regardless of whether Cpt. Parker’s comments meet the dictionary
definition of a threat, regardless of whether they “promised
retaliation” or merely implied that it was possible, (ECF No.
60-1,

at

7),

the

court

found

adverse

action

may

employee

would

have

adverse,

which

in

met

the

That standard is as follows:

standard for retaliation.

that

an

constitute
found
this

these

retaliation

the

context

challenged
means

it

comments

if

“a

reasonable

action

materially

well

might

have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.”
Fed.Appx.288

(Mem),

Munive v. Fairfax County School Board, 700
289

Northern, 548 U.S. at 68).

(4th

Cir.

2017)

(citing

Burlington

In this case, Cpt. Parker’s comments
3

Case 8:17-cv-02300-DKC Document 67 Filed 05/28/20 Page 4 of 4

met that standard, and nothing Defendant raises in the motion
for reconsideration changes that fact.
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not establish a
causal connection because “Plaintiff cannot prove that Captain
Parker was aware of her grievance.”
What

Cpt.

Parker

knew

and

when,

disputes of material fact.
U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

(ECF No. 60-1, at 10).

however,

turns

on

genuine

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

The court detailed these disputes in its

previous opinion and will not revisit them here.
Finally,
Defendant’s
comment.”

Defendant
“legitimate,

argues

that

the

non-retaliatory

(ECF No. 60-1, at 10).

court

reason

ignored
for

the

Again, the reason for Cpt.

Parker’s comment is plainly a dispute of material fact and it
would

thus

be

improper

for

the

court

to

decide

on

summary

judgment.
IV.

Conclusion
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

reconsideration will be denied.

Defendant’s

motion

for

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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