Thomas v. Prince George's County Sheriff's Office

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/6/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
COREY THOMAS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 17-2858

:
STATE OF MARYLAND
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Corey Thomas filed suit in the Circuit Court for
Prince

George’s

County,

alleging

that

he

was

against by his employer, the Sheriff’s Office.

discriminated
Initially the

complaint included claims under both federal and state law.

The

Defendant removed the action and Plaintiff amended the complaint
to delete the only federal claim.
court, which Defendant opposes.

Now he seeks remand to state
For the following reasons, the

court exercises its discretion to remand.
This court’s subject matter jurisdiction is determined –
and vests - at the time of removal.
deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Subsequent events do not

St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.

v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938).

When, however, all

federal

has

claims

are

dismissed,

the

court

discretion

to

decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c).
opposes.

Plaintiff seeks this course, while Defendant

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has set forth a number of factors to consider in exercising
discretion:
The statute then goes on to provide that
courts
“may
decline”
to
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction
in
certain
circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
In
particular,
a
court
has
discretion
to
dismiss or keep a case when it “has
dismissed all claims over which it has
original
jurisdiction.”
28
U.S.C.
§
1367(c)(3).
Recent case law has emphasized
that trial courts enjoy wide latitude in
determining
whether
or
not
to
retain
jurisdiction over state claims when all
federal claims have been extinguished. See,
e.g., Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th
Cir. 1993).
Among the factors that inform
this
discretionary
determination
are
convenience and fairness to the parties, the
existence
of
any
underlying
issues
of
federal policy, comity, and considerations
of judicial economy.
Carnegie–Mellon Univ.
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988);
Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware Cty., 983
F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993). The doctrine
of supplemental jurisdiction “thus is a
doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow
courts to deal with cases involving pendent
claims in the manner that most sensibly
accommodates
a
range
of
concerns
and
values.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350.
Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
those factors weighs in favor or remand.

An analysis of

There is no reason to

conclude that the state court is any less capable of resolving
this dispute than this one, or would it be any more inconvenient
for the parties to litigate there.
2

Even if state law takes the

lead of federal law in interpreting and applying its statute, it
is still a state law cause of action.
Plaintiff, who incorrectly asserts that this court may not
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, does not present
information as to these factors.

Defendant contends that the

factors favor retaining jurisdiction, reciting that the state
law

cause

of

action

parallels

Title

VII

and

that

judicial

economy would be served by keeping the case here.
The case cited by Defendant in arguing for the continued
exercise

of

supplemental

jurisdiction,

Hall

v.

Greystar

Management Services, L.P., 179 F.Supp.3d 534 (D.Md. 2016), is
readily distinguishable.

That case had not even been removed

from state court, but began in federal court.
pending for two and a half years in this court.
had

been

called

on

to

rule

on

several

merits

It had been
The trial judge
based

issues.

Under those circumstances, the motion to “remand” was denied.
Here,

in

stark

contrast,

the

case

is

truly

at

threshold.

Amendment took place promptly after removal.

the

law

state

involved

may

parallel

federal

law

in

the
While
some

respects, there is no pressing reason for this court to retain
jurisdiction.
Nor is there any bad faith to be discerned from Plaintiff’s
original pleading of a federal claim and deletion by amendment
3

after

removal.

In

a

case

assessing

whether

to

allow

an

amendment, this court noted:
There is little risk of undue prejudice or
delay here. Defendant has not answered
Plaintiff’s complaint, much less commenced
discovery,
expended
substantial
time
defending this claim, or moved for summary
judgment.
See Shilling v. Nw. Mut. Life
Ins.
Co.,
423
F.Supp.2d
513,
518–19
(D.Md.2006)
(granting
leave
to
amend).
Plaintiff’s response was filed within a
month of removal and therefore has not
caused undue delay.
See id.
There is no
evidence of bad faith or that Plaintiff
intended to force Defendant to incur the
expense of the removal process.
Id.
Defendant
suggests
that
Plaintiff
is
dismissing this claim in an attempt to
destroy federal subject matter jurisdiction
so her case may be remanded, but even if
Defendant is correct, such “jurisdictional
maneuvering” is not evidence of bad faith.
Id. “[I]t is not bad faith for a plaintiff
to bring both State and federal claims in
State court and then, upon removal, seek
dismissal of the federal claims and remand
to State court.”
Ramotnik v. Fisher, 568
F.Supp.2d 598, 603 (D.Md. 2008).
Verbal v. Giant of Md., LLC, 204 F.Supp. 3d 837, 841 (D.Md.
2016) (alteration in original).
Accordingly, by separate order, the motion to remand will
be granted.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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