Johnson et al v. Prince George's County Board of Elections et al
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/27/2018. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MELVIN JOHNSON, et al.
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 17-2867
:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights case are a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
a
more
definite
statement
filed
by
Defendant
Maryland
State
Administrative Board of Elections (“State Board”) (ECF No. 1338); and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Linda Lamone,
State Administrator (ECF No. 8).
The issues have been briefed,
and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the motions to
dismiss will be granted in part and Plaintiffs’ state law claims
will be remanded to state court.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background1
Plaintiffs Melvin Johnson and Qaaree Palmer claim to be
unregistered but eligible voters and residents of the state of
Maryland
1
who
were
detained
in
the
Prince
George’s
County
The following facts are set forth in Plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint, accepted as true, and construed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs.
Department of Corrections during the November 8, 2016 general
election.
(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 2, 3).
They assert that the State
Board lacked a “strategy governing inmate voter registration and
voting” and there was no “official local or statewide policy,
procedure, or plan to register eligible voters desiring to do so
by
the
absentee
October
or
18,
2016
otherwise,
misdemeanants
who
are
to
deadline,
or
pre-trial
detainees
registered
their right to vote[.]”
voters
(Id. ¶¶ 15, 17).
distribute
wanting
or
to
ballots,
convicted
exercise
Further, they allege
that the State Board failed to provide information to inmates
about
“voting,
voter
eligibility,
or
voter
registration”
and
“access to the ballot for persons eligible to register and/or
vote[.]”
(Id. ¶ 21).
Thus, Plaintiffs claim that they were
“denied the right to register, access to the ballot, and the
right to vote in the November [2016] General Election by the
City and State Board of Elections.”2
B.
On
(Id. ¶¶ 7, 8).
Procedural Background
November
21,
2016,
Plaintiffs
commenced
this
action
against the Prince George’s County Board of Elections and the
State Board in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,
2
Why Plaintiffs refer to the City Board of Elections is a
mystery. They have not brought this action against a city board
of elections. Perhaps the mistake is a result of copying an
earlier case brought by the same counsel, Voters Organized for
the Integrity of City Elections v. Balt. City Elections Bd., 451
Md. 377 (Md. 2017).
2
Maryland,
alleging
violations
of
the
Maryland
Election
Law
Article, Maryland Constitution, and United States Constitution.
(ECF
No.
13-1).
On
December
14,
Plaintiffs
filed
a
second
amended complaint, adding Linda Lamone as a defendant in her
official capacity as State Administrator of the State Board.
(ECF No. 2).
On August 24, 2017, all claims against the Prince
George’s County Board of Elections were dismissed.
37).
(ECF No. 13-
On September 1, Defendant State Board filed a motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint in state court (ECF
No. 13-38), and Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (ECF
No. 13-44).
Defendant Lamone was served with the summons and
second amended complaint on September 18.
September
26,
Defendant
Lamone
removed
(ECF No. 10 ¶ 1).
this
action
from
On
the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with the consent of
Defendant State Board.
a
motion
to
dismiss
(ECF Nos. 1; 4).
Plaintiffs’
second
Defendant Lamone filed
amended
complaint
on
October 11, 2017, incorporating the arguments made in Defendant
State Board’s motion to dismiss by reference.3
at 9 n.2).
(ECF Nos. 8; 8-1,
Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (ECF No.
14), and Defendant Lamone filed a reply (ECF No. 15).
3
The motions to dismiss filed by Defendants will
construed and referred to as a single motion to dismiss.
3
be
II.
Motion to Dismiss
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint
should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiffs failed to comply with
the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) and thus their claims are
barred by sovereign immunity; (2) Plaintiffs lack standing; (3)
Plaintiffs
fail
to
state
a
claim
upon
which
relief
may
be
granted; and (4) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for punitive
damages.4
Because
question
jurisdiction
this
case
over
was
removed
Plaintiffs’
§
based
1983
on
federal
claim,
it
is
appropriate first to consider whether Plaintiffs have standing
to pursue this claim.
A.
Standing
Any
plaintiff
seeking
to
invoke
the
jurisdiction
of
a
federal court must establish standing.
The doctrine of standing
consists
constitutional
of
two
distinct
“strands”:
pursuant to Article III and prudential standing.
standing
Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004), abrogated
on
other
grounds
by
Lexmark
Int’l,
Inc.
Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014).
v.
Static
Control
The requirements for
constitutional standing reflect that Article III “confines the
4
Although Defendant State Board raised other arguments in
its motion to dismiss pursuant to state pleading standards set
forth in the Maryland Rules, Plaintiffs’ complaint is reviewed
under the federal pleading standards set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a) after removal.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(1) (“[Fed.R.Civ.P.]
apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state
court.”).
4
federal
courts
‘controversies.’”
to
adjudicating
actual
‘cases’
and
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984),
abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 1377; see
also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1993)
(“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy
requirement
of
Article
III[.]”).
To
establish
Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) [he] has suffered an “injury in fact”
that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).
In
addition
to
satisfying
constitutional
standing
requirements, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that his claims
are not barred by prudential limitations on a federal court’s
exercise of jurisdiction.
428
(D.Md.
2009).
In
Doe v. Sebelius, 676 F.Supp.2d 423,
contrast
to
Article
III
standing,
prudential standing “embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’”
11 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at
One such limitation is
that “a plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
5
rights or interests of third parties.”
U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
Warth v. Seldin, 422
This limitation serves to “preclude a
court from deciding ‘questions of broad social import in cases
in which no individual rights will be vindicated’” and to ensure
that
“access
litigants
Consol.
to
the
federal
best
suited
to
Stores
Corp.,
125
courts
assert
the
F.Supp.2d
[is]
limited
claims.”
730,
to
those
Buchanan
738
(D.Md.
v.
2001)
(quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 422 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants “denied” their First and
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, yet they fail to allege
facts delineating something Defendants did or refused to do to
burden their right to register to vote.
Article
§
registration
3-201
–
identifies
including
by
methods
mail,
Maryland Election Law
available
through
the
for
State
voter
Board’s
online voter registration system, and with the assistance of a
volunteer authorized by the State Board.
Law
§
Article
3-201(a)(3),(6),(7).
requires
local
While
election
the
boards
Md.Code Ann., Elec.
Maryland
to
Election
administer
Law
voter
registration and absentee voting for nursing homes and assisted
living facilities, § 2-202(b)(11), it does not require the State
Board to do the same for correctional facilities.
Plaintiffs’
allegations
sufficient in other cases.
fall
well
short
of
those
found
See Coal. for Sensible & Humane
6
Sols.
v.
Wamser,
771
F.2d
395,
399
(8th
Cir.
1985)(finding
standing based on allegations that the defendant-local board of
election’s refusal to make voter registration facilities more
accessible and convenient, by denying a specific request by the
Coalition
to
appoint
its
own
members
as
deputy
registration
officials, infringed the plaintiff’s right to register and thus
her right to vote); Bear v. County of Jackson, 2015 WL 1969760,
at
*4
(D.S.D.
May
1,
2015)
(finding
standing
based
on
the
plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants’ refusal to approve
a satellite office for voter registration and in-person absentee
voting,
for
which
funding
was
available,
inconvenienced
the
plaintiffs’ ability to register to vote and thus infringed upon
their right to vote).
Plaintiffs’ bare assertion that “[t]he
State . . . board of elections refused to allocate any resources
to provide authorized volunteers to assist [eligible inmates]
with voter registration[,]” without pleading any facts, does not
demonstrate an injury in fact.
Additionally,
this
(See ECF No. 2 ¶ 36)
case
is
not
a
class
action
and
Plaintiffs cannot assert their claims on behalf of all “pretrial detainees, and individuals serving court-ordered sentences
of imprisonment for misdemeanor violations who are being held
within
the
custody
of
city/county
detention
centers,
intake and correction facilities throughout Maryland.”
7
and/or
(ECF No.
2 ¶ 34).
Therefore, Plaintiffs lack standing and the court must
dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.
B.
Failure to State a Claim
Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate standing, they fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Under what is
titled “Count I” of Plaintiffs’ complaint, Plaintiffs attempt to
bring a § 1983 claim against Defendants for alleged violations
of Sections 1 and 2 of Article 1 of the Maryland Constitution,
Articles 7 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the
First
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
to
the
United
States
Constitution.5
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,
464
F.3d
480,
483
(4th
Presley v. City of
Cir.
2006).
A
plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
5
On the face of the complaint, Plaintiffs’ claims numbered
Counts I, I(a), I(b), I(c) are imprecise. Plaintiffs explain in
their opposition to the State Board’s motion to dismiss that
“Plaintiffs[’] overarching and primary claim in their complaint
alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because [Defendants]
violated their federally protected Constitutional voting rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and that their
“‘underarching’ and secondary claim alleged that [Defendants]
violated Plaintiffs’ parallel State protected Constitutional
rights under Article I §§ 1 & 2 and Declaration of Rights
Article §§ 7 & 24, for all the same reasons.” (ECF No. 13-44,
at 6-7).
Plaintiffs are bound by their complaint and cannot
amend it through their briefs.
S. Walk at Broadlands
Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d
175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013).
The clarification has no bearing on
the failure to state a claim for violation of a federal right.
8
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).
Fed.R.Civ.P.
“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp.
That showing must
consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff,
see
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal
allegations
not
need
be
accepted.
Revene
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
v.
Charles
Cty.
Legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604
F.2d
844,
847
(4th
Cir.
1979);
see
also
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
Francis
v.
Ultimately, a
complaint must “‘permit[ ] the court to infer more than the mere
9
possibility of misconduct’ based upon ‘its judicial experience
and common sense.’”
Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d
187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a
person
acting
under
color
of
state
law
deprived
him
of
a
constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of the United
States.
Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F.Supp.3d
409, 416 (D.Md. 2014)(citing Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added).
In other
words, § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations
of a state constitution.
Thus, Plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 as
a vehicle to claim violations of the Maryland Constitution and
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Plaintiffs also fail to plead a § 1983 claim for alleged
violations
vote.
of
their
First
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
right
to
“The right to vote derives from the right of association
that is at the core of the First Amendment, protected from state
infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
U.S. 724, 756 (1974).
Storer v. Brown, 415
The appropriate standard for evaluating a
claim that a state law burdens the right to vote is set forth in
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983).
A court
considering constitutional challenges to specific provisions of
state election laws must weigh “the character and magnitude of
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
10
Fourteenth
against
Amendments
“the
precise
that
the
plaintiff
interests
put
seeks
forward
by
to
vindicate”
the
State
as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into
consideration
“the
extent
to
which
those
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”
at 789.
interests
make
it
Anderson, 460 U.S.
“Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing
court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision
is unconstitutional.”
Id.
Under this standard, the rigorousness of inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which
a
challenged
Amendment rights.
regulation
burdens
First
and
Fourteenth
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
[W]hen
those
rights
are
subjected
to
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must
be “narrowly drawn to advance a state
interest of compelling importance.”
Norman
v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992). But when
a state election law provision imposes only
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions”
upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment
right of voters, “the State’s important
regulatory
interests
are
generally
sufficient to justify” the restrictions.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
Id.
Plaintiffs have not identified a provision of the Maryland
Election Law Article that burdens or prohibits Plaintiffs’ right
to
vote.
impossible
The
absence
for
them
to
of
that
allege
11
critical
that
a
allegation
challenged
makes
it
provision
unconstitutionally
infringes
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
upon
Plaintiffs
First
and
Instead, Plaintiffs challenge “the
lack of a State strategy governing inmate voter registration and
voting.”
(ECF No. 2 ¶ 15) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs allege
that “[s]omething as simple as providing registration and voter
information
upon
entry
into
the
facility,
use
of
a
voting
kiosk/machine, or a access [sic] to duly authorized volunteers
with
a
hand-held
alleviate
at
devices
least
[sic]
part
of
is
the
all
that
was
problem.”
needed
(Id.
¶
to
39).
Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants’ failure to provide
volunteers with handheld devices or kiosks to facilitate voter
registration
Maryland
was
Election
individual
volunteer
may
an
omission
Law
of
Article
register
to
an
§
vote
act
required
3-201
“with
provides
the
law.
that
assistance
authorized by the State or local board.”
Ann., Elec. Law § 3-201.
by
of
an
a
Md.Code
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts
that the State Board refused to authorize volunteers to assist
eligible inmates with voter registration.
Plaintiffs’ failure
to identify a provision of the Maryland Election Law Article
that burdens their ability to register to vote is fatal to their
federal
could
constitutional
demonstrate
claim.
standing,
Therefore,
their
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
12
§
even
1983
if
claim
Plaintiffs
would
be
C.
Declaratory Relief
Count
relief.
II
of
Plaintiffs’
complaint
requests
declaratory
As an initial matter, a removed state-court declaratory
judgment action is treated as if Plaintiffs had invoked the
Federal
Declaratory
Judgment
Act,
28
U.S.C.
§
2201.
Alban
Waste, LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 9 F.Supp.3d 618, 620 (D.Md.
2014).
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act .
. . authorizes a federal court to give a
declaratory judgment only with respect to “a
case
of
actual
controversy
within
its
jurisdiction.”
(emphasis added).
It is
axiomatic that the Act does not supply its
own
jurisdictional
base,
and
where
jurisdiction is lacking, declaratory relief
should be denied.
Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950);
6A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 57.23 (1974).
Delavigne v. Delavigne, 530 F.2d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 1976).
Declaratory
Judgment
independent claim.
Act
does
not
provide
a
basis
for
The
an
Rather, it is an available form of relief,
should the court otherwise have a valid cause of action before
it.
See Gem Cty. Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 398 F.Supp.2d
1, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) (“When a plaintiff has a legal claim under
federal law, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows him to obtain a
federal
court
declaration
of
his
statute.”).
13
rights
under
that
federal
Plaintiffs
lack
an
independent
basis
for
Article
III
standing and have failed to state a claim and thus there is no
“actual controversy” for declaratory judgment purposes.
III. Supplemental State Law Claims
Once the claim over which this court has original removal
jurisdiction has been dismissed, the court has discretion to
remand
the
remaining
claims
to
the
state
court.
Hinson
Norwest Fin. S. Carolina, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th
2001).
v.
Cir.
Exercise of this authority requires consideration of
“principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”
Id.
At
law
this
early
stage
of
the
litigation,
when
only
state
claims remain, it is appropriate to remand.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Linda Lamone and Maryland State Board of Elections
will be granted in part.
will
be
County.
remanded
to
the
Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims
Circuit
Court
for
Prince
George’s
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
14
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