Brown v. Schrlau et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 2/23/2018. (c/m 2/26/2018 heps, Deputy Clerk)

IN TIlE UNITED STATES IHSTIHCT couln
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

.JEROLD D. BROWN, #2-t1l8311,123883-t

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v.

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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Jerold D. Brown. a sclf~represented
Correctional

Institution

alleging that Salisbury
Specifically.

Case No.: G.III-17-3189

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1'1lIl.,

Defendants.

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in Westover.

Maryland

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OPINION
litigant incarcerated

(".ICI")

at the .Jessup

has filed a civil rights Complaint

Police Officer Schrlau used excessive

carel. he attempted

to run away from Schrlau.

was tackled by another Officer. and that Schrlau "grabbed

force in detaining

him. lOCI' No. I.

ItI. at 5.1 Brown alleges that he

I Brown's]

strike to my ribs'" !d Brown names Officer Schrlau and the Salisbury
and seeks money damages

at 7. Defendants
15.2018."

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he alleges that on February 24. 2017. in response to a request by Schrlau to producc

his identification

Defendants.

A 10: I b

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Plaintiff,

OFC SCHRLAU,

lOIS FEB2b

hair and

IJ

deployed

a knee

Police Depm1ment as

and payment of current and future medical expenses.

!d

have filed a Motion to Dismiss. lOCI' NO.7. which Brown opposed on February

No hearing is necessary.

See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016).

I Pin cites to documents filed on the Court"s eicctronil" filing system (eMlECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system. The COllrt notes that Petitioncr"s Response to Respondent's
Answer appears to be missing what he
has labeled as page 4 and page 8.
Pursuant to the dictates of Rosehoro \'. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 HIll Cir. 1975). 011 Januar\' 5. 20 I H. Brown was
notified that Defendants had filed a dispositive Illotion. that Brown had seventeen days in' which to file written
opposition to the motion. and that if Brown failed 10 respond. summary judgmcnt could be enlcred against him
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without

further notice.

ECF No.8.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Proccdure 12(b)(6)."a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter. accepted as true. to 'state a claim to rcliefthal is
plausible on its lace .... Asher/!fi \'. Ilfhal, 556 U,S. 662. 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corl'. \'.
T\I'OInhl)'. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility \\hcn the plainlilTpleads

factual content that allo\\s the court to draw the reasonable inference that the delendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged'" I'lhal. 556 U,S, a1678, "Threadbare recitals ofthc elements ofa
cause of action. supported by mcre conclusory statements. do not suffiec'" It!. (citing T\I'OInh(I'.
550 U,S. at 555 ("a plaintifrs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[mcnt) to rclier
requires more than labels and conclusions. and a formulaic rccitation of a cause of action's
elcmcnts will not do.")).
Thc purposc of Rule 12(b)(6) "is to test thc sufficiency ofa complaint and not to resolve
contcsts surrounding the facts. the merits of a claim. or the applicability of defenscs'" Presley \'.
Cit)' 'ItCharlolle,l\'ille.

464 F.3d 480. 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted), When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). a court "must accept as true
all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint:' and must "draw all reasonable
inlerences [lrom those facts] in favor of the plaintiff." EI. duPont

de Nel110urs & CO.

I'.

Kolon

Indus .. Inc .. 637 F,3d 435. 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omittcd),

The Court need not. however. accept unsupported legal allegations. see Re\'ene \'. Charles
Count)' COI11I11'rs. 82 F.2d 870. 873 (4th Cir. 1989). legal conclusions couched as t~lctual
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allegations. Pal'a.lan \'. Allain. 478 U,S, 265, 286 (1986). or conclusory filetual allegations
devoid of any reterencc to actual events, United mack Firefighters
844.847 (4th Cir. 1979),

ofNorfhlk

\'. Ilirsl. 604 F.2d

II.

DISCUSSION

A.

Claim A~ainst the Salisbury

Title 42 U.S.c.

Poliee Department

* 1983 authorizes a plaintilTto

bring a suit 11)1' damages against any

individual whom "under color of any statutc. ordinance. regulation. custom. or usage. of any
State ... subjects. or causes to be subjected. any citizen of the United States or other person ...
to the deprivation of any rights. privileges. or immunities secured by the Constitution:'

Brown

sues the Salisbury Police Department. a municipal government agency. under 42 U.S.c.

* 1983.

and must prove two elements to succeed in this e1aim. First. he must establish the existence of a
constitutional violation on the part of the police officer. See Los Angeles \'. /leller. 475 U.S. 796.
799 (1986) (jury's finding that a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on thc plaintiff
removed any basis lor municipal liability against city and members of police commission):
TeJ11kin I'. Frederick

C/y. COJ11J11 945 F.2d 716. 724 (4th Cir. 1991)
'rs.

(* 1983 e1aim of

inadequate training or supervision cannot bc establishcd without a finding of a constitutional
violation on thc part of the person being supervised): see also DlIIrson

I'.

I'rince George's

Cly ..

896 F. Supp. 537. 540 (D. Md. 1995). Second. he !TIustshow that any constitutional violations
were proximately caused by a policy. custom. or practice of the municipality. See Monell
Dep'lo(Soc.

Serl'S. ofN

r. 436

I'.

U.S. 658. 691. 694 (1978). Municipal policy arises from written

ordinances. regulations. and statements of policy. id. at 690: decisions by municipal
polieymakers. l'eJ11hallr

I'.

CinciJ111<1Ii.
475 U.S. 469. 482-83 (1986): and omissions by

policymakers that show a "deliberate indifTerence" to the rights of citizens. See Canlonl'.

Ilarris,

489 U.S. 378. 388 (1989). Brown's Complaint focuses solely on the actions of Officer Schrlau.
and he has failed to allege that his injuries were eaused in any way by policies of the Salisbury

,

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Policc Dcpartment. As such, the Court dismisses Brown's claims against the Salisbury Police
Department.
B.

Claim Against Offieer Seh rlau

While Brown's claim against the Police Department fails, his claim against Officer
Schrlau may state a cognizable constitutional claim of excessive use of force by an arresting
officer. The Court, however, stays his claim pending his state criminal proceeding.
Where a civil plaintilTbrings a ~ 1983 action while there is a pending criminal
proceeding against him in state court. federal courts must apply the rounger doctrine. Trm'erso
". Penn, 874 F. 2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1989). The abstention doctrine articulated in roullger ".
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), "requires a federal court to abstain Ii'om 'interfering in state
proceedings. even if jurisdiction exists, if there is: (I) an ongoing state judicial proceeding,
instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding. that (2) implicates
important. substantial. or vital state interests: and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the
plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federallawsuit.'"

Laurel Saml &

Grm-e/

is not merely

I'.

Wilsoll, 519 F. 3d 156. 165 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omined). "roll/lger

a principle of abstention: rather the case sets forth a mandatory rule of equitable restraint.
requiring the dismissal of a federal action." lVilliallls

1'.

I.uhin. 516 F. Supp. 2d 535. 539 (D. Md.

2007) (quoting Ni\'C11SI'. Gilchrist. 444 FJd 237. 247 (4th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations
omined).
Here. there is clearly an ongoing state judicial proceeding: Brown is charged in the
Circuit Court for Wicomico County with. among other charges. resisting arrest in connection
with the underlying crime. See A/lI1J'lalld ". BrOll'11.No. C-22-CR-17-000213
Ct.). A jury trial is scheduled for April 10, 2018./d.

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(Wico. Co. Cir.

The proceeding clearly implicates a

substantial state interest. as it involves the state's police power. See. e.g. Pe/1/1::oil Co. \'. TexoL'O.
//1C.•

481 U.S. I. 13 (1987) (in applying }'oll/1ger doctrine. noting important interest that states

have "in the enforcement of its criminal laws"). Finally. the concerns raised by Brown (that
Officer Schrlauused excessive force in detaining him) are inherently implicated in I3rown's stale
trial which includes. among other charges. a charge for resisting arrest: a defendant may raise the
lawfulness or excessive nature of an ofticer's use of force as a defense to a charge of resisting
arrest. See. e.g. Riddick \'. LOll. 202 Fed. App'x 615 at 616 (4th Cir. 2006) ("a successful

* 1983

suit [for use of excessive force by a police officerl would necessarily imply invalidity of that
conviction [for resisting arrest]. since a person cannot be f'lHmdguilty of resisting arrest ifhe is
simply protecting himself: reasonably. against an officer's unprovoked attack or use of excessive
force"). As such. the

C01ll1

criminal proceeding. See

stays Brown's

7/,{I\'C/'so.

* 1983 claim against Officer Schrlau. pending his state

874 F.2d at 212 (courts must abstain "where granting the

requested relief would require adjudication of federal constitutional issues involved in the
pending state action").
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. ECF NO.7. is granted-in-part
and denied-in-part. A separate Order shall be entered in accordance with this Memorandum
Opinion.

Dated: Februarv£.7. 20 18
GEORGE.I. HAZEL
United States District .Iudge

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