Johnson et al v. Prince George's County Board of Elections et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/27/2018. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MELVIN JOHNSON, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 17-2867

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights case are a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
a

more

definite

statement

filed

by

Defendant

Maryland

State

Administrative Board of Elections (“State Board”) (ECF No. 1338); and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Linda Lamone,
State Administrator (ECF No. 8).

The issues have been briefed,

and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the motions to

dismiss will be granted in part and Plaintiffs’ state law claims
will be remanded to state court.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background1

Plaintiffs Melvin Johnson and Qaaree Palmer claim to be
unregistered but eligible voters and residents of the state of
Maryland
1

who

were

detained

in

the

Prince

George’s

County

The following facts are set forth in Plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint, accepted as true, and construed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs.

Department of Corrections during the November 8, 2016 general
election.

(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 2, 3).

They assert that the State

Board lacked a “strategy governing inmate voter registration and
voting” and there was no “official local or statewide policy,
procedure, or plan to register eligible voters desiring to do so
by

the

absentee

October
or

18,

2016

otherwise,

misdemeanants

who

are

to

deadline,

or

pre-trial

detainees

registered

their right to vote[.]”

voters

(Id. ¶¶ 15, 17).

distribute

wanting

or
to

ballots,
convicted
exercise

Further, they allege

that the State Board failed to provide information to inmates
about

“voting,

voter

eligibility,

or

voter

registration”

and

“access to the ballot for persons eligible to register and/or
vote[.]”

(Id. ¶ 21).

Thus, Plaintiffs claim that they were

“denied the right to register, access to the ballot, and the
right to vote in the November [2016] General Election by the
City and State Board of Elections.”2
B.
On

(Id. ¶¶ 7, 8).

Procedural Background
November

21,

2016,

Plaintiffs

commenced

this

action

against the Prince George’s County Board of Elections and the
State Board in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County,

2

Why Plaintiffs refer to the City Board of Elections is a
mystery. They have not brought this action against a city board
of elections. Perhaps the mistake is a result of copying an
earlier case brought by the same counsel, Voters Organized for
the Integrity of City Elections v. Balt. City Elections Bd., 451
Md. 377 (Md. 2017).
2

Maryland,

alleging

violations

of

the

Maryland

Election

Law

Article, Maryland Constitution, and United States Constitution.
(ECF

No.

13-1).

On

December

14,

Plaintiffs

filed

a

second

amended complaint, adding Linda Lamone as a defendant in her
official capacity as State Administrator of the State Board.
(ECF No. 2).

On August 24, 2017, all claims against the Prince

George’s County Board of Elections were dismissed.
37).

(ECF No. 13-

On September 1, Defendant State Board filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint in state court (ECF
No. 13-38), and Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (ECF
No. 13-44).

Defendant Lamone was served with the summons and

second amended complaint on September 18.
September

26,

Defendant

Lamone

removed

(ECF No. 10 ¶ 1).
this

action

from

On
the

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with the consent of
Defendant State Board.
a

motion

to

dismiss

(ECF Nos. 1; 4).
Plaintiffs’

second

Defendant Lamone filed
amended

complaint

on

October 11, 2017, incorporating the arguments made in Defendant
State Board’s motion to dismiss by reference.3
at 9 n.2).

(ECF Nos. 8; 8-1,

Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (ECF No.

14), and Defendant Lamone filed a reply (ECF No. 15).

3

The motions to dismiss filed by Defendants will
construed and referred to as a single motion to dismiss.
3

be

II.

Motion to Dismiss
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint

should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiffs failed to comply with
the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) and thus their claims are
barred by sovereign immunity; (2) Plaintiffs lack standing; (3)
Plaintiffs

fail

to

state

a

claim

upon

which

relief

may

be

granted; and (4) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for punitive
damages.4

Because

question

jurisdiction

this

case

over

was

removed

Plaintiffs’

§

based
1983

on

federal

claim,

it

is

appropriate first to consider whether Plaintiffs have standing
to pursue this claim.
A.

Standing

Any

plaintiff

seeking

to

invoke

the

jurisdiction

of

a

federal court must establish standing.

The doctrine of standing

consists

constitutional

of

two

distinct

“strands”:

pursuant to Article III and prudential standing.

standing
Elk Grove

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004), abrogated
on

other

grounds

by

Lexmark

Int’l,

Inc.

Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014).

v.

Static

Control

The requirements for

constitutional standing reflect that Article III “confines the
4

Although Defendant State Board raised other arguments in
its motion to dismiss pursuant to state pleading standards set
forth in the Maryland Rules, Plaintiffs’ complaint is reviewed
under the federal pleading standards set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a) after removal.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(1) (“[Fed.R.Civ.P.]
apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state
court.”).
4

federal

courts

‘controversies.’”

to

adjudicating

actual

‘cases’

and

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984),

abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 1377; see
also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1993)
(“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy

requirement

of

Article

III[.]”).

To

establish

Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) [he] has suffered an “injury in fact”
that is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).
In

addition

to

satisfying

constitutional

standing

requirements, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that his claims
are not barred by prudential limitations on a federal court’s
exercise of jurisdiction.
428

(D.Md.

2009).

In

Doe v. Sebelius, 676 F.Supp.2d 423,
contrast

to

Article

III

standing,

prudential standing “embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’”
11 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).

Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at
One such limitation is

that “a plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal

5

rights or interests of third parties.”
U.S. 490, 499 (1975).

Warth v. Seldin, 422

This limitation serves to “preclude a

court from deciding ‘questions of broad social import in cases
in which no individual rights will be vindicated’” and to ensure
that

“access

litigants
Consol.

to

the

federal

best

suited

to

Stores

Corp.,

125

courts

assert

the

F.Supp.2d

[is]

limited

claims.”
730,

to

those

Buchanan

738

(D.Md.

v.

2001)

(quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 422 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants “denied” their First and
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, yet they fail to allege
facts delineating something Defendants did or refused to do to
burden their right to register to vote.
Article

§

registration

3-201
–

identifies

including

by

methods
mail,

Maryland Election Law
available

through

the

for

State

voter
Board’s

online voter registration system, and with the assistance of a
volunteer authorized by the State Board.
Law

§

Article

3-201(a)(3),(6),(7).
requires

local

While

election

the
boards

Md.Code Ann., Elec.
Maryland
to

Election

administer

Law

voter

registration and absentee voting for nursing homes and assisted
living facilities, § 2-202(b)(11), it does not require the State
Board to do the same for correctional facilities.
Plaintiffs’

allegations

sufficient in other cases.

fall

well

short

of

those

found

See Coal. for Sensible & Humane
6

Sols.

v.

Wamser,

771

F.2d

395,

399

(8th

Cir.

1985)(finding

standing based on allegations that the defendant-local board of
election’s refusal to make voter registration facilities more
accessible and convenient, by denying a specific request by the
Coalition

to

appoint

its

own

members

as

deputy

registration

officials, infringed the plaintiff’s right to register and thus
her right to vote); Bear v. County of Jackson, 2015 WL 1969760,
at

*4

(D.S.D.

May

1,

2015)

(finding

standing

based

on

the

plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants’ refusal to approve
a satellite office for voter registration and in-person absentee
voting,

for

which

funding

was

available,

inconvenienced

the

plaintiffs’ ability to register to vote and thus infringed upon
their right to vote).

Plaintiffs’ bare assertion that “[t]he

State . . . board of elections refused to allocate any resources
to provide authorized volunteers to assist [eligible inmates]
with voter registration[,]” without pleading any facts, does not
demonstrate an injury in fact.
Additionally,

this

(See ECF No. 2 ¶ 36)

case

is

not

a

class

action

and

Plaintiffs cannot assert their claims on behalf of all “pretrial detainees, and individuals serving court-ordered sentences
of imprisonment for misdemeanor violations who are being held
within

the

custody

of

city/county

detention

centers,

intake and correction facilities throughout Maryland.”

7

and/or

(ECF No.

2 ¶ 34).

Therefore, Plaintiffs lack standing and the court must

dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.
B.

Failure to State a Claim

Even if Plaintiffs could demonstrate standing, they fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Under what is

titled “Count I” of Plaintiffs’ complaint, Plaintiffs attempt to
bring a § 1983 claim against Defendants for alleged violations
of Sections 1 and 2 of Article 1 of the Maryland Constitution,
Articles 7 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the
First

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

to

the

United

States

Constitution.5
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Presley v. City of
Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule

5

On the face of the complaint, Plaintiffs’ claims numbered
Counts I, I(a), I(b), I(c) are imprecise. Plaintiffs explain in
their opposition to the State Board’s motion to dismiss that
“Plaintiffs[’] overarching and primary claim in their complaint
alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because [Defendants]
violated their federally protected Constitutional voting rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and that their
“‘underarching’ and secondary claim alleged that [Defendants]
violated Plaintiffs’ parallel State protected Constitutional
rights under Article I §§ 1 & 2 and Declaration of Rights
Article §§ 7 & 24, for all the same reasons.” (ECF No. 13-44,
at 6-7).
Plaintiffs are bound by their complaint and cannot
amend it through their briefs.
S. Walk at Broadlands
Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d
175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013).
The clarification has no bearing on
the failure to state a claim for violation of a federal right.
8

8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff,

see

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

847

(4th

Cir.

1979);

see

also

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

Francis

v.

Ultimately, a

complaint must “‘permit[ ] the court to infer more than the mere
9

possibility of misconduct’ based upon ‘its judicial experience
and common sense.’”

Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d

187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a
person

acting

under

color

of

state

law

deprived

him

of

a

constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of the United
States.

Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 54 F.Supp.3d

409, 416 (D.Md. 2014)(citing Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added).

In other

words, § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations
of a state constitution.

Thus, Plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 as

a vehicle to claim violations of the Maryland Constitution and
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Plaintiffs also fail to plead a § 1983 claim for alleged
violations
vote.

of

their

First

and

Fourteenth

Amendment

right

to

“The right to vote derives from the right of association

that is at the core of the First Amendment, protected from state
infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
U.S. 724, 756 (1974).

Storer v. Brown, 415

The appropriate standard for evaluating a

claim that a state law burdens the right to vote is set forth in
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983).

A court

considering constitutional challenges to specific provisions of
state election laws must weigh “the character and magnitude of
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
10

Fourteenth
against

Amendments

“the

precise

that

the

plaintiff

interests

put

seeks

forward

by

to

vindicate”

the

State

as

justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into
consideration

“the

extent

to

which

those

necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”
at 789.

interests

make

it

Anderson, 460 U.S.

“Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing

court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision
is unconstitutional.”

Id.

Under this standard, the rigorousness of inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which

a

challenged

Amendment rights.

regulation

burdens

First

and

Fourteenth

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).

[W]hen
those
rights
are
subjected
to
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must
be “narrowly drawn to advance a state
interest of compelling importance.”
Norman
v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992). But when
a state election law provision imposes only
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions”
upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment
right of voters, “the State’s important
regulatory
interests
are
generally
sufficient to justify” the restrictions.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
Id.
Plaintiffs have not identified a provision of the Maryland
Election Law Article that burdens or prohibits Plaintiffs’ right
to

vote.

impossible

The

absence

for

them

to

of

that

allege

11

critical
that

a

allegation
challenged

makes

it

provision

unconstitutionally

infringes

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

upon

Plaintiffs

First

and

Instead, Plaintiffs challenge “the

lack of a State strategy governing inmate voter registration and
voting.”

(ECF No. 2 ¶ 15) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs allege

that “[s]omething as simple as providing registration and voter
information

upon

entry

into

the

facility,

use

of

a

voting

kiosk/machine, or a access [sic] to duly authorized volunteers
with

a

hand-held

alleviate

at

devices

least

[sic]

part

of

is

the

all

that

was

problem.”

needed

(Id.

¶

to

39).

Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants’ failure to provide
volunteers with handheld devices or kiosks to facilitate voter
registration
Maryland

was

Election

individual
volunteer

may

an

omission

Law

of

Article

register

to

an
§

vote

act

required

3-201

“with

provides

the

law.

that

assistance

authorized by the State or local board.”

Ann., Elec. Law § 3-201.

by

of

an
a

Md.Code

Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts

that the State Board refused to authorize volunteers to assist
eligible inmates with voter registration.

Plaintiffs’ failure

to identify a provision of the Maryland Election Law Article
that burdens their ability to register to vote is fatal to their
federal
could

constitutional
demonstrate

claim.

standing,

Therefore,
their

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

12

§

even

1983

if

claim

Plaintiffs
would

be

C.

Declaratory Relief

Count
relief.

II

of

Plaintiffs’

complaint

requests

declaratory

As an initial matter, a removed state-court declaratory

judgment action is treated as if Plaintiffs had invoked the
Federal

Declaratory

Judgment

Act,

28

U.S.C.

§

2201.

Alban

Waste, LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 9 F.Supp.3d 618, 620 (D.Md.
2014).
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act .
. . authorizes a federal court to give a
declaratory judgment only with respect to “a
case
of
actual
controversy
within
its
jurisdiction.”
(emphasis added).
It is
axiomatic that the Act does not supply its
own
jurisdictional
base,
and
where
jurisdiction is lacking, declaratory relief
should be denied.
Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950);
6A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 57.23 (1974).
Delavigne v. Delavigne, 530 F.2d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 1976).
Declaratory

Judgment

independent claim.

Act

does

not

provide

a

basis

for

The
an

Rather, it is an available form of relief,

should the court otherwise have a valid cause of action before
it.

See Gem Cty. Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 398 F.Supp.2d

1, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) (“When a plaintiff has a legal claim under
federal law, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows him to obtain a
federal

court

declaration

of

his

statute.”).

13

rights

under

that

federal

Plaintiffs

lack

an

independent

basis

for

Article

III

standing and have failed to state a claim and thus there is no
“actual controversy” for declaratory judgment purposes.
III. Supplemental State Law Claims
Once the claim over which this court has original removal
jurisdiction has been dismissed, the court has discretion to
remand

the

remaining

claims

to

the

state

court.

Hinson

Norwest Fin. S. Carolina, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th
2001).

v.

Cir.

Exercise of this authority requires consideration of

“principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”

Id.

At

law

this

early

stage

of

the

litigation,

when

only

state

claims remain, it is appropriate to remand.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants Linda Lamone and Maryland State Board of Elections
will be granted in part.
will

be

County.

remanded

to

the

Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims
Circuit

Court

for

Prince

George’s

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

14