Ventura-Quintanilla v. Warden
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/28/2020. (jj2s, Deputy Clerk)
Case 8:17-cv-03191-DKC Document 14 Filed 10/28/20 Page 1 of 6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOEL Y. VENTURA-QUINTANILLA,
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Petitioner
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v.
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WARDEN1
Respondent
Civil Action No. DKC-17-3191
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*
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Joel Y. Ventura-Quintanilla pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, who is a Maryland prisoner incarcerated at North Branch
Correctional Institution (NBCI),2 seeks to be transferred from state to federal custody to serve his
state and concurrent federal life sentences in the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). The court
ordered the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland and counsel for the Maryland
Division of Correction (DOC) to respond, and they have done so. ECF Nos. 2, 4, 7.3 Petitioner
has filed an opposition to the responses to the petition (ECF Nos. 12, 13). The court determines
that an evidentiary hearing in this matter is unnecessary.
1
The proper respondent in an action for habeas corpus is the Petitioner’s custodian. See 28
U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435–36 (2004). The Warden of North Branch
Correctional Institution, the facility where Petitioner is incarcerated, is the proper respondent in
this case. The Clerk shall amend the docket accordingly.
2
See https://dpscs.maryland.gov/inmate/search (visited October 23, 2020). Counsel notes
that the Maryland Judiciary casesearch does not show that Petitioner was sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole. ECF No. 7 n. 1. It thus appears that Petitioner is eligible for parole
consideration in accordance with Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 7-301(d).
3
The court informed Respondents that their response constituted neither acceptance of
service of process on behalf of any potential defendant nor waiver of any arguable defenses. ECF
No. 2 at 2. As service has not been effectuated, Petitioner’s filing titled as a motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 12) is inappropriately filed. Instead, it is considered as an opposition to the
responses to the petition.
Case 8:17-cv-03191-DKC Document 14 Filed 10/28/20 Page 2 of 6
I.
Background
A.
State Sentence
On September 17, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County to life imprisonment following his guilty plea to first degree murder. See State v. VenturaQuintanilla, Case Number 113269C (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cty).
B.
Federal Sentence
On October 20, 2010, Petitioner and his co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to
participate in a racketeering enterprise (RICO conspiracy) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
The overt acts alleged against Petitioner in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy charge were the
Montgomery County murder and a separate murder in the District of Columbia. Because the RICO
conspiracy charge included state crimes that carried the possibility of life imprisonment, Petitioner
was subject to a life sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Petitioner pleaded guilty to RICO
conspiracy, including the commission of the murders in Montgomery County and the District of
Columbia.
On April 30, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment, with the federal sentence
to run concurrent to the life sentence imposed by Montgomery County. See United States v.
Ventura-Quintanilla, Criminal Action No. RWT-09-0471 (D. Md).
C.
Petitioner’s Claims
As reason for his transfer, Petitioner asserts that he is unsafe at NBCI due to the presence
of rival gang members, and Respondents have acted with deliberate indifference to his safety, by
charging him with disciplinary rule infractions for two assaults and three weapons charges, which
he implies, without explantion, that he incurred because they were necessary to his survival. ECF
No. 1 at 3. Petitioner also alleges that he has been continually confined on administrative or
disciplinary segregation with “no end in sight” Id. He faults the case management team for doing
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Case 8:17-cv-03191-DKC Document 14 Filed 10/28/20 Page 3 of 6
nothing but “swat[ting] Petitioner back and forth between [a]dministrative and [d]isciplinary
segregation for more than twenty (20) months while indifferent to “the fact that all of the incidents
involving discipinary segregation result from rival gang issues.” ECF No. 1 at 4.
Petitioner claims, without explanation, that the BOP is better able to accommodate his
circumstances. ECF No. 1 at 4. He states that “it should really make NO DIFFERENCE to either
the United States or Maryland State Government [where] Petitioner is held to serve out the
remainder of his LIFE SENTENCES which have been imposed in both jurisdictions.” ECF No. 1
at 4.
II.
Discussion
Habeas corpus relief is available when a prisoner is held “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Challenges to the
execution of a federal sentence are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Setser v. United
States, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 1473 (2012). Liberally construed, Petitioner’s claims are that Respondents
fail to protect him from harm in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and have
abridged his right to due process. ECF No. 1 at 4.
An inmate has no constitutionally protected right to be incarcerated in any particular prison
system. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245, 247–48 (1983). Here, Petitioner has been
sentenced by two sovereigns – the State of Maryland and the United States of America. Where he
serves his sentences is a matter for those two sovereigns to decide. Simpson v. Cockrell, 273 F.3d
1100 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing United States v. McCrary, 220 F.3d 868, 870–71 (8th
Cir. 2000)). Primary custody of a prisoner charged with state and federal crimes, unless waived,
remains with the jurisdiction that had original custody of the prisoner. See Rios v Wiley, 201 F.3d
257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by statute, recognized in United
States v. Saintville, 218 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2000); Taccetta v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 606
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Case 8:17-cv-03191-DKC Document 14 Filed 10/28/20 Page 4 of 6
Fed. Appx. 661, 663 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, Petitioner does not dispute that the State of Maryland
has primary custody over him.4 Thus, Petitioner’s term in federal custody will not begin until the
state relinquishes custody of him. See United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2005)
(listing bail release, dismissal of the state charges, parole release, or expiration of state sentence
for relinquishing custody).
Counsel for the Office of the Attorney General has filed affidavits showing that Petitioner’s
allegations of danger from rival gangs have been investigated, a recent combatant was placed on
his enemies list, alternatives to placement on administrative segregation housing are being
considered for him, and he is housed in a manner to keep him safe. Declaration of Acting
Lieutenant David Barnhart, NBCI Intel Department, ECF No. 4-1 at 1-2;5 Declaration of
Lieutenant Walter Iser, NBCI, ECF No. 4-2 at 2. Specifically, Petitioner is housed in a double cell
with another inmate who is neither a documented enemy nor a validated member of a Security
Threat Group. Iser Declaration, ECF No. 4-2 at 1-2. Petitioner is escorted by an officer to the
shower or recreation area, showers alone in a single shower, and has recreation alone or with his
cellmate. His meals are delivered to him in his cell. Id.
Counsel for the Office of the Attorney General argues too that Petitioner does not satisfy
the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief to transfer him to BOP custody. Preliminary
injunctive relief is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter
of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 166 (2010), see also SAS
Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Lmtd, 874 F.3d 370, 385 (4th Cir. 2017) (satisfying four4
The doctrine of primary custody developed to provide different sovereigns (in this case the
state and the federal governments) with an orderly method by which to prosecute and incarcerate
an individual who has violated the laws of each sovereign. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260
(1922). The sovereign that first arrests the individual has primary custody.
5
The investigation had not been completed when the Response was filed in this case and is
not in the record.
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prong test is “a high bar, as it should be.”). A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order must establish the following elements: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the
balance of equities tips in the party’s favor; and (4) why the injunction is in the public interest.
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); The Real Truth About Obama,
Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2009). For reasons set forth
above, Petitioner has not demonstrated he is likely to succeed on the merits or suffer irreparable
harm absent preliminary injunctive relief. Moreover, in the prison context, courts should grant
preliminary injunctive relief involving the management of correctional institutions only under
exceptional and compelling circumstances not present here. See Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266,
269 (4th Cir. 1994).
Petitioner may access the administrative remedy procedure (ARP) process at NBCI, to
attempt to resolve issues concerning his safety and placement on administrative segregation.
Counsel notes that Petitioner has not availed himself of the administrative process. Such process
may also include state judicial remedies in addition to Maryland Division of Correction
administrative remedies. See e.g. Craighead v Warden, Civil Action No. GLR-13-2208, 2013 WL
5960883, n. 2 (D. Md. November 5, 2013) (if a Maryland inmate seeking transfer to BOP had
alleged his safety required confinement in federal custody, the inmate would be required to exhaust
state remedies, including administrative remedies before seeking transfer). Should Petitioner want
to pursue constitutional claims concerning his conditions of confinement, he may file a complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[A] § 1983 challenge is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who
is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length
of his custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). The court will direct the Clerk
to send Petitioner a § 1983 information packet.
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III.
Conclusion
Petitioner does not provide evidence that he is confined illegally, that there is an absence
of a State corrective process, or that his circumstances are otherwise ineffective to protect his
rights. For these reasons, the court will deny Petitioner’s request for habeas relief.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the court is required to issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability is
a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to an appeal from the court’s earlier order. United States v. Hadden,
475 F.3d 652, 659 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). A
certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where the court denies petitioner’s
motion on its merits, a petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists
would find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003).
Where a motion is denied on a procedural ground, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless
the petitioner can “demonstrate both (1) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Rose v.
Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner has not made
that showing and a certificate of appealability will be denied.
A separate Order follows.
October 28, 2020
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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